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FAO Strategy in Somalia & Plan of Action 2011-2015








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    Plan of Action for North Sudan. Emergency response and rehabilitation for food and agriculture August 2010 – August 2012 2010
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    After decades of civil conflict and associated political instability, populations throughout North Sudan have seen their livelihoods and production capacity eroded and their ability to cope with human-induced and recurrent natural disasters (floods, droughts, outbreaks of livestock diseases) worn away. There have been considerable efforts to respond to the protracted crisis, with the international humanitarian response reaching USD 1.3 billion in 2009. Despite this, millions of people continue t o face severe and chronic food insecurity. With between 60 and 80 percent of the working-age population relying on agriculture to meet their food and income needs, the sector’s importance to economic recovery and the consolidation of peace in North Sudan cannot be underestimated. In this Plan of Action (PoA), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) outlines its emergency and rehabilitation programme for North Sudan in 2010–12. It does not include FAO’s long-term develop ment programme, but is designed to complement the Organization’s ongoing development activities, as well as the interventions of United Nations agencies, Government and other partners which aim to mitigate the effects of recurrent crises while addressing their root causes. The programme relies heavily on a disaster risk management approach to the complex situation in North Sudan. This approach focuses on emergency relief, such as replacing lost assets or restoring livelihoods, as well as on earl y efforts as part of risk reduction that protect and sustain livelihoods. Such interventions can often be more effective than those delayed until people are in crisis. Given the complex and protracted nature of the crisis in North Sudan, FAO’s relief and recovery programming is enhanced by interventions that not only restore, but also protect and promote livelihoods in food and agriculture. Thus, the overall purpose of the PoA for North Sudan is to improve preparedness and to make short-term res ponses in food and agriculture more effective. The proposed priorities in this PoA will help FAO, its counterparts and partners to meet shortterm needs in ways that strengthen the resilience of communities and lead to more effective and longer-term recovery. The approach is reflected in the six key areas of focus as proposed in this PoA, based on an analysis of the current situation, the main factors triggering food insecurity and assessments identifying and targeting vulnerable groups. These ar e: (i) dwindling agricultural production; (ii) reduced livestock production and productivity; (iii) the adverse effect of climate change and the conflicts created over the use of scarce natural resources and longer-term issues such as land access; (iv) economic factors that affect the livelihoods of the various groups, as well as the creation of alternative livelihood resources; (v) the need for institutional strengthening; and (vi) coordination of the international community and the assistance provided. The above priorities have been expanded into twelve sectoral programmes that detail activities to be implemented by FAO in North Sudan to achieve expected outcomes and address the specific needs identified in three regions: (i) Greater Darfur (comprising North, South and West Darfur); (ii) the Transitional Areas (Abyei, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan); and (iii) Eastern Sudan (Gedaref, Kassala and Red Sea states). The total budget for the PoA 2010–2012 is USD 45 056 468. The PoA signa ls FAO’s adoption of a more programmatic approach in its emergency and rehabilitation activities in North Sudan. The document has used a programme cycle management approach to present the situation analysis, planned response and monitoring and evaluation framework. Through this PoA and other efforts, FAO is attempting to build greater programmatic coherence with internal and external partners, in line with national food security plans and related strategy and United Nations system programming fr amework. Fundamentally, this PoA is a dynamic programming tool that may need to be adjusted, according to contingency plans, when and as the food security situation evolves in North Sudan.
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    Resilient Livelihoods for Agriculture and Food and Nutrition Security in Areas Affected by the Syria Crisis 2014
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    The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) is closely monitoring the impact of the Syria crisis on food security, nutrition, agriculture and livelihoods in Syria and neighbouring Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt. Assessments carried out across the affected subregion indicate that threats to food security and livelihoods are severe and growing steadily. In addition to rendering over half of Syrians poor and nearly a third food insecure, the crisis is eroding the ver y foundations of food and livelihood security in what was once a middle-income country, with a relatively high employment rate (92 percent) and growing agriculture sector. Syria’s food chain is disintegrating – from production to markets – and entire livelihood systems are collapsing. The conflict also is severely affecting economic, social and human development in neighbouring countries. With most of Syria’s 2.6 million refugees living outside of camps, host communities face intense competition for resources such as land, water and income opportunities, while costs for housing, food and other commodities soar. The humanitarian appeals for Syria and neighbouring countries are the largest in history: USD 4.4 billion in 2013 and USD 6.5 billion in 2014. As the crisis shows no sign of abating, a resilience-based approach is proving ever more crucial to meet immediate needs while helping affected populations – and the systems which support them – better absorb, adapt and recover from curr ent and future shocks emanating from the crisis. Such an approach, combining emergency and development efforts, is indispensable in the context of food and livelihood security. Behind each family pushed into poverty and hunger, systems are collapsing which need to be protected, restored and strengthened. A holistic approach is needed not only to deliver crisisaffected populations from aid dependency, but also to prevent hunger and poverty from increasing and becoming endemic. FAO’s “Resilient Livelihoods for Agriculture and Food and Nutrition Security in Areas Affected by the Syria Crisis” is a five-year Subregional Strategy and Action Plan, budgeted at USD 280 million – just over a tenth of the value of agricultural losses suffered in Syria by 2012. The Strategy is a dynamic document developed over the course of agricultural programming missions to the subregion in late 2013 and early 2014, which build on rapid agricultural livelihood and food security impact assessments and initia l response plans prepared during the first quarter of 2013. With the aim to protect, restore and strengthen livelihoods and the agro-ecosystems on which livelihoods depend, the Strategy tailors short-, medium- and longer-term actions to address specific needs of the main groups affected by the crisis, including Syrian internally displaced persons (IDPs) and affected populations, refugees, returnees, host communities and national and local authorities. Activities focus on seven priority areas, which can be broadly categorized as: (i) control of transboundary animal diseases (TADs); (ii) control of plant pests and diseases; (iii) food security and natural resource information systems, disaster risk management and policy development; (iv) rural and peri-urban income generation and employment; (v) agricultural production; (vi) natural resource management; and (vii) food safety and nutrition. The Strategy aligns with national government priorities and existing regional frameworks for add ressing the Syria crisis and calls for close partnership with affected communities, national institutions, United Nations (UN) agencies, non-state actors and private-sector organizations. Agriculture cannot be an afterthought. Affected populations in the subregion need effective responses to the challenges threatening their food security and livelihoods. A resilience-based approach delivers this, while better preserving the integrity of lives, livelihoods, natural resources and critical develop ment gains achieved over the past decades.
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    Assessment of IUU activities on Lake Victoria 2012
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    Fishing all over the world is a major source of food for humanity and a provider of employment and economic benefits to those engaged in the activity. However, with increased knowledge and the dynamic development of fisheries, it should be known that world living aquatic resources, although renewable, are not infinite and need proper management, if their continued contribution to the nutritional, economic and social well-being of the growing world’s population is to be sustained. Lake Victoria i s Africa’s largest and most important inland water body with a total water surface area of 68,800km2. Lake Victoria contributes significantly through its fishery and generation of electricity to the economic benefits of not only the riparian states, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, but also to the neighboring countries and the world at large. Lake Victoria is arguably the most important single source of freshwater fish on the African continent, contributing significantly to national and regional econ omies and livelihoods of the regions inhabitants. Although not often associated with inland fisheries, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and the trade of illegal fish has threatened the biological, social, financial and cultural integrity of the lakes resources and those that depend on them. Given that Lake Victoria’s living resources are shared amongst the three riparian states, a regional fisheries body, the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization (LVFO) was formed in 1994 though the technical assistance of the FAO to manage the fisheries resources in Lake Victoria as a single ecological entity. Within the LVFO mandate, the identified areas of IUU fishing are considered in the form of: Illegal or misuse of fishing gears; illegal fishing, fish landing, processing and trading; unregulated fishing number of boats, fishers and gears (capacity); unregulated, unreported or undocumented domestic and regional fish trade; fishing and landing undersize fish in undesignated landing sites; and fishing during closed seasons or in the closed breeding areas or critical habitats. The decline of Nile perch stocks suggest that fisheries management and compliance structures within the three riparian states and at LVFO at the moment are at various levels of disarray, hence allowing IUU fishing to continue thriving unabated. Since the introduction of Nile perch into Lake Victoria in the 1950’s it has been the focus of an intensifying commercial fishery. In 1980, a total of 4 439 to ns of Nile perch were harvested, a decade later over 338 115 tons of Nile perch were landed annually. From 2000 to 2010, and average of 253 404 tons of Nile perch are caught. Despite relatively consistent landings reported by the LVFO, total biomass of Nile perch decreased from 1.4 million tons (92% of total biomass in Lake Victoria) in 1999 to it lowest recorded estimate of 298 394 tons in 2008 (14.9% of total biomass in Lake Victoria). Currently, as of 2010, the Nile perch biomass was estimate d at 18% of total biomass in Lake Victoria, which equates to 367 800 tons. Although a slight increase in biomass between 2008 and 2010 was observed, Nile perch biological indicators suggest that the fish is in a critical survival state. The average size of Nile perch has decreased from 51.7 cm TL to 26.6 cm TL, according to hydro acoustic surveys suggesting that a significant portion of total Nile perch biomass is less than 50 cm TL (legal size for export). It was reported by the LVFO stock asse ssment team that in 2006 and 2008, less than 2% of the Nile perch biomass was in fact greater than 50 cm TL. The size at first maturity of male and female Nile perch is also decreasing, this common amongst fish populations that are stressed (or overexploited). Despite the biological indicators, which suggest legal size Nile perch are less than 2% of total Nile perch biomass, the average number of fishermen increased by 33% between 2000 and 2008. During the same period, Frame survey and MCS compl iance missions noted a marked increase in the number of illegal gears being deployed to target undersize Nile perch. The number of vessels increased by 37% and the use of outboard engines increased by approximately 50%. It has been reported that motorized boats are more efficient, catching about 25 kg of fish per day, compared to 10 kg caught by non-motorized vessels. The increase in use of illegal gears, motorized vessels and fishermen suggests that fishing for Nile perch is still profitable. P reviously driven by lucrative export prices for Nile perch, fishers now target undersize illegal Nile perch for the lucrative domestic and regional trade, which is estimated to exceed the export trade by volume and value. This shift in fishing for undersize Nile perch will effect government revenues earned from the export fishery. The Nile perch fishery over the last decade contributed 0.6% less to the Tanzanian GDP, similarly, a decrease in export trade of Nile perch from Uganda of 14% occurred between 2007 and 2008, resulting in a 0.1% decrease in GDP contribution. By not controlling fishing effort targeting illegal, undersized and immature Nile perch, economic and social hardships will worsen. Current fisheries management both regionally through the LVFO, and nationally amongst the riparian states is inadequate, with respect to Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS). MCS is a collection of activities and tools intended to support fisheries management in fighting IUU fishing, and forms the framework on which accurate, informative and dynamic fisheries management decisions can be made. MCS is critical at all levels of fisheries management. Within the Lake Victoria region, co-management has been implemented through the establishment of Beach Management Units (BMU’s). A BMU is a community-based organization, which is legally accepted as a representative of a fishing community and is mandated on a voluntary basis to engage in MCS initiatives. Lake Victoria has 1 087 registe red BMU’s according to the harmonized BMU guidelines, agreed upon amongst the member states and the LFVO. Although the inclusion of community based management and MCS is critical in contributing to effective management of Lake Victoria’s fisheries resources, many challenges exist, including amongst others; geographical isolation of fishing communities, social issues (families of BMU members may partake in illicit activities), political interference (revenue collections, or election voting), corr uption, conflict of interests (BMU members are often fishmongers and fish traders) and lack of representation in higher management committees. Although advances in MCS technology have revolutionized fisheries management amongst many ESA-IO countries, the sharing of regional resources and capacity is fragmented and not effectively harnessed by the LVFO. Database management systems are not working effectively, data collecting, analyzing and dissemination are unreliable and time inefficient, respec tively and appropriate MCS tools for example net gauges are not available. The RWG-MCS reported that between 2004 and the end of 2008, a total of 4 605 suspects were apprehended, 12 126 beach seines, 9 550 small seine nets, 27 703 monofilament nets, 248 843 kilograms of immature Nile perch (249 tons) and 254 589 illegal gillnets were confiscated. These data are unreliable; furthermore they were not quantified in terms of definition of the item (how long were the nets that were confiscated 80 met er, or one kilometer, this has a profound effect on CPUE), of financial loss to fishers and traders versus the opportunity costs of MCS. The valve of court fines are insignificant especially if one considers the amount of uncontrolled fishing effort, uncontrolled illegal gears used in Lake Victoria, and the increasing value in the trade of immature fish on domestic markets. Also, there is no indication as to whether the court penalties and fines imposed on the same offences in the three partner states have any reference to the same severity across the region, or are recycled back into MCS initiatives. It is therefore difficult to determine whether the RWG-MCS interventions from 2004 to the end of 2008 were beneficial, as little to no comparative data exists. The LVFO depends highly on donor funds to support MCS and management initiatives, including training, capacity building and technical expertise. When donor funds are not available, regional MCS stagnates, which is a major concern. Operation Save the Nile perch is one such example. The EAC Council of Ministers in 2009 launched the ‘Operation Save the Nile Perch’ (OSNP), which required each of the three member states to contribute US$ 600 000. The goal of the initiative was to target illegal fishing and to curb the trade in undersize Nile perch currently threatening the economic integrity of Lake Victoria. The target of OSNP, as ratified by the Council of Ministers was to have fisheries illegalities in the lake, based on th e 2008 frame survey data as bench mark, reduced by 50% in June and 100% by December 2009. Currently as of 2011, Kenya has paid the required funds, with Tanzania only contributing 31% and Uganda zero resulting in less than half of the required funds paid in by from the member states. This undermines the legitimacy of ‘Operation Save the Nile Perch’ and political will and MCS operational capacity. The aim of this report was to assess the state of IUU in Lake Victoria, and to support the SMARTFISH programme in assisting the LVFO and established MCS committees to implement joint regional MCS trainings, by conducting a short cost benefit analysis of enhancing existing regional MCS initiatives and by evaluating past and present regional action plans to deter IUU fishing on Lake Victoria. An action plan was developed through a participatory workshop between the LVFO, national states and the MCS-RWG, held in Jinja, Uganda from the 5th to the 7th of October 2011.

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