Rural Institutions and Participation Service

Case Study

Lessons learned and Good Practice: Community-Based Organizations in Yemen

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Abstract

The increasing importance and recognition of Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) in poverty reduction and decentralization contexts is self-evident. However major challenges remain related to their capacities to assume key responsibilities at local level and their vertical integration into existing institutional settings. This paper discusses preconditions, good practice and operational lessons learned about organizational capacity development and empowerment processes analyzing the set-up and the institutional/organizational aspects of CBOs initiated and/or strengthened with the support of the Community-based Regional Development Program (CBRDP) in five distinct socioeconomic and ecological areas of Yemen. It assesses comparative advantages and potentials of local institutions and CBOs in decentralized rural development.

The study collected and used primary and secondary data applying different Participatory Learning and Actions (PLA) methods and tools. The study confirmed that a flexible area-based process approach provided the framework needed to establish local confidence in CBO operations and to respond to the dynamic needs of local communities. Moreover, investing simultaneously in institutional and human capacity and productive asset development proved indispensable for both success and sustainability. At the CBOs levels, the local socio-cultural, institutional and political settings revealed significant in shaping the organizational maturity and mode of interactions within the CBOs as well as between the CBOs and their environment. Successful CBOs were often those which proved successful in (a) practicing -internally- good governance based on clearly defined leadership/advisory functions between traditional leaders and elected representatives of the poor, (b) prioritization-based selection between productive investment and social initiatives, (c) linking poor to middle income groups using innovative ways building on their indigenous norms and practices and (d) establishing operational horizontal and vertical linkages with other institutions. A legal framework which supports the combination of social self-help initiatives and economic activities appeared as an essential precondition for successful CBOs operations and sustainability. CBOs showed good potentials to coordinate local poverty reduction initiatives and to contribute, through coalitions with others, to pro-poor policies at the macro-level.

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ACRONYMS

CBOs	Community-Based Organizations
CBRDP	Community-Based Regional Development Program
CDOs	Community Development Organizations
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DC	Development Council
EB	Executive Board
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GA	General Assembly
GBY	Gail Bin Yamein
KBS	Khamis Bani Saa'd
KR	Key Representatives
LC	Local Council
MON	Million
MoSAL	Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour
PDRY	Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen
PEB	Preparatory Executive Board
PITA	Participatory Impact Trends Assessment
PLA	Participatory Learning and Action
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RLP	Revolving Labour Pool
SIG	Small Investment Group
STC	Specialized Technical Committee
SWF	Social Welfare Fund
YAR	Yemen Arab Republic

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The growing importance and recognition of Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) in community development, poverty reduction and decentralization contexts is self-evident. However, major challenges remain related to their capacities to assume key development responsibilities at local level and to their vertical integration into existing institutional settings. As well, challenges extended to CBOs' operations processes in terms of the extent to which CBOs represent their communities, voice their concerns and respond to their needs. In view of the increasing roles of CBOs vis-à-vis the aforementioned challenges, this paper intends to provide practical answers to these challenges and, accordingly, to identify major lessons learnt, good practices examples and policy recommendations from a case study of specific CBOs in Yemen. The paper documents the findings of a study issued by the Rural Institutions and Participation Service of FAO. As a case study, the paper analyses the set-up and the institutional/organizational aspects of Community-based Development Organizations (CDOs) initiated with the support of the Community-Based Regional Development Program (CBRDP) in five ecological zones in Yemen.

The study collected and used primary and secondary data applying different Participatory Learning and Actions (PLA) methods and tools. Its findings were presented in this paper in three main sections. The study findings revealed the significance of the local socio-cultural, institutional and political settings in shaping both CDOs' formation and operations. Successful CDOs' formation proved positively correlated with: (a) the degree to which CDO's formation was decided by the local community in response to certain gaps and needs, (b) wider participation of all community groups, (c) positive interactions and commitment of community leaders supported by critical mass ready to back up those drivers, (c) clear CDO's plans to provide tangible benefits for its members, (d) clarity of the roles and responsibilities of the leaders, the EB and GA, (e) appropriate CDO's territory set according to social homogeneity, traditions of collaboration and mutual help and geographical proximity.

With regard to CDOs' operation, successful CDOs were often those which proved prosperous in: (a) representing various community groups; especially the poor and women, in their membership and EBs, (b) implementing diversified and attractive interventions in response to different needs of various community groups, (c) adopting prioritized combination of productive investment and social initiatives, (d) linking poor to middle income groups using innovative ways building on their indigenous norms and practices, (e) practicing -internally- good governance based on clearly defined leadership/advisory functions between traditional leaders and elected representatives of the poor, and (f) establishing operational horizontal and vertical linkages with other institutions.

Given the specific context of the assessed CDOs, the study findings highlighted three key issues, which influence the formation, operation and sustainability of the CDOs. These are: (i) the appropriateness of the legal framework, (ii) the high significance of proper CDO's territory and (iii) the relationship between the CDO and traditional power structures.

For an external actor supporting local communities establishing their CDOs, the study confirmed that, a flexible area-based process approach provided the framework needed to establish local confidence in CDO operations and to respond to the dynamic needs of local communities. Moreover, investing simultaneous in institutional and human capacity and productive asset development proved indispensable for both success and sustainability.

As a general conclusion, the CDOs showed good results and potentials to coordinate local poverty reduction initiatives and to contribute, through coalitions with others, to pro-poor policies at the macro-level.

SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

1. STUDY CONTEXT, OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY:

The last decade witnessed an increasing role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), particularly the Community-Based Organizations (CBOs), in development of their societies. This is due to combination of factors including their structural characteristics, which match the distinct shift towards participatory development as well as the weak responses of governments in the developing countries to the increasing developmental needs. The increasing role of CBOs led to an escalating concern with regard to their strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats vis-à-vis their mission statements and functions as catalysts for sustainable rural development.

In view of this rationale, the Rural Institutions and Participation Service of FAO issued a study to analyse the set-up and the institutional/organizational aspects of Community-based Development Organizations (CDOs) [1] initiated with the support of the Community-Based Regional Development Program (CBRDP) in Yemen. This program operates since 1999 in 10 districts representing five ecological zones. Regional offices are in: (i) Ghail Bin Yamein (G.B.Y), (ii) Al-Makha, (iii) Khamis Bani Saa'd (K.B.S), (iv) As-Swadeya, and (v) Aden. The program's principal objective is to strengthen CDOs as key actors and government partners in the context of decentralization. It gives highest priority to effective participatory community organizations as fundamental entry point for its interventions. To initiate and support CDOs, the program intervenes directly in five closely interrelated technical components. These are: (i) institutional building, (ii) human capacity building and training, (iii) community-based financial services, (iv) gender perspective and (v) institution-based coordination. Detailed description of the program is presented in annex 1.

The study was carried-out in the transitional period between CBRDP's Phases I (1999-2003) and II (2004-2006). Its objectives were to identify major lessons learnt from the CDOs' formation and management processes, to capture good practice examples and come up with policy recommendations, which may support replication of these experiences in Yemen as well as elsewhere under similar contexts. More specifically, the study focused on the following issues related to the role and potentials of local institutions in decentralized rural development (annex 2; TOR of the study): (a) territoriality concept and criteria underlying CDOs formation and operations, (b) key requirements for CDO leadership and governance (c) power relations and collaboration between CDO and traditional leaders (d) integration of poor with middle income groups in investment initiatives (f) horizontal and vertical linkages with other institutions.

The study built its methodology on the use of primary and secondary data by applying different Participatory Learning and Actions (PLA) methods and tools. To ensure data reliability, triangulation was emphasized by using more than one PLA tool to examine the same variable and replication of each tool with different individuals representing the same target group. Data were gathered from: (a) CDOs' Executive Boards (EBs), (b) CDOs' members, especially the poor and middle-income groups, (c) traditional leaders, (d) Executive Boards of the Local Councils. Annex 3 highlights the general PLA checklist used in data collection.

This paper presents the findings of the study in three main sections. Section one introduces the readers to the study context, objectives and methodology as well as the country context. Section two presents

[1] The term CDO was selected by community organizations themselves. It is the Yemen synonym to the more common term of Community based Organization (CBO)

and discusses the findings of the study along three main pillars: (i) CDOs' formation, (ii) CDOs' operations, and (iii) CDOs' linkages with other institutions. To facilitate easy reference to the core subject of the study, each pillar/sub-section concluded with the key lessons learnt, good practice examples and relevant policy recommendations. Section three offers general conclusion and the overall major lessons learnt, good practice examples and relevant policy recommendations.

COUNTRY CONTEXT "YEMEN":

2.1 Basic Data:

The Republic of Yemen emerged in May 1990, following the unification of the Yemen Arab Republic ("YAR" North Yemen) and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen ("PDRY" South Yemen). The country covers some 527,970 sq km from coastal plains to highlands. The climate varies from humid subtropical to cool mountainous with annual rainfall varying between 100 and 800 mm. Close to one million hectares of land are under cultivation, of which about 58% is rain-fed farming. Administratively, the country is composed of 20 Governorates comprising 332 districts. The population of Yemen was estimated at 18.4 MON in 2000. The annual population growth rate is 3.4%, which is one of the highest in the world. About 73.5% of the population lives in rural areas, of which some 80% is in communities of fewer than 500 people[2].

2.2 Poverty Situation:

Yemen is one of the least developed countries in the world. According to the Global Human Development Report 2003, it ranked 148 out of 178 countries assessed. The latest household budget survey (1998) revealed that 17.6% of Yemeni lives below the food poverty line and 41.8% lives below the absolute (upper) poverty line. Poverty in Yemen is the product of multiple natural and human factors as well as inappropriate domestic policies and unfavorable external conditions. It has a strong rural attribute, as 83% of the poor, and 87% of the food-deprived, live in rural areas.

Organized poverty alleviation efforts started in the second half of 1990s. In December 2000, the Government prepared an "Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (iPRSP)", which followed by a full-fledged PRSP in May 2002. The overall goal of the PRSP is to reduce poverty by 13.1% in the period 2003 – 2005. This is expected to be the effect of sustained GDP growth at an average rate of 4.7% in the period, and simultaneous reduction of the annual population growth rate to 3% by the year 2005. The PRSP sets out four main goals and axes of interventions: (i) achieving economic growth, (ii) developing human resources, (iii) improving infrastructure, and (iv) ensuring social protection. It also stresses decentralization, improved governance, participation and gender as crosscutting themes.

The PRSP's emphasis on decentralization and improved governance corresponds with the recent government shift towards decentralization as one of its top priorities. In February 2000, the Local Authority Law (no. 4/2000) was approved by the Parliament. The law provides a clear legislative framework for decentralization based on the following principles: (a) broadened popular participation through elected Local Councils at the district level (b) financial decentralization, and (c) decentralization of administrative and services delivery functions. Under this new local set-up and the infant decentralization reform, the role of local organizations, including CBOs, is indispensable to spearhead the required interaction between the Local Councils and local communities.

[2] Average population density in Yemen is 40 people per sq km.

2.3 Community Institutions/Organizations:

Yemen has had a rich history of both community participation and grassroots community-based institutions. Tradition of communities working together to build mosques, construct roads, clean cisterns, etc. are strong in most parts of Yemen. This may be related to the fact that there is no formal government administration in place below the district level.

2.3.1 The Tribes as the Fundamental Community Institution in Yemen:

In Yemeni context, the tribe (*Qabilah*) is not just an informal/traditional social institution; instead, it considered the most prominent and crucial element of the social, economic, cultural and political societies. It provides social identity to individuals and households and a reference for cultural values and social behaviors.

The tribal system is absolutely strong. It is a hierarchy of segmentary structures where individuals are placed in the middle of large concentric circles. Everybody knows his/her roles and functions as they are defined by the well-articulated customary regulations (*Hukm* or *Urf*), which, together with the religious laws (*Sharia'*), dictate behaviours and attitudes. The ethics of the honour (*Sharaf*) of the individual and of the family to which s/he belongs have a crucial value and precise social mechanisms to vindicate the loss of a part of this honour. Small-size social units constitute autonomous entities with individuals have daily social and economic ties and people conceive of relationships among themselves on the basis of shared common descent and are related to one another. Any segment sees itself as a unity in relation to other segment of the same section, but sees both segments as a unity in relation to another section.

Each tribe is divided into clans made up of lineages. To each tribe corresponds a tribal territory and, within the tribal territory, each clan has its own portion of land. Boarders between tribes and between clans are well-demarked and ownership is documented in local contracts. Common property land is considered as the common property of the tribe and is managed according to customary regulations. Tribal customary laws are related to specific crimes committed by individuals; unpunished crimes would bring shame to the entire tribe.

In each tribe, authority is vested in a *Sheikh* and, under the *Sheikh*, in an *Aqil* (often also called *Sheikh*) as well as in tribal judges (*Hakim*, pl. *Hukam*), who have a special knowledge of tribal customs. The *Sheikh* is a sort of "primus inter pares", a mediator, in charge of solving disputes between his tribesmen and of representing the tribe vis-à-vis the other tribal entities, administrative authorities and others.

2.3.2 Formal Community Organizations:

Though Yemen's experience with informal community institutions is deeply rooted in history, semi-formal community institution/organizations started in Aden under British rule as charitable societies. They were financed by contributions of people; and confined their scope to small charitable activities. After the revolution in the North, this experience was transferred to Taiz and then spread to other areas in the North. The most famous type of local organizations was the cooperatives (1962 – mid-1980s). The first associations' law was approved in 1963 (law no. 11/1963) and revised in 2001 (law no. 1/2001). While the revised cooperatives' law was approved in 1998 (no. 39/1998).

According to Yemen Human Development Report (2000/2001), the number of officially registered CSOs in Yemen in 2001 was 2,786 (table 1). This brings the average number of CSOs to 1.5 per 10,000 people. Despite 44.6% are grouped under community development organizations, the vast majority under this group are charity-focused. Moreover, about 38% are area-focused (i.e. established by a group from specific place who lives in or outside that place with the prime objective of collecting donations in support of service provision in their native homeland). According to an informal source from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (MoSAL), the current number of registered CSOs is 4142. Both above figures should be read with caution. According to above source, the 4142 CSOs can be classified into four categories as follows: (i) CSOs having serious legal violations submitted to the court (27%), (ii) CSOs considered inactive (25%), (iii) CSOs which are only seasonally active "mainly during the month of *Ramdan*" (30%) and (iv) active CSOs (18%). The low percentage of active CSOs is attributed to: (i) week level of institutionalization of structure, mechanisms and practices, (ii) inadequate capacities, (iii) fragile adherence to internal good governance mechanisms (iv) ambiguity of vision, objectives and tools to achieve objectives (v) CSOs are highly politicized and vulnerable to tribal and area-based affiliations, (vi) inadequate financial resources.

Table 1. Classification of the Officially Registered Civil Society Organizations in Yemen (2001)[3]:

Category	Number	% (of the total)
Local community development organizations	1,242	44.6
Occupational associations and unions	155	5.6
Specialized associations	646	23.2
Women and family development	*96*	*3.4*
Public health	*35*	*1.3*
Environment	*31*	*1.1*
Disability	*43*	*1.5*
Cultural	*102*	*3.7*
Student unions	*20*	*0.7*
Sport clubs	*272*	*9.8*
Art	*7*	*0.3*
Child rights	*11*	*0.4*
Human rights	*20*	*0.7*
Education and training	*9*	*0.3*
Cooperatives	661	23.7
Political parties	22	0.8
Others	60	2.2
Total	2,786	100

2.3.3 The Community-based Development Organizations (CDOs):

Against the aforementioned background, the CBRDP assisted local communities in the five selected areas establishing CDOs as the foundations on which all its development interventions are build. In this context, CDOs meant to play an active leading role in the development processes, especially poverty alleviation, at the community level. Thus, they formed to accommodate, address and voice the concerns of the poor at the grassroots level. To overcome the serious constraints facing community institutions in Yemen, the program set certain basic establishment criteria for CDOs, which included

[3] Source: Yemen Human Development Report (2000/2001), UNDP and MoPIC.

that they (i) have emerged from within the targeted communities, (ii) operate as development-oriented organizations, and (iii) are legally registered with the MoSAL.

The legal registration of a CDO is the outcome of a process undertaken by the local community with the program assistance, which includes: (i) community mobilization, (ii) participatory situation assessment of the local development bottlenecks and potentials, (iii) certain start-up training programs, (vi) establishment of Preparatory Executive Boards (PEBs), which entrusted with the preparations of the required documents for legal registration.

During the period September 1999 – October 2003, 52 CDOs were established in the five areas. Although encountering some of the general problems of CSOs Yemen, key results revealed by this study is that CDOs to a much higher degree were perceived by communities as self-owned and managed, more responsive to community demands and aspirations and better adhered to principles of good governance. Therefore they took another route of development and empowerment, and as this paper will show, they proved to be truly operational, committed and more sustainable.

SECTION TWO: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS:

1. THE FORMATION OF THE CDOS:

The general challenges facing CBOs at their formation stage include to identify genuine and critical local gaps, which they will fill and to attract memberships on that ground. A common known risk in CBO/CDO formation is that local organizations established to respond either to an outside demand, or purely in response to a felt opportunity to tap available financial resources. These are legitimate motivations of local people to initiate groups/organizations. The studied CDOs were not exceptional in this. It was crucial, however, that CBRDP was aware about this phenomenon and designed strategies to build on this momentum by creating local ownership and commitment through demand responsive interventions with community contributions, and clearly defined and communicated mechanisms of shared responsibilities.

Another challenging phenomenon facing the CBOs' formation stage is the dominance of the elites, traditional leaders and powerful groups. Due to their comparative advantages, in terms of accessibility, expertise and others, these groups often lead and dictate CBOs' formulation without enough attention to the involvement of other community members and groups in this vital process. This in turn affects not only the formation process but also the future operations and sustainability of the CBO.

The overall experiences with CDO formation in Yemen suggested in general terms that

- ***The establishment of CBOs should be a pure community decision*** in response to its identified needs and interests. In this framework, the role of any external program should be limited to catalytic facilitation and technical assistance tasks;
- The participation of all existing community groups, at least through consultations, at the stage of CBO formation is crucial. It is only through ***wider participation of all community members and groups*** that CBO can establish community agreement regarding CBO's objectives and activities as well as its constitution and bylaws. In the case of poverty-focused CBOs, as it is the case with the assessed CDOs, the involvement of the "poor" as the key target group is essential. ***Women*** are another important community group which need to be involved from the beginning because of the following reasons: (i) underdevelopment, particularly poverty, proved to have a strong gender dimension, (ii) especially within the male-dominated culture of most of the developing countries, Yemen is a good example, that women are often excluded at the CBOs' formulation

stage and (iv) in many developing countries, women demonstrated clearly their commitment to communal issues, if they had the chance to participate;

- As essential preconditions for CBO/CDO formation are that ***community leaders and drivers should be there*** and committed to invest time and energy for the communal benefit. In order to empower drivers of CDOs, there must be ***a critical mass ready to back up those drivers***. This however could only be ensured when CBO/CDO devised ***clear plans to provide tangible benefits for its members*** (as access to credit, training and others in the case of CDOs). However, experiences highlighted as well that leaders and drivers could develop into a potential element for risk (take over) at later stages of CDO existence (discussed later). Thus, ***specific roles, responsibilities and rights of the leaders, the EB (if different from the leaders) and GA*** should be clearly developed (preferably in a participatory manner), agreed upon and documented in the CBO/CDO constitution and bylaws;
- ***positive previous community experience in groups' formation and/or collective work*** as a critical advantage for successful CBO formation (e.g. the successes of Bani Ali CDO, K.B.S is partially attributed to the successful past community experience with informal institutions). On the other hand, negative previous experiences with community institutions hampered successful CBO/CDO formation (e.g. the poor performance of a previous cooperative in Bani Zeid, K.B.S affected the formation of the CDO thereafter).

The following chapters present and discuss some more specific issues related to the formation of CDOs in Yemen.

1.1 THE IMPACT OF LOCAL SETTING ON CDOS' FORMATION:

1.1.1 The Socio-cultural, Political and Traditional Institutional Settings in the Study Areas (annex 3):

The CDOs under CBRDP were gradually established and strengthened in five different ecological zones/areas in Yemen. Four of the areas are rural and one is urban; they include:

- The harsh high plateau, with As-Swadeya, Al-Bayda Governorate as action area of CBRDP,
- The steep mountain ranges, with Khamis Bani Saa'd, Al-Mahwait Governorate as action area,
- The large eastern semi-arid zone represented by Ghail Bin Yamein, Hadramout Governorate,
- The hot and arid coastal plains, with Al-Makha, Taiz Governorate as selected action area, and
- An urban context, with Aden, Aden Governorate selected as action area for CDO formation and empowerment.

Despite environmental disparities, the four studied rural areas have a rich history of community participation and grassroots community-based institutions in common, as well as a long tribal history. Scattered, mostly small villages characterize the rural settlement pattern and agriculture is the main source of livelihoods. Severe and increasing water constraint is also a common factor shared by the four rural areas. Nowadays, all of them are facing high levels of poverty.

On the other hand, one of the crucial elements of disparity between the areas today, which also affects CDOs' formation, is the ***level and strength of tribalism***. In As-Swadeya, the tribal system is extremely strong. The district is divided into 6 circumscriptions, which reflect the 6 major tribal entities. Each tribe has its defined territory. The ethics of the honour as well as tribal customary

regulations are exceptionally dominant. In addition to the tribes, there are *Saadah*[4], which have an alliance with one of the tribal circumscription.

In Khamis Bani Saa'd (K.B.S), tribalism is also strong but less than in As-Swadeya. According to tribal criteria, the district comprises three divisions (*Mikhlaf*). The tribes of the same *Mikhlaf* constitute a, more or less, homogenous unit, being either parts of wider tribal units or being linked by special alliances. Each *Mikhlaf* consists of a number of tribal clans (*Khoms)*, each of them subdivided into lineages with a common ancestor. The *Khoms* does not necessarily correspond to the village and often may cover two or more villages or cluster of villages. In addition to tribesmen, there are pockets of lower social stratum and marginalized groups (*Akhdam*).

In Ghail Bin Yamein "G.B.Y", tribalism used to be apparent and shaped the internal territories. However, as result of the socialist government of the former PRDY, tribal leadership has been severely limited. Powerful *Sheikhs* have not yet restored their former authority. Three types of settlements may be identified: (i) large villages often of socially heterogeneous nature, (ii) small village with the majority of population belongs to one tribe, and (iii) camp, which comprises people from the same tribe and practice animal husbandry. In addition to the tribes, the social grouping includes the *Saadah, Akhdam and Abid*. The lower strata (*Akdam* and *Abid*) are situated below the tribal people and the *Saadah*. Not owing land, they cultivate other people's land or make their living as traders, craftsmen, or service renders. Although during the period of the former PRDY there has been a considerable movement towards a more egalitarian society, social status continues, to some extent, to differentiate local communities.

In Al-Makha**,** the tribal system is no more strong. A process of detribalization is under way. People appear to be less integrated in kinship-based groupings than in larger neighbouring entities or more complex socio-territorial units, i.e. villages or cluster of villages. Tribes do not mean any economic specialization. In most of the villages, the majority of population belong to the same tribe; nevertheless, members of other tribes are easily incorporated. In this way residence and common utilization of available natural resources, rather than tribal affiliation, constitute the basis of pragmatic social and economic relationships.

Aden, instead as ancient urban settlement is very different. Compared to other urban centres in Yemen it has undergone a unique socio-economic and political evolution. It was the capital of the former South Yemen, which was colonized by Britain during the period 1839 - 1967 when the nationalist forces took over the country and then the Socialist Party. The people of Aden identify themselves as Adeni despite the fact that they are natively from other parts of the country and/or, to very less extent, have historical connections to other parts of the world especially India and east Africa. Thus, the social, cultural, economic and political set-up of each community is quite heterogeneous. In Aden tribal links have weakened and, often, disappeared, and have not been replaced by new forms of alliances and solidarities. However, a complex web of ties links households on the bases of kinship, caste, common interests, friendship and neighbourhood. Residents of a given neighbourhood, block or *Hara* may mobilize for precise purposes. It is often the aged and/or educated people who have significant contributions to their communities

Another factor which induced major socio-cultural differences were ***political variations*** among action areas, which are less significant today. Generally, and with exception of Aden and GBY, as parts of former South Yemen, political awareness is rather low and political affiliations of individual is highly

[4] The *Saadah* (sing. Sayyid) constitute a special non-tribal group, a sort of "religious nobility", who claim to be direct descendants of the Prophet Mohammed. They observe a strict endogamy, have strong political position and social prestige.

influenced by the affiliation of the tribal leaders. In Aden, the level of political awareness is the highest in the country, which is attributed to its rich political history. Though less compared to Aden, the level of political awareness in GBY is comparatively higher than in other action areas.

The level of gender inequality is another element of cultural-related disparity among the five areas. Generally, all parts of Yemen are characterized by acute gender inequality despite varying in severity. While in Aden women actively participate in general community matters, they are absolutely excluded in the strong tribal settings of Al-Swadeya and K.B.S, with Al-Makha and G.B.Y ranked between these two ends. In As-Swadeya and K.B.S, tribalism and status inequalities provide an essential background to the supreme gender inequalities. One source, and justification, for status and gender inequalities is that greater responsibilities equal higher status and thus more rights and privileges. Women are considered weak and therefore protected along with others in this status group. While women bear responsible productive and reproductive responsibilities, these are accorded lower status than those of men. This is mainly due to the tribal cultural norms as well as the misinterpretation of some Islamic principles. Although less compared to As-Swadeya and K.B.S, gender inequality is also distinct in G.B.Y.; mainly due to religious factors. In Al-Makha, gender inequality is the less among the rural action areas. This might be due to: (i) weak level of tribalism, (ii) different roles of women in fisheries communities, (iii) proximity of the area to the eastern Africa coasts, which facilitates exposures and socioeconomic relations between the area and some east African communities. In Aden, and due to many factors including the effect of the previous socialist party as well as the nature of the city as the main port of Yemen, gender inequality is considered the lowest not only among the assessed areas but also countrywide.

1.1.2 The Impact of the Local Settings on the CDOs' Formation[5]:

The local settings have the following major impacts on CDOs' formation:

1. ***The geographical set-up of CDOs:*** The MoSAL's law no. 1/2001, under which CDOs are registered, obliges any CBO/CDO to specify a well-defined geographical zone for its operations and membership. The local communities' decisions on this matter vary based on their socio-cultural context.

   In As-Swadeya and K.B.S, where tribalism is dominant, CDOs were formed on pure tribal basis, which also satisfied the geographical element of the law[6]. Although each tribe looks homogenous, it is, in fact, of a heterogeneous internal set-up. In some cases (e.g. Etihad CDO of KBS), this led to the establishment of CDOs with too large geographical boundaries, which CDOs were unable to reach and adequately serve all members. The CDO territoriality had significant impacts on its inclusiveness and representativity. Among the tribal-based CDOs, the most striking success stories were observed when CDOs had been formed at the lower lineage level.

   Given the mountainous topography of Yemen and its scattered settlements, neither tribal nor administrative boundaries should be the determining factor for CDO´s base of membership. Instead, social homogeneity, traditions of collaboration and mutual help and geographical proximity should be emphasized.

[5] The effects of local settings on CDOs do not confined to their formation only; instead, it also affects their internal operations and relationships with the environment.

[6] People of the same tribe often settle in the same place. The land under the control of the tribe is considered one of the most important factors determining the position of this tribe in the overall social hierarchy.

In Al-Makha where the tribal system is rather fragile and people are more integrated in neighbouring entities, CDOs were formed on both social homogeneity and geographical proximity bases and the same criteria were used in Aden.

2. ***CDOs' relationships with traditional power structure:*** In As-Swadeya and K.B.S, tribalism dictates behaviours and attitudes. In such situation, exclusion of tribal leaders from CDOs would create deep conflicts and block CDOs' operations. Thus, tribal leaders were significantly represented in CDOs' structures (see 2.2.3). In this setting, it is rather difficult to isolate the CDO, as a development-oriented organization, from the tribe, as social institution. Therefore, CDOs' formations and operations are vulnerable to tribal conflicts. For instance, an internal tribe's conflict seriously affected the operations of Ale-Ghasham CDO (As-Swadeya). In order to maintain the CDOs operational it was required to split it into two (Ale-Ghasham and Al-Mustagbal).

   Due to the process of detribalization in Al-Makha, the effect of tribalism on CDOs is rather minor, if any. Although all *Sheikhs* (17) are GAs' members, none of them is an EB's member and only 4 (24%) are represented in the EBs. The same is applicable in G.B.Y (neither the *Sheikhs* nor their representatives are EBs' members).

3. ***The level of inclusion of socio-culturally marginalized groups in CDO´s activities:*** The ethnic composition of Yemeni society characterized by the existence of limited number of marginalized and socially excluded groups. The most important, in terms of number, is the *Akhdam* group. They often settle together in small huts habitually of squatter nature. The majority of them are working as agricultural laborers (in rural areas) and garbage collectors (in cities). In the study areas, they existed in K.B.S, G.B.Y and Aden. Their level of involvement in CDOs activities in the three areas varies depending on variations in the local settings.

   The existences of a strong tribal system side-by-side with socially marginalized groups in K.B.S, draw negative consequences on the level of participation of these groups in the CDOs' activities. This group experiences deep social exclusion, which led to their weak participation in the CDOs' formation (about 20% of them are members in the CDOs and without any representation in the EBs). Their direct benefits from CDOs' support/activities are significantly poorer compared to both their eligibility and numerical weights.

   The situation in GBY and Aden is quite different. In Aden there are no signals of exclusion of the marginalized groups; instead, they are actively involved in the CDOs' operations as members, EBs' members and direct beneficiaries of the CDOs' interventions. In GBY, this is due to the socio-political effects of the former governing socialist party, which promoted and enforced the concepts of equality. In Aden and due to its peculiarity as an ancient port city of multiracial nature and its ideological and political history, it is rather easy for this group to integrate in the social fabric compared to other areas. Moreover, members of marginalized groups constitute the majority of members in 3 CDOs.

   The level of participation of the marginalized groups in CDOs activities depends on the relative degree of social acceptance they enjoy in the community, which is the ultimate result of its evolution in view of the geographical, social, political and cultural factors.

4. ***The effects of politics on CDOs' formation:*** This was only noticed in Aden's CDO, where the rich political experiences overtime influenced local communities. Hence, politics and political affiliation affects CDOs' formation and, later on, their internal operations as well as their relationship with the external environment including the government authorities.

5. ***The impact on women's involvement in CDOs' formation.*** In Aden women participated in the formation of all CDOs side-by-side with their men colleagues. Moreover, Al-Aydarous community voluntarily and successfully formed a pure women's CDO with remarkable support from men in the community. In Al-Makha and G.B.Y, and with the CBRDP's support though advocacy, women were inadequately consulted at this stage, while they were not involved in As-Swadeya and K.B.S

1.1.3 CDO Formation: Lessons Learnt and Policy Recommendations:

→ The CBOs' formation stage proved essential since it shapes their operations and sustainability. During CDO formation the following prerequisites revealed crucial:

- Clear CBO's mission responding to genuine gaps and needs identified by local communities,
- Participation of all community members and groups especially poor and women. In this regard, the constructive involvement and support of traditional leaders is important,
- Committed leadership of persons supported by the majority of community members, and
- Precise formulation of CBO's constitution and bylaws with wide participation of all community members and groups.

→ If an external program helped a local community initiating a CBO, the decision on CBO's establishment should be purely made by the local community. The roles of the external program should be kept to consultation, awareness raising and technical support.

→ The term CBO explicitly indicates what CDOs' territory should emphasize, which is the community as a holistic concept implying the people and their relationships as well as their relation with the place. This framework underlined both the social "people and relations" and the material "place and resources" dimensions. Therefore, in rural areas, the CDOs' territory should be determined by combination of key factors including social homogeneity, common interests and geographical proximity instead of merely focusing on tribal geographical boundaries and/or only geographical proximity.

→ In the urban context, CDOs' formation could be based on the smallest possible geographical zones (e.g. *Hara*) that can ensure reasonable level of social homogeneity. Moreover, the establishment and strengthening of Specialized Local Associations based on occupational/vocational basis may be recommended,

→ CDOs operations should be kept away from politics.

The socio-cultural differences between rural and urban communities necessitate applying different implementation approaches especially with regard to institutional building.

2. CDOS' OPERATIONS

Generally, CBOs and CDOs are voluntary, membership-based organizations formed to materialize certain positive changes deemed necessary by their constituencies. Thus, they are judged not only against their results in view of their objectives, but also in relation to the processes they adopt to produce these results. Consequently, CBOs are facing common challenges related to how to respond to the critical demands of their members and to keep them interested and committed to participate in their operations and management.

In this part, the paper discusses critical issues related to CDOs' operations, including mechanisms and means adopted by the CDOs to enhance community participation, and extracts key lessons learnt, good practices examples and relevant policy recommendations. It distinguishes two main issues: community participation in CDOs' operations and governance in CDOs' management. Moreover, the nature of interaction between the CDO and the traditional power structures and the degree to which the CDO integrate them in their structures revealed as a significant determining factor of its operations. Therefore and due to its implications on the nature of operations within the EBs, the paper discusses the latter issue as part of governance (2.2.3).

2.1 COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN CDOS' OPERATIONS:

Community participation is understood here as "a social process in which specific groups with shared needs living in a defined geographical area take an active part in the process of planning and implementing development activities as well as enjoying their benefits"[7]. This definition implies the terms community and participation. A community is first defined geographically and secondly is defined in terms of social factors as well as sharing of particular resources and needs. However, communities are by no means completely homogenous. In fact, they are often composed of different constituencies with different agenda and, sometimes, competing interests drawn along economic, class, political or gender lines. In the context of Yemen, this is concretely implies that the concept of community is not synonymous to the concept of a village as geographical term. Participation, the other half of the definition, refers to active involvement of groups and individuals. In this sense, participation can range from simple information sharing, to extensive consultation and joint decision-making, and to situations where the relevant stakeholders take on responsibility for monitoring the process and evaluating its success.

The paper analyzed and discusses the level of participation of various social groups in CDOs operations as a process indicator. More specifically, the study used the following key indicators for participation, ownership and sustainability of operations: (1) the degree to which CDOs represent their communities; especially the poor, (2) the inclusion of various community groups in the EBs, and (3) the level of mutual voluntary collaboration and the quantity and quality of support/services CDOs give and gain from its members.

2.1.1 CDOs' Representativity within Local Communities, especially with regard to the Poor and Women:

The CDOs' constitutions qualify all interested and legally eligible[8] community members within their areas for CDOs' membership. However, since the main target group for CDO support are the poor, all community members may not be equally interested in a CDO's membership. The overall average CDOs' membership, which is of course voluntarily, was in 2003, 37% of the eligible target population, with quite some variation among and within the studied areas (table 2).

[7] Sharon Beatty, Sabria al-Thawr and Thabet Bagash (April, 2002); Community Participation Experiences in Yemen: A National Review.

[8] According to law eligibility criteria for CDO's membership are: a member must: (i) be Yemeni national (ii) be of ≥18 years aged, enjoy physical and mental competency and legally fit (iii) comply with the internal regulations of the CDO (iv) not a member of another similar association within the same geographical coverage (v) have a permanent interest in the area covered by the CDO (vi) lives in the area covered by the CDO for ≥ 6 months (vii) pay the membership fees as subscribed in the internal regulations.

Table 2: CDOs' Memberships compared to the total numbers of communities members potentially entitled for CDO membership.

Membership (%)	**CDOs' in Studied Areas**					
	K.B.S	Swadeya	Aden	G.B.Y	Makha	Total
≤ 25%			√			
25 – 50%	√	√		√		√
50 – 75%					√	

The representation of on average of, almost, 40% of the local qualified populations made the CDOs strong, well respected, and, to some extent, influential players at local level. Pure quantitative statistical analysis, however, is rather insufficient to allow informed generalizations. For instance, this percentage (37%) would indicate a more satisfactory level of representation if the CDO operates in a socially heterogonous community, but not necessary to indicate the same in a purely homogenous community. As indicated by the table, the CDOs of Al-Makha showed the highest representation percentage. This is probably due to the local setting where people are more integrating in larger neighbouring entities or more complex socio-territorial units. Contrarily, Aden CDOs' showed the lowest percentage due to the heterogeneity of Aden´s population. Again, the level of CDO's representation revealed highly influenced by its geographical set-up. Generally, the criteria used to set the CDOs' territories affect their operations. The larger the geographical area, the lower is the percentage of representation. In this regard, several CDOs, which were purely formed on geographical basis suffered afterwards from the vast area to be covered by the organization. This, in turn, affected lively interactions between the CDOs' constituencies and EBs, in one hand, and the degree to which the CDOs responded to the needs and expectations of the local community members, in the other.

Within the CDOs, Al-Sayla CDO, G.B.Y, showed the highest representation by having all (100%) eligible community members included in the CDO membership. The reasons behind this, which also provided good ***lessons learnt*** from a specific case study, are:

(i) The CDO covered a reasonable (in size) geographical area,
(ii) Despite the social heterogeneity in terms of social classes, there is a distinct elements of homogeneity among community members since the majority of them are labourers,
(iii) The community enjoys a high level of political awareness gained through active involvement of most of the community members in the socialist party during the period of former PRDY. Against this background, they see in the CDO a form of a legal entity with participatory interactions and broader coverage unlike the previous semi-tribal system, and
(iv) The modality adopted in the selection of the EB (elaborated in the following paragraph and flashed in the adjacent box) facilitates participation of all community groups and members,

With regard to the degree to which ***CDOs represents the poor*** in their target communities, the studied CDOs operate in poor areas. Therefore, one can argue that poor have excellent representation in CDOs, if not the CDOs are inclusively of the poor. Based on data obtained from a sample size of 33% of the total CDOs, about 74% of the poor are CDOs' members (represents 64.6% of the total CDOs' members). These data and others relevant, gathered through different mechanisms, were analyzed to assess the qualitative inclusiveness of the CDOs i.e. ***are they organizations of the poor, organizations representing the poor or a combination of both?***. In this regard, aggregated analysis failed to provide concrete unified answer, which describes the situation in all CDOs. Instead, CDO-specific analysis produced reliable and diverse results. For instance, members of Al-Olayeb CDO (G.B.Y) are exclusively the poor households within the community, which qualifies it to be a typical example for

the "CDO of the poor". In Al-Sayla (G.B.Y), all community members, who are poor, are members in the CDO, which could be another example of the CDO of the poor. In Wedyan CDO (Aden), although all members are poor, they represent 71.5% of the poor in the area covered by the CDO. Therefore, it could be an example for the "CDO representing the poor". On the other hand, Al-Bahr Al-Ahmar CDO (Al-Makha) as well as Bani Zayd and Al-Mazab CDOs (K.B.S) are typical examples of the "CDO of and for/representing the poor". Despite all poor are members in these CDOs, they represent 85.8%, 36.4% and 93.6% of their members, respectively.

The studied CDOs proved to be organizations of the poor, organizations representing the poor and both.

Women's representation in CDOs is, generally, below the required level (women represent 36.8%[9] of the CDOs' membership); nonetheless, this considered a real success in the compared with their average representation in mixed CBOs in Yemen (29% including pure women's CBOs[10]). In addition, they constitute 35.2% and 26% of the direct beneficiaries of CDOs' training and credit interventions, respectively. In addition to socio-cultural factors, the relatively slow speed towards effective women participation in CDOs' operations attributes to two main gaps in the mechanisms adopted by the CBRDP to assist CDOs in this matter. These are: (i) the program adopted a unified gender strategy for all action areas despite the clear differences in women situation among action areas especially between urban and rural areas. Gender equality and equity approaches might be very relevant to Aden but not for As-Swadeya where might be more appropriate to start a more modest approached, and (ii) in most action areas, the program are targeting women's economic empowerment without emphasizing the suitable situation-specific requirements to achieve this target. In this regard, the program unit in Al-Makha developed simple implementation processes based on the findings of an initial situational assessment and imply the following causal relationships.



Being situation-specific and starting with/capitalizing on awareness raising, these processes appeared appropriate and consistent with the local setting, which qualify it as a ***good practice*** example.

2.1.2 Representation of Various Community Groups in the Executive Boards of CDOs:

Generally, GAs elect/select EBs in a way representing all villages and/or ethnic groups within the CDO coverage. However, in some CDOs is this apparent to be below the required level. It is more of a symbolic nature, which at the end has negatively affected the genuine participation of some community strata. In the cases where a CDO comprises more than one village, the main village often enjoys higher representation in the overall CDO membership and in its EBs.

[9] Participatory Impact Trends Assessment, CBRDP, October 2003
[10] Source: Yemen Human Development Report (2000/2001), UNDP and MoPIC

In some cases, the democratic election of EBs yielded biased results regarding representation of villages and/or ethnic groups since "majority carries votes". In the Yemeni context particularly the rural areas where the tribal and personal connections are highly influencing the election processes, it is recommendable to adjust this mechanism, without questioning however the superiority of democratic elections over other selection mechanisms due to its built-in ability to ensure and strengthen freewill selection and democracy. A locally adapted example was established by Al-Sayla CDO of G.B.Y., which selected its EB according to weighted representation of all social groups within its coverage.

Al-Sayla's community is composed of different social groups vary in numbers and social status from tribes to *Akhdam*. To avoid dominant of one/some groups if the EB is elected, the community decided to form the EB on weighted group representation basis. Accordingly, the EB comprises 19 members representing 18 groups. This mechanism was very effective during EB selection but less effective thereafter due to:

- Legal quorum in EB meetings is hardly maintained with this relatively big number, and
- Some EB members misunderstood their mandate and limited their role to monitoring the credit share of their constituencies

Community proposals to strengthen the idea included:

- Comprehensive criteria should be pre-set to ensure the qualitative aspect of the EB,
- Orientation of the constituencies on the importance of selecting good representatives, and
- Manage the process in away resulted in a manageable size of EB.

Another important issue is ***women's representation in EBs***. At the early stage of CDO's establishment, the majority of rural communities accepted women representation in EBs just to fulfil CBRDP's requirements for support, which include reasonable level of women's representation in EBs. Therefore, women's participation at that stage was more of symbolic nature in the majority of rural CDOs. Though gradually changed, this situation still exists in several rural CDOs, particularly in the tribally dominated areas As-Swadeya and K.B.S. Nevertheless, some communities achieved remarkable progress. In Al-Makha, for instance, a woman is chairing a mixed CDO, which is a rather rare case in all mixed CBOs in the country. Currently, women constitute 29% of EBs' members with 11% in key decision-making positions within the EBs.

2.1.3 The Scope and Diversity of CDOs' Interventions to Attract Continued Participation

The extent to which a CDO addressed and responded flexibly to the concerns of various community groups revealed significant to its operations. It influences the level of dynamic participation of various community groups in CDO operations as well as the degree to which these groups perceived the CDO as a community-owned mechanism for sustainable development and poverty reduction, which, in turn, inspire both the sense of ownership and sustainability.

CDOs developed initially around a basic services portfolio supported by the CBRD programme (mainly, institutional building, training and capacity building, credit to groups for productive income generation activities and mediators for provision of basic services)[11]. Most of these "priority" fields addressed the poor and, to less extent, the middle-income groups. While this helped the CDOs to focus, it hampered the level of involvement of other community groups in some cases. Some CDOs,

[11] The focus of this paper however is, as stated earlier, on the institutional and governance issues, which determine CDO operations, and not on the types and nature of CDO activities and services. Since these are, nevertheless, closely linked issues, an insight is provided in annex 4, which refers to the kind of activities and services CDOs, with CBRDP's start up support provided to their members.

though few, kept their interventions confined to the aforementioned services portfolio and, as a result, showed in the longer run a lower level of active community involvement in their operations, in relative terms, as compared to more innovative CDOs which initiated additional demand responsive activities.

The majority of CDOs expanded the scope of their interventions and/or adopted various innovative mechanisms, which are considered ***good practice*** examples, to make CDO operations more attractive for the communities' members, in general, and CDO members in particular. The following are the most significant among these initiatives:

1. ***Providing financial contributions to communal investment projects, which combine economic with social development objectives***. By responding to pressing community needs (e.g. water, communications, etc.), these projects increased CDOs membership and, simultaneously, promoted active interactions between the EBs' and the GAs' members. These projects provided a good mechanism to expand the benefits from the CDOs' to all socioeconomic categories of the societies keeping however the poor as the main target group. Examples of these projects are: water tanks implemented by Al-Rhma, Rhban and Al-Gaga'a CDOs of As-Swadeya, the telecommunication project implemented by Al-Maseyla CDO of G.B.Y, the bakery project implemented by Wedyan CDO of Aden, several small shops and pharmacies in remote villages of As Sawadya.
2. ***Provision of consumption credit without interest*** to the poorest CDO members on seasonal basis (e.g. food rations during *Ramadan*).
3. ***Supporting small self-help initiatives beyond the CDO membership base***. This is practiced by about 67% of the CDOs to respond to community needs, and increase CDO's attractiveness for the community/GAs' members. Moreover, such self-help initiatives contributed to self-reliance, economic development and social security. Examples of such initiatives include:
    - Cash support to destitute families (e.g. collection and distribution of *Zakat*[12], paying the school fees for students from poor families, sponsorship of orphans, etc.),
    - Liaise with government departments to establish pro-poor differential procedures (e.g. poor to pay monthly water and electricity bills in instalments and connecting destitute families to the Social Welfare Fund "SWF"),
    - Provision of some pressing community needs (e.g. water and electricity),
    - Vocational training (e.g. trainings in tailoring, coiffeur and weaving) and literacy education for women
    - Environmental-friendly activities (e.g. garbage collection campaigns and covering the public sewerage holes)
    - Cultural, health, sport and religious activities (e.g. cultural events, sport competitions, support to local football clubs, health awareness campaigns in certain issues, fasting-break/food during the month of Ramadan),
    - Support to public facilities (e.g. lighting of roads, construction of women centres), and
    - Community-driven gentlemen agreements to organize communal issues and to eradicate some harmful practices (e.g. organizing *Agram* system, specified dowries, etc.).

> Bani Ali CDO (K.B.S) paid the school fees for children of the poor CDO-members' families. Moreover, it reached an agreement with the local office of the Ministry of Education and respective schools to exempt children of destitute parents from the school fees. This led to increased percentage of CDO's active members from 62% to 79% in a month.

[12] Islamic tax collected from the better-off members on annual basis following certain principles based on minimum ceiling of annual net revenue and distributed to specified eight categories of needy people.

The analysis of these self-help initiatives revealed the following findings:

a. There are positive correlations between the number of the CDO's self-help initiatives and its organizational maturity, in one hand, and the level of GAs' participation, on the other.

b. Spatial analysis disclosed two findings:

(i) Aden's CDOs are more advanced regarding the level and the comprehensiveness of self-help initiatives. All CDOs there practiced self-help initiatives (average of 7 initiatives/CDO) in a comprehensive manner (their scope covered all the aforementioned fields except the legislations to organize communal issues). This is probably due to the following factors:

- Aden's rich experience with CBOs,
- Due to the social heterogeneity of Aden communities and the competition among CBOs within the same coverage, it is rather difficult for a CDOs to attract people if such initiatives are not in place, and
- The high level of awareness enabled CDOs to realize the fact that waiting for the government to respond to all their needs is not the right approach.

Although early to judge, the successful initiatives of some CDOs in Aden (Al-Dumayna and Al-Nahda) liaising with government departments to establish pro-poor differential procedures indicates the potential future roles of CDOs to influence government policies and practices in a pro-poor and community-focused manner.

(ii) The local settings shaped the scope of the CDOs' self-help initiatives. For instance, in rural areas, CDOs emphasized different mechanisms of cash support to destitute families, provision of some community needs and, to less extent, vocational training and literacy education for women. Among rural CDOs, As-Swadeys's CDOs initiated community-driven legislations to organize communal issues and to eradicate some harmful practices. In Aden, CDOs adopted, almost, all the aforementioned types of self-help initiatives with particular emphasis on liaise with different governments departments to establish pro-poor differential procedures; cultural, health, spot and religious activities, environmental-friendly activities and support to public facilities.

c. Among rural areas, As-Swadeya's CDOs showed the highest level of self-help initiatives. This is due to the indigenous local culture of solidarity among the tribes' members,

d. Interestingly, considerable portion of the CDOs' self-help initiatives were directed towards disadvantageous groups; mainly destitute, poor and women. In As-Swadeya's conservative and males-dominated community, Al-Eloum CDO, rewarded poor families who allowed their female members to participated in women literacy classes by connecting their houses to the CDO's electricity generator free of cost, and

e. Particularly in rural areas, CDOs' taped financial assistance from local wealthy and/or charitable people in support to CDOs' self-help initiatives.

2.1.4 Specific Target Mechanisms to Encourage and Support the Poor:

In all cases, CDOs' operations emphasized the participation of poor and their benefit from their interventions. For instance, CDOs' credit interventions mainly targeted the poor and, to less extent, middle-income groups according to a community-driven participatory targeting procedure described below as good practice example.

A ***good practice*** example adopted by all CDOs, is the definition of the key target group for CDOs support. In the context of CBRDP the procedure was called "the establishment of a Revolving Labour Pool (RLP)". The RLP was created at community level during the mobilization stage, before the CDO's formally establish. Its existence was considered one of the prerequisites of CBRDP to provide support to CDOs. Through facilitation by the program and after training of selected local community members on PLA, community members identify simple community-driven poverty indicators reflecting their perception towards poverty (e.g. income, number of livestock, house structure and furniture, etc.). Community members use these indicators to identify, develop and describe specific wellbeing categories (e.g. destitute, poor, middle-income, rich). Thereafter, they rank all households within the community under the specified categories. Groups of poor and low income households are considered the priority group to obtain loans from CDOs for productive Income Generating Activities (IGAs). Middle-income community members identified through the RLP mechanism could only benefit from CDO supported credit interventions, under the condition that through their group activity they would provide longer-term employment opportunities for poor and low-income household members. The RLP mechanism also helped to define against local criteria the most destitute households and facilitated linking them to the SWF and other relevant direct cash support mechanisms including the *Zakat*.

Being focused on community-driven indicators, foster participatory and transparent community-wide processes, the RLP considered an appropriate mechanism for understanding community's perceptions towards poverty, participatory credit targeting and credit monitoring.

Recent data (11/2003) confirm that the RLP mechanism helped to target poor households. They constitute 61% of credit direct beneficiaries compared to middle-income (30%) and rich community members (9%). On the other hand, CDOs' endeavours of linking poor with middle-income community members for joint group-based IGAs yielded interesting results.

A ***good practice example for linking poor and middle level income groups through*** labour-intensive IGAs is Kheyol Al-Badeya CDO (Al-Makha). It supported 72 middle-income farmers of smallholdings to purchase certified onion seeds and other production inputs for four production seasons. On average/per production season, 208 poor agricultural labourers were employed and benefited directly from the job opportunities created. Before credit, each middle-income farmer employed 1.63 labourers per season; the number increased to 2.89 labourers (77.3%); i.e. an additional 1.3 employment opportunities per farmer per season as a result of increased area under cultivation. Moreover, the same interventions refreshed the local economic status in the transportation sector, benefited the water pumps owners who provided water to water-less farmers against certain fees as well as agricultural middlemen and marketing agents (table 3).

Table 3: Change in Economic Opportunities After Financing of Onion's Farmers by Kheyol Al-Badeya CDO (Al-Makha):

Variable	Before Intervention	After Intervention	Change (%)
Number of functioning middle-income farmers	59	72	22
Number of agricultural labourers employed	96	208	117
Created job opportunities per farmer	1.63	2.89	78
Number of benefiting water pumps owners	13	17	31
Number of loading trucks involved	14	25	79
Number of middlemen and marketing agents	8	13	63

Other **generic example is (basically in AL-Makha) CDO financing of fishing boats.** In these cases, each project is owned by three families and creates an average permanent employment opportunities for another three poor labourers fishermen. The relationship between boat's owners and labourers is governed by clear production relations. Accordingly, certain amount of the catch is taken by the fishermen participating in fishing for their food. After deduction of all operating cost (including the cost of food during fishing), the net revenue is divided into equal shares. Two shares for the boat and a share for each fisherman participated in fishing regardless to boat's ownership. This system provided poor labourers fair terms of trade.

Through the financing of labour-intensive IGAs, the CDOs effectively linked poor community members to middle-income ones.

Another ***good practice example*** resulting from the RLP mechanisms is the pro-active roles played by CDOs in linking destitute households/persons with the SWF (for periodic cash support), charitable organizations (for cash and/or material support) and private sector (for *Zakat*). This was applied by about 28% of the CDOs. Moreover, Al-Amal and Al-Aydrous CDOs (Aden) facilitates within-communities monthly pensions' transactions by hosting officers from MoSAL in their premises. This saves the time and physical efforts of the retirees obtaining their monthly pensions.

The above experiences demonstrated good scope for increasing IGA through the linking of poor community members with better skilled ones through the group-based financing. "In Al-Makha, about 30.3% of the members of the funded SIGs had no past experiences in the fields of the financed projects. Currently, they are acquiring these experiences from their experienced colleagues in the SIG through teamwork and learning-by-doing" (PITA, October 2003)[13]. Successful experiences indicated a tendency to more self driven, independent follow-up initiatives by groups of poor households.

2.1.5 CDO operations: Lessons Learnt and Policy Recommendations:

→ The specific case study of Al-Sayla CDO, GBY, suggests some key factors for better CBO's representation of its respective community. These are: (i) reasonable geographical coverage (ii) sensible degree of social homogeneity (iii) high level of awareness and sensitivity regarding communal issues (v) appropriate mechanisms to ensure equitable representation of all socio-economic groups in the EB.

[13] Participatory Impacts Trends Assessment: Al-Makha; CBRDP, October 2003.

→ When the CBO's coverage comprises more then one village, and to avoid the negative consequences of dominance of the main villages in terms of representation in the EB, community-specific scenarios could be recommended e.g. sub EBs at the each sub-village.

→ Methodologically, pure quantitative analysis of some variables might lead to unrealistic conclusions. For instance, although all poor are members in Al-Mazab CDO (K.B.S) and they represent 93.6% of its member, the CDO operations and benefits were controlled by the better-off groups; namely traditional leaders. Therefore, one can argue that qualitative participation of poor in the CDO's operation and its commitment to the poor are more important than their quantitative participation no matter their numeric weights.

Qualitative participation of the poor in the CDO's operations and the CDO's commitment to the poor are more important than quantitative participation of poor in the CDO's

→ The appropriate approach to deal with the issue of women participation in CBOs' operations as a mean for their empowerment should be location and situation-specific. This should be precisely developed in view of the outcomes of a comprehensive analysis.

→ Generally, the CBOs should not just limit their focus to the activities assisted by outside agencies. Instead, they should initiate, even at very small-scale, other complementary activities, which, address all segments and age groups of the community. In the case of CDOs, financing of communal investment projects with social dimension and provision of consumption credit to poor members proved to be among the good practices, which make the CDOs attractive for the community members.

→ Self-help activities, as indicated by the experience of the CDOs, showed strong propensity to: (i) mobilize and rationalize the use of community resources (human, physical, financial, time, etc.), (ii) induce and foster self-reliance, (iii) contribute, significantly, to the social and economic development of the communities, (iv) make the CDOs very attractive for the community and GAs' members, (v) pro-poor, and (vi) respond to the various interests of different socioeconomic and age categories. Therefore, CBOs should emphasize the implementation of such initiatives, given their socio-cultural peculiarities and settings.

→ The experience of the CDOs with regard to the development and use of the RLP offered interesting good practices for similar CBOs involved in poverty-reduction initiatives. In addition to its relevant methodology, which implies community empowerment since developed by the local communities, it acts as tool to: (i) provide transparent community-driven targeting mechanism, (ii) facilitate linking the destitute to relevant agencies, (iii) link poor community members (households) with middle income, better skilled community members for joint group-based productive IGAs, (iv) enforce the benefit of the poor unemployed community members from the local employment opportunities created by the IGAs, and (v) monitor the changes in household's poverty status resulting from credit and/or other relevant interventions.

→ One of the appropriate mechanisms to facilitate liking of the poor to middle-income community members is through financing of labour-intensive IGAs, through which poor can tap employment opportunities and contribute to local economic growth.

→ Group-based financing proved to provide good opportunities for skills' transfer (on-the-job training), experience sharing and complementarity in favor of poor and less-skilled community members.

2.2 CDO GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT:

Governance is defined as "the process by which stakeholders articulate their interests, their input is absorbed, decisions are taken and decision-makers are held accountable"[14]. One goal of good governance is to enable an organization to effectively do its work and fulfill its mission. However, good governance is about more than getting the job done. Especially in the context of CBOs, where values typically play an important role in determining both organizational purpose and style of operation, process is as important as product. Good governance is, therefore, about both achieving desired results and achieving them in the right way. Since the "right way" is largely shaped by the cultural norms and values of the organization, there can be no universal template for good governance. Nonetheless, some common characteristics of good governance include[15]:

- ***Participation***: providing all men, women and different groups with a voice in decision-making
- ***Transparency:*** built on the free flow of information
- ***Responsiveness:*** of institutions and processes to stakeholders
- ***Consensus orientation***: differing interests are mediated to reach a broad consensus on what is in the general interest
- ***Equity:*** all men, women and different groups have equal opportunities to be involved
- ***Effectiveness and efficiency***: processes and institutions produce results that meet needs while making the best use of resources
- ***Accountability***: of decision-makers to stakeholders
- ***Strategic vision***: leaders and the public have a broad and long-term perspective on good governance.

The study applied two main indicators in assessing CDOs' governance: (a) EB operations and response to above characteristics while fulfilling their tasks, and (b) the interaction between EB and GA as the two key governing bodies of CDOs. However, since integration of traditional power structures into CDOs' structures revealed significant vis-à-vis governance, the study also assessed this variable.

2.2.1 Operations of CDOs' Executive Boards:

According to the existing law (MoSAL's law no. 1/2001), the basic rules of CDOs' operations include that their EBs must be democratically elected by the constituencies/GA, adhere to the CDO's constitution and bylaws and adopt accountability and transparency measures. The EBs maintained division of labour via Specialized Technical Committees (STC) such as service committee, women committee, monitoring committee etc.

The main tasks of the CDO's EB established under the CBRDP were defined as to:

1. Identify, plan and coordinate community's development priorities,
2. Identify, appraise and implement group based, productive income generating activities,
3. Monitor the progress of the implemented activities in their respective areas,
4. Manage the CDOs' own funding resources "Sanduq", and
5. Create effective linkages with other institutions at different levels for social and human development aspects of CDOs/communities.

[14] Source: Institute on Governance, **XXXX**

15 Source: "Governance and Sustainable Human Development", UNDP, 1997.

In view of the above characteristics of good governance and the EBs' tasks, and as revealed by the EBs' minutes of 17 randomly selected CDOs, the decision-making process within the EBs follows participatory patterns with reasonable participation of all members. They rarely resort to voting as decision-making mechanism (limited to 8% of the EBs' decisions). The EBs' members attributed this to the clearness of the adopted implementation systems, which provided good guidance on the routine issues discussed by the EBs. Nevertheless, in some EBs, which included *Sheikhs,* the participatory interactions within the EB are, directly or indirectly, hampered by the *Sheikh.*

In some CDOs, the EBs consulted some of their constituencies before deciding on crucial issues, often of informal nature during *Qat's Magials* and/or other social gatherings and, seldom, through exceptional GAs' meetings. In some few CDOs (e.g. Bani Ali, K.B.S), the GAs' members are allowed to attend the EBs' meetings as observers, which imply a good transparency dimension. While consensus orientation was considered high within all EBs, equity measures were not maintained in the majority of CDOs. This was due to the weak involvement of women in decision making within the EBs, with exception of Aden and other few CDOs in Al-Makha.

Most EBs communicated their decisions to the GAs through informal channels like social gatherings. Some CDOs, mainly in Aden, are using signboards to display the important findings of their meetings to the CDOs' members. Of key importance in communications is transparent information about CDO finance operations. Financial accountability is crucial. This attributed to the need for and use of simple and clear financial systems, which helped EBs adhering to the financial principals and assisting them applying good accountability measures.

A problem for most CDOs is the limited number of active members in the EBs. And, accordingly, only few members are handling most of the executive work of the CDOs. In view of the discussions with representatives of almost all EBs, the following cause factors were identified:

1. EBs' members are operating on pure voluntary basis. Under the pressing economic conditions, it is rather difficult for the majority of them to allocate enough time to CDOs' operations. Moreover, the culture of voluntary organizational work is not that developed in Yemen. The EBs' members are frequently raising this issue. Solving this issue is crucial to keep EB member's commitment alive. Options to reimburse EB members time inputs were identified and included (a) that a certain percentage of the net profits generated by the CDO's credit operations would be allocated for the EB's members on performance basis. (b) a second scenario (proposed by the Program's Strategic Planning Workshop in Aden, March 2002) suggested financing of an IGA under the name of the EB as an institution (and not merely the current EB's members). However, this proposal was not yet implemented; (c) some CDOs (Al-Maseyla of G.B.Y as an example) approved and implemented restricted incentive system for some EBs' members, often the members of the Sanduq Committee due to the nature of their tasks, which required certain commitments in terms of time and physical efforts (physical monitoring of credit).

Voluntary work is a major challenge facing the current and future operations of CDOs. While the CBRDP's and CDOs' philosophies are built around the voluntary work, it is absolutely difficult to be purely implemented in real life having the poverty status of the vast majority of the EBs' members and the demanding nature of EB work. This issue must be carefully addressed in a manner that maintains the rational of voluntary work and combining it, at the same time, with compensations for (jointly agreed) key members to reimburse their time and efforts in serving their communities.

2. Some EBs' members are lacking essential skills, which however are prerequisites for executive work such as the ability to read and write. In cases where illiterate persons were elected as EB

members this isolated them from most of the executive tasks. Hence, local communities should be thoroughly enlightened on the responsibilities of the EBs and the necessary criteria of their members in advance in order to assist them making informed selection decisions, and

3. Division of labour within the EB is not properly allocated and rationalized. For instance, members of the Sanduq committee are quite busy while the volume of work of other committees (e.g. Services committee) is by far less than their membership. This led to reluctance among the unutilised/under utilized members. Therefore, it is absolutely important to set the EB's size in accordance with its TOR.

2.2.2 Interactions Between EBs and GAs:

The nature and strength of linkages and cohesion between the EBs and the communities varies but in general, it was seen as a crucial challenge which needs further strengthening. The study figured-out the following key factors limiting proper EBs – GAs interactions:

1. ***Election of EB members***. Due to the nature of CDO formation, which in some cases was done in a rush, and sometimes to satisfy external project demands, or in order to attract outside resources, some CDOs missed the momentum to elect from the beginning the "right" - meaning capable, responsible and widely accepted persons with high social trust and reputation. It took several CDOs quite some time to replace the initially chosen "place holders", some of which operated in a highly unsatisfying way from the view of CDO members, thus inducing/contributing to weak EB - GA relationships. The legally prescribed re-elections of EB members were used in those CDOs where the reassignment of low performing EB could not be achieved earlier. At that occasion new EB members who better represent GA interests and participation were elected.

2. ***Frequency of formal meetings between the EB and the GA:*** Regular periodic GA's meetings are crucial for lively interaction between EBs and GAs. In this regard, meetings should not be confined to formal organized conferences; instead, informal gatherings should also be emphasized. However, this is not a common practice among CDOs.

> Periodic formal GA meetings and informal gatherings proved to be very efficient tools, which foster transparency and bring community members closer to the CDO.

   The reason behind this gap is largely attributed to the MoSAL's law no. 1/2001, which linkes mandatory GA's meetings with the re-election of the EB every three years. Exceptional GA meetings upon a request of either the EB or the GA are allowed under restricted conditions. This legal clause hindered regular interactions and transparent flow of information between the EB and GA. Moreover, this issue was not addressed by the constitutions of some CDOs, although legally allowed. The latter is mainly because most of these constitutions were just transcripted from the sample constitution offered by the MoSAL without being adjusted to suit the CDOs puropses. In addition, in some CDOs, the GA is not fully acquainted with the CDO's bylaws. This is either due to the poor level of GA's participation in the preparations or because these documents were presented in a polished technical language, which is beyond the understanding ability of the illiterate members. Therefore, it is important to ensure genuine participation of GA in the development of this essential document and also to present the bylaws in a way facilitates easy understanding of all members.

   Only few CDOs organize regular formal GA meetings for consultations, information sharing and decision making on certain issues (e.g. the monthly and bi-annual GAs' meetings of Al-Saylah and Bani Ali CDOs of GBY and KBS, respectively). Some others use informal gatherings (e.g.

Gats magials of Al-Bahr Al-Ahmar CDO of Al-Makha) for the same purposes. These CDOs are not experiencing EBs – GAs gaps.

The CDO's constitution should be designed in view of its interests and peculiarities as a participatory development-oriented entity within the overall legal limits. It should not be a transcript of the sample constitution offered by the legislative authority.	Al-Mustagbal CDO (As-Swadeya) translated its constitution and bylaws into simple language using the local dialect. This facilitates easy understanding of these documents & fostered participatory interactions between GA and EB.

3. ***Effects on EBs if CDOs are established on purely geographical basis*** (as discussed under **1.1**). With the exception of Aden with its urban uniqueness, the GA-EB gap is wider in the communities, which decided to form their CDOs on pure geographical basis (e.g. K.B.S). Within K.B.S's CDOs, this gap is deeper in Al-Etihad CDO, which comprises two *Auzla*. Moreover, all CDOs, which split into smaller geographical zones based on social factors showed progressive improvements in terms of GA-EB interactions after divisions.

4. ***Differences in political affiliations*** widen the gap between the GAs and EBs especially in highly politicized areas. Thus, the EBs' members should be reminded to differentiate between their personal right to practice political activities and their institutional roles as executive members of non-political entities such as CDOs.

2.2.3 Integration of Existing Power Structures into the CDOs' Structures:

As above highlighted, the highly tribal-influenced situation of rural Yemen, challenge the operations of CDOs, especially participatory interactions within the EBs. This challenge caused by the CDOs' intended shift from the individual *Sheikhs'*-centred to institutional/group-based (EBs) leadership at the community level, which risks the privileges of *Sheikhs*. In view of this, the level of involvement of the *Sheikhs* in CDOs' structures varies from complete lack of involvement (2%), to involvements as GA's members (25%), as EB's members (14%) and as honourable members in certain advisory positions (11%). Moreover, 28% of *Sheiks* were represented in the EBs by their families' members (table 4).

Table 4: Sheikhs' Involvement in CDOs' Structures:

Area	No. of *Sheikhs*[16]	Sheikhs' Involvement in CDOs Structures								Represented in EB by a Family Member	
		Not Involved		GA's Members		EB's Members		Honourable Positions			
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%[17]
K.B.S	10	1	10	5	50	3	30	1	10	5	50
Swadeya	11	0		7	64	3	27	1	9	3	27
G.B.Y	05	0		5	100	0		0			
Makha	17	0		8	47	0		9	53	4	24
Total	43	1	2	25	58	6	14	11	26	12	28

[16] Numbers include both major and minor *Sheikhs*.
[17] Compared to the total number of *Sheikhs*.

In addition to the impact of the local setting, the leadership style and the personal characteristics of the *Sheikhs* as well as their understanding of their roles vis-à-vis the CDO also induced these variations. Within the EBs, analysis of the quality of involvement of the *Sheikhs* and/or their representatives showed the following different pattern of interactions:

- Participatory leaders who contributed to CDOs' progresses (e.g. Rhban CDO, As-Swadeya),
- Eventful who don't have enough time for the CDO's executive work despite good willingness (e.g. Al-Haratik CDO, As-Swadeya) ,
- Tribe-oriented who mixed between the CDO and the tribe (Al-Khuraisheba CDO, K.B.S),
- Domineers who blocked participatory interactions, and
- Self-seeking who blocked poor from benefiting from the CDO (e.g. Al-Reboe CDO, K.B.S).

No unified recommendation could be generalized with regard to the question what might be more useful for the CDO: to have the Sheikhs within or outside the EB; instead, the finding was that it must be assessed on case-by-case basis and in view of the context. While *Sheikhs* in EBs may block democratic decision making and/or affects EBs' operations due to their occupied agenda, their exclusion may seriously damage the CDO operations. However, a ***good practice successfully*** adopted by some CDOs, in this regard, is to assign them certain honourable tasks (e.g. act as moral collateral for credit recipients) and positions (e.g. advisory bodies).

By assigning *Sheikhs* honourable positions, a CDO could avoid the negative consequences which it might face in case Sheiks would be completely excluded from CDOs, or involved in the EB's demanding executive work .

The two following good practice examples to involve local elites were tested by CDOs in the tribal context.

(i) The Advisory Council, Bani Ali CDO, K.B.S:

In 1994, a group of young friends including the *Sheikh's* son in Al-Hegra village (Bani Ali *Auzla,* K.B.S) established a community Sanduq to assist in counteracting some local financial problems. It was an informal cooperative at the village level with 25 members. The membership was open for adult (men and women). A three-member executive body was democratically elected by the members. Members developed simple internal bylaw. The EB was assigned the management of the fund, which was limited to productive investment activities. Mandatory biannual GA meetings were held to present the final accounts and to distribute the profits for interested members. In addition, the EB informally regularly briefs the members about the progress on weekly basis after the Friday prayers.
+
This Sanduq gradually expanded to neighbouring villages (current members are 225 persons). As a result, it was rather difficult to keep the informal briefings for all members. Therefore, an Advisory Council (AC) was formed, composed of one member from each participating village in addition to tribal leaders and some elders. Members from each village selected their AC's representative. The tasks of the AC were more of policy and advice as well as safeguard for transparency without an executive role. The AC meets with the EB on monthly basis and, in turn, each representative briefs his constituencies. After one year of successful operations, the constituencies decided to provide in addition to the investment credit also consumption and social credits (to respond to certain demands like death, illness and marriage) on restricted basis and according to certain criteria.

Successful previous community's experiences with community institutions enrich the CDO's experience and encourage participatory interactions within various sub-institutions within the CDO.

When Bani Ali CDO formed in March 2000, the members of the Community Sanduq (all are members in the CDO) decided to continue their Sanduq's operations side-by-side with the CDO's operations. The CDO's GA adopted the AC modality and the mandatory biannual GA meetings in the CDOs' operations. This experience is one of the most successful, which attributed to:

- AC's clear advisory and information sharing mandates,
- Successful previous community's experience with community institutions & advisory bodies.

(ii) Development Councils, As-Swadeya:

The Development Councils (DCs) were initiated in order to bridge the gap between the GAs and the EBs using the tribal norms in As-Swadeys. The DCs built on one of the indigenous organizational structures of the tribal system of "lineages' representatives". The lineages' representatives enjoy the admiration of communities and assume vital roles within their tribes including (a) collecting *Aghram,* (b) distributing benefits, (c) participating in tribe's meetings and (d) representing their lineages in communal tribe's concerns and gatherings.

The idea of DCs was to apply the same approach within the CDO context in order to form an advisory body representing all CDO members on lineage basis following the principle of weighted[18] representation of each lineage. The mandate of the DC was initially limited to advisory/consultative roles. Despite not fully functioning yet, the idea seems theoretically good provided that:

- The role of the DC would be limited to advisory/consultative issues,
- The lineages would be thoroughly advised to select good representatives and in a democratic manner.

On the other hand, DCs may bear the following risks:

- Some representatives might block their constituencies from effective participation and/or block transparent flow of information between the EB and their lineages
- DCs might try to intervene in CDOs executive work leading to conflicts with EBs.

2.2.4 Lessons Learnt and Policy Recommendations:

→ Frequent GA's meetings proved to be among the key essential mechanisms needed to promote lively interactions between the GA members and increases the GA - EB dialogue. In addition, it fosters good governance, which, in turn, supports the sustainability potentials of the CBO.

→ The first election of EB members is crucial**.** CDOs must be well briefed about the importance long term impact of electing from the beginning the "right" - meaning capable, responsible and widely accepted persons with high social trust and reputation. Flexible mechanisms for reelection in case of EB member default, should be included into CDO bylaws.

→ The CBOs should recognize the fact that the laws are usually developed to provide an overall (countrywide) organizational and regulating framework by addressing common themes. Therefore, they are not necessarily responding to the detailed local-specific, thematic and other

[18] Weights were based on the number of families within the clans.

peculiarities of each CBO. Nevertheless, this should not block a CBO from reflecting its interests and concerns in the internal regulations and bylaws. This is not withstand the serious need in Yemen to adjust the current MoSAL's law no. 1/2001 in order to better respond to the requirements of all development-oriented CBOs including the studied CDOs

→ The constitutions and bylaws of the CBOs, which are established by communities lacking previous experiences with formal organizations are too often simply transcripts of the sample documents offered by the legislative authorities. This must be adjusted since the CBO should develop these essential documents in view of its interests and peculiarities with the maximum participation/consultation of the CBO's members and within the overall legal limits. Ensuring demand responsive service delivery to the broadest possible basis of CDO members. In this regard, of Al-Mustagbal CDO (As-Swadeya) offered an example of a good practice by translated its constitution and bylaws into simple language using the local dialect.

→ Tribalism is deeply rooted in Yemeni society. It dominates and shapes the social live in most of the governorates in the northern part. While it could block organized CDOs-led community-driven development, it has very strong potential to support it. This is mainly depends on the type of the tribal leadership and, most importantly, the implementation approach used by CBOs in the tribal setting. Under such situation, success often correlated with the extent to which CBOs use the positive tribal norms and customary regulations as vehicle for development and, simultaneously, avoid irrelevant ones intelligently. For instance, the Aghram system, though encourages conflicts, could be used to promote community-driven development initiatives. Among the relevant and the others best practices adopted by the CDOs in As-Swadeya is using the ethics of the honour (Sharaf) as an efficient and flexible informal "moral" collateral to guarantee repayment of due credit.

→ A good practice adopted by some CDOs regarding the integration of traditional leaders into a CBO structure is to assign them honourable advisory positions. The successful experience of Bani Ali CDO, highlighted clear distinction between the advisory tasks of the advisory bodies and the executive mandate of the EBs as a key success factor.

3.1 CDOs' LINKAGES WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS:

There is lot of evidence that CBOs often do not mature and turn into sustainable organizations unless they have successfully established operational and political linkages to other organizations and government agencies, in particular local government. Institutional and economic linkages are essential for CBO to (a) define their niche and comparative advantage on a complementary basis to local government and other agencies, and (b) also to facilitate the access of CDO members to services which the CDO cannot provide itself, thus complementing its own activities. In case of rural Yemen the access to basic social services and infrastructure is crucial and a precondition to be addressed, before rural communities get ready to concentrate in a sustainable (long term) way on productive income generating activities. The definition of the role of CDOs in the decentralized organizational setting in Yemen is a political requirement to ensure their recognition and sustainability.

3.1.1 Basic Mechanisms to Promote CDOs' Horizontal Linkages:

The fact that all studied CDOs were initiated with the assistance of the same external program (CBRDP), implies the following consequences: (i) a high degree of similarity in terms of structures and operations, (ii) good opportunities for sharing information and experiences among CDOs within the same area through program-organized activities such as training programs, exhibitions, exchange visits, etc. (iii) increasing level of competition among CDOs. Moreover, as social characteristics of

rural Yemen, people of the same district know each other and often have socioeconomic linkages. All these factors facilitated good collaboration and coordination among the CDOs of the same area. The readiness of CDOs for collaboration was confirmed in several ways which are **good practice examples**:

- The first established group of CDOs assisted in the formulation of new ones through participation in the preliminary sensitization and community mobilization campaigns.
- Some advanced, relatively matured CDOs organized training programs, through their trained staff, for the newly established ones (e.g. AL-Amal CDO, Aden, trained 3 CDOs on accounting & bookkeeping,
- Exchange visits among CDOs,
- Inter CDOs' consultative and coordination meetings,
- The CDOs in Aden, GBY and Al-Makha initiated serious preparatory arrangements to form CDOs' coordination bodies at their respective areas.

However, the CDOs did not utilize the aforementioned comparative advantages and initiatives to develop organized coalitions among different CDOs of the same area. This might be associated to: (i) competition among CDOs, (ii) legislative barriers since the law limited the forms of CBOs' federations to unions and under rather discouraging conditions, and (iii) Unconsciousness among CDOs with the potential benefits of coming together in an organized form coupled with the absence of similar demonstrative successful models.

On the other hand, the number of other (other than CDOs) community organizations/institutions in CDOs' areas of operations, except Aden, is generally limited. The vast majority of them are informal charitable institutions with few numbers of consumers' cooperatives and specialized organizations. Most of these institutions are fragile, inactive, dominated by few members and lack the essential organizational requirements[19]. These outside (of CDO) factors negatively affected proper institutional-based coordination and collaboration between the CDOs and these institutions. Members of these institutions often chose to become also CDOs' members, which facilitates good personal coordination between the two institutions, though on individual-based nature, not on institutional base. The common fields of coordination varied from lobbying for provision of basic services and infrastructure projects to technical cooperation, mainly in training and, in few cases, self-help initiatives (e.g. coordination between Al-Aydrous CDO and other community institutions in health awareness campaigns in support of eradication of girl circumcision). Although not quite existing, sharing of common members could facilitate coordinated planning of the community needs and, thereafter, better complementary actions.

3.2 Good Practices of CDOs' Vertical Linkages:

3.1.2.1 CDOs' Linkages with the Local Councils (LCs)

As earlier presented, legislative decentralization started in Yemen in February 2000 and Local Councils' (LCs) elections were held in April 2001. Nevertheless, three years after their election, most LCs does not yet function as the law intended them to do. They neither plan their jurisdictions' development nor budget their resources and, in most districts, the local people did not see the value added of the LCs vis-à-vis the pre-existing traditional authorities. This is caused by number of reasons including the following:

[19] Source: CBRDP, Inception Report, Institutions, Capacity Building and Training Expert, Sana'a, 1999.

1. The experience is quite new for the government, LCs and communities,
2. Political and legislative decentralization were not accompanied with financial decentralization,
3. Lack of clear technical systems including the planning system, and
4. Inadequate skills and unclear vision of some LCs' members regarding their roles.

The CDOs' establishment preceded LCs' formations; therefore, coordination between the two entities was not addressed by the CDOs' initial design. While in some areas coordination between CDOs and LCs initiated, LCs in other areas were negatively intervened in CDOs' operations. However, the current coordination is not properly institutionalized and mainly attributed to the common CDOs/LCs members, which represents 35% of the LCs' membership in the 10 districts where CDOs is operating (table 5). A considerable percentage of the CDOs'/LCs' common members evolved as new local leaders as a result of their competency in CDOs' management, which offered them the chance to be elected for the LCs.

"I was elected for the LC after I proved my capacities as EB member. If the LC was elected before the establishment of the CDO I would not be elected. Instead, a *Shaikh* or his son would be elected in my place", Ali Mohamed, Bani Zaid Chairman and the member of the Planning Committee of K.B.S LC.

Table 5: CDOs'/LCs Common Members:

Area	Number of LCs and Districts	LCs' Members	CDOs'/LCs' Common Members			
			GAs' Members		EBs' Members[20]	
			No.	%	No.	%
K.B.S	1	20	10	50	8	40
Swadeya	3	57	26	46	9	16
G.B.Y	1	18	11	61	6	33
Al-Makha	2	36	10	28	8	22
Aden	3	60	10	17	9	15
Total	10	191	67	35	40	21

Common CDOs/LCs members benefited both the CDOs and the LCs in the following ways:

1. Availed the common members good opportunities to include communities' priorities identified by CDOs in the LCs' plans, which also strengthens the LCs' plans,

CDOs' in K.B.S failed to mobilize funds for water projects. When this was reflected in the LC's plan through the common members, the finance for 4 water projects was approved and are under implementation.

2. Common members, especially EBs' members, added extra value to the LCs' operations due to their experiences in working with communities and the technical skills they gained through training in their CDOs. For instance, K.B.S's LC ranked first in accounting in an internal assessment by Al-Mhwait LC at the governorate level. Accordingly, it assigned the responsibility of training other LCs in the governorate. K.B.S's LC attributed this to the fact that all the staff of their accounting unit (3) have been trained in their capacities as members of the Sanduqs' committees of their CDO.

Utilizing the knowledge acquired through the training, and their hands on experience with their own CDO, CDO members constitute valuable assets of the LCs' operations.

[20] Since EBs' members are also GAs' members, the numbers in this column are included in the numbers of GA's members.

Given the new Yemen's macro-policies landscape and its efforts to strengthen decentralization, in one hand, and the crucial CDOs' need for vertical linkages that can support their institutional sustainability, in the other, it is important to institutionalize and strengthen the relationship between the two entities. The study findings revealed high CDOs' comparative advantage to stand as competent partner to LCs at the community level as justified by the following:

- Unlike in other similar countries adopting decentralization, the administrative set-up in Yemen starts at the district level without any administrative structures at the community level. Thus, LCs were elected by temporal election centres (i.e. automatically dissolved after election) determined according to: population density (an average of 50,000 persons per centre), social homogeneity and geographical proximity. This risks the transparency and accountability dimensions in the LCs' operations especially when we consider the unfavourable demographic (relatively big number of constituencies spread over vast areas and topographical factors. On the other hand, being democratically formed and operational at the community level, the CDOs can bridge this critical gap especially in terms of two-ways information flow,
- As disclosed by the LCs, communities that have CDOs are better organized compared to others. Thus, CDOs' represent an organized communities, which easily interact with LCs,
- Common CDOs'/LCs' members showed better skills and richer experience compared to other LCs' members. This means, CDOs could offer more competent potential candidates for LCs,
- CDOs often have tested technical systems for participatory planning and targeting, which LCs' could build on especially it currently lacks such system,
- CDOs proved good tendencies (PITA 2003), in mobilizing un-taped community resources, contributing to local economic growth and implementing development interventions. CDOs could offer these expertise especially they are within the LCs' mandate, and
- CDOs collected and updated diversified data at the community level. They could offer both the data and the data collection and treatment expertise, which would enforce LCs' plans.

CDOs enjoy high comparative advantages vis-à-vis LCs. If properly utilized, they could enrich institutional linkages between the two entities for the benefit of their common communities.

Despite these comparative advantageous, which encourage future institutional-based linkages, there are two major risk elements, which need to be addressed:

1. There are critical legislative gaps and inconsistencies between the law no. 1/2001 of the MoSAL and the Local Authority law no. 4/2000. Both laws claim supervisory role of CDOs' activities without clear illustration of the term "supervision". This lead to subjective individual judgement of each LC regarding the term. While some LCs understood it as objective monitoring associated with backup, the majority understand it as autocratic control, and
2. The Local Authority law no. 4/2000 does not describe the legal relationship between the LCs and CBOs including CDOs. For instance, according to this law, "the LC could allocate up-to 20% of some of its resources to support self-help and/or cooperative initiatives at its level[21]". No clear implementation mechanism(s) was developed but left for the LCs' to decide.

2.3.2.2 CDOs' Linkages with other Local and National Institutions:

[21] Aarticle no. 134, page 46; the Local Authority law No. 4/2000.

With CBRDP's assistance, CDOs prepared to play pro-active role in coordination with other relevant actors at local and national levels. Planned preparations include different interrelated mechanisms the most important of which are:

a. Potential actors were identified and their fields of interventions, implementation modalities and procedures assessed. The generated information were used in designing a tailor-made training program for CDOs on project design and proposal writing,
b. Dialogues started will the identified actors and they were briefed and introduced to the CDOs,
c. CDOs prepared themselves, with CBRDP assistance, to assume leading roles in the coordination processes through: organized training on certain fields, development of publicity materials and adherence to transparency and accountability measures to attract donors.

As a result, the CDOs succeeded in tapping a total of YR 402 MON (US $ 2.2 MON) from 36 agencies in addition to non-cash contributions from 15 other agencies. The taped financial resources represent 62% of total CDOs' resource portfolio (fig. 4). The interventions implemented through coordination included: different capacity building activities, basic services (water, health and education facilities "especially literacy education"), agricultural development, livestock development, support to women activities and cash support to poor. These were resulted in: improved complementarity among development actors, better access of local communities to services and CDOs better perceived by the local communities as active player in the implementation of these projects. Having the fact that there are many development organizations who supports CBOs' initiatives in Yemen, this progress is basically attributed to the CDOs' comparative advantage, in terms of organizational capacities, vis-à-vis other CBOs.

However, such good results are missing a great opportunity for sustainability since there are no well-documented institutional-based coordination mechanisms between the CDOs and those actors. It is obvious that this is just an example of where the recommended CDOs' networks and federations could be very helpful.



3.3.2 Lessons Learnt and Policy Recommendations:

→ CDOs of the same action area should seriously think of promoting their existing coordination mechanisms into institutionalised networks as strategic means to foster their lobbying' capacities, voice their concerns and ease institutional-based vertical linkages with other institutions;

→ The common CDOs'/LCs' members demonstrated better skills and richer experience compared to other LCs' members. Thus, strategically, promotion of CDOs' capacity building could be a good vehicle to get qualified people elected into the LCs'.

→ The coordination initiatives between CDOs and LCs need to be institutionalized based on clear legislative vision that maintains the entity of each institution. To this effect, the value added of

both should be maximized and, simultaneously, the legislative inconsistencies as well as the legal relationship between both should be seriously addressed.

→ CBOs should emphasize strong vertical relations with relevant actors. The studied CDOs offered a good practice example in tapping resources from different sources, which might be due to their comparative advantage and the organized approach adopted for this purpose. However, all CBOs' coordination actions should be institutionalized to foster sustainability.

SECTION THREE: CONCLUSIONS, MAJOR LESSONS LEARNT, GOOD PRACTICES AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS:

Based on the study findings and in view of the general organizational aspects and performance of CBOs in Yemen, the assessed CDOs showed fair successes regarding:

- Empowerment of local communities through self-owned and managed community-driven organizations,
- Responsiveness to the demands and aspirations of local people, particularly the poor, in both processes and results
- Pro-poor inclusiveness of structures and mechanisms
- Linking poor households to middle-income groups,
- Interactions with and integration of traditional power structures,
- Coordination of local poverty alleviation initiatives through different means including operational horizontal and vertical linkages

Moreover, CDOs have good potentials and comparative advantages- though some were not yet used- in the following: (i) institutionalized coordination with the Local Councils, and (ii) tendencies to influence pro-poor policies and to contribute to good governance within the decentralized context. The new orthodoxy of "good governance" has potential to promote CBOs, including the CDOs under assessment, into a centre-stage of development but with new dual roles. In addition to service provision, CBOs are also seen as pivotal actors, though advocacy, in contributing to local policy development and in holding local governments to account for their actions. Both issues required competent CDOs' coalitions, alliances building and strong advocacy.

The findings of this study highlighted some key issues as crucial precondition for successful CBOs formations, operations and sustainability. These include:

- The local socio-cultural, institutional settings proved to be fundamentally important in shaping the organizational maturity and modes of interactions within the CBO as well as between the CBO and its environment.
- CBOs in urban context differ from those of rural context in terms of both formation and operation.
- Under strong tribal context, CBOs should smoothly, but without negatively affecting their mandates, incorporate the traditional leaders in their structures and operations. As suggested by the study, assigning traditional leaders honourable advisory positions proved appropriate mechanism in this regard.
- Appropriate setting of CBO's territory is crucial in view of both social and geographical factors and in connection of the goals and processes devised by the CBO,
- Legal issues as the consistency of the legislative framework with the CBOs' mission statements and operations revealed as an extremely crucial precondition for successful CBO formation and operation. One of the repeated shortcomings in the CBOs' legislative frameworks is the

amalgamation of often contradictory mode of organizations within the same framework without necessary demarcations and/or explanations,

- Processes of interaction adopted by CBOs proved as important as their ultimate services/products they may offer, since the processes affect internal governance, inclusiveness vis-à-vis the target group (the poor in the case of the CDOs) and relation with the local environment.
- Despite essential, voluntary work of the executive bodies of CBOs, exclusively voluntary work often negatively affects their institutionalized operations, especially in the case of CBOs of the poor. The challenge facing CBOs is how to maintain the ethics of voluntarisms without hampering their institutional-based processes and performance.
- In the cases whereby an external actor(s) assists local communities establishing their CBOs, the following proved crucial:

  a. The early stage of introducing the program to the local communities proved to be extremely crucial, which necessitate careful planning regarding the appropriate entry points to the communities, the messages to be transferred and the staff who will deliver these messages. In this context, the introduction messages to the local community should be: precisely developed, consistent, up-to the point without creating a state of over expectation, and clearly transferred using the appropriate channels, which match the local setting,
  b. During the program's start-up, there is a need to invest in social preparation keeping targets for physical achievements below.
  c. The operational strategy of the external actor should emphasize location-specific implementation modalities, which accommodate and tackle the contextual differences among targeted areas and communities within the same area.

- Within the country, consistency in major approaches among external actors (programs and projects) working with the same communities should be maintained by the concerned government authority (in most of the cases Ministry of Planning). This issue was emerged during the course of the study since some institutions working in the same CBRDP's areas and targeted communities were using quite different and contradicting implementation approaches to those used by the CBRDP e.g. 70% subsidized credit adopted by the Fishery Project as oppose to credit at the commercial interest rate applied by the CBRDP and CDOs.

The study explored the opinions of various concerned groups on which characteristics of CDOs are key for communities to commit themselves, support and maintain CDOs in one hand; and for the CDOs to sucessfuly accomplish their missons statements, in the other. Their responses foumulated a sort of generic policy recommendations for CBOs in similar context. Accordingly, CDO should adher to the following:

I. Prior CDO Establishment:

1. Intensive community orientation, mobilization and awareness-raising involving all community members -including leaders and elites, poor and other disadvantageous groups-,
2. Precise selection of the community organizers, from within the community, according to well-articulated criteria including social acceptance,
3. Setting the CDO's territory according to social homogeneity, common interest and geographical proximity,
4. Participation of all community groups, at least through consultations, in the development of the CDO's objectives, constitution and bylaws, and
5. The role of an external actor, if any, should be limited to facilitation and technical assistance,

II. At CDO's Establishment:

1. The GA should be aware of the required competencies of the EB's members. Accordingly, the GA can develop certain criteria for selection,
2. The EB should be democratically elected, and
3. Representation of various community groups and villages in the EB,

III. During CDO's Operations:

1. Participatory interactions between GA and EB through different mechanisms including regular formal and informal meetings,
2. Pro-active advisory roles of the traditional leaders,
3. Clear and consistent internal implementation systems,
4. Adoption of transparency and accountability measures by the EB using various tools including regular community-auditing sessions,
5. Participatory decision-making mechanisms within the EB. The GA's members could attend EB meetings as observers,
6. Implementation of diversified activities, which respond to the interests of various groups. This could include investment projects with social dimensions, which benefit all community members as well as diversified self-help initiatives, and
7. Good horizontal and vertical linkages.
8. Preferably, CDO's should demonstrate good tendency to work as a conflict resolution body in their communities.

Annex 1

Background to the Community-based Regional Development Program (CBRDP)

1. The CBRDP: An Overview:

CBRDP is an integrated community-driven initiative adopting a participatory bottom-up approach to achieve sustainable regional development and poverty alleviation. It commenced its field operations in May 1999, on a pilot basis, in five action areas representing five distinct ecological zones; these are (fig. 1):

- Ghail Bin Yamein, Hadramout Governorate; representing the eastern semi-arid zone,
- Aden, Aden Governorate; representing urban settlements,
- Al-Makha, Taiz Governorate; representing the coastal plains,
- Khamis Bani Saa'd, Al-Mahwait Governorate; representing mountain ranges, and
- As-Swadeya, Al-Bayda Governorate; representing the high plateau.

The program is nationally executed under the overall supervision of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoIC) and with the financial and technical assistances of UNDP and FAO, respectively.

The overarching development objective of CBRDP is "to assist in establishing a fully functioning organisational framework and processes for participatory planning and for implementing community-based development and poverty alleviation initiatives". According to the Program Support Document (PSD), this was initially planned to be achieved through the accomplishment of the following two immediate objectives, to:

1. To set up the institutional framework for supporting the implementation of the Community-based Regional Development Program, and
2. To empower local communities in fully participating in economic development and build their capacities to become the main actors of effective wealth generating action for the alleviation of poverty at the national level and its eradication at the local level.

During the course of implementation, these immediate objectives were modified in view of the lessons learnt to:

1. Empower local communities and community members, in particularly poor, to fully participate in sustainable development and poverty reduction initiatives,
2. Institutionalize collaboration linkages between Community Development Organizations (CDOs) and other actors that enable local communities accessing additional resources complementing the CBRDP's endeavors towards poverty alleviation, and
3. Assist the GoY in creating an enabling environment and methodologies for successful implementation of the community-based regional development.

Fig 1. Program's Areas of Operation[22]s:

2. Main Features of CBRDP's Implementation Strategy:

To achieve its aforementioned objectives, CBRDP's adopts a flexible learning-by-doing participatory approach, which stands on the following principal pillars:

a. Applies a livelihoods perspective that focusing more on people and development processes than on technology transfer,
b. Accentuate community's strengths, instead of its constraints, as entry point,
c. Builds on participatory implementation approaches and methods,
d. Starts with pilot areas,
e. Emphasizes cross-sectoral interventions,
f. Focuses on capacity building and training,
g. Flexible, eco-zone specific, implementation modalities, which reflect and accommodate the different socioeconomic, cultural and environmental conditions of the pilot areas,
h. Iterative implementation strategy allowing for regular fine-tuning in view of the lessons learnt,
i. Capitalizes on coordination with other stakeholders to cope with the multidimensional nature of poverty,
j. Institutionalizes development through channeling all program interventions via CDOs and
k. Creates community-owned and managed revolving funds (Sanduq) located within CDOs.

The program adheres to these principal pillars to intervene, directly, in five major technical themes/components: institutional building, human capacity building and training, community-based financial services, gender perspective and institution-based coordination.

[22] Numbers (1 – 5) indicate the action areas of Ghail Bin Yamein, Aden, Al-Makha, Khamis Bani Sa'ad and As-Swadeya, respectively.

In order to assist CDOs, the program operates at two levels: a Central Support Team (CST), which coordinated and advises program activities at national level and five regional teams, which interact directly with the CDOs.

2.1 Institutional Building:

Poverty is partially attributed to insufficient participation of the poor in formulating decisions pertaining to their livelihoods. Therefore, CBRDP has highly emphasized effective community participation as the fundamental tool for successful implementation of its interventions. Its key mechanism, in this regard, included the establishment/strengthening and capacitating of CDOs, which are considered the foundation on which all program-induced development interventions are build. These CDOs could be newly established with CBRDP's assistance or already existing ones. Nevertheless, in all cases they should be: (i) have emerged from the targeted communities, (ii) be development-oriented, (iii) legally registered in the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (MoSL), and (iv) should fulfilled the required conditions for the program's membership.

The Executive Bodies (EBs) of these CDOs must be democratically elected/selected by the General Assembly (GA), adhere to the CDO's constitution and bylaws and, adopt accountability and transparency measures. Division of labour within the EB is maintained via technical committees or focal points (Women, Investment, Sanduq, Services and others). In some cases, technical committees' membership is not limited to the EB but extended to include some CDOs members (fig 2).

Fig. 2: CDO's Structure:



The main tasks of the CDO include; to:

6. Identify, plan and coordinate community's development priorities,
7. Identify, appraise and implement and/or supervise the implementation of poverty alleviation interventions,
8. Monitor the progress of the program's activities in their respective areas,
9. Manage Sanduq resources, and
10. Create/activate effective linkages with various institutions at different levels.

A legally registered CDO is the direct output of a series of activities undertaken by the program to assist targeted communities to create with their representative institution. These activities included:

- Community mobilization, sensitization and orientation about the program's objectives, philosophy and implementation strategy,
- Assisting communities undertaking participatory situation assessment of their development bottlenecks and potentials,
- Providing training programs including, but not limited to, Participatory Learning and Action (PLA), Participatory Planning, Community Organization, Leadership and CDOs' Law, and
- Assisting communities establishing Preparatory Executive Bodies (PEBs) and, subsequently, assisting the PEBs to prepare the required documents for legal registration.

CBRDP's strategy emphasizes 4 phases of CDOs' maturity lasting for 5 years as presented in table 1.

2.2 Human Capacity Building and Training:

The adoption of participatory approach, which is considered the cornerstone of CBRDP's implementation strategy, necessitates the existence of certain knowledge, skills, attitudes, trends and behaviors. On the other hand, lessons learnt from relevant experiences highlighted human capacity building as the most appropriate tool to provide these necessities. Hence, CBRDP's implementation strategy boldly and clearly underlined this component, together with institutional building, as the driving force for its interventions.

As starting point CBRDP undertook assessments of training needs, capacities of training providers and available training facilities and detailed its implementation strategy for this component accordingly. This strategy emphasized two main types of training needs:

(iii) **Development-process related training** intends to capacitate CDOs' EBs, technical committees and Sanduq Investment Groups "SIGs" with relevant technical, organizational, managerial, administrative and financial skills in order to enable them to assume their mandate efficiently. 17 fields of development training were identified and considered mandatory to be provided to relevant target group(s) at specific stage of CDO's maturity. However, human capacity building and training is a dynamic process that requires regular updating of training contents; and refocusing according to growing capacities of the trainees. Therefore, these fields were not exhaustive and additional training fields were identified and implemented on demand-driven basis. Program's-specific tailor-made training modules were developed in each of the above-indicated mandatory fields, were field-tested, fine-tuned they are under publishing and will be distributed to CDOs and other interested actors.

Development training programs are entirely organized by the National Training Team (NTT), which was established by the program in its early stage and continuously empowered. The NTT operates at two levels: the action area/Regional Program's Management Unit (RPMU) and at the central levels. At the RPMU level, each training team is composed of the Training Facilitator and 3-4 local community members selected according to certain criteria. The NTT is composed of the five regional training teams at the overall program's level. This team is technically supported by the Institutional, Capacity Building and Training International Expert (ICBTIE).

(ii) **Vocational Training** is targeting local community members and intends to provide them with different vocational skills that widen their employment/self-employment opportunities and provide the respective communities with necessary vocational services. In technical terms, vocational training is provided through collaboration with specialized national vocational training institutions and/or competent vocational trainers. In financial terms, its costs are either paid by the program alone or shared with other actors or provided completely by other actors.

The development (both formal "class" and informal "on-the-job") and vocational training are complemented by other capacity building activities including: sensitization, orientation and awareness raising sessions; exchange visits (among CDOs of the same RPMU, between RPMUs and to other relevant experiences); attachment programs (attaching vocational trainees to existing businesses to learn by doing), exhibitions and others.

2.3 Community-based Financial Services:

The objective of this component is to set up practical funding mechanisms, which support local institution building and locally determined and managed development initiatives of CDOs. More specifically, the participatory revolving credit intends to: (a) fill the financial-gaps existing at the community level through funding community-identified, appraised and implemented productive activities, (b) assist in alleviating/reducing income poverty of poor households, (c) contribute to the provision of required goods and services at the local level, (d) provide CDOs with the opportunities to build up their financial management capacities and to develop and operate their own financial system, and (e) increase the local financial-base in a way, which enable CDOs to respond, in a sustainable manner, to future financial demands (i.e. contribute to the financial sustainability of CDOs' operations).

The program promotes two interrelated funding mechanisms: (i) match grants from the Community Development Investment Fund (CDIF) to CDO Sanduqs which distribute it as a loan to investment groups, individual women and community projects and, (ii) the loans repayments being the property of each CDO, called Community Loan Funds (CLF). The CLFs are managed by the CDOs as revolving funds.

The CBRDP delegates matching grant processing and approval power to RPMUs and from them gradually to CDOs. This process is strongly linked with the program's integrated and participatory approach, which combines financial support with organizational capacity building, technical and managerial assistance, and the transition from CDIF to CLF. This kind of integrated approach does not only lead to start–up capital ownership but also to empowerment and improved decision making capacities of local leaders.

Loans are provided at market rates of profits to finance cross-sectoral activities that are: economically viable, environmentally sustainable and socially acceptable. There are no principle restrictions except of *Qat* planting, trading in weapons, environmentally destructive and other legally forbidden and/or socially unacceptable activities. According to CDOs choice, funding follows the Islamic lending principals.

The program assists CDOs, through training and technical advice, in: SIGs formulation, projects identification and appraisal (economic and technical feasibility studies), bookkeeping and accounting (a simple accounting system would be designed and adopted), credit management, management of CLF, business and financial planning.

In order to get access to CDIF funding, the CDO have to have a ranked list of the poorest households (RLP) established by the CDO's GA using community-emerged indicators, EBs members have to be trained in certain topics; bookkeeping and accounting system have been set

up; a prioritized list with project profiles proposed for funding requests, and the first community development plan.

2.4 Gender Perspective:

Yemen's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP, 2002) highlighted poor participation of women in development as one of the causes of poverty in the country. Reasons behind this poor participation are numerous and interrelated: women's suffer from high illiteracy rates, inadequate levels of awareness (especially reproductive health awareness, which aggravate the problem of high population growth) and some hindering socio-cultural norms and traditions. Given this situation, on one hand, and women's huge idle potentials to strengthen and accelerate development, on the other hand, CBRDP's implementation strategy emphasizes effective participation of women. The strategy fosters women's participation through:

- Women participation is considered central to all program's interventions,
- Women's representation in EBs is one of the eligibility prerequisites that qualify the CDO to program's assistance,
- Minimum allocations were set with regard to women shares[23] of credit (25%) and training (30%) below which the program's postponed its assistance to the CDO,
- Women are exempted from certain credit and training eligibility criteria. For instance, individual loans and non-credit-linked vocational training against the program budgets are only applied to women.

In addition to its general implementation strategy, CBRDP developed a particular gender strategy, which reflects allied national policies and strategies. This strategy highlighted situation-specific tools to cater for the apparent discrepancies in women circumstances among action areas and the existing social norms and values.

2.5 Local and National Co-ordination with Other Stakeholders:

CBRDP conceptualizes poverty as a crosscutting socioeconomic phenomenon, which is caused by a combination of economic, social, cultural, environmental and political factors; and, therefore, its alleviation necessitates well-planned and coordinated holistic/multi-dimensional actions. Taking into account the fact that CBRDP thematic fields of interventions are limited and alone not sufficient to alleviate poverty, the program's implementation strategy emphasized the promotion of institutional coordination linkages with other partners to complement its own components in a harmonized manner. The program assist in a two folds way: (i) by establishing effective, institutions-based, coordination mechanism between the program, CDOs and other relevant actors, and (ii) assisting CDOs to get access to and benefit from the basic services and other projects funded by different actors.

Therefore, the program works on two dimensions concurrently: (a) liaise with all potential actors through different means and (b) prepare CDOs (through relevant training programs) upgrading their organizational/institutional abilities and encouraging their publicities to undertake leading role in the coordination processes.

[23] Although specified women's minimum shares might considered low compared to other developing countries and/or some Yemeni urban communities, it carry significant logic bearing in mind the socioeconomic settings of CBRDP's areas of operations.

Annex 2

Traditional Institutional Settings in CBRDP's Action Areas

Ghail Bin Yamein "G.B.Y" (Hadramout Governorate):

The B.B.Y district is made up of rocky and arid plateau (60% of the area), which is bisected by a network of major and minor wadis.

The district is divided into 3 socio-territorial units, which reflect both the social groupings and socioeconomic activities. Traditionally, these units coincided with the tribal territories (or *Raydah*) controlled by major tribes and their names still reflect this correspondence between geography and tribal organization. The socialist government of PDRY, however, introduced different appellations in line with the social and economic ideology. The same entities were, thereafter, called domains (*Hayi*) and tribal affiliations were replaced by socio-professional categories. Although names were modified, the social and economic realities remained unchanged. Each *Raydah*/*Hai* is made up of different forms of human settlements. Three types of settlements may be identified: (i) large village (*Qaryah*) comprises 500 – 1500 persons and often of socially heterogeneous nature, (ii) small village or hamlet (*Mahal*), usually located in proximity of a wadi. The *Mahal* is usually have a population ranging between 300 and 500 persons, the majority belongs to one tribe, and (iii) the camp (*Tagamma'*) is usually located at the edge of a wadi (about 40 camp in the district). Camp people belongs to the same tribe and practice animal husbandry.

About 40 – 50% of the people are integrated into the tribal system. Each tribe (*Qabilah*) is divided into clans (*Fakhd*), made up of lineages. To each tribe corresponds a tribal territory and, within the tribal territory, each clan has its own portion of land. Boarders between tribes and between clans are well-demarked and ownership is documented in local contracts. Common property land is considered as the common property of the tribe and is managed according to customary regulations. Tribal customary laws are related to specific crimes committed by individuals; unpunished crimes would bring shame to the entire tribe. The tribesmen constitute a noble group, claiming to be the original inhabitants of the Hadramout. The tribal leaders is the *Sheikh* (also called *Mugadam*), who is selected among the members of the leading family lineages. His power is shared with the leaders of the tribal branches or clans (*Aqil*) as well as with tribal judges (*Hakim*, pl. *Hukam*), who have a special knowledge of tribal customs. During the socialist government of the former PRDY, tribal leadership has been severely limited. Powerful *Sheikhs* have not yet restored their former authority.

In addition to the tribes, the social grouping includes the *Saadah, Akhdam and Abid*. The *Saadah* (sing. *Sayyid*) constitute a special non-tribal group, a sort of "religious nobility", who claim to be direct descendants of the Prophet Mohammed. They observe a strict endogamy, have strong political position and social prestige. In recognition of their peacemaking activities, they used to receive agricultural products, livestock and water rights as well as land and wells. The lower strata (*Akdam* and *Abid*) are situated below the tribal system and the *Saadah*. Not owing land, they cultivate other people's land or make their living as traders, craftsmen, or service renders. The *Akhdam* descendants of African origin and in the past they were agricultural labourers; while the *Abid* were originally servants and slaves and they were, in the past, soldiers in the Sultanates army.

Although during the period of the former PRDY there has been a considerable movement towards a more egalitarian society, social status continues, to some extent, to differentiate local communities. It is a caste-like system, which affects social behaviour and economic attitudes and is reflected in different ways: type of work and skills, residence, clothing, language and marriage traditions. Cultural values define the role of each stratum as well as the relationship among strata.

Al-Makha (Taiz Governorate):

CBRDP's operates in Al-Makha and Dubab districts out of the 20 districts of Taiz Governorate, south west Yemen. The total area of the two districts is 3,174 Km2, which constitutes 28.2% of the total area of the governorate. The total population of the two districts is 59,075 persons (9,993 households; with an average household's size of 6.3 persons). Population density is rather low 18 persons/sq. Km. and about 82% of the population concentrated in the rural areas.

By targeting the aforementioned districts, the program is focusing on the area of about 120 Km. long and 60 Km. wide along the red sea (140 – 200 Km. south of Taiz town); and comprises 5 *Auzal* (group of villages) within three different agro-ecological zones: (i) A straight coastal strip (*Sahil*), (ii) An inland (Badiya), and (iii) Two major wadi areas (Mawaz and Rasyan), with some minor tributaries.

The society is organized in tribes. Tribal organization includes small cohesive family units all the way to larger groupings including lineages, clans and tribes. Tribal categories still provide social identities to individuals and households and a reference for cultural values and social behaviours. However, the tribal system is not as strong as in other parts of Yemen, particularly the northern governorates. One can argue a process of detribalization is under way. For a number of reasons, people appear to be less integrated in kinship-based groupings than in larger neighbouring entities or more complex socio-territorial units, i.e. villages or cluster of villages. Tribes do not mean economic specialization. Furthermore, in all villages, although the majority (60% - 80%) of the population is made up of members of the same tribe, members of other tribes may be easily incorporated. In this way residence and common utilization of a available natural resources, rather than tribal affiliation, constitute the basis of pragmatic social and economic relationships.

Khamis Bani Saa'd (K.B.S):

K.B.S district is located in the southern uplands, west and south-west of Al-Mahwait town. It is crossed by several wadis. The district has a total population of 47,375 persons (8,299 households) with a population density of 50 – 97 persons per sq Km.

According to traditional tribal criteria, the district comprises three divisions (*Mikhlaf*): Al-Hagri, Saraa and Bani Saa'd. This framework of *Mikhlaf* was largely used for political and administrative purposes. The tribes of the same *Mikhlaf* constitute a, more or less, homogenous unit, being either parts of wider tribal units or being linked by special alliances. Each *Mikhlaf* is made up of a number of tribal clans, each of them subdivided into lineages (*Khoms)* with a common, close ancestor. The *Khoms* constitutes the basic of social life. It does not necessarily correspond to the village and often may cover two or more villages or cluster of villages, with the possible addition of smaller and scattered hamlets. It is among member of the same *Khoms* and among closer *Khoms* that links of cooperation, solidarity, and defence are expressed in different manners. For instance, it is at the level of *Khoms* that voluntary forms of cooperation (*Al-Ana*) take place for the implementation of communal activity (e.g. construction of a bridge). The Khoms is also the unit for the payment of *Akhram*[24] including the *Diyah*[25]. All the tribes of the district belong to the tribal confederation of *Bakil*, which is among the three major confederations in Yemen. In addition to

[24] *Aghram* is the plural of *Ghurm*, which mean the cash and/or in-kind compensation paid by tribe A to tribe B when a member or group of members from tribe A violate the rights of one or group of tribe B. All clans and families within the tribe contributed with certain amount to pay the *Ghurm* using certain fixed parameters; and they are committed - socially and morally- to pay their contributions. The refusal to pay the *Ghurm* will lead to social isolation and rejection from the tribe. In this sense, the *Aghram* system considered one of the tribal solidarity systems, which enjoys high respect and recognition by the tribe and the State. In the past, the *Ghurm* was the social unit in charge of supplying soldiers to the army.

[25] *Diyha* is the blood-money aimed at compensating the murder of a person of another group.

tribesmen, there are pockets of lower stratum and socially marginalized *Abid*. In the past, *Abid* were slaves owned by tribesmen.

As-Swadeya (Al-Bayda Governorate):

As-Swadeya district is one of the 12 districts of Al-Bayda governorate. Its population, 46,798 persons (5,046 households), is essentially rural (98.6%).

The district as a whole could be divided into 6 circumscriptions, which directly reflect the 6 major tribal entities (*Qabil*) of the entire area. All these tribes are part of the Madhhij confederation, which is the most powerful tribal confederation in all eastern region south of Ma'rib. Each of these entities could be called tribal circumscription has its defined territory, made up of privately-owned cultivated land and uncultivated land used as grazing areas and managed under communal tenure. Within each tribal circumscription, a limited number of divisions (1-3) may be found corresponding to tribal branches or clans (*Al*). These tribal divisions ultimately correspond to the administrative sub-districts. Each clan comprises a total number of about 250 settlements (village, hamlet and nomadic camp); and controls its own portion of the total territory.

The tribal system is absolutely strong. It is a hierarchy of segmentary structures where individuals are placed in the middle of large concentric circles. Everybody knows his/her roles and functions as they are defined by the well-articulated customary regulations (*Hukm* or *Urf*), which, together with the religious laws (*Sharia'*), dictate behaviours and attitudes. The ethics of the honour (*Sharaf*) of the individual and of the family to which he/she belongs have a crucial value and precise social mechanisms aim at vindicating the loss of a part of this honour. Small-size social units constitute autonomous entities with individuals have daily social and economic ties and people conceive of relationships among themselves on the basis of shared common descent and are related to one another. Any segment sees itself as a unity in relation to other segment of the same section, but sees both segments as a unity in relation to another section.

In each tribe, authority is vested in a *Sheikh* and, under the *Sheikh*, in an *Aqil* (often also called *Sheikh*). The *Sheikh* is a sort of "primus inter pares", a mediator, in charge of solving disputes between his tribesmen and of representing the tribe vis-à-vis the other tribal entities, administrative authorities and others.

In addition to tribes, there are *Saadah* with their known religious nobility and other socio-cultural and political characteristics. They have an alliance with one of the tribal circumscription (Ale-Swa'ad).

Aden (Aden Governorate):

Aden, a major port on the Gulf of Aden located at the tip of the Arabian peninsula, is situated on two small peninsula of volcanic origin that rise to more than 300 meters in height. Its position near the southern entrance to the Red Sea made the city one of the busiest refuelling stations in the world during the 1950s, servicing most of the ships that passed through the Suez Canal. During the 19th century, the port of Aden was the most important point on the sea route between India and Great Britain, and became the third largest port in the world after New York and Liverpool, apposition it attained after the opening of the Sues Canal in 1869[26]. Aden is also known historically for its role as commercial hub located on a nexus of perfumes, scent and spice trails converging from South-East Asia and East Africa.

The program is working in three districts: Dar Saa'd, Al-Sheikh Othman and Seirha. Except in Al-Aydrous (Seirha), all CDOs are operating in the suburb of the city and some in squatter

[26] Source: Request For Proposals, Port Cities Development Program, 2002.

settlements. Tribal links have weakened and, often, disappeared, and have not been replaced by new forms of alliances and solidarities. However, a complex web of ties links households on the bases of kinship, caste, common interests, friendship and neighbourhood. Residents of a given neighbourhood, block or *Hara* may mobilize for precise purposes. The system called *Hakba*, for instance, is a traditional group saving system usually among women (10 – 25 members). As typical urban centre, there are extreme heterogeneities, individualism and household-based survival strategies in highly competitive environment.

Annex 3: PLA Checklist

Variable Under Assessment	PLA Method/Tool	Data Source			
		EB	GA	Trad. Leaders	Others
1. <u>Local Settings</u> – Historical background on the community, – Natural resources: what they have, how utilized, who control, etc. – Economy: sources of livelihoods, local economy, poverty level, etc, – Social life: ethnic composition, socioeconomic/ethnic groups, relationships between various groups, history of communal work, informal institutions, etc, – Type of local leadership, tribalism, tribal norms, etc,	– Focused Group Discussion (FGD) with key informants, – Secondary information, – Historical map (time trend analysis) – Resources map, – Direct observations	✔		✔	
2. <u>Background on CDOs and their Formation:</u> – Description of pre-formation era, – Idea and rationale behind the formation of the CDO, – Consultations during the formation stage (who led the process, who involved/consulted, how and why, what were the responses of various community groups, – How traditional leaders responded to the formation process? what were their specific role at that stage? – What are the objectives of the CDO, who set these objectives and why? – How the CDO constitution and bylaw developed and approved? Who led this process? What level of participation/consultation was applied? – CDO's territory, how decided and why – How the local setting influenced CDOs formation? – What role CBRDP played during the formation stage? – What preconditions, characteristics and others proved necessary for successful CDO formation? Why? – How the processes adopted in the CDO formation affected, afterwards, its operations? – In view of their experience, what they were do differently if they opt to form a new CDO "negative" and what they will keep doing "positive" (lessons learnt, policy recommendations)	– FGDs (different groups), – Secondary information (e.g. constitution, bylaws, ect.)	✔	✔	✔	✔ o Non-CDO's community members

Variable Under Assessment	PLA Method/Tool	Data Source			
		EB	GA	Trad. Leaders	Others
– What general and/or specific mechanisms proved to be good practice from the CDO formation stage?					
3. <u>CDOs' Operations</u>: – The institutional set-up of the CDO and the specific functions of each structure (e.g. GA, EB, technical committees, advisory bodies "if any") – CDOs objectives and applied mechanisms to achieve the objectives – CDOs' implementation systems (e.g. credit policy, financial system, etc.), – CDOs strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats from operation perspectives, – Progress and impact induced so far, – CDOs' operation-related problems and mechanisms adopted to solve them. – What general and/or specific mechanisms proved to be good practice from the CDO operations?	– FGDs (different groups), – Secondary information (e.g. implementation systems),	✔	✔	✔	
3.1 <u>Community Participation in CDOs' Operations:</u> – Membership: conditions for the CDO's membership, how many members (gender disaggregated and compared to the no. of qualified community members), from which villages (if the CDO comprise more than one village), classification of membership according to community groups, etc. – Poor: who is poor (community definitions of poverty and the poor), what % of CDO's members are poor and what % they represents of the poor community members who are qualified for the CDO membership, – What mechanisms the CDO applies to link poor community members (households) with middle income, better skilled community members for joint group-based productive Income Generating Activities (IGAs) and local economic growth; What are the operational experiences with the "Revolving labour pool" approach; – Are CDOs organizations of the poor or organizations representing the poor or a combination of both? Why or why not? What appeared as good practice. – How the EB formed, how many members (gender disaggregated), from which villages, from which community groups, what criteria the community used in the election/selection of the EB, why, etc. – What activities the CDO implement to satisfy the different needs of various community groups, – Self-help initiatives: are they adopted by the CDO, what type of activities, why these	– Secondary information, – FGDs (different groups), – Direct observations (e.g. group dynamics)	✔	✔	✔	✔ o Non-CDO's community members

Variable Under Assessment	PLA Method/Tool	Data Source			
		EB	GA	Trad. Leaders	Others
types, why did they succeed or not? What are the criteria or key principles in CDO's operations that support self-help initiatives; What conditions and capacities are needed for a CDO to promote self-help initiatives without external support? – Key characteristics of CDOs for communities and the poor to commit themselves, support and maintain CDOs "attractive measures". –					
3.2 <u>Governance in CDOs' Management:</u> – When EB meets (schedule), why (purpose/agenda/topics), what are the internal decision making process, level of participation of each member, are member women's attended the meetings jointly with their men colleagues, etc. – Is EB consulted the GA and/or certain members of the GA on certain issues, why and how, etc, – Are the EB's meetings documented, why documented, etc. – How EB's decisions communicated to GA, the feedback they receive, etc. – How the technical committees operate, meet, internally coordinate, etc. – When GA meetings held (schedule), why (purpose/agenda/topics), etc. – What are the adopted financial procedures, who control financial matters and what are the roles of other EB's members in this, – Is the CDO adopt any kind of community auditing, what mechanism, how – How traditional leaders are represented in the CDO's structures, how the traditional leaders operate as EB's members, etc.	– FGDs (different groups), – Secondary information (minutes, CDO's records, etc.) – Direct observations (leadership among the EB, dominance of certain person(s)/group)	✔	✔	✔	
3.3 <u>CDOs' Linkages with Other Institutions:</u> – What are the existing institutions at the community level (other than CDOs), – What kind of relationship the CDO have with these organizations, – What are the relationships between the CDO and other CDOs in the area, – What kind of relationships the CDO have with the Local Council (LC), – How many CDO's members are members in the LC, what changes those members induced in the operations of both the CDO and the LC and why, etc. – Is the CDO have any vertical relationships with other institutions at the governorate and/or national level, which institutions, what type of relationships, how operates, what are the results, etc.	– FGDs (different groups), – Secondary information, – Direct observations	✔	✔	✔	✔ o EBs of other institutions o Local Councils o Sample of governorate and/or national levels

Annex 5

Lessons Learnt about the CBRDP approach, supporting CDO formation, operations and graduation to maturity

Annex 1 above describes briefly how the CBRDP operates today. This is a result of a learning process, which was build around regular reviews and, accordingly, several adaptations. The following are the main lessons learnt, good practices and policy recommendations suggested by this process:

⇒ The flexible learning-by-doing approach adopted by the program proved valid in responding to the dynamic nature of community-driven development work. Such approach is strongly recommended for other similar contexts.

⇒ The CBRDP's approach is considered as an innovative approach to community based and regional development in Yemen. Most of the previous regional development initiatives in Yemen were of uni-sectoral focus, relay on direct delivery -often from a central offices- or implementing through existing informal community institutions or newly established beneficiaries' committees, which especially set to facilitate the implementation of these initiatives. On the other hands, the nature and the scope of the existing community institutions were rather irrelevant to take lead on the implementation of a comprehensive and sustainable community-driven development as was planned for.

Given this situation, the institutional set-up of the program is considered appropriate. In this set-up, RPMUs were intended to be located within the targeted communities to: (a) allow for better understanding of the local settings, which help in regular and precise adjustments, and (b) enable timely responds to the demanding tasks related to the capacity buildings of the local communities and their respective CDOs. Overtime, the role of the RPMUs diminishes and, concurrently, those of CDOs increases to cater for smooth program's phase-over. This designed built-in smooth phase-over strategy offered a good practice to the design of similar projects/programs.

⇒ Within each community, the program starts its implementation processes with comprehensive participatory planning through which local community assisted to identify its development bottlenecks and potentials and, accordingly, design a Community Development Master Plan (CDMP). Being educational and participatory, this process considered good starting point for similar initiatives. However, community expectations from the project/program should be kept to the level of what the project/program can actually provide vis-à-vis the CDMP together with the binding conditions of this external assistance in terms of what the local community should contribute.

⇒ The CBRDP initial design was built on assisting small groups of community members to form informal/unregistered associations "Small Sanduq Associations (SSAs)". This was modified at the early stage to have the SSAs under the overall umbrella of an informal/unregistered Village Development Committee (VDC). After a 5-months pilot testing in two action areas and based on a proposal from a local community (Al-Sayla, G.B.Y), this institutional set-up was changed into the current registered CDOs. This was mainly to foster the sustainability potentials of the community institutions especially in terms of legal aspects. It was extremely useful to pilot test possible institutional modalities, and to be flexible enough to modify according to the local perceptions and preferences, which allowed for smooth integration of the CDOs into the local institutional setting and facilitated their acceptance and ownership by the local communities. However, on the other hand, this quick shift from one institutional set-up to another led to some confusion at the community level and affected the consistency of program's messages to the communities. It would be more appropriate if this testing was planned for (of course as approach not the results) and the communities were prepared to go for it.

⇒ With regard to the legal framework of the CDOs, both the program and local communities assessed the pros and cons of the two available legal options; namely the cooperative associations and charitable organizations. None of the two is appropriate, nevertheless, the option of charitable organizations was selected for the following reasons:

- It is flexible and can, relatively, accommodate some of the needs of the development organizations,

- The cooperative law is purely focusing on economic activities without any space for non-productive development activities such as training and social development,
- The membership of a cooperative association is bind with the financial ability of interested community members to become shareholders. Moreover, a member has the right to have any number of shares s/he can afford, which is against the program principle of equal right for participation of all community members especially the poor.

This situation proposed having the appropriate legal framework for the development-oriented CBOs as an important policy recommendation for the concerned legislative authorities under similar conditions.

⇒ A good strategic planning model was developed and adopted by the CBRDP to guide the implementation of the institutional capacity building and other interventions. This model not only facilitates coherent planning of the program's interventions in support of strengthening the capacities of CDOs but also helps with smooth phase-over and gradual planed transfers from RPMUs to CDOs.

⇒ Almost all training programs on development-related fields were entirely organized by the NTT. Composed of the 5 CBRDP's training facilitators and 22 community members, the NTT initiated, capacitated and empowered by the program is considered one of the distinct good practices, which:

- Enhanced economic feasibility of the training (the inclusive average daily cost per trainee was found to be YR 512 "US$ 2.8", PITA)
- Improved the training designing ad implementation processes in view of the local socio-cultural setting, and added a real value to the sustainability of development trainings.