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Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development

Final Report

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Acronyms

AAP	Accountability to Affected Populations
ACTED	Agence d'Aide à la Coopération Technique et au Développement
AGIR	Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative - for the Sahel and West Africa
AGP	Plant Production and Protection Division
AHI-INAP	Integrated National Action Plan for Avian and Human Influenza
AOS	Administrative and Operational Support
APFS	Agro-Pastoral Field School
AU/IBAR	African Union / Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CAR	Central African Republic
CARI	Central Agriculture Research Institute
CBO	Community-based organizations
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CFI	Chronic food insecurity
CFS	Committee on World Food Security
CFSNS	Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey
CFW	Cash for Work
CH	Cadre Harmonisé
CILLS	Permanent Interstates Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel
CONAFED	National Committee for the Woman and Development
CPF	Country Programming Framework
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
CWGER	Cluster Working Group of Early Recovery
DALA	Damage and Loss Assessment
DEVCO	Development and Cooperation Directorate General – EuropeAid
DFID	Department for International Development
DG	Director General
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EC	Emergency Coordinators
ECHO	European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department
ECTAD	Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases
EEP	External Expert Panel
ERCU	Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordination Unit
ESA	Agricultural Development Economics Division FAO
ESP	Social Protection Division
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FAO-LOG	FAO - Liaison Office Geneva
FAOR	FAO Representative
FFS	Farmer Field School
FONGIM	Forum des Organisations Non Gouvernementales Internationales au Mali
FSAC	Food Security and Agriculture Cluster
FSAL	Food Security and Agricultural Livelihoods Support Sector Group (Uganda)
FSC	Food Security Cluster
FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
GAP	Good Agricultural Practices
German DED	German Development Service
GFDRR	Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
GT9	Development coordination mechanism for the agricultural sector DRC
HUP	Project on Support to the Development of Urban and Per-urban Horticulture

IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDDRSI	IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFI	International Financial Institutions
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IP	Implementing Partner
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification system
IPM	Integrated Pest Management
JFFS	Junior Farmer Field School
L3	Level 3 Emergency Response
LAT	Livelihood Assessment Tool-kit
LEGS	Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards
LRRD	Linking Relief Rehabilitation Development
LTO	Lead Technical Officer
MAAIF	Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries
MPTF	Multi-Partner Trust Fund
MIRA	Multi-Cluster Initial Rapid Assessment
MNA	Multi-cluster Needs Assessment
NARO	National Agricultural Research Organisation
NEDA	National Economic and Development Authority
NERICA	New Rice for Africa (rice variety)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OED	FAO Office of Evaluation
OIE	World Organization for Animal Health
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
OR	Organizational Result
OSD	Office for Support to Decentralized Offices
PADC	Programme on Support to Community Development
PDNA	Post-Disaster Needs Assessment
PF	Programme Framework
PFS	Pastoral Field School
PPR	Peste de petits ruminants
RAF	Regional Office for Africa
RAP	Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific
RAY	Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda
REACH	Renewed Efforts Against Child Hunger and under nutrition
REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
REOA	Emergency and Rehabilitation Office for Eastern Africa
REOSA	Emergency and Rehabilitation Office for Southern Africa
REOWA	Emergency and Rehabilitation Office for West Africa/Sahel
RIMA	Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis
SEAGA	Socio-Economic and Gender Analysis
SDC	Swiss Development Cooperation
SEFSEC	Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey
SFERA	Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities
SHARE	Supporting Horn of Africa REsilience
SIDA	Swedish International Development Authority
SIFSIA	Sudan Institutional Capacity Programme: Food Security Information for Action
SO	Strategic Objective
SPS	Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary

SRO	Sub-Regional Office
SRP	Strategic Response Plan
SUN	Scaling Up Nutrition
SWALIM	Somalia Water and Land Information Management
TA	Transformative Agenda
TCE	Emergency and Rehabilitation Division
TCP	Technical Cooperation Programme
TCSR	Donor Liaison and Resource Mobilization Unit
TDA	Transitional Development Assistance
TOC	Theory of Change
TWG	Technical Working Group
UN	United Nations
UN ECHA	UN Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UN-DOCO	UN Development Operations Coordination Office
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDP-BCPR	UNDP-Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNISDR	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
UN-OPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAM Unit	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Unit
VSF	Vétérinaires Sans Frontières
WB	World Bank
WBGS	West Bank and Gaza Strip
WFP	World Food Programme

Executive Summary

i. Resumption of agricultural production and achievement of food and nutrition security – FAO’s quintessential areas of action – are critical aspects of the transition out of crisis situations, whether they derive from violent conflict, natural disasters, socio-economic crisis, food chain emergencies, or other causes, and whether they are of short or protracted duration.

ii. According to its basic mandate, FAO is a technical assistance organization focused on supporting sustainable development of the food and agriculture¹ sectors. In carrying out this mandate, it has over time and out of necessity developed wide-ranging skills in **applying its technical assistance role and abilities in all types of contexts, including contexts of crisis response**. FAO’s ability, or lack of it, to respond to crisis situations from the very earliest point with emergency interventions that explicitly and closely link to its development role, and to carry out development work in crisis contexts that is fully sensitive to the crisis risks, is the subject of this evaluation.

iii. The main purpose of this evaluation is to assess the nature and effectiveness of its role in *ensuring an effective link between short and long-term objectives in the response to these emergencies*. The objective of the evaluation is to identify strategic recommendations that could improve FAO’s effectiveness in transition contexts. To do this, it assesses:

- whether FAO has been effective in its role supporting transition;
- the impact of its coordination efforts on the quality and pace of transition;
- whether and how, in its early ‘relief’ response to crises, FAO’s development (and now ‘resilience’) mandate has helped to more effectively link relief and development;
- FAO’s ability to mobilise appropriate funding for this ‘relief and development’ role as part of its resilience agenda, overcoming the frequent donor divide between short-term ‘humanitarian’ funding and longer-term funding for development; and
- FAO’s comparative advantages and competitive positioning in crisis-related environments, to identify lessons from experience and spell out its optimal role.

iv. The evaluation, reviewing the period roughly from 2007 to 2014, examined crises ranging from natural disasters to complex emergencies and protracted crises in fragile states. Field visits focused mostly on FAO work in fragile states affected by conflict-related crises in the last decade.² It also assessed the response to a major natural disaster, Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines.

v. The team analysed how internal changes affected FAO’s work in this area, either positively or negatively, focusing on reforms leading to the decentralization of emergency operations, new standard operating procedures for large scale emergencies, and the Reviewed FAO Strategic Framework of June 2013.

vi. In the complexities of ever-more frequent crisis situations, the contribution from a technical specialized agency like FAO cannot be isolated from the broader socio-political dimensions and multi-faceted nature of these crises. The evaluation seeks to assess the extent

¹ The word “agriculture,” when used in this report, refers to the wide definition of agriculture that is FAO’s mandate, including plant production, animal production, forestry and fisheries.

² Countries visited were Liberia, Mali, Uganda, DRC, West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the Philippines.

to which, in its actions in crisis situations, FAO is able to take into account key elements of this complexity, including risks of violence and insecurity, underlying social tensions, and the humanitarian as well as developmental needs of affected populations.

vii. Findings of this evaluation cover a wide range of issues and cut across a number of conceptual debates, agendas, and internal and external reforms. The interaction between these factors is at the centre of the analysis. Specific recommendations (“Suggested Actions”) are offered on individual topics in Chapter 4 and summarised in Appendix 2.

Overall conclusions and strategic recommendations

viii. First of all, the evaluation was impressed with the direction FAO is taking, very actively, in the area of transition work, now embedded in the larger “Resilience Agenda” and the rest of the new Strategic Framework. Findings of the investigative phase leave no doubt that FAO has a widely recognised comparative advantage, highly appreciated by its peers and partners, in working in this area of crisis response. It contains within its mandate all the elements for an early response to crises which should effectively link relief, rehabilitation and development. A number of factors have come together to allow FAO to position itself – in food and agriculture – as the ideal ‘transition agency’ in situations of crisis response of all types. This leads to a first ‘recommendation’ (or rather, positive encouragement):

FAO should continue and strengthen development of the conceptual, strategic and institutional direction that the Organization is taking in capitalizing on its comparative advantages and new Resilience Agenda to build stronger links between the relief, rehabilitation and development aspects of its emergency response work.

ix. If it is pursuing its corporate vision, global goals and strategic objectives, FAO’s commitment to promote transition **must respond first and foremost to the needs of the poor, the food insecure and the vulnerable**. No doubt the most important overall conclusion of this evaluation is (1) how important and unavoidable it is, if FAO is to accomplish its mandate and strategic goals, for the Organization to work in a growing number of crisis-related contexts, and (2) that this implies that FAO, working on transition in these settings, cannot avoid the need to go beyond its usual focus on the technical solutions for material aspects of vulnerability (assuming them to be politically neutral), to confront and help constructively shape difficult socio-political realities. **It is impossible, without taking on this latter aspect, for FAO to be fully effective in assisting the populations affected by crises**, whose livelihoods are at risk, and whose destiny is ultimately at the core of FAO’s action and its goals.

x. Country programmes reviewed are rich in relevant interventions that can potentially produce benefits to affected populations. However, **impact on livelihoods of individual FAO activities is seldom verified, due to inadequacy of monitoring mechanisms**, always focused on timely delivery of outputs, neglecting outcomes or broader impact on livelihoods. When assessing its own performance FAO must ask: “did we improve the lives of the poor and hungry?” rather than “did we manage to deliver what we planned?”

xi. **Context specificity and contextual analysis:** In order to be able to deal with crisis response that works at the local level, **FAO needs to adopt context-specificity as a condition for designing transition work**. This entails focusing on factors such as: access to land; prevailing rural livelihoods; and political and social constraints including power relationships, social mobility and social exclusion, gender relationships, institutional architecture, and prevailing patterns of income and wealth distribution. In most cases,

current FAO Country Programming Frameworks (CPFs) are not based on an adequate context analysis, especially one containing the elements related to crises. Inadequacy of the context analysis is found also at the level of individual projects, where vulnerability and conflict analysis and attention to “do-no-harm” approaches are generally absent. The prevailing programming approach adopted by FAO contrasts with the demand for increasing flexibility. **The CPFs reviewed show a limited capacity for flexible programming**, since they cannot be easily adjusted to a continuously changing environment.

xii. Although women are among the most vulnerable groups in situations where crises and social upheavals occur, with a few exceptions gender was dealt with by seeking to include women beneficiaries in project activities, rather than designing project interventions to attack the root causes of gender inequalities.

RECOMMENDATION 1: Transition for whom?

- a) In line with its Corporate Vision, Global Goals and Strategic Objectives, FAO’s work in transition *must respond first and foremost to the needs of the poor, the food insecure and the vulnerable*.
- b) This means that FAO must measure and report on its work in crisis contexts in terms of impact on these affected populations, including analysis of gender and other inequalities, and in particular the longer-term impact on livelihoods and resilience. Reporting on delivery, operational processes and outputs is not enough.

In order to do this effectively, FAO needs to do continual context analysis during its work in transition contexts in order to be able to respond *flexibly* to rapidly changing circumstances.

- c) Together with this contextual analysis, in complex crises, fragile states and protracted crisis/post-crisis contexts, FAO should further develop the CPF to include specific provisions for a purpose-designed and highly flexible country planning approach for such crisis conditions. This approach must include appropriate development and resilience programming, combining the four pillars of SO-5. It must foresee the provision of emergency relief interventions when needed, but carefully linked to a longer-term view of development. These CPFs, with accompanying project concept notes, should also serve as a powerful resource mobilization tool.

xiii. The reason this evaluation was tasked with examining FAO *in the context of crisis response* is that, as observed and concluded by the evaluation, **FAO has developed over time a special sub-set of its development skills that allow it to put its technical support to work in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, or in the midst of a protracted crisis, or at the outbreak of a food chain crisis**, with emergency interventions that bring to bear its technical capacity in accelerating the emergence from crisis and the resumption of a positive trajectory of development. These skills have been so well developed that this work has become one of FAO’s recognised comparative advantages. Under its Strategic Framework, FAO’s emergency response work now comes mainly under Strategic Objective 5: “*Increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises.*” All Strategic Objectives, however, contribute to the Resilience Agenda.

xiv. Transition is central to the Resilience Agenda in contexts of crisis-related response – a ‘good transition approach’ is an essential means for achieving the *outcome* of “resilience.” And **the in-built ability (and mandate) to link relief to development is one of FAO’s**

major comparative advantages in crisis contexts. Transition is as much about development as about emergencies, and about ensuring development support includes the factor of crisis and threats of crisis, so that all the SOs have a role in ensuring effective transition.

xv. **Decentralization and integration of emergency work:** Regarding the decentralization, the evaluation observations raised questions on whether, within FAO, maintaining a critical mass of centralized expert resources and supporting constant global exchanges may ensure more dependable and consistent levels of support to countries where transition is relevant. This is particularly important as FAO, though a technical organization, increasingly confronts the need to help shape contentious issues of political economy that are root causes of the poverty and vulnerability which it is seeking to end. The conclusion of the evaluation is that “integration” should be pursued to its logical completion as quickly as possible, but “decentralization” as it relates to the critical mass of capacities needed to affect fundamental changes, may need to be addressed more cautiously, particularly in the short term.

xvi. Although it is premature to assess the implementation of the reform integrating emergency and development work, the evaluation found FAO’s commitment quite solid. This commitment, however, is not in itself enough to overcome the challenges to this integrated process. **A culture change is still needed** to ensure the principle of integration becomes a part of everything FAO does in crisis or crisis-prone contexts. This means constant awareness among emergency staff of long-term development goals, and also, importantly, that those who focus on development must always plan development in crisis-related contexts as if a crisis were about to hit.

xvii. The application of the *L3 emergency response protocol* for Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines and in the severe conflict crises of South Sudan and CAR gave a major boost to the application of the new Resilience Agenda. In the Philippines, the very positive initial outcomes with regard to integration and transition confirmed the significance of strong leadership, close interaction with government, and integrated technical support from headquarters, regional and country staff.

xviii. **The funding challenge:** Funding continues to be a headache in seeking to ensure a smooth link between emergency response and relief, and interventions structured around longer-term issues and objectives, classed as ‘development’ activities. FAO tries to find the right mixture of short- and long-term funding to support the transition process, though the real challenge is to link short- and long-term horizons with a sufficient degree of certainty, reliability and flexibility.

xix. FAO has advocated hard for donors and partners to overcome this division, most recently with its own ‘Resilience Agenda’ and close interaction with the resilience agendas of donors and partner agencies. FAO’s message must be clear: to respond effectively to a crisis, you *need* an agency like FAO, a technical assistance and development institution fully capable of **functioning effectively in the humanitarian response arena, but with development-oriented contributions.**

xx. **Coordination for transition:** The evaluation confirms the importance of FAO’s coordination responsibility in crisis response, recently in the form of co-leadership (with WFP) of the global Food Security Cluster (gFSC). The effectiveness with which FAO exerts this function depends on the quality of the FAO Representative and his/her staff, and of the cluster coordinators, as well as on the support that they receive from other levels of FAO.

FSCs represent formidable opportunities for a dialogue with other actors, but they also face challenges in their interaction with national entities, including both governments and sometimes NGOs and CSOs. As a result, they are poor at handing over responsibilities to national authorities when they are withdrawn. FAO's more development-oriented role in the FSC could be a basis for advocating with the IASC for stronger engagement and better handovers.

xxi. **FAO's technical contribution:** FAO can provide key technical contributions to transition through a great variety of activities, such as assembling and analysing information that is relevant to transition processes, capacity development, provision of normative products, etc. However the evaluation found normative products underused, and capacity development mostly limited to individual training, often of short duration, with a narrow time horizon and thematic coverage.

RECOMMENDATION 2 on FAO's role in Transition:

FAO is a technical agency and a development organization with an exceptional capacity to act in early response to crisis, giving it a distinct and widely recognised and appreciated comparative advantage in supporting crisis-related transition.

- a) FAO needs to strongly advocate for recognition of this comparative advantage among donors, partners and member countries, also as a key tool to press resource partners to overcome the humanitarian-development divide.

FAO must get the message across that to respond most effectively to an emergency, you *need* an agency like FAO, a development institution fully capable of functioning effectively in the humanitarian response arena, but with development and resilience-oriented contributions.

This should be done actively both at global level and in countries.

The new Resilience Agenda under Strategic Objective 5 provides an excellent framework for this advocacy.

- b) FAO should capitalise on its role as co-leader of the Global Food Security Cluster to advocate for much greater integration of long-term (transition and resilience) thinking and planning in the cluster system at inter-agency level, as well as in this specific cluster.

Internally, in addition to ongoing formal integration of emergency and development work,

- c) Management needs to effect a culture-change, advocating for 'good transition work,' integrating it across the organization, especially regarding 'two-way LRRD,' where development policy in crisis or crisis-prone countries or areas is determined by crises and crisis planning (which is not at all the case at present).

This particularly aims to obtain the participation and contribution of all development units in the context of FAO crisis response and transition and resilience work. Management should find a resource-effective way to extend the positive effect of the L3 response protocol in mobilising development staff to participate in other (non-L3) emergency work.

xxii. **Revisiting FAO's role in transition in conflict-prone contexts:** Context specificity, conflict sensitivity and "do-no-harm" are important principles of any transitional

intervention. These principles have been strongly endorsed by the international community. The Committee on World Food Security (CFS) has recently launched a consultative process to elaborate an **Agenda for Action for Addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted Crisis**, exploring inter alia: (1) linkages between food insecurity and fragility, including through fragility assessments; and (2) the role that food security and nutrition can play in fragile and conflict-affected states, particularly in the specific context of the Busan New Deal *Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals*.³

xxiii. For an organization like FAO, promoting a good transition approach in a conflict-prone and fragile environment poses the problem of the nature of FAO's contribution. FAO generally sees itself narrowly confined to (ostensibly 'neutral') technical work in its mandated areas, as opposed to other international actors, including some UN agencies,⁴ who have more of a peace-building mandate. In such cases, capacities in conflict resolution, peacebuilding and governance seem to be more relevant than FAO's competencies in agriculture and natural resource management. However, capacities in conflict analysis and management cannot be completely outside of the responsibilities of any agency active in fragile states, if its goal is to help vulnerable populations.

xxiv. The evaluation, however, concludes clearly that FAO is not paying sufficient attention to these and other basic principles for working in such environments, where nonetheless it has the duty to work. Countries that are in post-conflict situations or still in conflict conditions, or characterised as fragile states, represent a growing part of the priority countries for FAO support.⁵ FAO appears to be lacking in the relevant technical qualifications for conflict analysis and conflict-sensitive programming, in spite of its mandate in such key conflict-related areas as tenure of land and other resources. Overall the evaluation felt that there is still a tendency in FAO to consider technical assistance as neutral, non-political and non-conflictual. This, however, is questionable, as in situations of conflict, no intervention can be completely neutral. Who receives it and who does not, and what it changes with respect to use of and control over resources, are some of the ways in which even the most technical of assistance can affect conflict.

xxv. The evaluation was obliged to reflect upon and discuss a key dimension of this problem encountered in some of these contexts: the relationship between FAO and national governments in conflict-prone situations in which government is party to the conflict. This can be a highly charged issue, though such matters may vary significantly from case to case. As a general rule, compared to most other UN organizations and to development partners generally, FAO has exceptionally close relationships and high levels of trust with national governments, especially with the institutions and authorities in charge of agriculture, rural development and food security. As evidenced in innumerable evaluations, this is a major comparative advantage for FAO, and working exclusively through the national government is a part of its basic constitution.

³ See Community of Practice on Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises, *Mainstreaming Food Security into Peacebuilding Processes – Agenda for Action for Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises*, Online discussion: 27 November – 18 December 2013.

⁴ Seven United Nations agencies and departments (UNEP, UNDP, UNHABITAT, PBSO, DPA, DESA and IOM), coordinated by the UN Framework Team for Preventive Action, have partnered with the European Union on a research and action agenda for Land, Natural Resources and Conflict Prevention to help countries identify, prevent or transform tensions over natural resource as part of conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes.

⁵ This is clearly recognised by FAO's Strategic Framework, which dedicates one of its five strategic objectives (SO-5) specifically to building resilience in situations of crisis or potential crisis.

xxvi. However, in conflict-related situations, there may be times when assisting the poorest, most food insecure or most vulnerable may not be fully compatible with this exclusive channel of communication and action. The Vision, Global Goals and Strategic Objectives of FAO's current Strategic Framework are all stated in terms of impact of FAO assistance on the ultimate beneficiaries, who are precisely the poorest, most food insecure and most vulnerable populations. This can create a dilemma for FAO. Of course FAO must first try to use its 'trusted partner' role with government to advocate for action in food and agriculture in favour of all affected populations. FAO has often tackled challenges effectively in this way thanks to the value of its technical contribution and its ties to government.

xxvii. Another important aspect of FAO's role – or potential role – in conflict-prone situations derives from the fact that agriculture is a major source of job creation, income generation and economic activity, in addition to food production. This is true as much in fragile states and conflict situations as elsewhere. The resumption of agricultural activity has an huge potential in helping stabilise and neutralise situations of conflict which cause terrible hardship to affected populations. FAO therefore has the ability, and, this evaluation suggests, *the responsibility*, to make a positive contribution to conflict resolution and peacebuilding through its technical role in support of agriculture and food security. FAO's potential role in conflict prevention – which is all about moving from crisis into development, and therefore about transition – is both enormous and important, but developing this role will require significant commitment, skill development and investment of resources. **This justifies a paradigm shift in the way FAO deals with conflict situations** taking into consideration in all circumstances the impact (hopefully positive) of its interventions on conflict and peace.

RECOMMENDATION 3:

- a) In a paradigm shift, the relationship of food security and agriculture (including tenure, employment and income) to conflict and potential conflict management/resolution should be a paramount concern in FAO's crisis response work in conflict or conflict-prone situations, and FAO's intervention should begin with a contextual analysis examining that relationship in each case. Interventions and support should be designed keeping in mind the positive impact they could potentially have on conflict reduction through hunger reduction and support to economic activity. To do this well, FAO will need to expand its analytical competence.
- b) Central to this contextual analysis must be strong political economy analysis and conflict analysis. This is key in any crisis context. Tenure of land and other natural resources is a key factor in the potential for conflict.

This contextual analysis should be fully integrated with strategy development, targeting, intervention design, planning, implementation and monitoring for each transition environment.

- c) Such analysis will need to be conducted in partnership. FAO is not in a position to have all the information and skills needed for the analysis, and will need to work closely with other stakeholders.

1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose and scope of the evaluation

1. Resumption of agricultural production and achievement of food and nutrition security – FAO’s quintessential areas of action – are critical aspects of the transition out of crisis situations, whether they derive from violent conflict, natural disasters, socio-economic crisis, food chain emergencies, or other causes, and whether they are of short or protracted duration. FAO has been implementing projects for years at all stages of the transition process in crisis contexts, when possible starting in the immediate aftermath of a crisis. FAO has also played a convening and coordinating role in responding to these crises within its mandated areas, both with interventions on the ground and activities at global and regional levels.

2. According to its basic mandate, FAO is a technical assistance organization focused on supporting sustainable development of the food and agriculture⁶ sectors. In carrying out this mandate, it has over time and out of necessity developed wide-ranging skills in **applying its technical assistance role and abilities in all types of contexts, including contexts of crisis response**. FAO’s ability, or lack of it, to respond to crisis situations from the very earliest point with emergency interventions that explicitly and closely link to its development role, and to carry out development work in crisis contexts that is fully sensitive to the crisis risks, is the subject of this evaluation.

3. The main purpose of this evaluation is not to assess all FAO work in emergencies (which has been the subject of several other evaluations), but to assess the nature and effectiveness of its role in *ensuring an effective link between short and long-term objectives in the response to these emergencies*. The objective of the evaluation is to identify strategic recommendations that could improve FAO’s effectiveness in transition contexts. To do this, it assesses:

- whether FAO has been effective in its role supporting transition;
- the impact of its coordination efforts on the quality and pace of transition;
- whether and how, in its early ‘relief’ response to crises, FAO’s development (and now ‘resilience’) mandate has helped to more effectively link relief and development;
- FAO’s ability to mobilise appropriate funding for this ‘relief and development’ role as part of its resilience agenda, overcoming the frequent donor divide between short-term ‘humanitarian’ funding and longer-term funding for development; and
- FAO’s comparative advantages and competitive positioning in crisis-related environments, to identify lessons from experience and spell out its optimal role.

4. In making this assessment, the evaluation was guided by five general questions, which served to orient both the investigation and the analysis:

1. In crisis contexts in general and especially where this relates to food security, agricultural livelihoods and production, has there been effective attention to the link between humanitarian response and longer-term development and greater resilience? What has FAO’s role been? How effective has it been?

⁶ The word “agriculture,” when used in this report, refers to the wide definition of agriculture that is FAO’s mandate, including plant production, animal production, forestry and fisheries.

2. To what extent does FAO successfully manage the challenges of doing good development work in a crisis context?
3. Are FAO's new management reforms contributing to more contextually-relevant and effective action in crisis response and transition? If yes, how?
4. To the extent that the longer-term needs of disadvantaged people, groups and communities have been prioritized in crisis situations, how and how much has FAO contributed?
5. Given FAO's mandate, long-term presence in countries and close relationship with host governments, what leadership and catalytic role (if any) does or could FAO play in transition work in crisis contexts?

5. This evaluation has also analysed how internal changes affected FAO's work in this area, either positively or negatively, focusing on reforms leading to the decentralization of emergency operations, new standard operating procedures for large scale emergencies, and the Reviewed FAO Strategic Framework of June 2013.

6. The evaluation reviewed the period roughly from 2007 to 2014. The types of crises considered range from natural disasters to complex emergencies and protracted crises in fragile states. Field visits focused mostly on FAO work in fragile states affected by conflict-related crises in the last decade. It also assessed the response to a major natural disaster, Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. In both cases, the evaluation focuses on FAO's ability link relief interventions to rehabilitation and development, and development interventions to crisis risk (two-way LRRD).

7. To the extent possible, the evaluation also assessed the extent to which FAO can hold itself accountable to crisis-affected populations and other stakeholders, adhering to international humanitarian principles, standard development principles, and recognized principles for engagement in fragile states, including the 'do no harm' approach, conflict sensitivity, focus on the most vulnerable, promotion of local ownership, contextual appropriateness, and sustainability of solutions.⁷

8. To frame the analysis, the evaluation takes into account the current debates on resilience, transition, linking relief and development, and food security in fragile states and protracted crisis.

9. In the complexities of ever-more frequent crisis situations, the contribution from a technical specialized agency like FAO cannot be isolated from the broader socio-political dimensions and multi-faceted nature of these crises. The evaluation seeks to assess the extent to which, in its actions in crisis situations, FAO is able to take into account key elements of this complexity, including risks of violence and insecurity, underlying social tensions, and the humanitarian as well as developmental needs of affected populations.

1.2 Potential audiences

10. There is a wide range of audiences for this evaluation, internal and external to FAO. In FAO these include senior management; Country Representatives and staff in countries with crisis or post-crisis situations; and the teams working on Strategic Objective 5 on Resilience and to a lesser extent, on the four other strategic objectives.

⁷ See Box 4, section 3.1.5 below

11. External audiences include member governments; major donors; international humanitarian coordinating mechanisms and bodies; and UN⁸ and non-UN actors in the humanitarian environment, including national and international NGOs and research centres.

1.3 Definitions

12. This evaluation adopted the working definitions shown in Box 1 below:⁹

Box 1: Definitions

Transition refers to a way of working in crisis-related response which follows a *process of linking immediate objectives (meeting the immediate needs of the disaster/shock-affected population through emergency operations) to medium and long term development objectives.*¹⁰ As can be seen from the title of this report, “Transition” is used interchangeably with “**Linking relief, rehabilitation and development**”, or **LRRD**.

Resilience is “*The ability to prevent disasters and crises as well as to anticipate, absorb, accommodate or recover from them in a timely, efficient and sustainable manner. This includes protecting, restoring and improving livelihoods systems in the face of threats that impact agriculture, nutrition, food security and food safety (and related public health).*” (FAO 2013)¹¹

A complex emergency, as defined by the IASC, is “*a humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country programme.*” (IASC 1994)

A fragile state refers to “*a region or state that has weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society.(...) More resilient states exhibit the capacity and legitimacy of governing a population and its territory.*” (OECD, 2013)¹²

1.4 Structure of the report

13. Chapter I summarizes the main objectives of the evaluation, and identifies the key questions. Chapter II outlines the methodology, starting with the analytical approach, and also identifies sources of information.

14. Chapter III describes the conceptual and institutional context of the evaluation and suggests a Theory of Change for FAO’s role in transition. It presents an overview of FAO’s recent strategic planning exercise and Reviewed Strategic Framework, with special focus on Strategic Objective 5 on Resilience and an analysis of the place and role of transition work in the new Resilience Agenda.

15. Chapter IV presents a synthesis of findings in topic areas investigated by the evaluation, the analysis of FAO’s contribution, conclusions for each topic and, where

⁸ In particular UN humanitarian agencies in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and the UNDG-ECHA Working Group on Transition.

⁹ Terms of Reference of the Evaluation, p. 7 (with adjustments)

¹⁰ See *FAO in Emergencies GUIDANCE NOTE: Transitional Programming*, 2013, p.3.

¹¹ FAO Reviewed Strategic Framework 2013.

¹² OECD (2013), *Fragile States 2013: Resource flows and trends in a shifting world*.

relevant, suggested recommendations. The specific suggested actions relating to the topic areas are presented in boxes following the related analysis, and also grouped together in a summary table at the end of the report (Appendix 2).

16. The final Chapter V presents the overall conclusions and the strategic recommendations of the evaluation.

2 Methodology

2.1 *Analytical approach*

17. As a strategic evaluation covering a period of repetitive major reforms in FAO, more than looking backwards and focusing only on evidence on past work in crisis situations, the evaluation analyses ongoing changes to reach reasonable conclusions for the future.

18. The evaluation has included observations resulting from a broader consultation with a variety of stakeholders both inside and outside of FAO (see section 2.2.3 below) and a review of current debate and literature. It examined approaches adopted by other UN agencies or international organizations working in crisis-related transition, as they represent important terms of comparison for FAO as it deals with fragile states, protracted crises and other crisis-affected areas. The evaluation also reviewed the debate on resilience, transition, and linking of relief to development and food security in fragile states and protracted crisis.

19. Through this broader analytical approach, it has been possible to arrive at conclusions on whether FAO's initiatives – as currently conceived, executed and resourced – are adequate to meet future challenges in crisis contexts, reviewing strengths and weakness of FAO's operations, recognizing opportunities and challenges, identifying guiding orientations for the future of FAO's strategy in crisis contexts.

2.2 *Main sources of information*

20. An evaluation of this broad coverage could not but have an extensive list of information sources, as the evaluation makes use of both primary and secondary data. These sources include:

- a. Review of research literature on protracted crisis, resilience, linking relief to rehabilitation and development, and links between food security and crisis situations.
- b. Review of international documents produced by FAO, the UN system, the World Bank and several bilateral donors on transition, resilience and related themes.
- c. Meta-analysis of past evaluations by FAO's Office of Evaluation (OED) for the period 2007-2013 (see next section).
- d. Country-level documentation (FAO Country Programming Frameworks and project-related information) on FAO's operations.
- e. Extensive consultation with FAO officers in headquarters.
- f. Findings from missions to six crisis-affected countries, where the team consulted with government, multilateral organizations, UN institutions, donors, academia and research centres, INGOs and national NGOs, and carried out field visits to projects (see section 2.2.2 below).
- g. Consultation with selected regional and sub-regional FAO offices.
- h. Consultation with partners at their headquarters: multilateral organizations, UN institutions, major bilateral donors and research institutes.

2.2.1 *Meta-analysis*

21. The initial meta-analysis of past FAO evaluations on themes relevant to FAO's work in transition contexts (see Annex 4) provided a significant body of information for the evaluation. The evaluations were included in the meta-analysis if they met one or more of the following criteria:

- i. focused on emergency and/or rehabilitation activities of FAO;

- ii. regarded FAO's response (global, regional or country specific) to natural disasters;
- iii. focused on areas of FAO's work crucial to support transition;
- iv. concerned cross-sector issues relevant for transition;
- v. concerned countries affected by severe crises in the last 10-15 years;
- vi. covered FAO modalities relevant for programming FAO's work in transition situations.

22. The meta-analysis verified whether solid evidence already existed on topics relevant to transition, and where additional primary data gathering was necessary. It was used during the first analytical stage for a discussion within the Evaluation Team and with the External Expert Panel (EEP). Specific evaluations reviewed in the meta-analysis are listed below.

Box 2: List of evaluations reviewed for the meta-analysis

<p>a) <u>On FAO emergency and/or rehabilitation activities</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2010 - Evaluation of FAO's operational capacity in emergencies • 2011 - Evaluation of FAO's work through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) • 2013 - Evaluation of FAO's role and work in Disaster Risk Reduction in Asia and in Latin America and the Caribbean 	<p>b) <u>On response to specific natural disasters</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Real Time Evaluation of the FAO Emergency and Rehabilitation Operations in Response to the Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami • Evaluation of the FAO Response to the Pakistan Earthquake • First/Second Real Time Evaluation of FAO's work on the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza • An Independent Evaluation of FAO's Response to the July 2010 Floods in Pakistan 		
<p>c) <u>On key technical areas of the FAO's relevant for increased long-term resilience</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of FAO's Role and Work in Nutrition • Strategic Evaluation of FAO's Work on Tenure, Rights and Access to Land and Other Natural Resources • Strategic Evaluation of FAO's role and work in Forestry • FAO's Role and Work in Food and Agriculture Policy • Evaluation of FAO's role and work related to water • Evaluation of FAO's Role in Investment for Food and Nutrition Security, Agriculture and Rural Development • Impact Evaluation on FAO's support to the Implementation of the Code of Conduct in Sri Lanka 	<p>d) <u>On specific cross-sector issues relevant for transition</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of FAO's role and work related to Gender and Development • Evaluation of Capacity Development in Africa (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe) 		
<p>e) <u>On relevant FAO modalities and procedures</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategic Evaluation of FAO Country Programming 	<p>f) <u>On effectiveness of FAO programme in specific situations</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FAO's Effectiveness at Country Level: Synthesis of Country Evaluations: Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Cambodia and Honduras 		
<p>g) <u>Country evaluations of FAO activities</u></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghanistan • DRC • Ethiopia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sierra Leone • Somalia • Sudan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sri Lanka • Tajikistan • Zimbabwe

2.2.2 *Assessments at the country level*

23. A key analytical tool for this evaluation was a number of specific field missions. The evaluation team visited the following countries and territories:

Country visited	Nature of crisis
Philippines	Recent major sudden onset natural disaster, leading to UN declaration of Level 3 response
Mali	Conflict 2 years ago still not fully resolved, on top of previous drought, in a fragile state and a vulnerable agricultural system exposed to climate hazards
Democratic Republic of Congo	Post-conflict in the West and protracted conflict crisis in the East in a long-standing fragile state
Liberia	Post-conflict (2003) with risk of recurrent conflict in a long-standing fragile state
Uganda	Post-conflict (2007) in Northern Uganda (LRA) Protracted conflict in Karamoja
West Bank and Gaza Strip	Very long-term protracted conflict

24. The case of South Sudan was also reviewed based on information collected through desk reviews and interviews with FAO staff working in the country. Although the sample is small in size, the number of visits was considered sufficient, since it was complemented by country evaluations recently completed in countries affected by crises, for which no additional field visit was necessary.

25. The sample was selected on the basis of following criteria:

- Portfolio size of so-called transition projects over the period;
- Diverse characteristics and dimension of the crisis, including both conflict-related, natural disaster and mixed conflict/natural disaster causes;
- On-going or recent crisis preferred over post-crisis context;
- Avoidance of overlap with other recent or on-going evaluations;
- Status as a “fragile state,” “protracted crisis,” etc., according to various classifications.

26. In preparing for the country missions, a review of project documents, project evaluations and final project reports was carried out. For each country visited a specific country brief was produced summarizing main findings from the missions. The briefs also included an analysis of FAO’s Country Programming Frameworks (CPFs).

2.2.3 *Stakeholder consultation*

27. As already mentioned, the assessment undertaken required broad consultations extended to a wide range of stakeholders, both within FAO and external to the Organization. A complete list of persons met during this vast consultation process is reported in Annex 2.

28. Stakeholders met for consultation can be grouped in two main groups:

External stakeholders:

- Focal points of UN organizations and International Financial Institutions (met at their headquarters or country offices), including members of the UNDG-ECHA Working Group on Transition and the IASC Early Recovery Cluster Working Group (CWGER). These included: OCHA, UN-DOCO, UNDP, WFP, UNICEF, UN-HABITAT, UNISDR, UN-OPS, IFAD and the World Bank (including its Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, GFDRR, and Center on Conflict, Security and Development).

- Representatives of bilateral development partners: the European Union (DEVCO for development assistance and ECHO for humanitarian affairs); USAID; the Dutch Cooperation; Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC); Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA); Canadian humanitarian assistance.
- Representatives of Government in countries visited, including different ministries and agencies with which FAO works, such as agriculture, livestock, environment, forestry, fisheries, food security, gender, social affairs, youth employment and rural development. Where field visits took place, those consultations also included local authorities.
- Experts in research or academic institutions working on crisis and transition issues.
- Representatives of international and national NGOs, on country visits. These included NGOs that have a role as implementing partners (IPs) of FAO.
- Representatives of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) or Community-based organizations (CBOs).

Internal stakeholders (within FAO)

- Staff and management at headquarters through interviews, comments on the draft report and the Management Response to the final evaluation report. These included the Emergency and Rehabilitation Division (TCE), the Office for Support to Decentralized Offices (OSD), the Donor Liaison and Resource Mobilization Unit (TCSR), and all the technical divisions, including those working on cross-cutting themes (gender, capacity development, partnerships with NGOs and civil society, food security analysis and information systems). Extensive discussions also took place with the Coordinator, the Core Team and the inter-departmental team of Strategic Objective 5.
- Staff and management in the regional and sub-regional offices. The team visited FAO Regional Offices in Bangkok (Asia and the Pacific) and Accra (Africa), as well as the FAO Resilience Hub in Nairobi.
- Staff and management of FAO country offices: FAO country representatives, staff in the country office; FAO project coordinators at the country or sub-national level.

2.3 *External Expert Panel and quality assurance*

29. An *External Expert Panel* (EEP) provided independent and high-quality technical inputs, playing an advisory role to the evaluation team since the inception phase. At a final meeting in Rome, the Panel provided its comments on the final draft report and in particular, on the evaluation recommendations.

30. FAO Office of Evaluation has developed quality assurance processes and tools (peer review, checklists, templates) based on the UN Evaluation Group norms and standards which have been systematically applied during the course of the evaluation.

2.4 *Limitations*

31. FAO has been undergoing a series of major reforms over the period covered by the evaluation, with the development of two successive new and completely different strategic frameworks, the restructuring of many of the organization's departments and divisions, the ongoing decentralization of its operations. The decentralization of FAO's emergency operations and the integration of the emergency and development programmes is very recent and assessment of its results is necessarily limited to what has already taken place. The same is true for the impact of changes associated with FAO's Reviewed Strategic Framework, which has only begun implementation in 2014.

32. As noted above, the evaluation was designed with a limited number of field visits because of the existence in FAO of a large body of recent evaluations with direct relevance to the topic of transition. Therefore, in its analysis and conclusions, the evaluation is dependent on a high proportion of secondary data (e.g. the Meta-Analysis described above).

3 Context

3.1 *FAO in crisis contexts*

33. This evaluation needs to be rooted in the concrete crisis contexts on which FAO operations intervene, which vary significantly from country to country and, for the same country, in different areas and different moments in time. The types of crisis situations as classified by FAO are listed in Box 3.

Box 3: The five types of crises¹³

- **Natural disasters** (e.g. geo-climatic and climate variability, including extreme weather events originating from natural hazards – droughts, floods, storms, extreme temperatures, hailstorms, wild fires, landslides, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, earthquakes, etc.);
- **Food chain emergencies of transboundary or technological threats** (e.g. transboundary plant, forest, animal, aquatic and zoonotic pests and diseases with high impact, food safety events, radiological and nuclear emergencies, dam failures, industrial pollution, oil spills, etc.);
- **Socio-economic crises** (e.g. the 2008 global food price crisis and more recent financial shocks);
- **Violent conflicts** (e.g. civil unrest, regime change, interstate conflicts, civil wars, etc.); and
- **Protracted crises** (i.e. complex, prolonged emergencies that combine two or more aspects of the above-mentioned shocks).

3.1.1 *The notion of transition in FAO*

34. For programming purposes, FAO defines transition as in Box 1 above: a process of linking immediate objectives (meeting the immediate needs of the disaster/shock-affected population through emergency operations) to medium and long-term development objectives.

35. Until recently, transition was viewed as a phase of crisis response following a shock, in which transition refers to the period between relief (the initial phase) and development (final phases) in a linear process often defined as the “*relief-development continuum*.” This was the approach used by the United Nations in the early 1990s, when it adopted a series of resolutions of the General Assembly calling for a *relief-development continuum* to fill a funding gap.

36. This approach is currently considered inadequate to describe what FAO is asked to do in crisis-related transition. The linear approach to transition may be still applicable to single-cause rapid-onset emergencies, e.g., natural calamities, but has become less common as FAO, even in cases of natural disasters, more often faces emergencies that are defined as *complex emergencies* (see Box 3).

37. In a Guidance Note on transition programming, FAO suggests elements for successful *transition programming* in emergency operations, which include the following:¹⁴

- i. enhanced national ownership of the activities promoted, including through support to national strategies and policies in the sector;

¹³ See FAO New Strategic Objective 5, “Increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises”.

¹⁴ *FAO in Emergencies GUIDANCE NOTE: Transitional Programming*, op. cit., p.5.

- ii. inclusive planning has been launched, including locating that planning within existing or nascent national institutions;
 - iii. disaster risk reduction has been integrated in the emergency operation, focusing on building household, community and institutional resilience;
 - iv. capacity development aimed at reducing future risks and vulnerabilities to disasters has been promoted;
 - v. market forces have been activated to achieve humanitarian and development outcomes, including through market-based interventions; and
 - vi. gender equality has been promoted.
38. These elements are highly relevant, but do not appear to be designed for complex emergencies, protracted crises and fragile states or situations. These kinds of crises and their characteristics are discussed below.

3.1.2 Transition in complex emergencies, protracted crises and fragile states

39. As opposed to the linear process of transition just described, when transition is conceived in the context of a complex emergency, the concept of linking relief to rehabilitation and development (LRRD) cannot be seen as a time sequence of separate phases. FAO's role becomes more articulated, linking simultaneous long and short-term actions in a more flexible approach, where the context is made up of convoluted cause-effect chains between recurring crises and development work. This applies especially in the context of protracted crises in fragile states. Country missions undertaken by the evaluation team in Liberia, Mali, DRC, Uganda and West Bank and Gaza Strip, provide evidence of transition of this complex nature. Country evaluations reviewed in the meta-analysis (for Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Sudan) provide similar types of transition processes (see Annex 4).

40. The review of current literature on this subject emphasises the implications of addressing transition in complex situations. Special attention is given to conditions prevailing in fragile states, defined above as “*a region or state that has weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society*”.¹⁵

41. In fragile states, there is a substantial disequilibrium in the relation between state and society, caused by multiple factors, some of them chronic and particularly acute. These crises are by their nature much more “political” than one-cause emergencies linked to natural calamities. However, in situations of protracted crisis, even natural calamities can become complex emergencies. In fragile states, even natural disasters (such as droughts in the Sahel) can easily turn into a political crisis given their socio-economic implications.¹⁶ Fragility is often associated only to the notion of vulnerability to conflicts. However, there are important links between fragility of the state and poverty and food insecurity, especially in rural areas, which may be both causes and consequences of state fragility.

42. The evaluation seeks to further clarify the impact of conditions prevailing in fragile states on FAO's role in transition.

¹⁵ OECD (2013), *Fragile States 2013: Resource flows and trends in a shifting world*.

¹⁶ See Mark Duffield (1994), *Complex Emergencies and the Crisis of Developmentalism*, in *IDS Bulletin*, 25.4.1994, page 3.

3.1.3 The two-way link between short and long term actions in a strengthened approach to transition

43. As discussed above, in rapid onset and natural disasters the main concern is usually to develop a pathway out of relief by linking affected communities to longer-term development to return to the pre-crisis status as quickly as possible. FAO usually also seeks to achieve more ambitious targets with a “*building back better*” approach, in which the after-crisis conditions will be better than before, with more sustainable and resilient livelihoods.¹⁷

44. However, addressing conditions in countries affected by protracted crises requires more complex strategies, based on a thorough knowledge of the context and a renewed approach to transition. Protracted crises make it mandatory to conceive the link between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) as a link among concomitant actions – not successive ones – in a single integrated strategic approach.

45. Thus LRRD is a way of linking short-term concerns for *immediate effects* of crisis with actions aimed at the structural inequalities and imbalances that are the *underlying causes* of vulnerability to crisis. Relief operations not only address immediate needs of affected populations but also pursue their longer-term constraints.

46. A newer approach to transition conceives LRRD also in the other direction (**two-way linking**): all development operations in protracted or recurrent crisis situations should be conceived with the existence and consequences of crisis – and the recurrent need for relief – as a central element of design.

3.1.4 The Transformative Agenda and Level 3 Protocol

47. A major addition to FAO’s approach to emergency response was the recent adoption of the “Transformative Agenda” for interagency response to large-scale emergencies, and the development of the so-called “Level 3 Protocol.”

48. The humanitarian response of the international community to the Haiti earthquake and the Pakistan floods showed a number of weaknesses and inefficiencies. On the basis of lessons learned from these experiences, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) introduced the *Transformative Agenda* (TA) in December 2011. The TA is a set of recommendations and actions to transform the way in which humanitarian actors respond to large scale emergencies to improve timeliness and effectiveness. The TA focuses on three key areas: (a) stronger leadership; (b) more effective coordination structures; and (c) improved accountability for performance and to affected populations.

49. With the adoption of the TA, for the first time IASC agreed on a set of mechanisms, tools and procedures to respond collectively as UN system to large scale “Level 3” emergencies, that require the activation of a system-wide response. Level 3 emergencies are judged by their scale, complexity, urgency, the capacity required to respond and the reputational risk to humanitarian organisations and responders if the response is not effective.

¹⁷ Although the only country visited in a post-natural disaster situation (Philippines) is a generally stable, middle-income country, it is important to keep in mind that power relations and potential for conflict affecting crisis-vulnerable populations exist in all contexts and countries. Political economy analysis is critical to find effective ways to ‘build back better’ even in natural disaster contexts.

Many elements of the Transformative Agenda are to be applied as appropriate to non-Level 3 contexts (including protracted crises, slow-onset, and smaller-scale disasters), to strengthen existing response operations.¹⁸

50. FAO has committed to implement the Transformative Agenda, and has also adopted the related Level 3 Emergency Response Protocol. However it is worth noting that the Transformative Agenda is still very much focused on improving the *humanitarian* response, without much attention to the issues of transition. In the case of FAO's application of the L3 protocol, in particular in the Philippines as seen during this evaluation, the protocol allowed – within FAO – for the closer involvement of development staff in an emergency response. However, the Transformative Agenda itself does not address the need for long-term development perspectives to be integrated into the immediate response to emergencies.

3.1.5 *Principles for engagement in transitional contexts*

51. When operating in crisis situations, or when transition processes are ongoing, FAO adheres to certain principles related to its role as provider of assistance both in humanitarian and longer-term development contexts. These principles are particularly relevant in confronting difficult situations of complex and protracted crises. They can be classified according to the following categories:

¹⁸ *Key Messages: The IASC Transformative Agenda*

Box 4: Principles developed for intervention in crisis contexts

a. Humanitarian principles¹⁹

- Humanity
- Neutrality
- Impartiality
- Independence

b. Development Principles²⁰

- Empowerment;
- Participatory development;
- Sustainable development;
- Self-reliance;
- Equity;
- Capacity development; and
- Transparency/accountability.

c. Principles for engagement in fragile states and situations²¹

- Context-specificity;
- Do no harm;
- Focus on state-building as the central objective;
- Prioritize prevention and risk reduction;
- Recognize the links between political, security and development objectives;
- Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies.

The above three sets of principles should ideally complement each other, with greater weight given to one set or to one principle according to the crisis scenario. However, there can be trade-offs between humanitarian and development principles.

These “basic” principles have been complemented by OECD with the following “*practical*” rules to operate in fragile states or situations²²:

- Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts;
- Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors;
- Act fast but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance;
- Avoid pockets of exclusions (“aid orphans”).

3.2 *FAO’s recent Strategic Frameworks: SO-I and SO-5*

52. The current evaluation was initially conceived under FAO’s *Strategic Framework 2010-19* that was current at the time, but no longer so when the evaluation started implementation in 2014. By then, a completely new strategic framework had been developed

¹⁹ These derive from a set of core principles adopted in 1965 by the International Committee of the Red Cross. The UN General Assembly endorsed a few of them on two separate occasions, with its resolutions 46/182 (1991), and 58/114 (2004).

²⁰ FAO’s *2010 State of Food Insecurity in the World* report lists these seven development principles, which were endorsed by the United Nations and formalized through resolutions of the UN General Assembly.

²¹ These OECD principles have been formally endorsed by ministers and heads of agencies at the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) High Level Forum, 3-4 April 2007.

²² The rules of engagement in fragile states and situations are the product of OECD, which adopted them in 2007. The rules of engagement in fragile states do not have the formal endorsement of the United Nations

(which goes under the name of “*Reviewed Strategic Framework 2010-19*”), and it is in the context of this new framework that the evaluation outcomes are here discussed.

53. The Strategic Framework 2010-2019 approved in 2009 had 11 Strategic Objectives (SOs – labelled SO-A to SO-L) organized around FAO's main areas of work, of which SO-I: “Improved preparedness for, and effective response to, food and agricultural threats and emergencies” was the one dealing with emergency and rehabilitation. TCE was responsible for the overall management of this SO. SO-I had three Organizational Results (ORs): OR1 on Disaster Risk Reduction, OR2 on Response to Emergencies, and OR3 on Transition and LRRD.

54. The Office of Evaluation conducted an evaluation of FAO's work and role in disaster risk reduction (OR1) in 2012-13 mainly focusing on Asia and Latin America and Caribbean. Regarding OR2, there is a large number of evaluations that address emergency activities and looked at FAO's response. The meta-analysis conducted as part of this evaluation undertook a review of those evaluations. OR3 is the subject of the current evaluation. As observed in the concept note for this evaluation, OR3 used the umbrella term “transition,” and while the organization has expended a certain effort in discussing the concept, this evaluation found that there is no shared understanding of its definition and implications within the Organization. Furthermore, there is no clear set of interventions or tools in FAO explicitly addressing transition, though general guidelines do exist.

55. In the original *Strategic Framework 2010-2019*, transition was initially seen as part of a linear process, a *continuum* from relief to rehabilitation to development. At the same time a concept note was developed on OR3 questioning the linearity of that concept, underlining that “*a linear transition is neither feasible nor effective in most cases*” and that “*it is frequently necessary to simultaneously engage in relief operations, recovery and development over the same space and time.*” The concept note called for the adoption of the concept of a “*contiguuum*” of action, covering the simultaneous (“contiguous”) implementation of emergency and development work.

56. In 2012, the new DG launched a new strategic thinking process to determine the future strategic directions of the Organization. The process led to the *Reviewed Strategic Framework 2010-19*, in which five cross-cutting Strategic Objectives were identified. The box below presents FAO's Results Framework as it emerges from the new strategic framework.

Box 5: FAO's results framework: the main components

FAO's vision

A world free of hunger and malnutrition where food and agriculture contributes to improving the living standards of all, especially the poorest, in an economically, socially and environmentally sustainable manner.

The three **Global Goals of Members:**

1. eradication of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition, progressively ensuring a world in which people at all times have sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life;
2. elimination of poverty and the driving forward of economic and social progress for all, with increased food production, enhanced rural development and sustainable livelihoods; and
3. sustainable management and utilization of natural resources, including land, water, air, climate and genetic resources for the benefit of present and future generations.

The five **Strategic Objectives:**

1. Contribute to the eradication of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition
2. Increase and improve provision of goods and services from agriculture, forestry and fisheries in a sustainable manner
3. Reduce rural poverty
4. Enable more inclusive and efficient agricultural and food systems at local, national and international levels
5. Increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises

Additional objective

- Technical quality, knowledge and services

Cross-cutting themes

- Gender
- Governance

Core Functions

1. Facilitate and support countries in the development and implementation of normative and standard-setting instruments, such as international agreements, codes of conduct, technical standards and others
2. Assemble, analyze, monitor and improve access to data and information, in areas related to FAO's mandate
3. Facilitate, promote and support policy dialogue at global, regional and country levels
4. Advise and support capacity development at country and regional level to prepare, implement, monitor and evaluate evidence-based policies, investments and programmes
5. Advise and support activities that assemble, disseminate and improve the uptake of knowledge, technologies and good practices in the areas of FAO's mandate
6. Facilitate partnerships for food security and nutrition, agriculture and rural development, between governments, development partners, civil society and the private sector
7. Advocate and communicate at national, regional and global levels, in areas of FAO's mandate


Functional Objectives

- Outreach
- Information Technology
- FAO Governance, oversight and direction
- Efficient and effective administration

57. The fifth of the strategic objectives, SO-5 on Resilience, is the one most closely related to FAO's emergency and rehabilitation work. As noted above, **resilience** is defined in SO-5 as *"The ability to prevent disasters and crises as well as to anticipate, absorb, accommodate or recover from them in a timely, efficient and sustainable manner. This includes protecting, restoring and improving livelihoods systems in the face of threats that impact agriculture, nutrition, food security and food safety (and related public health)."*²³

58. SO-5 and its four Organizational Outcomes (or "Pillars") are illustrated below in Figure 1:

Figure 1: The elements of SO-5



59. SO-5 is to be delivered through all seven of FAO's Core Functions – especially through capacity development, knowledge management, strategic partnership, and policy dialogue. It is also to work on the cross-cutting themes of governance and gender.

60. With the introduction of the Resilience concept the linear approach to transition has been definitively abandoned. At the same time, in the *Reviewed Strategic Framework* the word "transition" itself has disappeared.²⁴ Although the term has disappeared, the concept of linking short-term relief and long-term development is still clearly present in the Action Plan developed for SO-5: *"adheres to the "twin-track" approach of taking immediate steps to support food security and nutrition, while simultaneously addressing the underlying factors driving disasters and crises. It will facilitate (...) strategic programming processes involving humanitarian, development and investment actors before, during and after crisis."*²⁵

²³ FAO Reviewed Strategic Framework (2013).

²⁴ It is worth noting however that in an early draft (21 September 2012) of SO-5, Outcome 4 still refers to transition: *"Disasters and crises affecting agriculture and food systems are effectively and accountably managed, including preparedness, robust responses and effective post-crisis transitions"*.

²⁵ C 2013/3 Web Annex XII: Strategic Objectives Action Plan Medium Term Plan 2014-17 and Programme of Work and Budget 2014-15 para. 210.

61. Another clear point made in the new *Strategic Framework* is the link between SO-5 and the other Strategic Objectives. The *Reviewed Strategic Framework* (para.111) indicates that “*There are complementarities, as well as reasonably clear boundaries between SO-5 and other Strategic Objectives. In times of crises and disasters, it is important to anchor related actions in broader development objectives and promote resilience as part of commitments to combating hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition (SO-1). SO-5 also links up to: ecosystem sustainability and climate change mitigation and adaptation (SO-2); poverty reduction/alleviation and safety nets (SO-3); and market and private sector viability (SO-4). SO-1 and SO-4 contribute to decreasing the longer-term risks of, and stresses brought about by global food price volatility and food safety emergencies, while SO-5 focuses on risk reduction for disasters and crises*”.

62. Resilience is a result sought across all SOs, but while SO-5 focuses on developing resilience to “**shocks**” (defined as irregular, relatively large and unpredictable disturbances), the other SOs mainly support resilience to “**stresses**” (defined as a regular, sometimes continuous, relatively small and predictable disturbances). Especially in dealing with “slow onset emergencies” and protracted crises in fragile states these different approaches are crucial to define a strategy for transition.

3.3 Mapping “Transition” (LRRD) to SO-5 and “Resilience”

63. As defined in this evaluation report, “Transition” is specifically related to crisis contexts. “Resilience” on the other hand, as defined under SO-5²⁶ is a concept that includes not only actual or recent (or recurrent) crises, but also potential crises (with the words “prevent,” “anticipate” – see footnote), meaning risk management, DRR, prevention and preparation, etc., which do not fall under the definition of transition we are using for this evaluation. Or, as it is phrased in a recent ODI paper: “...*resilience is broader, not only encompassing people in crises but also those vulnerable to crises.*”²⁷

64. FAO’s previous strategic framework (which was in force when this evaluation was requested) gave a major role to transition under SO-I, Organisational Result 3: “Improved transition and linkages between emergency, rehabilitation and development,” as part of achieving the strategic objective of improved response to emergencies. In the *Reviewed Strategic Framework*, the objective is to support affected populations to achieve greater *resilience* to crises. “Response” as a whole is one of the four tools (pillars) for this, and within response, the effort to link relief and development (“transition”) is one element. However, crisis-related response still remains by far the largest area of FAO’s emergency-related and resilience work. And transition/LRRD is central to the resilience agenda in crisis-related response – it is an essential means for achieving the *outcome* of “resilience.” And the ability (and mandate) to link relief to development is one of FAO’s major comparative advantages in these crisis contexts.

65. As stressed to the evaluation team, and also noted by ODI, the emergence of the resilience concept has made it clear that LRRD is not only a tool for humanitarian actors (as was the case in the past), but is also a key concept for development actors working in areas

²⁶ As noted in Box 1, “Resilience” is: *The ability to prevent disasters and crises as well as to anticipate, absorb, accommodate or recover from them in a timely, efficient and sustainable manner. This includes protecting, restoring and improving livelihoods systems in the face of threats that impact agriculture, nutrition, food security and food safety (and related public health)* (FAO *Reviewed Strategic Framework* 2013).

²⁷ I. Mosel and S. Levine: “*Remaking the case for linking relief, rehabilitation and development,*” Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, London March 2014, p. 4

with a risk of shocks: *“The argument that development policy should be determined by crises, which became a major catalyst for the resilience agenda, overlaps with the case for rethinking LRRD. An LRRD agenda that is not just about emergency relief trying to find exit strategies to link to longer term structures, but is a genuinely ‘two-way LRRD’.”*²⁸

66. In the case of protracted and complex crises (Somalia, DRC, West bank and Gaza Strip...), emergency funding is used for interventions that are often longer-term in nature, but take place in an environment with characteristics of crisis contexts (weak government, unpredictability, recurrences of shocks of various types and dimensions, etc.). In this context, the “transition” approach (or better, LRRD) overlaps strongly with the entire resilience agenda. Strengthening resilience in these contexts necessarily passes through a blended programme combining both short-term and longer-term objectives and activities.

67. This evaluation is focused on FAO’s capacity to respond to crises with a “transition approach” which includes simultaneous consideration of both short-term and long-term issues, actively linking relief, rehabilitation and development. Among the four pillars of SO-5 illustrated above, it would appear that this evaluation is concerned mainly with tying Pillar 4: “Prepare and respond to crises” to the other three pillars. This includes such aspects of the other pillars as the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification system (IPC) and other information tools related to Pillar 2, or the impact of emergency interventions on policy and institutional capacity development (Pillar 1), or the ‘building back better’ of agricultural livelihoods under Pillar 3. However, the key concept for the evaluation is the design of emergency *response* that integrates development concerns and, in the other direction, designing development work that builds in crisis response where needed.

68. The FAO Resilience Agenda views all work done in any area where there is a potential for crisis (covering many of the areas where FAO works, and particularly poorer areas and more fragile environments) as part of a complex, changing assistance environment where FAO is constantly adjusting and dosing its various types of inputs (in particular the four types which make up the 4 pillars of the resilience strategy) to best respond to the evolving conditions, including response to shocks. There is no separation between contexts which have a current crisis and those that do not – it is all a continuum of changing scenarios requiring a flexibility of approaches ranging from immediate crisis response to long-term development.

69. Under this vision, separating out the analysis of “crisis-related transition” is most useful if it recognises how this work blends seamlessly into all the other resilience work that FAO should be doing even outside of the crisis-related context.

3.4 A Theory of Change for FAO’s role in linking relief, rehabilitation and development

70. The Theory of Change (TOC) in Figure 2 below seeks to explain why FAO should adopt “good transition approach” in crisis contexts. At the top are FAO’s Global Goals: what the Organization is trying to achieve through its work. The first question is: *“in crisis contexts, how does a ‘good transition approach’ contribute to reaching FAO’s Strategic Objectives and Global Goals?”* The second question is, *“what are factors contributing to FAO’s ability to implement a ‘good transition approach’?”*


²⁸ S. Levine and I. Mosel, *“Supporting Resilience in Difficult Places”*, HPG, ODI, London March 2014, p.6

71. This TOC identifies a number of logical and causal links that lead to the achievement of FAO's overall goals. The corporate factors at the bottom of the illustration are the institutional conditions resulting from recent reforms which most affect FAO's transition work. The other factors above correspond to the elements in FAO's ways of working which are most important to achieving a "good transition approach" in crisis contexts. The full group of factors corresponds roughly to the analytical sections in Chapter 4 of this report.

72. The "TRANSITION" box in the TOC, which includes a number of concepts as discussed in the text in the preceding sections, is further broken down in Figure 3 below, and then in Appendix 1 at the end of this report.

73. The "good transition approach" should improve crisis response in the ways listed under 'Sudden Onset' and "Chronic, Protracted, Complex'. For sudden onset crises such as natural disasters, good transition should lead to *faster exit from expensive and troublesome humanitarian assistance*, as well as *improving the quality of that assistance through incorporation of longer-term planning into design*. For complex or protracted crises, better transition should lead to a focus on *tackling the underlying causes of vulnerability to shocks*, while not losing *ability to respond to recurrent occurrences of crisis*. This better response should in turn lead to strengthened resilience of affected populations and national systems, both to shocks (which FAO supports through the products and services provided under Strategic Objective 5 on resilience), and to stresses (supported under parts of Strategic Objectives 1, 2, 3 and 4).


Figure 2: Theory of Change for FAO’s role in crisis-related transition



74. Figure 3 below is an attempt to unpack the central green “Transition” box in the Theory of Change in Figure 2. While seeking to include the important elements of transition, the figure still may give the appearance of a linear, chronological conception of transition. It should, however, be interpreted as a ‘snapshot’ of the response to any moment of crisis, whether one-off as in a natural disaster, or part of a recurrent series or complex set of crises in a situation of fragility and protracted crisis. Overall the concomitance of the highlighted relationships is dominant as compared with the time sequence, which is quite marginal. What counts is that the two triangles (one referring to humanitarian assistance and one referring to development), are simultaneous, with plenty of concomitant interactions.


75. The column on the left side (basic principles) is a selection of relevant principles, taken from the list of principles in Box 4 (above) and helps the analysis in focusing on few selected principles of paramount relevance, which would make a difference in revising FAO’s approach to transition. The column on the right side (building blocks) lists fundamental action areas, mechanisms and types of relationships that need to be considered in a revised approach to “good transition.” These building blocks are further elaborated in the table in Appendix 1 to this report.

Figure 3: Breakdown of the elements of transition (unpacking of the green box in Figure 2)



76. Figure 4 below provides some context to the “Better Response to Crises” box in the TOC, illustrating more generally how FAO’s role, which bridges the full relief-to-development divide, fits with the role of other agencies and actors in response to crises.

Figure 4: FAO in the wider crisis response environment



4 Assessing FAO's work in crisis-related transition: analysis, findings and suggested actions

4.1 *Decentralization and management of major disaster emergencies*

4.1.1 *Decentralization and integration of emergency responsibilities*

Findings:

- The decentralization of emergency operations and their integration into the overall structure of FAO offices at country level **is having a major, if gradual, impact on FAO's way of dealing with development work and emergency operations**, increasing awareness of approaches adopted and issues addressed by FAO officers dealing with both, raising sensitivity of development staff to the problems of working in crisis situations, and that of emergency staff to the consequences of emergency work on longer-term development objectives.
- Integration was perceived by staff as a positive change despite limited resources available at regional and sub-regional level to provide support, compared to the capacity TCE used to have.
- In the majority of countries visited, FAO staff was working as one team, or else efforts were on to make it work, with good examples of mutual learning.
- For resource mobilization, having only one FAO at the country level allows the country office to approach donors with a more coherent unified programme and indicate areas where development funds are needed and others for humanitarian funds (same programme but different funding windows). TCE's role in resource mobilization is useful and support in this area is necessary.
- While the integration is recent, in many countries FAO's emergency programme already contained many elements of the transition approach, linking relief and development.
- All indications are that the integration will allow (it is early to say has allowed) for a more coherent and consistent programme, with advantages for external stakeholders as there is more clarity when they approach FAO. However **the success of integration will need to be measured by its outcomes, and so ultimately its impact on vulnerable populations**, rather than in terms of its success as a management reform. It is too early for the evaluation to make an assessment of the success of integration in these terms.

77. FAO in 2012 began a major *decentralization of emergency and rehabilitation operations* from headquarters to country level, with the aim of achieving a more integrated approach to country programming, which now includes both development and emergency programmes under a single leadership. This decentralization and integration interacts with the roll-out of the *Reviewed Strategic Framework* and the adoption of the UN system *Protocol for Level 3 Emergencies*. All these factors influence FAO's ability to contribute to crisis-related transition from relief towards greater resilience and development.

78. In order to assess the extent to which this reform resulted in a more integrated programming approach and has affected FAO's effectiveness in its transition role, the finding of six country missions are here considered. However the mission to the Philippines focused FAO's Level 3 (L3) emergency response only, which could not be used as a typical example of integration. Another "exception" is the visit to West Bank and Gaza Strip, as Palestine is not a full member of FAO and there is no FAO country representation but only an emergency team, making integration not applicable. However, although the programme in West Bank

and Gaza Strip has been and still is based entirely on emergency funding, the majority of project interventions are developmental by nature. The other four cases (DRC, Liberia, Mali and Uganda) offered interesting examples of challenges but also, and above all, positive outcomes of integration of the emergency and development sides of the Organization. Regional Offices in Accra and Bangkok and the Subregional Emergency Operations Office in Nairobi were visited too.

79. Between 2010 and 2013, the Office of Evaluation conducted five regional thematic evaluations of FAO's decentralization that have extensively covered the decentralization reform. The integration of emergency and development constitutes only one step of this broader decentralization process. However, it is a very significant step that brought several changes in the way FAO is working today compared to the past. Past evaluations of FAO's decentralization have covered the decentralization of TCE only to a limited extent as country-level integration is recent. Among the evaluations on decentralization, the Africa one has more extensively covered FAO's emergency interventions

80. The present evaluation is not going to repeat the work already done. More than in the mechanics of decentralizing emergency operations, this evaluation is interested in how effective the decentralization process is in supporting transition, integrating "Emergency and Rehabilitation" with the "Development" work at the country (and regional) level.

81. While overall perception of FAO's staff concurs in saying that integration was a necessary step and a needed reform, some cases were found to be lagging behind in this. Regarding improving FAO's ability to contribute to transition, the theory behind the reform is that the process of bringing the two sides of the organization under one line of command at country level (the country representative or FAOR) should enable FAO to better link "emergency" to "development", with the two sides cross-fertilising each other.

4.1.2 The model before and after the integration²⁹

82. Prior to the integration, FAO at country level was working with two different models: the FAO Representation was in charge of the development programme and the *Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordination Unit (ERCU)* was in charge of emergency work and headed by the *Emergency Coordinator* who directly reported to the Emergency and Rehabilitation Division (TCE) in headquarters. The country emergency units were strongly supported by operations officers in TCE in areas such as recruiting personnel, liaising with the procurement unit and with technical divisions. The *Administrative and Operational Support (AOS)* fee earned by TCE on emergency projects was used to secure services needed for faster processing. In some cases, TCE funded posts in technical divisions in Rome. TCE was very active in resource mobilization, supporting project design, and ensuring reporting requirements were met.

83. In 2009, the Evaluation of FAO's Operational Capacity in Emergencies recommended to considerably increase the decentralization of emergency operations, but it was only with the arrival of the new FAO Director-General in 2012 that a specific timetable was established for the handover of emergency responsibilities at country level to FAORs, starting with a

²⁹ This section is based on the Evaluations of *FAO's Regional and Sub-regional Offices (i) for Africa and (ii) for Asia and the Pacific*.

selected pilot countries in the first half of 2012 (Bangladesh, Cambodia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sri Lanka), continuing up to the end of 2013 to apply the decentralization to all the other countries.

84. The Emergency and Rehabilitation Division was significantly scaled down in headquarters, from a variable number around 250 people (depending on the number of emergencies) to about 60. Only a minor part of the staff that left the division has remained in headquarters or has been deployed to decentralized offices at regional and country level. Responsibilities retained by TCE in headquarters after the integration are:³⁰

- (i) Coordinate the development and maintenance of corporate tools and standards to enable Decentralized Offices' assistance to member countries to prepare for, and respond to, food and agriculture threats and crisis;
- (ii) Ensure humanitarian policy coordination and knowledge, liaison with the inter-Agency Standing Committee and with humanitarian resource partners, co-leadership with WFP of the global Food Security Cluster;
- (iii) Ensure organizational preparedness, surge capacity and response to large-scale emergencies;
- (iv) Support food and nutrition security assessment and early warning activities related to emergency and humanitarian analysis and responses;
- (v) Play a major role in the development and leadership of SO-5.

4.1.3 *Initial results of the integration process*

85. The Africa decentralization evaluation³¹ observed variability between countries with respect to integration already achieved between the emergency and development programmes and that *"in many countries working relations between the two teams was less than optimal. Rivalries have developed over time as disparities in access to resources became more and more apparent, and differences in approach and operating style come sharply into view"*. Difficulties in implementing this integration process are not only in the relationship between the two teams but also in the hand-over phase in which strong support from TCE was perceived to be suddenly reduced, with a number of significant implications in terms of emergency project design and fund raising.

86. While the sample of countries visited by this evaluation is limited, the majority of cases examined with country missions show a successful integration of the emergency and development teams, with the possible exception of Mali, where integration seems to advance slowly. This success is partially dependent on the structure the country office had before the reform. While some country offices were already quite integrated (Uganda), others were much more divided.

87. Another important element is commitment by management, although that may not be sufficient to allow integration (in Mali, e.g., top management was supportive and experienced in emergency but the process was still slow). The positive attitude of FAO staff toward integration and their flexibility to change working approaches and mind-sets (both apparently weak in Mali) and their perception of the reform and positive aspects it could bring, were all found to be contributing factors.

³⁰ DG Bulletin 2012/45 *Review of the Functions and Programmes of the Technical Cooperation Department (TCE)*

³¹ "Evaluation of FAO Regional and Sub-Regional Offices in Africa" (2013)

88. Integration has been frequently seen as a step to facilitate relations of FAO with partners and donors at country level, overcoming the image of two different interlocutors, one for emergency and the other for development, with which they had to deal in the past. FAO can now interact/discuss with external stakeholders as one organization. *“We are now perceived as a single programme: we approach our donors and partners as one office, and are under one management”* one FAO Representative (FAOR) said “[...] *When partners come to the office, they know who to talk to... it is a major advantage.*”³²

89. As another FAOR emphasised, today “The FAOR is the one that needs to make sure there is consistency in every action at country level and progress in one direction [...] in the past in some countries it was terrible when separate projects were going on advocating totally different approaches. If the organization wants to make an impact, there is a need to have a strong, crystal-clear image associated with FAO at country level, one UN agency promoting, advocating and influencing the government. The integration has undoubtedly helped in creating this image”³³.

90. One expectation of this reform, highlighted in comments received in the country visits, was that decentralisation may transfer the dynamic business model and work culture of TCE to the rest of the Organization also at decentralized level. However, it was also noted that decentralization of authority is a matter of organizational culture and implies the ability by central management to relinquish control and accept the risk that this implies. TCE was significantly less risk adverse compared to the rest of the Organization. In order to benefit from TCE’s risk-taking culture through the integration process, there is a need to create an enabling management environment, promoting a major culture change in the country offices.

91. The major difficulty so far met in the implementation of this reform is to ensure that FAO can provide country-level access to technical capacity. Availability of technical personnel and capacity to retain it depend on availability of funds, which are variable and often depend on a short-term funding cycle. Short term contracts prevent staff to have long term visions. There is no sufficient staff in the country office to take advantage of opportunities. There is a need for expertise to design projects or modifying expertise when the context changes, and also for innovative ideas.

92. Under the reform, the position of Deputy FAOR (international) has been created in several countries where, previously, there was a large emergency unit headed by an Emergency Coordinator. In most cases, the new Deputy FAORs are previously Emergency Coordinators (EC), but now the Deputy FAOR looks after both emergency and development interventions. Therefore, while the reform gives a special role to the FAOR as budget holder of both development and humanitarian projects in crisis situations, it is the new profile of Deputy FAOR that often brings contribution of experience in emergency coordination, further supporting an integrated approach to emergency, rehabilitation and development.

Suggested Action 1:

The Organization should encourage continued support and strengthen to the decentralization of emergency operations and their integration into the overall structure of FAO offices at the

³² See article on Integration TC Intranet

³³ Ibidem

country level, emphasizing the need for culture change among both development and emergency staff and managers. Success of the reform will need to be measured in terms of outcomes, the impact of FAO's work on affected populations.

4.1.4 *Support from regional and subregional units: the experience of Africa*

Findings:

- With the decentralization of TCE, country offices lost their main entry point in headquarters for rapid action in crisis situations (with an exception in the case of L3 responses). Before decentralization, TCE was very good at quickly coordinating requests from the field. Regional and Sub-Regional Offices, which should take over this function, still do not have adequate technical or operational capacity to support emergency response.

93. The Africa region has four Sub-Regional Offices (SROs), which are designated “first port of call” for technical support to country offices. This system follows a principle of subsidiarity where technical support is provided by the closest office with available capacity. The Africa decentralization evaluation observed that most of the emergency projects implemented over the period covered by the evaluation received technical support from headquarters while only in a minority of cases the lead technical officer (LTO) was based in an SRO.

94. The trend is however increasing. With the transfer of technical clearing and backstopping responsibilities for emergency projects to the Regional Office for Africa (RAF) and the SROs, the evaluation expressed concerns that the capacities of these offices, already inadequate for backstopping of country development projects, would be further strained. This corresponds to the situation found by the present evaluation, which collected the views of staff in country offices that emphasised a problem of limited capacity of the regional and subregional offices compared to their needs.

95. A “*Resilience Unit*” was established in early 2013 in RAF to provide operational support in the area of emergency and resilience. The Resilience Team includes former TCE staff and all posts in the unit are funded through extra-budgetary funds. While in the Resilience Team staff has also technical capacity and experience in development, they were not given clearance responsibility and they are seen by other colleagues in RAF as operational staff. The unit is operational only to a limited extent given its small staff capacity and the fact that some of its staff are now based in CAR for a surge intervention. While all staff met in country offices knows that the unit has been established, they often do not call upon it given its limited capacity. The Resilience Unit in Accra is small and cannot replace the service TCE was providing.

96. TCE used to have active focal points in technical divisions in headquarters, who were the responsible in those divisions for clearance of TCE operations. The more difficult access to this technical support for emergency work is much felt at the country level, since that capacity has not been replaced in decentralized locations. When support from HQ is needed, country-level emergency staff emphasised that TCE used to provide the link with the other divisions while now they have to develop direct relations with them and this is not always

easy in case of urgent need. TCE was also pushing other divisions for getting the job done, while today, country office staff feels that there is not sufficient capacity in headquarters to effectively follow up requests or processes on their behalf. While the SO5 country support process aims to address this issue through the creation of dedicated support teams for priority countries, at the time of the evaluation the process had just started.

97. Seen from the other end of the process, a technical division in headquarters indicated that in some cases the lack of coordination among decentralized offices is a problem. In the past, there were operation officers in TCE that were filtering the requests from the field before contacting the technical divisions. Now technical divisions receive several uncoordinated requests from different staff in decentralized offices, sometimes even referring to the same request. What emerged overall is a serious problem of communication between country offices and headquarters.

Suggested Action 2:

A new – and more effective – system is needed for follow-up to requests from country offices, in particular in crisis situations, involving all levels of the organization (HQ, ROs and SROs). This could be through focal points (as intended under the multidisciplinary SO-5 team), though they need to have the right incentives.

Also, in crisis situations, support to the Regional Offices from HQ needs to be strong and rapid in order to strengthen their ability to provide adequate support to countries.

4.1.5 Subregional structures for transition: the Resilience Hubs

Findings:

- From the outside, the role and responsibilities of the three Resilience Hubs in Africa is not clear. Development and resource partners are asking for clarity. In the case of the Nairobi hub, this lack of clarity is affecting their ability to mobilize resources. That hub lacks resources to provide support and surge capacity in the case of large emergencies and even L3 responses.
- The hub in Nairobi is actively working on resilience and is recognized by the other partners as having a leading role in the resilience debate in the subregion. But there is a need to define the mandate of the Resilience Hubs and the reporting structure.
- The Resilience Unit in Accra does not have sufficient capacity to provide the necessary support on resilience to meet the needs of the entire region. A possible solution would be to reinforce the capacity of the Hubs. The hubs should invest in the capacities needed in emergencies which are lacking elsewhere, such as political economy analysis, deep knowledge of the specific contexts of countries with crises, strong regional partnerships, etc. With stronger capacity the Hubs could also become more proactive in providing support in the case of L3 responses.
- It is not an efficient solution – or in line with the decentralization reform – to have budget holder responsibilities in RAF, given that the regional office is not involved in the implementation of the projects.

98. In the Africa region, between 2001 and 2006, TCE established three Sub-Regional Emergency Offices respectively in Dakar (REOWA), Nairobi (REOA) and Johannesburg (REOSA). The location and geographical coverage of those offices has been intentionally established in “humanitarian hubs” in Africa in order to ensure relevant response to crises from these sub-regional emergency units, and differs from the four “regular programme” Sub-regional Offices (SROs), located in Harare, Addis Ababa, Libreville and Accra. Following decentralization of TCE these Sub-Regional Emergency Offices are now referred to as Resilience Hubs.

99. Today the budget holder for projects under all three Resilience Hubs is the Resilience Unit in RAF (Accra), reportedly in order to ensure that a strong link is maintained between the Hubs and RAF. The technical teams of the Resilience Hubs, however, are under the responsibility of the Sub-Regional Coordinators (SRCs), located in the SROs in Addis Ababa, Harare and Accra. As it stands, this situation creates quite a bit of confusion and is not ideal. While the reforms refer directly to the situation at the country level, they have not properly addressed the sub-regional level, where the impact of the decentralization reform is still unclear. As reported by the head of REOSA, his office and the SRO in Harare have been proactive in establishing clear link between the SRO and the Hub based in Johannesburg. The Africa decentralization evaluation suggested that this collaboration should become a model for the other sub-regions, with a particular focus on multi-disciplinary work around SO-5.

100. The Evaluation of FAO's Regional and Sub-Regional Offices for Africa observed that Resilience Hubs have been playing an important role in information, analysis, advocacy, communication and coordination for food security interventions in the context of recurrent shocks. They have also established solid partnerships with other UN and non-UN humanitarian actors including the Regional Economic Commissions (RECs). Funding for Hubs is completely from extra-budgetary resources, which makes it more difficult to institutionalize their skills due to frequent turnover of staff and changing priorities according to crises and funding. Resilience Hubs have significant capacity in disaster risk management and resilience programming but have not, as yet, been fully integrated within the sub-regional Multi-Disciplinary Teams (MDTs), focusing instead on implementing their own projects.

101. The Hubs played a limited role in the L3 response in Africa compared to the role they could have had. One reason for the limited involvement of REOA was that unlike in the past, donors have not been willing recently to provide them with coordination funds to cover emergency coordination activities. All the resources for REOA come from specific sub-regional projects of more technical nature with country implementation. The lack of clarity regarding the mandate of the office was indicated as a reason for a decrease in the funds that the office was able to mobilize.

102. It seems that the provision of further support to the transition process and the implementation of the *resilience agenda* will need to pass through further reforms of these decentralized sub-regional units, and in the case of REOSA, formalization of changes already underway. The Africa Decentralization Evaluation suggested a consolidation of technical expertise from the four SROs into two Technical Teams and recommended that a study be carried out on the optimal location of these two Teams. In relation to the Resilience Hubs, that evaluation recommended integration of the staff of the Hubs into the technical teams of the SROs to provide technical backstopping on resilience issues. (The recommendation was accepted, although the response suggested that consolidation of technical support in two subregional teams required more discussion and analysis). However up to now the situation

has not changed. While at country level the emergency and development programmes have merged, at sub-regional level the decision is still pending.

Suggested Action 3

Regarding the Resilience Hubs:

- The hubs should be able to provide overall policy advice in crisis situations, and where needed, liaison support with technical capacities available within the Organization, as well as guidance and assistance in resource mobilization for resilience building and promotion of transition.
- The hubs should have specific capacities needed in emergencies which are lacking elsewhere, such as political economy analysis, deep knowledge of the specific contexts of countries with crises, strong regional partnerships, etc.
- RAF should prioritize the strengthening of its Resilience Unit and the use of expertise available in the Resilience Hubs to support country office staff in charge of transitional and resilience activities.
- The Resilience Hubs with the Resilience Unit should facilitate networking opportunities for FAO staff working on resilience in the region.
- The mandate and reporting lines of the Resilience Hubs must be better defined and clear to all stakeholders. The hubs should have operational responsibilities (as well as resources) decentralized to them from Accra, and be given 'budget holder' control over their own activities.

4.1.6 *Implementation of Level 3 Emergency Response: evidence from the field*

Findings:

- The application of the L3 protocol in the case of FAO's response to the Typhoon Haiyan **has been very successful in ensuring good transition practice**. Two elements of the response contributed to preparing the ground for transition: i) large involvement of staff coming from the "development side" of the Organization in the emergency response; and ii) rapid deployment of strong capacity and expertise since the very start of the emergency phase, which enabled FAO to lead later in the transition debate. **The L3 protocol became a means to promote the application of FAO's new Resilience Agenda**, pursuing an integrated approach to emergency surge and transition. The response was also used as an opportunity to link to a better rehabilitation, to "build back better."
- Success of FAO's participation in the L3 emergency response is due to: (a) the leadership role taken by FAO after the declaration of the crisis; (b) the presence of FAO national staff in the country office with excellent capacity and deep local knowledge and networks with government departments; (c) surge staff from the Regional Office and headquarters, both development and emergency, selected for their excellent knowledge of the context and experience in the country; (d) the increased visibility of FAO due to the high number of FAO staff deployed on the ground and a good balance between technical and operational capacity.
- From the earliest stages of FAO's response, the Organization was able to mobilize technical competencies that brought longer-term concerns for the livelihoods of the affected population to the table during the international and national response.
- The lack of staff dedicated to emergency work in RAP makes it difficult to place confidence in the office's capacity to respond in a timely and effective way to an emergency.
- FAO's participation in the L3 responses provide an important opportunity for FAO to play a strong advocacy and leadership role in ensuring that integrated and long-term perspectives for durable solutions are given their due importance in L3 contexts.

103. When IASC declares an L3 Emergency Response on the basis of an assessment of the need for a system-wide humanitarian response, each UN agency decides its own Emergency Response Declaration Level and FAO takes its own decision as well after assessing the impact of the disasters/crisis on agriculture, food and nutrition security and/or food safety. Before the decentralization of TCE, all emergency responses from FAO were managed directly from headquarters, while today responsibility for country emergency projects is with the FAO country representative. With the introduction of the L3 protocol, however, upon declaration of the L3 response the rules of the decentralization process do not apply any longer. In spite of the decentralization of emergency responsibilities, TCE is still expected to provide its full support in field level emergency operations when a Level 3 emergency response has been declared.³⁴

104. While it is not in the scope of this evaluation conducting an in-depth analysis of the L3 protocol, there are some overall findings regarding the Philippines response that are relevant to our analysis of the transition process.

³⁴ Recently a "process evaluation" on Lessons Learned from FAO Level 3 Emergency Response has been conducted, assessing the process and procedures used in the case of the response to the Typhoon Haiyan and the complex emergency in Central African Republic (CAR).

Level 3 Emergency Response: the Philippines case

105. The evaluation team visited the Philippines to assess FAO's application of L3 response to the Typhoon Haiyan. Following consultations with the government and IASC, the *Emergency Relief Coordinator* formally activated an IASC system-wide level 3 emergency response. Five days after the disaster, as a result of the devastating damage to agriculture and fisheries sectors, the FAO Director-General declared the first FAO Level 3 Emergency Response. The selection of the Philippines as a case study provides an opportunity to examine the way in which the new emergency response protocol works, surging technical resources from across the Organization, and assessing whether those resources contributed to better transition programming. At the time of the evaluation, FAO was participating in other two level 3 Emergency Responses in Central African Republic and in South Sudan.

106. The Philippines case study indicates that FAO showed significant leadership³⁵ capacities in organizing and implementing the response to the emergency in the Philippines by deploying high calibre staff in lead position at the right time, providing a visible and effective role in coordination and assessments, undertaking a successful resource mobilization. That was combined with the involvement of highly capable local staff, who managed to create a solid relationship with the FAOR a.i. as one team, integrating normal programming with an active emergency response operation in a very effective and mutually helpful way, making use of their deep understanding of the context, excellent technical knowledge, and well-established networks and relationships with key government departments and officials. These factors turned out to be critical for the success in assessing the need, and then sourcing, certifying and delivering the seeds and fertilizers on a timely fashion. The country staff were also well versed in working on disaster issues – with a long standing experience in emergencies (many of them natural disasters but including conflict in areas such as Mindanao), and being involved in interventions regarding DRR and early warning.

107. The L3 declaration took decision making power to Rome, although resources were mobilized from all levels of the Organization. SFERA “No Regrets” funds were made available immediately to facilitate rapid deployment of personnel, for coordination and assessment activities. This enabled the deployment of the required technical and operational staff from RAP and Headquarters. The pool of surge staff assembled in country in the first month was an ideal mix of technical staff with development backgrounds and operational staff with emergency skills. The technical staff brought in from the RAP office (on Fisheries, Forestry and Livestock) were of very high calibre and competence, with an abiding interest and experience in Philippines, although most of them did not have operational field experience in emergencies. These staff were also familiar with the national staff and were able to work well together.

108. Three of the RAP operational officers drafted in during the initial month were previously from TCE and had strong emergency backgrounds. They were familiar with the humanitarian architecture and pace of work and quickly established presence in the forums and prepared for accessing funding. Other than the officers decentralized from TCE, RAP did not have any other staff skilled in emergency operations, but the Philippines response experience helped increase acceptance/recognition of the role of FAO in emergencies.

³⁵ Strong leadership is one of the three key areas of the TA. The other two areas are more effective coordination structures and improved accountability for performance and to affected populations.

109. Thanks to L3, FAO was able to mobilize top level expertise including staff coming from the development side of the organization and have people on the ground since the beginning. This helped FAO to develop a sound response programme.

110. It was made very clear that having a good integrated programme during the early emergency/humanitarian period enabled FAO to be at the table on transition discussions in the aftermath of the disaster, and to play a lead role in shaping the transition debate in the UN team. This is an important opportunity for FAO to play a strong advocacy and leadership role in ensuring that integrated and long-term perspectives for durable solutions are given their due importance in L3 contexts.

111. Though technical capacity and agency mandate are helpful in establishing FAO's credentials, it is the ground game that gives it the profile and voice to shape transition in the short run. As one operational person pithily pointed out "Give in the short term – to gain in the long term:" FAO has to have a strong emergency foot print to gain greater traction to work on long term objectives. The FAO Level 3 Lessons Learned report also underlined "involvement in meetings and access to information after only 72 hours" as an element that contributed to the success.

112. Given the large amount of resources that FAO mobilized for L3, the Organization needs to ensure capacity to deliver also after the downgrading of the emergency from L3 to L2 or L1, because of the reputational risk associated with this intervention. Similarly, it is of the utmost importance to maintain strong technical support from FAO during the implementation of the individual initiatives. There is a concern (raised by FAO staff interviewed) that Level 3 emergency can create an illusion of much larger capacity, which, if not sustained over time, risks disappointing stakeholders both in the country and at global level.

113. While the DG bulletin mentions the three levels of emergency response, the evaluation team found that the guidelines so far available for moving on after L3 as well as operational protocols for L2 and L1 were still being worked out. As a result, quite some confusion still remained among staff and management, especially regarding modalities for the transition out of Level 3 (with main responsibilities at Headquarters, with its large emergency team in TCE) and into Level 2 (at Regional Office level, where capacities in emergency work are very weak), or Level 1 (at Country Office level, also generally weak).

The response to the emergency in South Sudan

114. While the evaluation was able to look in depth only at the Level 3 Emergency Response in the Philippines, the team also had the opportunity to meet with FAO staff involved in the South Sudan response. Before the peace agreement South Sudan had been in a conflict for decades. With the peace agreement, the country started to "transition" out of the crisis, and the challenge at that time was how to move from a protracted crisis to building a viable state. FAO responded by establishing a "transition programme". The current crisis has changed the context and the Organization had to shift back again to an emergency mode.

115. As stated by the head of FAO's South Sudan country office, FAO's response to the emergency is articulated around three objectives: "1. saving lives 2. preventing a famine 3. avoiding losing another generation of young Sudanese." This is happening while the previous transition programme is still in place and continues, to the extent possible. FAO is trying to re-organize the transition programme to respond to the humanitarian needs.

116. In South Sudan, FAO is facing the challenge of running the emergency response in the Eastern part of the country affected by the conflict and a longer-term development programme in the more stable areas at the same time. There are donors only focusing on the emergency response and others focusing on longer-term interventions. To be successful there is a need for an overall country plan articulating the short-term with the long-term, able to tackle the overall challenges of the country, and to create synergies among the two.

117. The challenge is to have a programme able to allocate funds to the development interventions in more stable areas, which may then also support the emergency interventions (for example by producing seeds in the Western part through development funds and use it for seeds distribution in the East through emergency funds). Such an integrated response requires having strong analytical capacity to understand the changing context/needs and flexible programmatic capacity to be able to propose a convincing programme.

118. What made the response possible was the presence of very effective integrated team within FAO, having *a programme and an operation unit that look at both short term emergency and long term development interventions*, and which design and implement the entire programme, with a mix of officials including programme staff coming from the development side and with previous experience in the Somalia, therefore able to find ways to use emergency interventions (or funds) to serve development.

119. A key element for the success of the operation in South Sudan was also a relatively big development programme operating in a fragile environment before the crisis. The emergency response was able to build on that development programme, which FAO had established over the years, enabling the country to better respond to emergencies (vaccination campaigns, seeds certification systems and distribution systems, support to the food security information system funded by the EU). For example, an IPC analysis was carried out in October 2013, a couple of months before the crisis, and was used during the crisis, when access was limited, to make projections of needs.

120. Strong leadership was also critical in L3 situations and South Sudan was a case in point. FAO was there during the long-term crisis, during the transition phase and now is still there to respond to the new emergency. FAO had strong capacity in the country.

121. In South Sudan human resources were indicated as one of the major constraints. International staff turnover is high and it becomes difficult to find national staff that stays on. As mentioned, a very limited role has been played by REOA in CAR and South Sudan for the L3 emergency response. The office had a role in liaising with donors and information exchange. In the case of South Sudan, the office provided a communication officer in surge capacity, while in the case of CAR support has been more limited given the insufficient francophone capacity among staff. Lack of resources does not allow the Resilience Hubs to play a stronger role in supporting these emergencies.

4.2 Context analysis and country programming

4.2.1 Context specificity, situation analysis and CPF

Findings:

- In crisis-prone countries, especially in complex emergencies, one of the basic principles for sound engagement is context-specificity, referring in particular to the crisis context. A thorough problem analysis of the crisis-related environment in which FAO operates is a basic requirement, so that a country-specific resilience agenda can be defined. In most cases, however, current CPFs are not based on an acceptable level of analysis of the *crisis* context (as opposed to the general development context), as their situation analyses often neglect addressing prevailing conflicts and their implications for socio-economic situation in agriculture, food security and its mapping, poverty factors, natural resource management, vulnerability and the causes of crisis situations, being limited to a rapid review of agriculture and socio-economic evolution of the country.

122. Context specificity is one of the key elements of the transition process and a basic requirement for FAO's work in complex emergencies and protracted crises.³⁶ It calls for a thorough problem analysis of the environment in which FAO operates as the first step to define its role in crisis-prone situations. Interviews in the course of country missions and project-site visits, including with local communities, confirm that there is an increasing awareness of the importance of contextualizing FAO's crisis-related interventions,³⁷ given its complexity.

123. This evaluation addresses the extent to which the complexity of the local context is actually being considered as a premise of FAO's programming, both at the aggregate country-wide level and at project level. This question is going to be addressed in this section with reference to country programming and the next one in the framework of individual projects.

124. The great majority of past country evaluations reviewed in the meta-analysis observes that the achievement of the objective of overcoming the state of emergency to undertake a long-term process of sustained development meets a major obstacle: absence of an overall FAO strategy within the country. Context analysis and the establishment of a strategic programming framework are closely related, and are based on a thorough situational analysis. This is the task that FAO attributes to its *Country Programming Framework (CPF)*.

125. The review of the first generation of CPFs and the analysis conducted in specific missions in countries with complex emergencies show that so far the situation and context analysis conducted in most CPFs falls short of the requirements of accuracy that context specificity demands in crisis-related contexts. In most cases, the situation analysis contained in the CPF is limited to a rapid review of the agriculture development and other socio-

³⁶ Of course context specificity is important in *all* context, not only emergencies. Here the point is to look at its particular importance for good transition work.

³⁷ For similar position in other aid organizations, see the position of DfID, *Defining Disaster Resilience: A DfID Approach Paper*, pages 7-9 and USAID (2012) "*Building Resilience to Recurrent Crisis – USAID POLICY AND PROGRAM GUIDANCE*".

economic factors at national level in the country.³⁸ A mapping of food insecurity and poverty across the country is often omitted. Vulnerability to crises of individuals and communities, let alone differences in vulnerability by sex and age, is not addressed.

126. Despite the presence of conflicts (e.g. in DRC, Philippines and Mali), the CPFs observed in the countries visited do not include an analysis of those conflicts or internal tensions, and of their root causes (the one exception observed was West Bank and Gaza Strip, because this is still an entirely emergency-based programme). CPFs did not consider the implications of these conflicts and tension for the functioning of the country's agricultural sector, for the socio-economic dynamics of the prevailing food security situation, and for conditions for natural resource development. None of the CPFs reviewed referred to a *Do No Harm* approach or an analysis of conflict sensitiveness of interventions. The CPF for DRC makes a reference to the conflict but fails to analyse its causes or make any attempt to apply *Do No Harm* principles. The CPF for the Philippines does not contain any analysis of the conflict in Mindanao and its implication for FAO's country programme. Political conflict is mentioned in the CPF for Mali but only to the extent that internal displacement disrupts livelihoods and increases pressure on natural resources.

4.2.2 CPF and integration between emergency and development

Findings:

- In its implementation, the CPF has shown limited capacity as a flexible programming tool that can respond to the need for adaptation to a continuously changing environment typical in fragile states and in complex emergencies, due to a number of pitfalls: (a) inadequate attention to analysis of the crisis context; (b) insufficient integration between emergency and longer-term operations; (c) low emphasis on monitoring mechanisms and no structured M&E capacity development (e-learning on monitoring is in the pipeline); (d) rigid and lengthy formulation procedures, including for revision/updating processes.³⁹
- The CPF has not promoted, other than a few exceptional cases or in purely formal terms, integrated processes of interaction between emergency responses and longer-term perspectives, meaning not only emergency work with a development perspective, but also awareness that development is directly and constantly affected by crisis factors and threats of future emergencies. The CPF guidelines prescribe a comprehensive coverage of the CPF, including all emergency activities, but this has not been followed. There is the risk of implementing the Strategic Framework not as an integrated process but adopting a dualistic approach that keeps emergency and development operations still separate. The introduction of a Resilience Agenda within FAO may change these conditions in the future but much work is still required.
- Given the current limited capacity at FAO country office level, the expected contribution of the CPF to support the implementation of the Resilience Agenda linked to the "Reviewed Strategic Framework" appears somewhat ambitious, unless significant changes occur. This could, e.g., be through a more proactive role for RO/SROs in the CPF review process, bringing in the relevant technical units as needed.

³⁸ For instance, the CPF for Liberia even fails to examine the food security situation of the country other than in purely productive terms, not including a holistic analysis of acute and chronic food insecurity problems in the country, and the widespread malnutrition, nor does it refer to the dramatic situation of unemployment and reduced involvement of young generations in agricultural activities.

³⁹ Annual reports on the implementation of the CPFs are usually expected but seldom produced, though this mechanism has been further formalized only recently in early 2014. In countries visited, the evaluation team could verify the production of an annual report (2013) on the implementation of the CPF results framework only in Uganda.

127. In most CPFs reviewed, there was limited, if any, attention to the links between emergency and development. First-generation CPFs were prepared in a situation where integration of emergency and development as part of the decentralization process was ongoing or had not yet started, resulting in insufficient attention to the emergency aspect. Most CPFs adopt a developmental focus but in doing so they often ignore the deepest causes of emergencies. CPF documents remain a first entry point to programmes that will later be more detailed and specific. While the CPFs need revision (having been drafted before the operationalization of the new Strategic Framework) these should not constitute a burden for FAO's work and programmes; they should be relatively short documents that can be easily adjusted following a change in context.

128. Weaknesses may depend on the fact that they neglect sub-national diversities, neglecting areas where tensions or ongoing conflicts are found (e.g. Philippines, DRC and Uganda) or may disregard altogether the risk of natural disasters for FAO programme.⁴⁰ Or in some cases, they may prefer to adopt a "developmental" approach that overlooks political economy factors that influence the functioning of society, focusing only on themes more familiar to FAO technical work, even if those themes are strongly influenced by those factors (e.g. land tenure in Liberia).

129. Country missions do not provide clear signals whether FAO is actually pursuing an integrated country-level resilience agenda or is still entangled in a dualistic approach to short-term emergency operations and development, leaving substance unchanged in spite of the change of approach officially endorsed.⁴¹ Although the guidelines for the CPF suggest full integration of emergency and development activities in one programming framework, themes such as transition and LRRD do not find sufficient space (or any at all) in past CPFs, at least in explicit terms, although disaster risk reduction (DRR) and disaster risk management (DRM) have sometimes been included among the pillars of the CPF.

130. In line with the Reviewed Strategic Framework and the introduction of a *resilience agenda*, linked to Strategic Objective 5, FAO is providing new guidance to facilitate the integration of SO-5 in the formulation of the CPF in disaster and crisis prone countries. Two countries visited for this evaluation are applying a resilience approach in formulating newer versions of the CPF. In Mali and West Bank and Gaza Strip, a dual approach is applied: (a) a *resilience* approach to target vulnerable people in food insecure areas; and (b) an economic growth strategy in areas with agricultural potential.

131. Currently, second-generation CPFs are under preparation in most visited countries (e.g. Uganda and West Bank and Gaza Strip) that may show some improvement with regard to linking emergency with development as part of the decentralization process. New CPFs are expected to contribute to the overall monitoring of FAO's strategic objectives (SOs) but will

⁴⁰ In the Philippines, for instance, where twenty cyclones per year are expected, there is no strategic framework for immediate emergency response to these disasters or to launch relevant recovery and rehabilitation activities related to them, even though CPF priority areas include, *inter alia*, disaster risks reduction related to climate change and climate change adaptation.

⁴¹ In the DRC, FAO is committed to support the government in increasing resilience to crisis among vulnerable population but it is not clear how this will differ from traditional way of dealing with emergency within the CPF. In Mali, the inclusion of resilience among the three CPF priorities hides a dualistic approach still prevailing in handling relief and development approaches, the former confined to the Northern region, and the growth approach prevailing in regions with good production potential and security (an integrated approach being pursued only in the food insecure areas in the Sahelian zone).

require significant support and changes in the capacity of FAO country offices to handle monitoring and evaluation responsibilities in the context of a new strategic approach to LRRD. TCE and the SO-5 team are expected to provide support to country offices in linking emergency with development, including through broader analysis in complex emergencies but faces a clear capacity constraint due to reduced human resources available to TCE after the decentralization reform.

132. The CPF should provide the overall strategic framework for the country-level project portfolio, which should also help ensure a coherent and consistent approach to transition. In West Bank and Gaza Strip, FAO has made use of the CPF as a coherent approach fully aligning projects to the programming framework. In that case, a baseline study on resilience defines targeting and project area priorities. Interviews in Uganda emphasized the use of the CPF mostly as a powerful instrument for resource mobilization, which resulted in a coherent portfolio. In several countries visited (Mali, DRC, Liberia), a huge gap exists between the CPF and project portfolio, since either the CPFs did not take transition into account (DRC, Mali), or its definition was not well worked out. In these countries, the emergency portfolio more often reflected donor priorities rather than FAO's objectives as set in the CPFs. In no countries visited or in those reviewed in the meta-analysis the CPF has been used successfully for project monitoring purposes.

133. The main limitations in making use of the CPF for an integrated approach to emergency and development and letting it play the expected role as strategic programming tool in a crisis context are:

- a) Formulation of the CPF often took place under time pressure and little attention was paid on the preparation of a thorough situation analysis;
- b) Low quality of the CPF documents has been found in several cases, reflecting inadequate resources and capacity of country offices (in particular, limited resources and skills for assessment work and strategic planning) and insufficient quality control;⁴²
- c) In several cases, the preparation of the CPF did not involve FAO country office staff adequately but relied excessively on external consultants;
- d) Exclusion of themes (and their underlying factors) – either from the situation analysis or the programming framework – that are fundamental features of complex emergencies in protracted crisis situations, preventing the CPF from addressing key issues in transition and resilience building;
- e) Limited reference to emergencies and crisis situations in CPFs related to countries (such as DRC, Liberia, Mali, Uganda, Philippines, where crisis conditions still prevail) may have been the result –in some cases – of the national government's interest in giving priority to development rather than emergency issues.
- f) Co-ownership of the CPF by the national government has sometimes turned into a boomerang, if government's endorsement entailed lengthy consultations with several public entities., as these lengthy procedures are not compatible with annual reviews, making the CPF not a flexible tool for programming, differently from what would be required in fragile states where regular monitoring, adaptations and revisions should be the norm for a renewed approach to resilience.⁴³

⁴² Ideally, Quality Assurance (and support to the preparation of CPFs) is provided from both the regional and HQs levels, but this does not always happen to the extent expected, presumably due to the limited capacity of responsible units that is caused by their reduced manpower available.

⁴³ DfID, *Defining Disaster Resilience* cit., page 15.

Suggested Action 4:

The CPFs should be prepared on the basis of a *thorough analysis of the context (including in particular the crisis-related contexts)* in which FAO operates, including adequate consideration of key political economy factors and existing inequalities that are root causes of conflict and vulnerability. This is a necessary condition if the short, medium and long-term needs and their interactions are to be addressed simultaneously. The CPF Guidelines should reflect this.

Suggested Action 5:

In complex emergencies and protracted crises, the CPF must have different and special characteristics, unlike those in more stable countries. Among others, it should include an emergency response component or pillar which can be activated rapidly when needed, it should include the ‘resilience building’ concept in all its objectives, and it has to be conceived as a much more *flexible* programming instrument than the present guidelines suggest, capable of adjusting rapidly to a changing environment. It should be linked to the SRP, or other inter-agency emergency planning documents.

4.3 *Funding of transition in a changing world*

4.3.1 *The funding trap*

Findings:

- The funding architecture of humanitarian aid and of development assistance continues to maintain a strong demarcation between these two lines of support, making it difficult to raise funds for transition activities that link the two with any degree of certainty. There is a clear consensus that much more funding support which bridges relief and transition/recovery is needed.
- It is nonetheless true that some donors in some contexts are beginning to allow more flexibility in time period and thematic areas. The availability of these funding windows is growing and tends to increase options open to FAO (and others) to fund transitional activities.
- Pooled financing mechanisms and Multi-Partner Trust Funds can play a critical role to foster a common vision for transition from relief to recovery, rehabilitation and development, aligning efforts across a wide range of actors and fostering synergies across humanitarian and development assistance. They represent one possible source to significant donor aid for transition, but FAO needs more flexibility to participate fully in these mechanisms.
- Funding for transition may be a challenge for FAO in those cases where emergency funding is rapidly declining and is not compensated by other longer term funding.
- FAO is a participant in global discussions on resilience and a key player in these discussions among UN agencies. However, FAO’s efforts in this direction appear inadequate given the critical importance of funding constraints for transition work.

134. Progress in the path of transition, which this evaluation is assessing in its various dimensions, passes through a narrow bottleneck: adequate availability of, and access to,

financial resources, granted at conditions that allow for flexible use and sufficiently long-term activities, bypassing the constraints of short-duration emergency funding.

135. The country evaluations reviewed in the meta-analysis make frequent reference to the biased structure of funding sources for FAO activities, and mention the difficulties of finding adequate resources to support rehabilitation and development initiatives in the course of the transition phase, after the funding for emergency operations is exhausted.

136. The analysis of several project documents funded with emergency resources and non-emergency resources in countries in protracted crisis shows attempts to bridge between humanitarian responses and development components. During the field missions a wide variety of programmes and activities that can be categorized as ‘transition’ programming were undertaken by using emergency funds. They included training and capacity building of local actors, disaster risk reduction, co-ordination, micro-infrastructure, rural irrigation, disaster preparedness, early warning systems, technical assistance for planning etc. Similarly there were also evidence of preparedness, risk mitigation and information systems that were part of development programming which helps in transitions.

137. However, this is not the solution to fund transitional activities, since one specific feature of emergency funds is their short-term duration, frequently not longer than one year or even shorter. The trick of splitting long-term operations into shorter emergency projects is frequently adopted, but does not solve the fundamental constraint of facing long-term initiatives with the wrong financial means, which do not allow for longer term strategies.

138. This is a major constraint in the effectiveness and efficiency of FAO initiatives in support to transition processes. Nothing guarantees that when emergency operations are over, funding of comparable amounts is going to be available from longer-term funding windows to support transitional activities since the two funding windows are often not harmonized with each other (e.g. European Union). Furthermore, being emergency funding of short-term duration, commitments for transition do not manage to have broader and longer-term horizons to allow the country or the community to grow the necessary capacities, skills and processes.

139. As is quite obvious to all those working in this sector, the evaluation noted that most of the current donor architecture for humanitarian/emergency funding is inadequate in meeting the funding needs for recovery and transition. However, there is a growing recognition of the importance of engaging countries in protracted crisis through innovative funding, including by International Financial Institutions (IFIs).⁴⁴ *“There is a growing consensus within the international community, and the development aid community in particular, that disengagement from protracted crisis, including conflict-affected and ‘failed’ states, is no longer an option”*.⁴⁵ While the funds available under both development and humanitarian assistance have increased over time, their distribution across countries and fluctuations within countries have been uneven. The tendency for new emergencies to divert

⁴⁴ See for instance Adele Harmer, *Bridging the gap? The international financial institutions and their engagement in situations of protracted crisis*, in A. Harmer and J. Macrae, *Beyond the continuum – The changing role of aid policy in protracted crises*, HPF, ODI, 2014, pages 38-41. The World Bank has made intensive use of MPTFs, as the Post-Conflict Trust Fund and the LICUS Trust Fund, where LICUS stands for Low Income Countries Under Stress, in order to overcome the obstacle of not being able to provide loans to countries in arrears, even via IDA facility.

⁴⁵ See A. Harmer and J. Macrae, *Beyond the continuum – The changing role of aid policy in protracted crises*, cit. page 1.

scarce humanitarian resources from ongoing efforts in more protracted crises has been recently highlighted,⁴⁶ confirming the complexity and contradiction of present funding available for transition.

140. The Resilience Agenda has gained prominence as an approach in which the humanitarian agencies are looking at long term implications of their emergency operations, but also one in which development actors look at an earlier engagement in fragile contexts, and consider the impact of crises on their development work more generally. Consequently, though still anchored to short-term operations, this has forced a reflection on the suitability of the available funding modalities. It is in this context that new forms of funding have appeared within USAID and DFID, for instance, applying longer deadlines and more flexible terms for initiatives that contain transitional elements even though they build on initial relief operations. Duration of these operations is still relatively short compared with the long-term requirement of development processes but allows for a multi-year operations, which is an improvement compared to operations that used to last only a few months. Another example is a special funding instrument established by the German development cooperation (BMZ), known as *Transitional Development Assistance (TDA)*, to fund operations moving from short-term emergency to longer-term development.⁴⁷ The innovation is not only a financial technicality, but the introduction of a different approach: the idea is that there is a tremendous need to promote development while countries are still in crisis situations, differently from the usual premise that development assistance can wait until emergency is over.

141. Increasing attention is toward multi-partner trust funds or MPTFs (often but not always managed by the World Bank), including specific MPTFs available within the UN system. This evaluation did not undertake an analysis of all these financial mechanisms but highlights their importance for FAO in seeking support for the *resilience agenda* and promoting an integrated approach to transition.

142. Since the Busan *New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States*, the design of pooled funding mechanisms has been evolving to respond to situations affected by severe crises in fragile states. To the extent that pooled funds increase in number and volume, the real constraint may not be the amount of resources available for transition but the ability of FAO, given the complex UN's procedures, regulations and approaches, to be able to access these resources and fund its initiatives when they are oriented towards transition.

143. Despite the availability of multiple channels of funding for emergency, during the period under review, resource mobilization for transition was challenging on various counts. The global financial crisis and slowdown in economies in donor countries made them reassess their priorities and aid commitments. But that was only part of the reason. Though official development assistance for conflict-affected and fragile states doubled in the decade⁴⁸ and humanitarian assistance for disaster response was available as before, the architecture to deliver them was structured in a compartmentalized manner that made fund raising for holistic transition efforts very difficult.

⁴⁶ See Fiona Bayat-Renoux & Yannick Glemarec, *Financing Recovery for Resilience*, UNDG, Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, June 2014

⁴⁷ See I. Mosel and S. Levine: "*Remaking the case for linking relief, rehabilitation and development*," Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, London March 2014, page 1.

⁴⁸ OECD DAC (2013) *Fragile States 2013: Resource flows and trends in a shifting world* (quoted in UNDP (2013))

144. Despite the good faith efforts of different bilateral and pooled funds, their ability to realize their objective to make funding available in a flexible manner for transitions and to link relief with development was underachieved.⁴⁹ “*The financing mechanisms envisaged to support critical early recovery priorities that build resilience and support countries transition from relief to longer term recovery and sustainable development are often conspicuously missing*” observed a recent study⁵⁰. But on a positive note, the discussions around the ‘resilience agenda’ and ‘holistic preparedness’ that are taking place now, appear to be addressing the shortcoming in the current funding architecture. These have the potential to shape the aid architecture beyond 2015.

145. FAO is a participant in global discussions on resilience and at times has taken initiatives. It is also a key actor in the resilience discussion within UN agencies. The evaluation found that being an agency that inhabits both humanitarian and development spheres and for which funding constraints related to transition is of central concern, the Organization is perceived as not being pro-active enough in these resilience and preparedness discussions. Despite strong experiential base and technical expertise, the participation in these discussions sometimes appears to be driven more by individuals’ commitments than by an institutional strategy for active engagement.

4.3.2 FAO’s ability to raise resources for its transition work

Findings:

- When FAO is able to have an operational presence and demonstrate efficient delivery on the ground in a timely manner during the emergency phase of a crisis, it is often better able to raise funds for livelihood recovery and other programming for relatively longer durations. Its ability to apply its technical and normative mandate in crisis contexts, and its proximity to government are distinct advantages in this regard. Dynamic leadership, an integrated programme, good communication strategy and a network of partnerships are critical for fund raising at the country level.

146. The following observations could be made with regard to FAO’s ability to raise funds for its own work to support transition programming:

147. *Observation 1:* FAO’s mandate to carry out its technical support role in all development contexts, both humanitarian and longer-term, is recognized by all resource partners and when it is appropriately pitched gives it a distinct advantage that helps position FAO in fundraising for transition.

148. FAO’s niche as one of the agencies whose mandate transcends the phases of emergency recovery and development is recognized by all partners (as reported in the country mission reports from West Bank and Gaza Strip, Philippines and Mali) and institutionalized in the aid architecture in various ways, including as co-leader of the Food Security Cluster.

⁴⁹ ODI (2014)

⁵⁰ UNDP (2013)

But FAO's role does not seem to be well presented or pitched in all the contexts and its role in transition is sometimes not well defined. Where there is a strong country team with a history of programming work and emergency work, FAO is better able to articulate it in a manner that is context specific and coherent with donors' policies, as reported for South Sudan and Philippines, and FAO can be successful in raising funds that are able to effectively link emergency relief and development.

149. *Observation 2:* When FAO is able to have an operational presence and demonstrate efficient delivery on the ground in a timely manner during emergency phase, it is able to raise funds for livelihood recovery and other programming for relatively longer durations.

150. The evaluation missions found that where FAO has been able to perform well during the emergency phase, as in Philippines, then its ability to raise significant funding that could also be used for transition purposes (with limits) also improves. Similarly a strong operational track record in the country also facilitates fund raising as in West Bank and Gaza Strip. Here FAO being more operational than in other countries was appreciated by resource partners. When raising transition funding, it is its multi-level operational presence that links up normative policy work with field level work and having an implementation partner network that makes FAO more appealing to donors. This is consistent with the findings of another FAO study which finds that 'Having continuous and competent presence on the ground is key for programme development and fund-raising (FAO 2009)'

151. *Observation 3:* FAO's proximity to the Government and the good relationship/trust/buy-in that FAO offices are usually known to have with the host governments are seen as advantageous for transition programming by some resource partners. This advantage may be further leveraged to mobilize resources to support transition processes.

152. Unlike during acute phases of emergencies, transition contexts generally have greater local ownership and the national governments play a bigger role. The development assistance principles (Paris principles that were improved upon in Busan) demand that interventions be more in line with local priorities and plans as espoused by the national governments. Therefore at this stage donors are also looking at initiatives and partnerships that are endorsed by and involve the government. In this context FAO's relationship with the government that is usually good is seen as an advantage by donors in making funding decisions. This is an area of comparative advantage for FAO and is bolstered further if there are joint processes that are convened or facilitated by FAO with the government. For example in Uganda, which is considered a good example for effective fund raising, since the CPF had government's approval, Belgium and EU supported programmes that are aligned with it. Similarly DFID supported a watershed management program because of the working relationship that FAO had with the relevant government bodies.

153. The Hyogo framework on disaster risk reduction and the discussions on emergency preparedness⁵¹ are gaining prominence and place greater emphasis on comprehensive country level processes that link emergency and development (both after disasters as well as before during 'normal' times). These tend to be among the subjects that over-lap with transition programming and if these are reflected in the next round of humanitarian reform process that is currently under way, they could open up further funding opportunities that FAO could access capitalizing on its relationship with the Governments.

⁵¹ ODI, 2014

154. *Observation 4:* Despite the separation of funding channels into humanitarian and development funding with their own set of rules and regulations, very often FAO representations on the ground, if dynamic, are able to negotiate for flexibility (in duration/type of activity covered) in emergency funding to fit transition requirements. Of course, this varies across countries, disasters and funding sources.

155. In the Philippines for instance, riding on a creditable emergency delivery performance, FAO had raised around \$40 million, a substantial portion of which is for a durations ranging from 12 to 18 months, mainly under the UN *Strategic Response Program (SRP)*. Considerable amounts of the pledges were based on brief project concept notes, which incorporated references to strong recovery aspects – including capacity development, infrastructure and DRR. While the time frames are short in comparison to development programme horizons, the FAOR and the team expressed the intention to build upon the accomplishments of the Haiyan response programme and seek relevant funding for development projects that will capitalize on such results.

156. Similarly in West Bank and Gaza Strip, despite accessing funding from an emergency window, FAO, like many other organizations including UNDP, have since 2007 been able to stretch the definition of emergency funding to include recovery and development activities. In Mali some of the resource partners met by the evaluation team were of the opinion that it is through organizations like FAO that they could transcend the rigidity of their funding structures to do context relevant work on both humanitarian and development spheres simultaneously. They appreciated FAO's adaptability and supported its work on 'emergency plus.'

157. *Observation 5:* FAO's management and operational arrangements – leadership, integrated program strategy, effective communication - play a critical role in being able to raise funds for transition both in sudden onset disasters as well as protracted crisis situations. In fact, partners' perceptions that FAO suffers from weaknesses such as start-up delays, a lengthy procurement process, or a resource mobilization strategy which is not designed to bridge the humanitarian/development divide, impede FAO's ability to effectively raise funds for transitions.

158. Strong country leadership is sine qua non for fund raising. It was clearly evident that when you have a strong and dynamic leader who is able to represent the agency and programme in the forums and with donors it benefits the organization. The evaluation team saw such strong leadership in the Philippines and in West Bank and Gaza Strip – but both were in transition. In Mali too the arrival of a new FAOR had improved the funding situation. But in addition to resource mobilization for FAO, the Representative also required to draw the attention of the donors to the importance of funding for transition and gaps in them. Given that most of the resources for recovery tend to come from extensions to humanitarian funding windows, a good understanding about the humanitarian architecture and funding mechanisms is a requirement for any FAOR to be an effective fundraiser.

159. Both in the Philippines and Mali staff pointed out the importance the role of communication in fund raising. Emergencies generally occupy the limelight briefly before giving way to normal news cycles in the media and public perception. Shaping the messages during these fleeting moments is critical to get the transition story highlighted. In the Philippines a good communications person – working closely with the technical team – was able to plug the 'livelihood savings' message effectively to the donors and to the public. This was crucial and contributed to the sector being 100% funded.

160. *Observation 6:* Joint programming with other UN partners and in some instances NGO partners, and consortium bids, which are designed to capitalize on the strengths of respective organizations at the country level and aimed at resilience building, are seen with favour by resource partners.

Suggested Action 6:

FAO should continue to explore the potential use of newer mechanisms for funding transitional activities through such mechanisms as Multi-Partner Trust Funds or other innovative funding for transition. It should review its internal rules in order to facilitate its access to these funds. FAORs should become more aware of the role that they can play to mobilize resources also by showing evidence of results of their field work.

4.4 Programming individual projects

4.4.1 *Transition and project design*

Findings:

- Suitability of individual projects to local context (context specificity), including consideration of security constraints, is critical for the effectiveness of the transition process.
- FAO implements several types of initiatives that are relevant to promote transition from relief to development if integrated in a comprehensive approach. However, there are several weaknesses in the way FAO designs its projects for transition in crisis-related situations, such as (a) Weak or absent context analysis, especially of the crisis context, (b) occasional lack of flexibility in solutions suggested, or (c) not enough experimentation with new approaches. There was not yet a focus on a resilience agenda in the projects reviewed, as the agenda is still too new. Findings from country missions also showed some weaknesses in project design, such as, again, the inadequate analysis of local crisis context and absence of conflict analysis; scarce attention to critical issues related to resource tenure, and land tenure in particular; omission of DRR analysis; and insufficient linkages between emergency and development approaches.

161. The CPF provides the overall framework within which implementation of a new approach to transition may (or should) be assessed, but transition becomes a reality only if it is translated into valid approaches to relief and development at the project level. While good management and efficiency, appropriate design and programming procedures, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and efficient procurement may contribute to achieve a good project, this may not be sufficient for a smooth transition unless FAO meets specific challenges summarized in the following questions, partly already raised with regard to the CPF:⁵²

- (i) How suitable are the individual interventions to respond to the crisis or post-crisis situations and what is their ability to address changing needs of the most vulnerable population?

⁵² See also I. Mosel and S. Levine (2014), Remaking the case for linking relief, rehabilitation and development cit. page 16.

- (ii) How appropriate is the design of those initiatives for conditions of “insecurity,” and to what extent do strategies consider the crisis-related context prevailing?
- (iii) To what extent do development interventions suggested address underlying causes/factors of possible crises, reduce the risk for such threats, increase resilience of vulnerable groups or increase their capacity to cope with consequences of emergencies?
- (iv) What is the ability of individual interventions to improve relationships between vulnerable populations and institutions that should protect or support them in the long term?
- (v) In case of emergency projects of short duration, to what extent do they have a longer-term dimension, ensuring that benefits endure also after the end of the projects?

162. The meta-analysis of past country evaluations provided some elements to respond to a few of these questions. In particular, it identified a series of typical examples of FAO initiatives that are relevant to promote transition from relief to development if integrated in a comprehensive approach that addresses short, medium and long term requirements in those critical situations.

Box 6: Areas where relevant activities for transition are found in past country evaluations

- Capacity building initiatives, especially in central government (but inadequate elsewhere);
- Strategic planning for agriculture (e.g. Afghanistan, Sudan);
- Public information systems for food security and agriculture (e.g. FSNAU and SWALIM in Somalia, INFOSEC in DRC, SIFSIA in Sudan), linked to an early warning and DRR approach;
- Shift from asset replacement to asset building. Asset replacement may still continue, but main concern for asset building is channeled through a wide variety of initiatives for the development of agriculture, livestock, and fisheries. Examples of relevant activities are:
 - Farmers’ Field School system (FFS) (particularly successful in DRC, Sierra Leone and Sudan);
 - Improved/Certified seed in the main staple and a diversified series of crops;
 - Partnerships to improve dairy productivity (Afghanistan, Sri Lanka);
 - Livestock health and production (Tajikistan and Sri Lanka), development of veterinary services, DRR measures;
 - Irrigation rehabilitation (e.g. in Afghanistan); and
 - Water tank rehabilitation (e.g. Sri Lanka, in dry zones).
- Relevant side effects of humanitarian emergency operations for the transition process. Rebuilding of livelihoods through emergency relief is the first step of transition. *Post-conflict resettlement* is complemented with enhanced crop production, land preparation, fisheries and aquaculture, water use, repairing or development of irrigation. Good examples of how emergency operations can positively affect transition are found in input replacement programmes (especially if they establish constructive links with local markets) and initiatives such as Cash-for-Work (CFW).
- Advocacy work on food security and coordinated action with other UN agencies, linked with other food security projects and DRR measures.

Source: Meta-analysis for this evaluation

163. Potentially, the examples shown in the above table can respond to the challenges met by FAO in crisis or post-crisis situations, addressing key needs of the most vulnerable population, responding to some of the questions raised above. Some questions, however, remain unanswered, and in subsequent sections this evaluation will attempt to provide some explanations. One aspect however should be mentioned here: most examples contained in the above table have been conceived as response to crisis-related immediate needs, even if they were not necessarily *emergency operations*. But the notion of transition was seldom (if ever) mentioned in those projects. Nonetheless, they represent good examples of suitable responses and opportunities for a good transition approach.

164. The meta-analysis also highlighted a number of observations about the quality of those projects that may help understand the difficulties and opportunities faced by FAO in achieving transition in complex emergencies. Some country evaluations, however, mentioned that design faults were a major problem in achieving the desired results. Below, from the 2010 country evaluation for Sri Lanka, is a table with some of the major project design flaws that have a bearing on transition and are also valid for other countries and contexts.

Box 7: Weaknesses in project design with relevance to transition in post-crisis countries: the example of Sri Lanka

- Inflexibility – little scope for changing, adapting and innovating at field level once central authorities had set targets and determined packages of assistance;
- Little experimentation with alternative modalities, such as cash transfers, in recovery projects;
- Insufficient risk assessments and mitigation measures (e.g. market development, post-harvest storage and value addition);
- Little social analysis or social mobilization;
- Weak criteria for targeting: selection of beneficiaries and project sites;
- Insufficient attention to sustainability, including resilient livelihoods, disaster risk reduction.

Source: Evaluation of FAO Cooperation in Sri Lanka 2006-2012, OED, 22 October 2012.

165. A review of project documentation for projects conducted since 2010 in the six countries visited (DRC, Liberia, Mali, the Philippines, Uganda, West Bank and Gaza Strip), together with interviews in the countries, highlights additional evidence on a few questions raised above, as summarized below:

- (a) The **analysis of local context** was of relatively good quality in the Philippines, as regards the L3 response (for the typhoon Haiyan), because FAO staff with good knowledge of the local context were available. Good context analysis was also found in the West Bank and Gaza Strip where a resilience analysis was applied. Quality of project design was of medium level in Uganda. In Mali a few projects in the drought areas show a good analysis, while emergency projects in the Northern region were designed with limited analysis at field level due to security concerns. Low quality analysis was found in projects reviewed in Liberia and DRC (for DRC, access to the local context was particularly difficult at the planning stage).
- (b) **Conflict analysis is lacking in all visited countries except in West Bank and Gaza Strip.** This confirms findings for the CPFs. Project design, in general, does not address root causes of conflict related to agriculture even if projects take place in conflict areas. In some cases, conflict analysis and ‘do-no-harm’ analysis was delegated to partners, e.g., international NGOs. Some projects in Uganda were then conducted with a ‘do-no-harm’ approach. In DRC, results of the analysis were provided too late, and were not focused on the agricultural and rural context.
- (c) **Land tenure analysis**⁵³ and related tensions/conflicts are scarcely covered in project documents, with in some cases negative consequences in FAO’s work (examples connected to the lack of access to land were seen in DRC and Mali). However there are several examples of FAO involvement in (rural) land tenure work in some of these countries: Joint projects with FAO, UNDP and UN-Habitat constitute an important progress in land tenure in some projects in DRC: UN-Habitat does the tenure work, while FAO provides the agriculture support as land issues are clarified. Positive examples were found in Uganda, where FAO is a lead agency in land tenure, and in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where projects target areas with land access hardship as a result of the political context. In Liberia FAO has been asked

⁵³ While land tenure was the most commonly encountered type of tenure issue, this observation applies to fisheries, forest, water and other natural resource tenure as well.

to provide support to the Land Commission. Tenure work is an opportunity for “building back better” and addressing root causes of conflict. Tenure work links closely to LRRD, resilience, conflict prevention, DRR and climate change. FAO should invest in more work in this area of its mandate.

- (d) **Disaster risk reduction analysis** is not yet the focus of most transitional projects, in spite of the adoption of the *Resilience Agenda* by FAO. Where small activities are planned in relation to disasters, they are often not based on sound disaster risk reduction plans. Positive examples are however found in Uganda, where considerable competencies have been built and several projects have been carried out on disaster risk reduction. In the Philippines, projects in fishery and coconut farming take some DRR aspects into account. DRR related to natural hazards was found in a number of projects in the Philippines (fisheries, upland interventions and coconut sector), Liberia (forest management) and Uganda (climate change) but is missing in transitional projects in conflict areas in Mali and DRC.
- (e) **Linkages between emergency and development objectives** are traced in many projects, especially in resilience type projects, but are still weak. The links are usually conceived as a time sequence instead of adopting an integrated strategic approach to short and long term objectives pursued concomitantly. In Uganda, seed and other input distribution conceived for emergency phases is addressed separately from seed production. In discussions with local communities, it was evident how interventions were scattered in individual interventions of short duration, not necessarily integrated in an overall strategy.

166. **Rehabilitation of agricultural institutions (and reform if needed):** The review of projects conducted through country missions verified their suitability to enhance resilience to future crisis or post-crisis situations through rehabilitation and reform of agricultural institutions destroyed by conflict or disaster, but no evidence was found of any significant activities, even if those institutions remain exposed to great challenges.⁵⁴ In DRC, FAO supported the Ministry of Agriculture on development of extension services, but mainly because it was the only solution to implement projects in inaccessible areas, rather than as an attempt to rebuild the ministry.

167. The *diversification of agricultural production* was often addressed as part of the strategy to promote rehabilitation of the sector and food security, also through short term emergency interventions, but also in view of building resilience on a longer term.⁵⁵

168. Inclusion of *market analysis* as part of the planning of individual initiatives was **not** explicitly referred in the project documents reviewed, and in general appears to be insufficient to anticipate the broader impact of interventions whether of short-or long-term nature.

169. **Exit strategies** out of the crisis were not always so obvious, and as a consequence the projects could not foresee credible exit strategies. Some attempts were found in Uganda where FAO has tried to move gradually towards development approaches in the Northern region, and several rehabilitation plans had been launched. In the precarious conditions prevailing in West Bank and Gaza Strip, it is difficult to identify exit strategies. In the Philippines, exit strategies should play a lesser role, given the bridging nature of FAO’s interventions and the significant capacities in both development and emergencies mobilised for the L3 response. This middle income country is expecting to see a decreasing volume of external support for transition, gradually replaced by national resources and capacities. The

⁵⁴ While none were seen in the countries visited, examples in other countries do exist, such as for example the rehabilitation and reform of fisheries institutions in Indonesia after the tsunami.

⁵⁵ In West Bank and Gaza Strip, a positive example of integration of new crops with environmental concerns and economic analysis was found.

Food Security Clusters (section 4.7 below) need to play a role in identifying an exit strategy from the humanitarian work to move into development, but they have tended to be too focused on the humanitarian side so far.

4.4.2 Approaches in project implementation

Findings:

- Good design of individual interventions in crisis-related transition *is critical* to allow FAO to integrate an effective response to humanitarian emergencies with the pursuit of recovery and development through concurrent actions.
- Project implementation in crisis-related contexts is challenged by issues of timeliness, which is not only the time to respond to urgent needs (often constrained by a bureaucratic approach of the Organization) but also the timing of providing early phases of long-term support in the short-run, and duration of a 'state of emergency' beyond what is necessary. The inadequate level of competencies available in FAO country offices is an obstacle to rapid project implementation, as are slow procurement procedures. Quality of project implementation is linked to quality of FAO's technical contribution.
- In cases of direct implementation or execution by FAO with its own project staff, implementation can be inefficient (too few, too late) or inadequate (wrong seeds, disease-carrying animals), calling for an intensification of FAO's normative and policy role, making more use of local implementing partners. However, FAOs normative and coordination role is better accomplished when it is based on lessons learnt through country-level project implementation.
- A renewed and more flexible approach to project design in crisis and post-crisis situations is called for if FAO is going to address some of the flaws mentioned in this report. Project design must be founded on a *thorough analysis of causal relationships that determine crises and conflict, and condition the emergence or aggravation of vulnerability*.

170. The complexity and variety of situations that are behind the implementation of individual projects could not be assessed in the course of the missions, although some observations can be made based on interviews and secondary sources. The *timeliness* of the support provided compared with the urgent needs caused by the emergencies was often addressed as a key topic for the effectiveness of FAO's work on the ground. In the countries visited, it was found that timeliness was excellent in the specific emergency observed in the Philippines where working conditions were favourable for a robust response (also thanks to the application of the L3 protocol by FAO and close collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture). However timeliness was an issue in DRC.

171. Many people interviewed in country visits and consultation meetings refer to FAO's *slow administrative processes*, as excessively bureaucratic (e.g. in procurement), even though some made opposite remarks, especially if compared with other international organizations (European Union and World Bank). These criticisms related to projects directly executed by FAO, some of which delayed delivery of time-critical inputs such as seeds. However, in the Philippines, under L3 level procurement procedures, it was possible to efficiently deliver seeds in a very narrow time window. Good success was also achieved for the first rice-cropping season in the Mali conflict with an international NGO that could manage to bring in seeds and fuel for irrigation despite very critical security conditions. The concept of strategic

stocks in recurrent conflict situations (DRC) also proved to be helpful, since agricultural inputs can be made available according to short procedures upon arising needs.

172. The *quality of the implementation* of individual projects is linked to the quality of FAO's technical contribution. Quality of the implementation was probably also affected by *limited monitoring* and supervision of project implementation during the emergencies and immediately after them.

173. Quality of the implementation in conflict situations was affected by the *accessibility to insecure areas*. In DRC, only 20% of the area was reached with aid interventions because of insecurity or lack of road access or both, and only there was it possible to assess the quality of the interventions, while in other areas this quality assessment could not be undertaken. In DRC, FAO works mainly with communities and not in camps, since displaced people often seek refuge in villages.

174. *Direct implementation or execution* by FAO with its own project staff was met with criticism by some interlocutors either because inefficient (too few staff, too late) or technically inadequate (provision of the wrong seeds, or disease-carrying animals), although in most cases resource partners praised FAO for the good technical quality of its work. Some interlocutors observed that FAO is too keen in taking over direct project execution responsibilities instead of limiting its role to policy advice and coordination of transition process and relying on local entities for project implementation. The evaluation team, however, could verify that FAO has frequently been using local or international implementing partners (e.g. Uganda, Myanmar and Liberia), especially (but not only) in emergency interventions, making use of their expertise and contribution, sometimes providing capacity development inputs for the benefits of these partners.

175. While these comments call for a more intensive use of FAO's role in normative work and policy advice, which corresponds to a key comparative advantage of the Organization, they tend to neglect the technical assistance role that FAO plays in transferring and adapting knowledge to the local context through its project technical staff. That role is best played through direct involvement of FAO in project implementation, in piloting or demonstrating technical advice in the field to support its normative and policy advisory role. Direct project implementation allows gathering knowledge on the local context and helps in designing new projects. Some international development partners have supported FAO's normative role by funding initiatives in which FAO works at the country project-level as well as at the normative level at the same time (see Belgian projects in Mali).

Suggested Action 7:

Design of individual projects needs to be upgraded by making use of available planning tools such as IPC, resilience analysis, conflict analysis, integrating a "do-no-harm approach" in order to foster resilience in the local context and in relations to specific target groups. DRR/M capacity building should be enhanced for decentralized offices.

Suggested Action 8:

FAO should intensify the use of flexible tools at the level of individual initiatives, e.g. through a more extensive use of concept notes, drawn from in-depth analyses but less labour-intensive than traditional project documents, in order to increase FAO's ability to respond to crisis and post-crisis situations adjusting to continuously changing circumstances.

4.5 *Transition for whom? Livelihoods, targeting and gender*

4.5.1 *Livelihoods in the context of transition*

Findings:

- Livelihoods analysis frameworks are useful tools for a context analysis and as a basis for new approaches to transition and resilience. They help to establish baseline information to improve scope for monitoring and evaluation. However, while these tools exist, they are rarely used. Absence of a preliminary context analysis (including lack of identification of gender and other social inequalities) and good risk mitigation measures have led in some cases to distortions or reduced benefits in the countries reviewed.
- Impact on livelihoods is seldom verified but replaced with information on output delivery. Evidence on impact on livelihoods in traditional emergency interventions (distribution of seeds, tools and other inputs) differed from expectations.
- Although impact of livelihoods has seldom been verified with hard evidence, under SO-5 concern for livelihoods is a dominant theme of resilience and transition in FAO, and the situation appears to be improving.

176. “**Transition for whom?**” was a central theme of this evaluation. According to its vision, goals and objectives, FAO is working for the poor, the food insecure and the vulnerable. This is true in crisis contexts as elsewhere. The attention must be on accountability to these beneficiaries of FAO interventions in transition situations. This requires a focus on the impact on livelihoods of affected populations, even if findings on this impact may be difficult to obtain.

177. Immediate responses to crises mainly look at humanitarian needs of affected populations. Longer-term interventions look at enhancing their resilience and improving their livelihoods to achieve – or return to – sustainable development. These concerns are the basis for FAO’s *accountability to the affected populations* (whose livelihoods are at stake) for the results of its interventions.

178. Concern for “saving lives and livelihoods” has been a longstanding tenet of FAO’s work in emergencies.⁵⁶ FAO’s latest *Reviewed Strategic Framework* places resilient livelihoods at the core of the Organization’s objectives by adopting SO-5, whose very title specifies the focus on livelihoods: “*Increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises*”. Focus on livelihoods in crisis settings is a consequence of FAO’s food security and poverty-eradication mandate. Convergence of development and humanitarian thinking on concepts such as social protection and welfare safety nets⁵⁷ justifies the increasing attention

⁵⁶ Both the 2006 handbook *FAO’s role and effectiveness in emergencies*, and the *Livelihood Assessment Toolkit*, developed by FAO jointly with ILO and published in 2009 are explicitly based on these premises.

⁵⁷ See Luca Alinovi, Günter Hemrich, Luca Russo, and Denise Melvine, Chapter 1 on “Food security in protracted crisis situations: issues and challenges”, in Luca Alinovi, Günter Hemrich, Luca Russo (eds), *Beyond Relief – Food Security in Protracted Crisis*, FAO, 2008, page 5. On this convergence, see Johanna Macrae and Adele Harmer, Chapter 1 of the HPG Research Report on *Beyond the continuum – The changing role of aid policy in protracted crisis*, edited by the same authors, published by ODI, HPG, 2004, page 10.

to *livelihoods-based analysis frameworks*, which start from assets or resources on which people base their livelihoods to assess intervention aimed at enhancing *livelihood strategies* and building *resilience*. Interventions should be tailored to local conditions and consider prevailing gender and other social inequalities to ensure the most vulnerable will benefit.

179. In rapid onset and one-cause natural disasters, concern for livelihoods provides the pathway out of relief by linking affected communities to durable and longer-term development and “*building back better*,” establishing the basis for a longer-term sustainable development. In that case, rehabilitation becomes an opportunity to improve as compared with the past and not only to replace what is damaged.

180. In complex emergencies and protracted crises, the assessment of the impact on livelihoods is even more articulated and may require complex analyses. In 2009, FAO and ILO produced a *Livelihood Assessment Tool-kit (LAT)*, consisting of pre-disaster baseline assessment, an immediate after disaster appraisal and a detailed livelihood assessment (after 90 days). This type of analysis allows focus on social protection to shield people from unacceptable levels of risks and vulnerability. It addresses vulnerability by promoting livelihoods on the short term as well as through pro-poor growth and deals with a broad series of issues: asset accumulation, land tenure, market reforms, social inequity and social cohesion.

181. The meta-analysis of past country evaluations looked for evidence of visible impacts of FAO’s efforts on livelihoods in the rural environment, especially in activities linked to agriculture, livestock and fisheries emergencies. Encouraging results were found but they were seldom expressed as *impact on livelihoods*. Most findings were exclusively referred to the timely delivery of project outputs, giving marginal attention to outcomes and broader impacts. The often-heard excuse that there is not enough time to carry out outcome and impact assessment is not an acceptable one, as the time can be made given the importance of such assessments to improve the quality of FAO’s transition work.

182. Findings from most past evaluations reviewed confirm that even when project performance is excellent, and outputs and targets are met, it is difficult to find sufficient evidence that intended outcomes are actually achieved, especially in terms of improved livelihoods, food and nutrition security, and poverty alleviation.

183. The information collected by the evaluation team in its field missions does not provide sufficient evidence on long-term impact of transition work on livelihoods of affected populations. Most findings were limited to short-term effects. There are reasons for this scarcity of data on impact in crisis and post-crisis settings: frequent absence of baseline data; insecurity and other field conditions that make research difficult; prevailing attention on output delivery more than on effects on livelihoods; absence of a culture of accountability for results in FAO’s emergency work, as evidenced by past neglect for assessment of results (impacts); inadequate consideration for operational work on livelihoods, not necessarily viewed as central to FAO’s role. However, a summary of short-term results achieved by FAO and identified by the evaluation team during the mission is reported in the following table.

Box 8: Emergency distribution of seeds and tools

Though less and less done in isolation, the archetypal initial emergency operation for FAO has long been free seed and tool distribution. The purpose of these interventions is the re-establishment of productive capacities rather than the preservation of livelihoods, even though the two are related. Past country evaluations of FAO often focused on the effectiveness of free seed, livestock and tool distribution, often focusing on the distortive effect of free distribution of imported inputs on local markets, and questions of quality and timeliness of the seed distributed. Where local purchase of seeds was used, multiplier benefits for the local communities were recognized.

However, to assume that seeds scarcity is the major problem in a crisis situation may neglect that often there is no chronic lack of seeds, or that fields are not abandoned because of seed deficits.⁵⁸ Studies conducted in the Great Lakes region⁵⁹ indicate that most poor households buy their food with cash in the market rather than consuming their own production, preserving seed for planting. Farmers, under the pressure of crisis conditions, have an incredible resilience, sometimes replacing scarce seeds with substitutes, looking for value in their production (e.g. replacing crops such as maize and beans with alternatives, such as potatoes and cassava). This is why free distribution of seeds may turn out to have little impact on poorer farmers and their livelihoods.⁶⁰

Seed distribution programmes are often oriented to support not the most vulnerable or poorest farmers but the most productive ones, who happened to be also better off. The problem thus becomes one of *targeting* (see next section). One benefit of the free distribution of seeds is that FAO's interventions may help introduce improved seeds.⁶¹

FAO should start a new seed distribution programmes only after an assessment of the overall livelihood status of the affected populations, verifying the nature of the seed security issues and formulating an appropriate strategy.⁶²

184. Unsurprisingly, there are some indications that the absence of a preliminary context analysis and good risk mitigation measures may have led to distortions or reduced benefits. A good number of unintended impacts, both positive and negative, were registered (or assumed) in various occasions.

185. For example in the Philippines, perhaps due to the rapidity of the response, the number of unintended secondary effects of FAO's interventions was higher. Evidence from countries under prolonged threat of continuous destabilization like Afghanistan shows that farming under given circumstances can be much more resilient than expected from the collapse of agricultural service delivery system in those situations. Farmers continue to have access to inputs and informal services, even though prevailing conflicts affect conditions in which production is obtained and commercialized. Undoubtedly, those conditions of instability generate the need for continuous adjustment to changing circumstances by farmers and households, as markets opportunities change.

⁵⁸ Simon Levine and Claire Chastre (with others) *ODI-Missing the point* etc. cit. page 14.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁶¹ In the Philippines, in the region affected by the Haiyan Typhoon seeds actually distributed turned out to be of better quality compared with those employed in previous cropping seasons. This may have created a distortion in the relationships between farmers who got access to the distribution of new quality seeds compared with other farmers, who continue to sow lower quality seeds.

⁶² See FAO (2010), *Seeds in Emergencies – A technical handbook*, FAO Plant Production and Protection Paper No. 202, Chapter 9 on “*Technical aspect of seed procurement*”, page 33.

Box 9: Some short-term achievements with likely positive livelihood outcomes

- Improved crop production at households level (in West Bank and Gaza Strip, Liberia, Uganda Mali), though in some cases limited in quantity and over time. The food processing component in one case was found to prevent losses from harvested crops (Mali).
- Better agricultural production translates in greater food and nutrition security for beneficiaries (Liberia), in one case with greater dietary diversity and proven durable change (West Bank and Gaza Strip), and higher income spent on primary household goods (Liberia).
- Better access to irrigation, with possible impact on food and nutrition security, although not clear whether the most vulnerable benefitted (Mali).
- Emergency large-scale seed distribution ensured resumption of normal agricultural activities and timely seasonal planting in area affected by Haiyan typhoon, with the added benefit due to use of improved seeds (Philippines).
- Positive impact on return and reintegration of communities, conflict resolution and peacebuilding (Liberia, DRC).
- Coordinated WFP/FAO project had the effect of preventing migration and ensuring the “contre-saison” crop planting (Mali) and multi-sectoral approach improved the quality of interventions in each sector (DRC).
- Savings and loans methodology disseminated by FAO was taken up in the community with long-lasting positive effects (Uganda).

Suggested Action 9

Given the paramount importance of proper livelihood, social and needs assessments for the success of interventions, even in the most urgent of circumstances, FAO must develop a culture of carrying out such assessments as a matter of rule. In spite of the urgency of crisis situations, there is always the time to do this if it is a priority, which it should be. Resources (financial, human and *time*) must be made available by FAO from the very start of its response to conduct livelihood-based studies in crisis and crisis-prone contexts. This can then also serve as a baseline to measure the impact on livelihoods of FAO’s response.

4.5.2 *Targeting*

Findings:

- FAO has developed powerful and successful tools for comprehensive targeting, such as the IPC, the Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA), the Livelihood Assessment Tool-kit, and others. These could provide the basis for vulnerability analysis and the definition of alternative targeting approaches, especially if integrated with comprehensive context analysis. Up to now, however, the results of analyses done with these tools were not fully used or integrated in CPFs reviewed (the exception is West Bank and Gaza Strip) or in project design, and are therefore underused in transition contexts.
- Targeting differs according to the nature of the crisis and the state of recovery/transition phase and available funds to cover prevailing needs. CPFs in countries visited hardly refer to emergency/transition needs (again except for West Bank and Gaza Strip). General rules on targeting cannot thus be derived from those CPFs.
- Occasionally beneficiaries are designated based on a detailed vulnerability analysis, but often project documents define very generic targeting criteria or do not define them at all. There are different approaches to targeting, but also difficulties in introducing thorough targeting processes due to time pressure and other circumstantial difficulties.
- There is inadequate attention to conflict sensitivity in geographical targeting and in community level targeting, where often a blanket approach or traditional community systems are used for different reasons. Instead of being the result of intentional decisions, FAO's interventions sometimes favour regions and individual groups by coincidence, because of donor preferences, or due to specific technical reasons, or security constraints, sometimes unintentionally accentuating disparities between groups or regions.
- In ideal circumstances, the needs assessment for targeting should be undertaken in consultation with the target population, agreeing on distribution of benefits according to vulnerability. In reality this consultation, where present, was far from thorough or effective.

186. Much of what can be said about impact on livelihoods regards the challenge of **targeting** the right beneficiaries. Past evaluations confirm that targeting is, in most cases, a complex exercise.

187. Beneficiaries of transition interventions are often designated in the project documentation, and may be the result of a detailed **vulnerability analysis**. In several cases, however, project documents define very generic targeting criteria or they do not even define them at all.

188. In the Farmer Field School (FFS) initiatives in Sierra Leone,⁶³ impact studies provide vital information on distribution of benefits among those 36,000 farmers who participated in the FFS interventions, making a comparison between FFS farmers and other vulnerable groups that had not been participating in those initiatives. Evidence shows that when no in-depth assessment of target population was undertaken as part of project appraisal, the final selection of beneficiaries may turn out to be inappropriate, with consequences in implementation.

189. Some past evaluations underline that, in ideal circumstances, although targeting should be undertaken in consultation with potential beneficiaries, agreeing on distribution of

⁶³ See OED, *Evaluation of FAO Cooperation in Sierra Leone (2001 – 2006)*, FAO, April 2007.

benefits according to vulnerability. This consultation seldom takes place or it is often far from thorough or effective. Participation of potential beneficiaries in the process of targeting is in line with what IASC Principals defined as *Commitments on Accountability to Affected Populations*, endorsed in 2011.⁶⁴ FAO endorsed those commitments and defines *Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP)* as “an active commitment by humanitarian actors and organizations to use power responsibly by taking account of, giving account to and being held to account by the people they seek to assist”.⁶⁵ In line with AAP, targeting must be defined in full agreement and participation of the affected populations. In practice this may happen only on a case by case basis. This is a principle that is mostly frequently defined only as a goal to pursue rather than as a strict requirement to meet. Nevertheless, FAO encourages AAP at all levels, even if the approach has still to find a thorough practical application. Its application has been found in countries such as Cambodia, Pakistan, the Philippines and West Bank and Gaza Strip, where the AAP has been tried with significant results.⁶⁶

190. Various country evaluations provide examples of trade-offs between different approaches to targeting, resulting in some sort of discrimination among various groups of potential beneficiaries:

- Do criteria that identify targeted farmers in seed distribution programmes require that farmers to show title to the land that they cultivate (e.g. Sri Lanka), or are landless ones included?
- Do herders entitled to receive livestock replacement or shelter repairing need to show that they have, at least in part, the resources required to build shelters?
- In order to receive a water pump, is a farmer required to pay a contribution to its cost (e.g. 50% of its price)?
- Are there any safety nets or similar measures to protect the weaker or poorer populations or groups, if a discriminatory approach that excludes them from targeting is adopted?

191. *When targeting is not satisfactory*, FAO’s ability to produce the desired impact on the most vulnerable groups is definitely hampered. Appropriate targeting, however, may be a time-consuming and costly process and may not be practical when FAO faces urgent demands due to big emergencies. One FAOR met during a country mission alerted the evaluation team that there is also the risk of “over-targeting” in crisis or post-crisis situations, when urgent delivery of emergency aid is required.

192. The six country case studies analysed by the evaluation team through missions did not have satisfactory information on project targeting. The following findings were identified:

- Information on targeting was often not available or too scarce or not found in project documents;
- In Mali, pastoralists were considered difficult to target, and targeting was often restricted as a consequence of limited funding available.

⁶⁴ There are 5 commitments: (1) **Leadership/Governance** (accountability mechanisms) (2) **Transparency** (3) **Feedback and complaints** (4) **Participation** and (5) **Design, monitoring and evaluation** with involvement of affected population. (see IASC, CAAP Tools, V5:04/07/12, page 1)

⁶⁵ <http://www.fao.org/emergencies/fao-in-action/accountability-to-affected-populations/en/>

⁶⁶ Focus groups have been experimented at the community level, given special attention to their composition, power distribution and gender balance. Community participation and feedback has been shaping programme design in West Bank and Gaza Strip, where it was integrated within the mid-term review of FAO’s Plan of Action (2011-2013). FAO is developing guidelines on AAP and a work plan for its use within FAO.

- In Mali, a broad definition of vulnerability was found, referring to women, youth, aged persons, people living with handicapped persons, displaced people, host communities, and victims of conflict.
- In Mali, vulnerability criteria (land size, lack of other resources and potential to acquire means of subsistence) were combined with specific status (displacement, returning households and being part of a host community, households with few active members or female-headed households).
- In Mali, the selection process was found to be participatory, although participatory selection was initially hampered in conflict areas, where relatively distant places could not be easily reached.
- In DRC, targeting is defined in terms of communities and not individuals. In theory, FAO in DRC does not apply “*status targeting*” but “*vulnerability targeting*” (anybody who does not have the means to survive in a target community is entitled to receive assistance, whether he/she is a refugee, IDP, host families or just a poor villager in the targeted community).⁶⁷
- In DRC, farming households without means to rent land were sometimes excluded.
- Unclear tenure rights in coconut and fishery communities in the Philippines complicated targeting.
- Since most CPFs reviewed in countries visited do not include a comprehensive vulnerability analysis and hardly refer to emergency and transition needs in their priorities, general rules cannot be derived from the CPFs (except for West Bank and Gaza Strip, where resilience analysis is available).
- Targeting is often closely related to vulnerabilities and needs as they are included in the UN “Strategic Response Plans” or specific recovery plans for crisis areas. The response plans usually refer to the needs of different livelihood groups but not to the diversities within these groups.

193. Geographical targeting (selection of priority areas where to focus interventions) is frequently one of the most important decisions that FAO has to make both in its initial emergency response and all along during its transitional phase (whenever it starts, if it is defined). Usually the areas most affected by the crisis, and the population who lives there, benefit from the interventions, hoping that the latter coincide with the most vulnerable people,⁶⁸ but access or security constraints or power relations may modify these targets.

194. Where the IPC is operational, it may play a key role in defining geographical targets. Resilience programmes and climate change adaptation interventions are mainly carried out in drought-prone areas such as the Sahelian zone in Mali. In the Philippines, sea level rise and typhoons risks naturally result in focusing on coastal areas (although this may neglect of highly affected area not placed along the coast).

195. To define geographical targets it may be necessary to tackle specific issues such as the following:

- Conflict sensitivity analysis in deciding to reach out to specific communities which are hard to contact;

⁶⁷ This procedure is less harmful to social cohesion at the local level. However, this distinction is not applied consistently. Access to land is a condition to benefit from FAO support in the DRC while vulnerable households without access to land (or money to rent it at high costs) often do not have alternative livelihoods outside agriculture other than working as hired hands on other people’s land or search for less satisfactory solutions (mining, charcoal preparation or joining armed groups).

⁶⁸ For instance, areas where the level of destruction was the highest (typhoon in the Philippines), or where needs connected to conflicts and displacement were met (Mali, DRC, Uganda) or where specific vulnerabilities concerning access to productive resources were found (West Bank and Gaza Strip).

- Targeting in conflict areas may be hampered by lack of access to project sites due to security restrictions, such as in parts of North Mali or in Eastern DRC;
- Targeting for food production in crisis areas may favour concentration in highly productive food production areas such as the irrigated rice schemes in the Philippines (coastal typhoon area) and in Mali (along the Niger River valley), with the risk of neglecting households without access to irrigated land.
- The trade-off between crisis areas and high potential areas with better growth potential (outside crisis regions but which can produce more food for crisis alleviation) can appear in some CPFs (West Bank and Gaza Strip, Mali) but not in others.

196. Effective targeting within a geographical area entails identification of vulnerable groups and requires vulnerability analysis, identifying the main drivers of vulnerability, differential needs within the vulnerable groups (including women), context-specific and objective criteria for selection, consultative processes for a transparent selection and possibly a grievance and complaints mechanism in case of inclusion/exclusion biases. Difficulties were claimed in introducing all these concepts when FAO needs to operate under time pressure or other circumstantial difficulties. Nonetheless, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip a comprehensive resilience analysis was applied to distinguish between low, medium and high resilience groups country-wise, and targeting is directly related to the results of the resilience analysis. While it may not be easy, this type of preliminary analysis is necessary and nearly always possible despite constraints.

197. Depending on the socio-cultural context, targeting exclusively very vulnerable groups may be perceived in some communities as a charity activity and not as a development driver, and this may eventually undermine traditional solidarity systems. FAO, as many other organisations, often applies a **community targeting approach** with a few pre-defined criteria regarding gender and vulnerability. An evaluation of FFS in DRC observes that such an assisted community self-targeting approach led to increased knowledge and expertise with farmers and farming communities. This approach tends to avoid the trade-off between maximizing aggregate production and improving household food security for the most vulnerable, preferring a **blanket approach**, mentioned in a few country evaluations, as an approach that *explicitly* avoids targeting by deciding “on purpose” to have the broadest distribution of benefits with no restrictions in a given community. This method may be easier to apply, since it does not require special preparation. However, it usually entails neglect for the neediest, and that may contradict the humanitarian principles and main objectives of FAO. Several past evaluations underline that vague or broad targeting may also favour “better connected” elites at community level.

198. Inadequate targeting or no targeting may be due to perceived time pressure or be the result of an explicit decision to avoid any discrimination due to: high conflict sensitivity if any targeting system is adopted; political opportunity of making use of local traditions in identifying beneficiaries instead of accurate measures of most vulnerable groups; interference of local authorities in determining benefit distribution; unfeasibility of alternative targeting methods. In some cases in past evaluations, however, it was indicated that inadequate targeting was simply due to a faulty design or inadequate attention to targeting by the project formulator.

199. Targeting in opposition to government preferences is a challenge that FAO and other agencies may face when there are opposing views on developmental or social priorities. FAO may then play the role of mediator between the Government and other interlocutors, including those who may not be in condition to establish a dialogue with the government, so that commonly agreed targeting approaches could be identified. The situation, however, may

differ from fragile situations to non-fragile ones. FAO's role as mediator and facilitator in fragile situations can be important, however difficult it is in practice.

4.5.3 Gender

Findings:

- Although some examples were found in countries visited where FAO was making efforts at integrating gender concerns in transition planning and activities, the Organization has not made sufficient progress in mainstreaming a gender focus in its work in crisis-related transition. This is all the more pressing given that FAO has a clear corporate policy on gender equality.
- FAO Policy on Gender Equality, various guidelines and the analytical tool "SEAGA for Emergency and Rehabilitation Programmes" all lay the premise for a more prominent role of gender in designing transitional processes than was found. This requires that planning for "transition" be based on a more exhaustive gender analysis than is currently the case.

200. Women are among the most vulnerable groups in emergency situations, especially in conflicts and social upheavals. Traditional roles of "women" in societies still affected by widespread poverty are further stretched in crisis situations. Pre-existing conditions of inequality and social exclusion precludes them from having access to many forms of assistance or sometimes even aid distribution. Even when legislation gives equal access to land to women and men (e.g. the Land Law in Tajikistan), institutional resistance and interference of local authorities can make it difficult to apply this principle.

201. Crises affect all vulnerable people that are exposed to risks and threats but men and women are affected by emergencies in different ways. Gender-disaggregate data on past crises, when available, show that women are among the most vulnerable groups in those situations, especially in conflicts.

202. Emergencies relief operations after major disasters, conflicts and protracted crises may also provide opportunities for poor men and women to participate more in decision-making and contribute to the rehabilitation process. These opportunities, however, need to be based on a thorough analysis and accurate knowledge of the constraints that women face before, during and after the emergency, as crisis often exacerbate existing gender inequalities.

203. The 2011 evaluation of FAO's work on gender⁶⁹ observes that a gender perspective has not been effectively integrated into FAO's projects, even though the Emergency Coordination Unit (now integrated at the country level following the recent reforms) may have played a dynamic role as gender champion in crisis situations. Although women are targeted beneficiaries of several projects to improve their food security and incomes, the gender evaluation emphasises that the gender roles and relations within households and communities are often not analysed and understood.

⁶⁹ 2011 *Evaluation of FAO's role and work related to Gender and Development*, June 2011

204. Past country evaluations confirm that FAO has not played a sufficiently strong role in gender equity through its transitional work. Participation of female-headed households in FAO initiatives is still small, with little or no evidence that female farmers have been consulted. FAO's capacity to reach out to women in agriculture, fisheries and forestry is generally disappointing. Gender analysis is rarely done. Few projects were informed by a gender perspective. Gender is not always concretely factored into project design or implementation. Women are often excluded from CFW initiatives, if no male relative advocates on their behalf. In several evaluations, the conclusion reached is that performance of the FAO country programme is often extremely weak in the domain of gender equity and gender mainstreaming, with poor accountability records.

205. The 2013 country evaluation on Somalia highlights FAO's responsibilities for not having been able to support government authorities in formulating agricultural and livestock policies that are gender sensitive and inclusive. In Somalia, interventions in the livestock sector show that livestock ownership does appear to be gender disaggregated in Somaliland and south-central Somalia, but not in Puntland. Participation of female-headed households in FAO initiatives was still small, with no evidence that female farmers had been consulted. The food and nutrition security information system FSNAU has been revising its methodologies for data collection, to analyse changing roles of gender in livelihoods, coping strategies, access to services, and differential needs. However, progress is still very slow.

206. In some countries (e.g. Tajikistan)⁷⁰ FAO has made special efforts to include women as beneficiaries, putting the primary focus of attention on women and female headed households. However, effectiveness of these attempts is not yet sufficiently demonstrated. In the case of Sri Lanka,⁷¹ the capacity of FAO's work to reach out targeting women in agriculture, fisheries and forestry was disappointing. Little consultation with women was associated to design interventions (e.g. in poultry raising and home gardening), with only sporadic training provided. In Ethiopia,⁷² gender has not been systematically reflected in the project/programme cycle management process and project documents do not show gender disaggregated data nor any gender analysis in project design.

207. In order to seize those windows of opportunity and structuring transition programmes so that they incorporate gender-sensitive transformational elements, FAO requires a strong contextual awareness of the specific requirements of the transition process linked to gender issues, and this is achieved only through a rigorous gender analysis, close partnerships with progressive women's solidarity groups and strong leadership, organizational commitment and willingness to tackle structural issues regarding women above illustrated.

208. Poor performance of the Organization on gender issues contrasts with the importance of gender equality in FAO's mandate in accordance with which FAO can achieve food security for all by raising levels of nutrition, improving agricultural productivity and natural resource management only if it simultaneously works towards gender equality and supports women's diverse role in agriculture and rural development.⁷³ Within its corporate policy on

⁷⁰ See OED, *Evaluation of FAO activities in Tajikistan (2004-2009)*, FAO, 2009.

⁷¹ See OED, *Evaluation of FAO Cooperation in Sri Lanka (2006-2012)*, FAO, 2012.

⁷² OED, *Independent Evaluation of the Programmes and Cooperation of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations in Ethiopia*, FAO, 2011.

⁷³ See *Summary of the FAO Policy on Gender Equality – Attaining Food Security Goals in Agriculture and Rural Development*. FAO's policy on gender equality is to provide FAO with a framework for guiding its efforts to achieve gender equality in all its technical work. Its corporate goal in this matter is to achieve equality between women and men in sustainable agricultural production and rural development for the elimination of

gender equality, FAO has also established a series of Gender Equality Objectives to be achieved by 2025 that address women's participation, their access to and control over employment and resources, their access to goods and services for agricultural development and to markets, reduction of their work burden, while the share of total agricultural aid committed to projects related to women and gender equality is increased to 30 per cent. Part of this gender policy is the inclusion of a country gender assessment to be undertaken as part of FAO country programming, although gender analysis is seldom included in the situation analysis for the CPFs and the great number of FAO projects do not include a serious gender analysis.

209. Despite the lack of in-depth analysis, all countries visited by the evaluation team, except Liberia, refer to gender roles in their project portfolio. They emphasize the contribution of women in production, processing and marketing and try to include activities that are mainly conducted by women. At the same time, they envisage including men in nutrition activities that are usually under the responsibilities of women (Mali). However, strategic gender needs are only considered in few projects, and that idea is often initiated by a resource partner (Mali, DRC) and not by FAO. Lack of a serious gender analysis in the transition context represents a major impediment to gender mainstreaming.

210. This situation may improve only if a more exhaustive gender analysis is conducted, building on the *Socio-Economic and Gender Analysis (SEAGA)* that FAO and WFP developed since the early 2000s, including issuing a toolkit known as *SEAGA for Emergency and Rehabilitation Programmes*. That toolkit suggests an approach to a participatory identification and analysis of the factors that determine women's and men's priorities and potentials. Specific normative tools have been prepared to provide support to the implementation of these mechanisms in specific areas, with the aim of better integrating gender issues in the CPF,⁷⁴ or mainstreaming gender issues in technical programmes.

211. Country missions undertaken by the evaluation team offered the opportunity to recognize transitional activities with high involvement of women. A typical example found in several countries visited regarded backyard gardening and horticulture, which promoted higher production of vegetables as well as better nutrition and better income opportunities. However, no preliminary economic analysis was found, so their efficiency as income-generating activities could not be assessed. Horticulture contributes to agriculture diversification and reduces dependency on rainfall but is by itself a risky business since it is threatened by pests and other diseases requiring technical capacities, not necessarily generated within the projects observed, and is especially sensitive to highly volatile market conditions.

212. Other valuable initiatives observed that may benefit women in transition contexts are value chain initiatives that give weight to processing and marketing. A SIDA funded project in Mali may be stressed for its holistic approach to women's economic empowerment in the context of food insecurity and climate change. In the fishery sector in the Philippines, a project plans *inter alia* focusing on sea weed farming, post-harvest tools and implements, which by design will target women. In the same country, within its inter-cropping support for

hunger and poverty, pursuing the following objectives: (a) reducing the gap between rural women and men in access to productive resources and services; (b) ensuring that women and men have the ability to influence programme and policy decision-making and building institutional responsiveness and accountability; and (c) ensuring that rural women and men take up economic opportunities to improve their individual and household wellbeing.

⁷⁴ See FAO, *Country Programming Framework – Integrating gender issues*, 2010: guidelines.

coconut farmers that suffered from Haiyan Typhoon, FAO proposes crop types that will give ‘*women opportunity to actively participate in the recovery process*’.

213. The role of women in transition processes is emphasized in initiatives promoted by FAO in West Bank and Gaza Strip with the aim of supporting gender mainstreaming and targeting of women, providing support to women associations and interacting with other agencies.⁷⁵ In DRC, FAO managed to target women in a specific project (DIMITRA), an information project jointly promoted with the *National Committee for the Woman and Development (CONAFED)*, that aims at enhancing capacities of rural women, and other initiatives such as the *Project on Support to the Development of Urban and Per-urban Horticulture (HUP)* and the *Programme on Support to Community Development (PADC)*, where gender-based (sex-disaggregated) data have been used to target interventions.⁷⁶ The FFS show a well-balanced participation of women and men, as evidenced in DRC and Uganda. These are just a few of the many examples observed in the country missions regarding transitional activities with an important role for women.

Suggested Action 10:

Since the support to livelihoods in crisis-related transition is central to build resilience, both in natural disasters and in complex emergencies and protracted crises, it is urgent that thorough vulnerability, gender and livelihood analysis be adopted by FAO as part of the contextual analysis (see section 4.2) which should be the basis for CPFs and transition planning. This analysis should make best use of IPC, LAT, SEAGA for Emergency and Rehabilitation Programmes, and other analytical frameworks, to ensure appropriate and gender-sensitive design and targeting, and greater positive impact of FAO’s work on livelihoods. This work must be effectively monitored in a timely manner, and necessary adjustments introduced to FAO’s work as circumstances change.

Suggested Action 11:

FAO should make the required changes in its programming procedures so that conflict sensitivity analysis and do-no-harm approaches are systematically included in determining geographical, community-level and household-level targeting to ensure that decisions in programming transitional activities benefit groups and territories that FAO considers of the highest priority, taking into account government priorities and security constraints, and, most importantly, after consulting potential beneficiaries.

⁷⁵ Many of the members of a female food processing cooperative in Gaza are widows and heads of household, and confirmed that FAO’s intervention has made a real difference to their household income. The whole value chain involved in the production of food relies on women, with a special attention to the most vulnerable amongst them.

⁷⁶ See FAO 2008, *Evaluation de la cooperation de la FAO en République Democratique du Congo (2003 – 2007)*.

4.6 Coordination issues

4.6.1 Basic coordination functions in a crisis-related situation

Findings:

- As co-leader (with WFP) of the Global Food Security Cluster since 2010, FAO was found to be taking a major role in coordination at country level of emergency response in its areas of mandate. Before the Cluster role and going back as far as 20 years, FAO often took on coordination responsibility for the agriculture and rural sector in crisis response situations. This coordination role at least in some cases (e.g., Philippines) has a major bearing for the sector in linking relief, rehabilitation and development in crisis and post-crisis situations.
- Some aspects of this coordination role were found still to need perfecting, such as: getting the structural features of the forums right; providing stronger leadership; better using FAO's technical expertise to guide the many actors (especially bilaterals and NGOs) responding in the sector in programme planning, prioritizing communication and advocacy; helping mobilize resources; and facilitating the transition of coordination functions to local authorities.

214. Coordination is a crucial function in emergency response and transition and FAO has been taking on a sector coordination role in crisis response at least since its work in the Great Lakes region in Africa in the mid-1990s. This role was consolidated in the response to the Kosovo conflict in 1999-2000, where FAO took the lead in coordinating some 50/80 NGOs and other agencies operating in the rural, agriculture and food security sectors. That intervention was judged highly effective by a multi-donor evaluation in 2001, and led to FAO taking on such a coordination role several times in succeeding years.

215. Since the endorsement by the IASC in December 2010, FAO has had a mandated role and responsibility for coordination in post-disaster and protracted crisis situations as co-leader of the *Food Security Cluster – FSC*⁷⁷ – at the global and country level FAO has a critical responsibility in the humanitarian architecture in complex emergencies, protracted crises and sudden onset disaster situations. These coordination mechanisms not only facilitate achievement of humanitarian goals during the relief phase but also potentially offer FAO an avenue to channel 'development thinking' into the emergency phase while facilitating effective linkages between immediate response and long term development, guiding responders through transitions with a long term perspective.

216. In addition to the global FSC, FAO is a member of Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery since its creation in 2005, and is part of its Strategic Advisory Group and the Technical Working Group. As a part of this role, FAO and ILO developed a '**Livelihoods Assessment Toolkit (LAT)**' piloted in several countries. FAO is also part of the UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition.

⁷⁷ FAO originally was designated as the lead of Agriculture Cluster that was created as a part of the humanitarian reform process in 2005, although the global Agriculture Cluster was not activated. Later, it was made Co-lead of Global Food Security Cluster along with WFP in 2010. At the country level, it is frequent that the Food Security Cluster is expanded to be a Food Security and Agriculture Cluster or various combinations of agriculture, food aid and food security issues cluster, co-chaired by WFP and FAO. See *The Four Pillars of Humanitarian Reforms*, UNOCHA (2006), *Guidance Notes on Using the Cluster Approach to Strengthen Humanitarian Response*, IASC (2006) and *Cluster Coordination Guidance*, FAO (2010).

217. There have been several evaluations looking at FAO's coordination role, both at the country level and at the global level, the most recent being the *WFP/FAO Joint Evaluation of Food Security Cluster Coordination in Humanitarian Action*, done in parallel to this one in 2014. This section reviews only FAO's role in coordination as it applies to transition contexts (both after sudden onset disasters and in protracted crisis situations) and assess how that role and its performance have helped or hindered linking relief, rehabilitation and development, ensuring effective transition.

218. Six key aspects derived from the functions of a cluster coordinator have been considered to have an impact on the transition process:

- a) Structural features – terms and boundaries of the clusters and sub-working groups, ensuring the presence of coordination forums in the right locations with the right mix of participants;
- b) Leadership – deploying high calibre leadership for coordination and representation and ensuring organization-wide (at the FAO country level) awareness for FAO's lead role in coordination;
- c) Programme Planning Guidance⁷⁸ – sound context and vulnerability analysis, thorough needs assessments, planning and strategy development (e.g., the SRP), technical guidance and quality standards, integrating DRR, gender mainstreaming and accountability to affected population;
- d) Communication and Advocacy – collecting and disseminating pertinent information, being a conduit for communicating government policy and strategies, advocating on behalf of the sector;
- e) Transferring Coordination Responsibility – aligning with pre-existing coordination mechanisms, capacity building and transfer coordination responsibilities to local actors – mainly Government; and
- f) Resource Mobilization – generating resources for coordination function but also for the sector as a whole so that it has the resources for programming for transition and development.

219. A joint responsibility of WFP and FAO for the global Food Security Cluster is an opportunity to focus on better country-level coordination. It provides training and creates a pool of better coordinators. It improves programme quality in partnering with INGOs. It should help in using resilience as conceptual framework to facilitate transition. Food security is addressed in a holistic manner, covering availability, access, utilization and stability.

220. Nevertheless, in some places it appeared that cluster functions were still compartmentalised: WFP's food security/food aid cluster for the initial months, followed by a FAO's agriculture and livelihoods cluster. Although this joint role has helped to balance some of the leadership issues, a greater ability to think holistically in coordinating needs assessment and programming is required.

221. FAO may face a few difficulties in dealing with cluster coordination. Raising funds for coordination is a challenge for FAO. Although there are some funds available for support surges at the global level, they do not seem to be sufficient to facilitate a regular coordination function in emergency. So far SFERA is the only source flexible enough to provide coordination funding in the emergency phase. WFP has some resources available for that role, and there has been some joint fund raising by the two agencies, but this resource issue can at time cause imbalance in the partnership at the country level. Cluster coordination capacity is not strong within FAO and there is not enough awareness of its importance, its characteristics and in particular the over-all responsibilities that it entails.

⁷⁸ A useful breakdown of this is the stages (under frequent revision) of OCHA's Humanitarian Program Cycle.

4.6.2 *Structural features of FAO's performance in the Food Security Cluster*

Findings:

- Timely setting up of country-level clusters with clear and shared understanding about purpose among key participants has improved. But there is a need to improve timely and adequately resourced coverage and performance in sub-national locations and not only in capitals.
- Working groups/sub-clusters within the FSC are being developed as needed and are found to be useful. But boundaries and definitions still remain to be clarified – particularly those that relate to ‘livelihoods,’ ‘early recovery,’ etc., driven by competition between agencies and particular contextual histories and not necessarily by logical reasons.⁷⁹
- FSC clusters have difficulties in convening and ensuring effective participation of local NGOs and CSOs and the local private sector. Transaction costs, operational arrangements and language of operation remain obstacles to involving local organizations.
- **Fragmentation** of the FSC and the cluster system in general (clusters tend to work quite separately from one another) led to some problems with coordination.

222. In all countries visited, FAO was part of some form of coordination mechanism. Often, it was the Food Security Cluster (FSC) but FAO was also seen as a key player in locally established and government-led forums (e.g. FONGIM in Mali, FASL in Uganda, Agriculture Group in the Philippines). Missions showed that clusters had been set up on time and were functioning with regularity. Participants in clusters interviewed had both clarity and positive feedback on purpose and importance of the clusters. In the Philippines, the L3 protocol had provided further impetus and resources to emergency clusters in a timely fashion. FAO had also taken a lead in creating sub-clusters or working groups. The Coconut Working Group and the Fisheries Working Group in the Philippines, and the Livestock Subgroup in Mali are good examples.

223. Coordination mechanisms within country (sub-national level) remain weak and FAO appeared to find it difficult to be present and service them effectively. In Mali, FAO did not contribute enough to decentralized cluster units in the Northern region.⁸⁰ In the Philippines, OCHA observed that FAO had not taken coordination role seriously at the sub-national level even though FAO was actively involved in the cluster at the national level. It was clear that the coordination presence of FAO where it was most needed in Guiuan and Roxas was weak and late. The situation was said to be improving however, and an external Lesson Learnt report for the Philippines found at a later date that coordination in Tacloban was going well. This was particularly problematic as the typhoon response in the Philippines was undertaken in a decentralized fashion by the government keeping with the administration arrangement in country. In DRC though participants expressed satisfaction with the national level cluster work, the clusters were recognized as not being equally active in all parts of the country.⁸¹ The lack of adequate staff and/or resources to dedicate was identified as a key constraint.

⁷⁹ This is helped in part by the recent decision to integrated ‘early recovery’ into all clusters, rather than keeping it as a separate cluster under UNDP.

⁸⁰ It could only provide some support to the Mopti cluster, leaving the others to be facilitated by INGOs like Oxfam (Gao) and Handicap International (Timbuktu).

⁸¹ The Goma cluster was identified as being weaker.

From the affected communities' point of view, local inter-cluster coordination is most relevant as a way out of emergency.

224. The coordination system, including clusters when activated, seems to have become well entrenched in the humanitarian architecture, with all the UN agencies and key INGOs becoming well versed with the processes and participating in them in all countries visited. However, the involvement of key local NGOs and CSOs remains a challenge although their participation is crucial for their long-term presence and commitment. Some causes were operating language, transaction costs and logistical challenges.⁸² There was no indication that a capacity assessment of local organisations had been used in the early stages to solicit their participation.

225. Despite improvements introduced since 2011, there still remain blurred boundaries and troublesome fragmentation among clusters and responsibility allocations between agencies. In the Philippines, in addition to a cluster system overlaid on top of an already existing nationally-led coordination mechanism, confusion prevailed between the mandates of the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster (FSAC) and the Livelihoods and Early Recovery Cluster, and it took time to bring them in line with mandates of the lead agencies. As of April 2014, there still remained lingering issues for these clusters while transitioning towards local government ownership should already have been underway. On a positive side, the evaluation found that in West Bank and Gaza Strip, following on the advice from the global cluster coordination unit, three sectors were merged to offer an integrated coordination mechanism.

226. A further fragmentation was observed in the approach used to address food security and agriculture as separate domains even within the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster.⁸³ The overwhelming presence of emergency actors in the Philippines FSAC (and FSCs in other countries reviewed) explains why discussions tended to focus on immediate needs of food aid, even in chronic crisis situations such as Chad, even though an FSC should deal with food availability, access and sustainable livelihoods in an integrated manner.⁸⁴ The global FSC evaluation concludes that *“most of the mechanisms analysed have contributed little to strengthening links with development actors.”* This weakness in the cluster system (not enough consideration or integration of the longer-term view and the consequences of emergency assistance) is more generally an issue with the Transformative Agenda, as stated in Section 3.1.4.

⁸² Similar limitations affecting the relevant government departments (central and local) participating in coordination mechanisms was also noted.

⁸³ Many interlocutors at the country level in the Philippines, the global FSC evaluation notes, believed that the cluster was a food security cluster lead by WFP and that the focus would shift to agriculture only once FAO will take over later on in the recovery phase. See *FAO/WFP Joint Evaluation of Food Security Cluster Coordination in Humanitarian Action*, May 2014.

⁸⁴ See *FAO/WFP Joint Evaluation of Food Security Cluster Coordination in Humanitarian Action* cit., paras. 28 and 84.

4.6.3 *Leadership*

Findings:

- Quality of cluster coordinators and support to and recognition by FAO's country leadership of the key role that coordination plays in the emergency and transition processes is critical and is seen to be improving over time.
- There is still insufficient organization-wide backing of the coordination function at country level by FAO and recognition by FAO technical/program staff that the Organization has a key role to play as a lead agency at country level.

227. Coordinating myriad humanitarian actors while ensuring that there is 'development thinking' requires strong leadership and credibility among stakeholders. Credibility can be assured if the coordinator has adequate back-up of technical expertise and guidance. This requires that the FSC coordinators are supported by the FAO country representatives. While cluster coordinators do not need to be necessarily technical experts, FAO officials with technical duties should be aware of the agency's responsibility towards the cluster.

228. Quality of coordination is in large part contingent on the quality of the coordinator. A global effort is underway to strengthen the pool of coordinators on the ground. The stakeholders recognized FAO for its technical expertise and noted that when FAO technical staff leads/contributes to discussions in the coordination forums, given the nature of the subjects (e.g. agriculture, fisheries, livestock or forestry) they are able to transcend the immediate emergency imperatives.

229. While TCE staff have a long experience in IASC humanitarian architecture and the cluster coordination responsibilities, these traits are not shared among FAO's other technical and operational staff, in headquarters and at the regional and country offices. As observed by country missions in Uganda and Myanmar, the FAO representation was not so strong in carrying out the coordination function. As a result there may be a drop in the coordination quality once the emergency period winds up in case of sudden onset disasters. A lot of FAO's cluster co-lead functions such as resource mobilization, advocating for cluster issues in the Humanitarian Country Team and with the government, are left unattended, unless the engagement of the FAO representative is ensured.

230. Without strong leadership from FAO, a FSC may be perceived within a narrow food aid realm. The role of FAO is to combine immediate food security concerns with long term food security (livelihood recovery and resilience) objectives. In its absence, the cluster may be seen as a WFP-led food security forum. This requires a greater engagement of FAO's technical personnel in clusters to bring long-term thinking.

4.6.4 *Contribution of coordination to programme planning and design*

Findings:

- FAO's role in cluster coordination in crisis-related situations involves contribution to multi-sector needs assessments.
- FAO is recognized for its technical contribution to strategic response planning in agriculture and livestock, and for looking beyond the relief phase.
- Guidelines for transition planning appear inadequate due to lack of guidance on resilience, DRR, and for inadequate attention to local capacity development. This affects effectiveness of planning the link between short term interventions with long term development.
- As cluster co-lead in examples reviewed, FAO has been less than successful in getting cluster members to focus on cross-cutting issues such as gender mainstreaming, DRR and more recently, 'accountability to affected populations.'
- FAO has not been effective in disseminating its normative products through clusters, even though that could help clusters think through transition more meaningfully.

231. FAO's coordination of the cluster planning process has been a critical catalyst in helping the sector think through longer term implications. In Uganda a 'Plan of Action' was developed as part of the cluster work, with the aim of setting a framework of interventions by the cluster members in Northern Uganda. That Plan was the result of an extensive consultation process with stakeholders and used as a guiding document for transition not only FAO but also by other UN agencies and NGOs. In DRC the cluster defined guidelines for rehabilitation beyond the relief phase, requiring sustainable responses, resilience building, strengthening of local capacities, exit strategies and synergies with other sectors. In West Bank and Gaza Strip, the FSC contributed to a Strategic Response Plan,⁸⁵ organizing emergency response in a developmental mode. The longer term planning exercises were considered useful also by the bigger organizations and even the government departments that had been involved.

232. FAO does not appear to use the Cluster system to disseminate normative products related to transition. Though there are exceptions (e.g. DRC), FAO did not appear to use the clusters to focus on the most vulnerable as a part of the needs assessments, to adequately integrate gender and culture analysis, or to define and articulate resilience, disaster risk reduction and capacity development.

233. The evaluation team found that FAO coordinated the planning process in the clusters in a participatory manner involving the members. However, lack of systematic and consistent consultation with the affected communities and often insufficient involvement of the government departments were identified as shortcomings.

234. Having a shared information base and a shared analysis is a necessary condition to coordinate diverse actors towards transition. Clusters have contributed to it during the planning phase by carrying out joint needs assessment, both for immediate response and for recovery. FAO has often been the lead contributor within the cluster on needs assessment for

⁸⁵ UNDP had decided in 2010 that with the WBGS CAP in place there was no need for a separate Early Recovery Cluster, which was more appropriate following sudden onset crisis.

agriculture (e.g. MIRA 1 and MIRA 2 in the Philippines, and the PDNA compiled by the Government).

235. FAO should disseminate normative products relevant to transition and ensure that the cluster participants, particularly non-traditional newcomers and weaker ones, are provided with these analyses and options, upstream policy implications and downstream consequences. This would help set performance quality standards that integrate development thinking in the local context, leading to clearer definition of the concepts of resilience and disaster risk reduction. It would help ensure that responses reach the most vulnerable segments, and that cross cutting themes like gender and the ‘*accountability to affected populations*’ (AAP) approach are mainstreamed and applied consistently.

4.6.5 Contribution to communications and advocacy

Findings:

- FS Clusters have been good sources of information about needs and response in the sector for participants and resource partners. FAO leverages its good relationship with the government departments to bring views, policies, plans and strategies of the government into the cluster.
- While FAO uses its close relationship to influence governments in some instances (on technical standards, sustainability concerns), some partners were found to believe that it lacks critical distance from government to be able to advocate alternative options.

236. The cluster coordinator should be able to advocate on behalf of the sector on resource allocation, priority areas, sustainability concerns and targeting with resource partners and government to create an enabling environment conducive for flexible transition programming. FAO as a cluster co-lead has been able to maintain a good flow of information (needs and plans to a great extent, and gaps to some extent) within the FSC and to effectively communicate with other clusters.

237. On most occasions, FAO has leveraged its good standing with the government to access information for the benefit of cluster members. FAO brought in relevant government departments to brief cluster members in Philippines on issues of policy, strategy and regulation. FAO is often (Mali, Philippines) the main link between the government-led forums (which generally focus on long term development) and cluster groups focused on humanitarian needs. The UN Resident Coordinator in Philippines appreciated that FAO could communicate government priorities and plans to the UNCT.

238. Given its special relationship with the governments, FAO often uses its technical expertise to influence policy changes, but may avoid pushing on sensitive or controversial issues. Such controversial issues (e.g., tenure issues, targeting, governance, corruption) are potential areas for advocacy work of the cluster (together with the other clusters and the UNCT), where FAO could play a bigger role than that seen by the missions. To move from short-term life-saving to address structural issues linked to the transition process is a challenging task, which may require a stronger advocacy role than FAO is willing to take on.

4.6.6 Contribution to resource mobilization

Findings:

- FAO plays a critical role in shaping the messages of the cluster to donors to raise funds for the medium term to assist with transition.
- Raising funds *for coordination itself* on a regular basis has been a challenge, impacting on the quality of coordination and in delaying the emphasis on transition and development.

239. The cluster coordinator should be able to advocate on behalf of the sector on resource allocation and priority areas. Effective transition programming and programmes that aim to link relief and development require flexible funding that should be at the same time available in a timely manner and be of sufficient duration. The cluster coordinator has a responsibility to ensure that this is communicated and sufficient resources are mobilized. Clusters in different countries coped with this issue in different ways and FAO's performance is mixed.

240. In the Philippines, the cluster coordinator's strong advocacy was able to position the sector to receive significant funds during the initial emergency phase. Cluster members, including FAO, demonstrated delivery on the ground that was seen by donors as an emergency intervention that had reduced, in the medium term, the burden of food aid, while helping rehabilitation. This prompted donors to commit over 100% of the funds requested by the cluster, offering some degree of flexibility in duration of emergency interventions, with some projects slated to be for 18 or more months.

241. In DRC, donors and implementing partners created two funding pots (pooled funding) one for humanitarian needs and a standard funding for a rehabilitation-oriented and longer-term programme. The cluster produced a needs assessment, plans and selection criteria for qualifying for these funds and was successful in extending the funding period to two years.

242. FAO also needs to raise funding for the coordination function on a sustained basis. Availability of funding for coordination brings in a level of continuity and certainty that contributes to quality of coordination, but more importantly leads the sector towards transition. While SFERA and CERF do provide an opportunity to fund coordination, raising funds for cluster coordination has been uneven. This has impacted adversely on the performance of some clusters. For example in Mali the inability to raise funds for coordination meant that coordinators were retained only for short contracts.

4.6.7 Coordination responsibilities in different transition phases

Findings:

- The current FS Clusters are not always aligned with pre-existing local coordination mechanisms and generally lacked plans for the transfer of responsibilities to local actors (mainly government) during the transition phase. This appeared to be a fundamental weakness of the cluster system

more generally: it gives a limited role to local actors (who tend to participate only with the objective of obtaining funding), and to national/ local systems. The cluster coordination system is mainly about the international actors, rather than being focused also on building capacity to enable a smooth transition from international coordination to national and local coordination. This is true in spite of the fact that FAO remains a committed partner of national government/stakeholders, and its lead role in coordination mechanisms would give the Organization the ability to better facilitate this transition of coordination responsibilities.

243. Beyond the initial emergency phase, as a cluster co-lead FAO has a key role in ensuring that coordination arrangements are transferred to local actors (principally the Government) to ensure local ownership and a long term perspective. Based on pre-existing coordination mechanisms in the country, ideally the post-emergency arrangement should align with them or at least ensure effective communications between FSC and those mechanisms. Effective transition is facilitated if cluster work is continued through the transition, transferring coordination/lead responsibility to the relevant government departments.

244. FAO's performance in this regard was found to have a number of shortcomings. Firstly in many locations, the cluster system was rolled out without fully comprehending and taking into consideration the pre-existing coordination mechanisms, causing the establishment of parallel structures: on the one hand, the government-led mechanisms (often with a long term focus) and, on the other, the WFP/FAO-led cluster with a lot of international actors and resources (often with a short term humanitarian focus). For example in Mali there was FONGIM (in this case NGO-led), in the Philippines there was the Agriculture Group, and in DRC there was the GT9. Where possible, utilizing pre-existing and preferably government-led processes to build emergency response coordination would benefit transition better⁸⁶.

245. The evaluation also found that FSCs did not have a proper exit strategy in many countries. In Mali the emergency phase was about to be concluded and the Government was to re-assume responsibilities but the cluster did not have an exit strategy. Similarly though it was imminent in the Philippines that after the government reconstruction plan, the ministry would ask the international actors to align the coordination mechanism with the one led by the Government, the clusters had not yet discussed that eventuality. In these situations, FAO appears to be the best placed to negotiate the change as it is often present in both mechanisms, being involved in both phases of the process. The evaluation also found that in Uganda, after the end of the emergency phase, a more structured approach was adopted. At the end of the humanitarian phase, FAO wrote a concept note titled "*Transitional adaptation strategy: From UN led Coordination of Food Security and Agricultural Livelihoods (FSAL) to Government led Forum*" for planning the hand-over process. The note describes the objectives, activities, and membership and coordination structure of the Food Security Cluster and defines the proposed goals, objectives, activities, and membership and coordination structure of the "new" coordination mechanism. While there were obvious efficiency trade-offs between the two mechanisms, the hand over was aimed at ensuring continuity of the work into development phase.

246. It should be recognized that this smooth transition of the coordination leadership is complicated by the fact that the boundaries between emergency and post-emergency are often

⁸⁶ While it is possible that there may be some efficiency trade off during the humanitarian phase.

unclear, and the end of the formal IASC cluster set-up may not correspond to moment for hand-over to government, so some of the actions initially promoted by the FSC system may need to continue. What is clearly required is systematic capacity development on coordination skills and tools for national stakeholders, including government.

Suggested Action 12:**On its role as co-lead of the Food Security Cluster:**

- **FAO should confirm and build on the potential of its role in the Cluster coordination system at country level to have a positive impact on the transition process.**
- **FAORs should actively support the Cluster Coordinators, also at the sub-national level, taking charge of this supervisory function. Since selection of good quality coordinator is crucial for the performance of the coordinating function, the Organization must devote maximum attention in selecting qualified candidates for that function.**
- **To be an effective forum to support transition, coordination clusters should be set up from the very start of a crisis.**
- **FAO should advocate (probably with the IASC, or OCHA) for changes to the cluster system to overcome the current fragmentation, which hinders effective coordination. While they may evolve depending on context, it is imperative that the terms/scope of the cluster in which FAO operates and its relationship with other clusters are clearly defined at any given point in time.**
- **The clusters should be set up where decisions are taken (usually at the capital) as well as where action is taking place (sub-national level or where disaster struck). Clusters where possible should incorporate local NGOs/CSOs and government stakeholders from the outset.**

4.7 Normative work, technical knowledge and information systems to support transition

4.7.1 Contribution of normative products to transition

Findings:

- At present no consistent production, communication and dissemination strategy is in place for normative documents relating to transition. Accordingly, many documents which could be of relevance are unknown and not used by country offices. However, those documents which do reach the country offices, are mostly known because they are actually used and much appreciated by staff in these offices.
- The quality of the documents produced is uneven. An important factor limiting uptake, dissemination and adaptation to local contexts seems to be the fact that these documents were mostly produced at headquarters with little consultation with country offices, making them little known or poorly adapted to different local contexts.

247. FAO's normative function⁸⁷ is far from homogeneous and covers a significant variety of tools, standards and frameworks, which go well beyond the scope of this evaluation. Here

⁸⁷ This is FAO's first core function, here referred to as "FAO normative work", and its role, as defined in the Reviewed Strategic Framework, is *to facilitate and support countries in the development and implementation of normative and standard-setting instruments such as international agreements, codes of conduct, technical standards and others.*

only the use of normative products that are directly relevant to support the transition process are assessed.

248. In order to assess the effectiveness and relevance of FAO normative products to transition, a set of documents⁸⁸ was chosen in consultation with key internal stakeholders and used as a prompt during interviews and as the basis for a survey sent to 40 country offices.⁸⁹ Selected documents included:

- a Programmatic/technical documents and operational guidelines potentially relevant to transition settings;
- b Strategic documents outlining FAO's approach to transition; and
- c Reviews of good practices and lessons learned from FAO's work in transition

249. *Authorship and ownership* of the selected publications is quite heterogeneous. Some were produced by TCE, in certain cases in collaboration with external stakeholders (e.g. LEGS), and some by other FAO divisions, with variable inputs from TCE. TCE communication material has been mostly directed at resource partners, while an internal drive to develop guidance material was limited by the mandate and resources of the *Outreach and Reporting Unit* within TCE. No standard procedures on editing and publishing of good practices and lessons learnt in emergencies were agreed upon, which meant that they were regularly left as undocumented and unpublished.

250. At present FAO and the TCE Outreach and Reporting Unit do not have a clear and documented *communication* strategy and this translates into normative documents which are not homogeneous in format, style and quality. Equally, a *dissemination* strategy, reflecting the document's expected readership and end users is very rarely devised from the beginning. Presently it is difficult to retrieve documents from the FAO website without prior knowledge of their existence. The idea to set up a *Disaster Risk Reduction portal* as an open group to act as a compendium or repository for guidance documents was developed but did not take off.

251. Some documents were introduced through *training*, for example LEGS in Mali and Zimbabwe, and there were indications that this was perceived as an efficient and effective way of disseminating the normative documents and building awareness about them. Though interviews with staff revealed that occasionally the documents had been received and archived, overall there seems to be limited knowledge and dissemination of FAO's normative documents for transition in country offices. It was not clear whether they had reached the office, and if they had, whether they had been introduced to the staff as they should in order to gain their attention.

252. It was not possible to review the extent to which these FAO documents were used by non-FAO actors. Some uptake was mentioned in most countries, though it did not seem to be systematic.

253. There is no tracking system to retrieve information on demand for documents coming from country offices. There is no standardised procedure for translations either, as they tend to be initiated by the author or another champion on an *ad hoc* basis. To different degrees some of the country offices visited, and notably Uganda and DRC, have been proactive in *adapting* documents received from headquarters to their own needs, or producing new ones.

⁸⁸ See annex 3

⁸⁹ The countries made up the list of post-crisis and fragile state countries prepared for this evaluation

Box 10: Examples of normative products prepared by the FAO country office in Uganda

- Facilitators' Guide for Running a Farmer Field School. An Adaptation for a Post Emergency Recovery Programme (used also in South Sudan and Somalia). 2010
- Customized version of the LEGS
- The FAO Guidance, Intentions and Commitment to Climate Change for Uganda (2010-2014). February 2010.
- Tool Kit for Assessing the Right to Food at District Level in Uganda (no date).
- Uganda. Integrating Food and Nutrition Security and the Right to Food in Local Government Development Planning and Budgeting. 2013

254. The survey conducted asked whether the documents in the list (see Annex 3) had been heard of, read and used. The **three most well-known** documents according to responses received are *Resilient Livelihoods*, the *Livelihood Assessment Toolkit (LAT)* and *LEGS*, which is consistent with better dissemination efforts, and in the case of LEGS with its having been produced in collaboration with partners. The **most read and used documents** were *LAT*, *LEGS*, the *Cluster Coordination Guidelines* and the *Voluntary Guidelines on Land Tenure*. The need was expressed to add lessons learned and guidance on how to adapt these guidelines to local contexts in these documents.

255. On the other hand it was difficult to make some documents available within country offices, and among these, the *Guidelines for Input Trade Fairs* stand out as being potentially an important area of work in transition situations. Nevertheless, the feedback from the few countries using them was good, indicating that a greater effort in disseminating them would be desirable. Overall uptake and use of documents are uneven. The survey results indicate that a few offices, for example in the Philippines, Pakistan, Somalia and Zimbabwe, make much more use of the documents than others. This could be because of the presence in country offices of key resource persons who know the documents.

256. Some of the following constraints to uptake of normative documents for transition should be highlighted: (i) uptake may depend on the presence of staff who used to work at headquarters and are more aware of the normative products that are available; (ii) knowledge is severely constrained in field offices compared to the central office; (iii) coordination clusters are not always used to disseminate available normative documents; (iv) the fact that most documents are available only in the English language is a barrier in non-Anglophone countries; (v) it was mentioned that the fact that the documents were originated at headquarters makes them sound too theoretical or “representing headquarters’ thinking”; (vi) in general, there is not much evidence of any systematic consultation process during the development of guidelines and normative documents, nor is it clear whether country offices are required to provide feedback on the way they have used them.

257. Very little corporate normative work was used or shared by FAO in the L3 response in the Philippines. However, there was familiarity with some normative products. FAO operational staff was not familiar with normative documents that guide emergency work (e.g. LEGS, seeds in emergencies), although it was not possible to ascertain if this was the case at all levels. This may have impaired the ability to engage critically with the government on transition-related needs assessment and programme design.

258. The *Guidance Note* series and *Livelihood Assessment Toolkit (LAT)* are two examples of guidance documents produced by TCE. The former are listed by TCE among the actions to

implement the *Transformative Agenda* (see Section 3.1.4). The basic idea behind the series was to familiarise FAO staff with key concepts and serve as introduction for new staff. They were to be part of a briefing package, a “policy primer” series. However there is some ambiguity about their nature, with some confusion on whether they were policy or operational documents.

259. The best known documents of the series are the *Guidance Note on Transitional Programming* and the one on *Cash-Based Transfers*, though neither has been much in use in country offices. The publication *Resilient Livelihoods* has been much in demand. It was translated in the four official languages and sent to country, regional and sub-regional offices. Other documents produced by TCE that were translated and properly disseminated resulting in good uptake are the *LAT* and the *Cluster Coordination Guidelines*. The *Assessment and Programme Formulation Guidelines for Agriculture in Emergencies* are an example of a tool that was developed in relative isolation and without a dissemination strategy or a specific audience in mind. This seems to have resulted in weak uptake, according to the survey. However, it seems to be considered a useful document when it does reach country offices.

Suggested Action 13:

A consistent and articulated communication and dissemination strategy regarding normative documents, including through a user-friendly online repository, possibly open to external audiences, would facilitate access to them by country, regional and sub-regional offices and their application in crisis or post-crisis situations

Suggested Action 14:

Greater involvement of country, regional, sub-regional offices in planning and developing guidelines, strategic documents and reviews of good practices on transition would ensure better suitability of those normative products to the needs of the end users, while ensuring at the same time feedback on their use, generating lessons learnt and an improvement of their quality.

4.7.2 Technical qualifications of FAO staff

Findings:

- While technical competencies of FAO’s staff employed in countries with crises may be right to fulfil immediate tasks in FAO’s projects, the availability of the “right” competencies for transition differs significantly among the countries visited. The technical capacity of FAO decentralized offices is relatively weak and depends on their access to financial resources and technical resources not necessarily immediately available. No country office visited had staff with competencies in conflict analysis or land tenure, for example, and limited skills were found in social analysis, political economy analysis, disaster risk reduction and crisis prevention, which are of the utmost importance for transition in crisis contexts. Communication skills and strategic planning capacity also vary from country to country and are rarely sufficient to promote an integrated approach to transition.
- There are limits on FAO in-house technical personnel that can be immediately mobilized to face

sudden emergencies.

- An important difficulty to meet technical requirements during the design phase of transitional activities is that FAO needs to have already approved and funded projects to recruit technical personnel. In addition, technical staff recruited to provide immediate assistance for transitional activities usually have contracts of limited duration, as projects are often of a short duration. Thus a major constraint on technical qualifications of FAO in transitional situations is high staff turnover.
- Highly specialised FAO technical staff tend to focus only on technical aspects of their work, when analysis of the social, economic or political aspects may be indispensable for success in crisis-related contexts.

260. This section examines whether FAO's technical contribution, as derived from its own competencies and mandates, effectively relates to a transition agenda, and whether FAO officers – at all levels and locations – support the transition process with the necessary competencies. When working in crisis or post-crisis situations, FAO officers need to complement their technical competencies (in agriculture, livestock, fisheries, forest and natural resource management, food security), with other qualifications that do not necessarily belong to their professional qualification. Working in countries in protracted crisis, post-conflict situations and fragile states and major national calamities requires competencies in areas such as disaster risk reduction, crisis prevention, conflict analysis and conflict sensitiveness, social analysis, and political economy analysis that are needed so that an integrated approach to programming in those difficult circumstances can be undertaken. In addition, a dialogue with stakeholders, actual/potential beneficiaries, and affected population, is a basic requirement, which needs proper communication skills.

261. Information from the meta-analysis on the nature of technical support provided by FAO in crisis-response situations can be integrated with findings from consultations held in country missions or meetings with FAO technical staff in central and decentralized locations in the framework of the current evaluation.

262. The overall situation regarding technical competencies at the country level can be summarized as follows:

- (a) The availability of the “right” competencies for transition differs significantly among the countries visited with field level missions. The West Bank and Gaza Strip office generally appears to have right competencies to address transition; the Philippines office was able to mobilize competencies on a short notice to address pressing needs for a sound transitional programming with a short and medium term horizon; and the Uganda office was able to adapt its competencies over time to a number of transitional requirements, e.g. disaster risk reduction and adaptation to climate change. On the whole, performance of FAO staff in the field was appreciated as good or satisfactory also from the resource partners' perspective in Uganda, DRC and Mali, while complaints focused on administrative issues due to cumbersome procedures. The Liberia office was mostly concentrated on its traditional core competencies focused on crop management and veterinarian support, while the Mali and DRC offices were building up competencies related to resilience, but some basic transitional competencies are still lacking.
- (b) None of the country offices visited seems to have currently any staff with competencies on conflict analysis and related areas (with a possible exception of West Bank and Gaza Strip), whereas there are only few competencies related to land tenure found in Uganda, where FAO is leading a platform on this theme within the UNCT. In DRC, FAO lacks competencies in tenure issues, which has been taken over by UN-Habitat, also in rural areas. Several country

offices managed to complement – to some extent – their competencies in conflict analysis by cooperating with other institutions, for instance with international NGOs in Uganda and Mali, and with other UN agencies in the DRC. Joint projects with other UN agencies are used in some cases to combine different competencies. Overall, it was observed that highly specialised FAO technical officers tend to focus only on technical aspects of their work, giving inadequate attention to social, economic and political implications of their technical work.

- (c) The greatest difficulties met in mobilizing technical competencies in FAO country offices and meet urgent requests, especially in the design stage of transition, is the fact that FAO does not have a “core group of technical staff” in-country funded with core budget resources. FAO needs to have specific projects already formulated and funded with extra-budgetary resources that allow for recruitment of such a technical personnel. That makes FAO’s technical presence to provide immediate response to any request for transition somehow dependent on availability of external funding even at the early stages, although modest amounts of emergency funding can be made available even on a short notice through SFERA and TCP. Limited support is available from multidisciplinary teams at regional or sub-regional levels or from technical people in headquarters technical divisions. As a technical agency, FAO can mobilise highly quality technical staff to become available at the country level, but only after it has developed and funded specific projects. This is a major constraint, especially after rapid onset emergencies. In protracted crises, however, FAO may work out solution to mobilize competencies with more flexibility.
- (d) Another constraint in transitional situations is the high staff turnover resulting from short-term funding of many of those activities. The West Bank and Gaza Strip office shows a 50% staff turnover since 2010, and DRC has lost a high number of staff in the East. Only in Uganda, where the transition process was smooth and spread over a certain time, the office did not seem to have suffered major staff losses.⁹⁰

263. Several recent evaluations have pointed out the possibility of using project technical staff as part of FAO’s overall technical network. In general, the extent of available expertise at a regional level at any given moment is not known. An exception to this is REOA, which was able to map more than 350 experts available in the region, and its subregional strategy document mentions that a knowledge network is under development. It was observed that under the threat of a crisis, donors will generally allow FAO to use technical expertise available on their projects in other countries for the response. In the case of CAR for example, FAO brought in national staff from other countries under the Level 3 protocol, raising their status from national to international staff for the time of the emergency. This also had the advantage that it was a major boost for these competent individuals.

264. The contribution of technical staff from regional or sub-regional offices to complement country offices competencies is an important option, but is not really producing, so far, the expected results, since the demands from country offices can be met by regional or sub-regional offices only to a limited extent. An exception was somehow found in the Philippines, where RAP could contribute to the L-3 response by quickly mobilizing several technical staffs who not only had the required technical competencies but also had the required contextual knowledge. As already observed in section 4.1.6, however, that circumstance may also be due to specific conditions not necessarily replicable to other situations very easily. Indeed, such an experience could not be acknowledged in any other case studies in fragile or poorer situations visited as part of this evaluation, where severe constraints in technical capacities available in the countries were found.

⁹⁰ Some of the “lost” staff may have been recruited, after the end of their contract with FAO, by such as by international NGOs (DRC) or other UN agencies (West Bank and Gaza Strip). More secure working conditions in other UN agencies and higher salaries with international NGOs have been reported as reasons for FAO project staff not to continue with the Organization and look for a change in employment.

A few examples of good practice in technology for transition

- (i) **Seed multiplication.** In Liberia, response to high demand for seeds due to reintegration of conflict affected populations, relied on collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture through a rapid seed multiplication initiative articulated in several projects and selected farmer groups, establishing various seed multiplication sites. Production of high quality seeds from a national research laboratory was supported by a seed bank, making use of NERICA varieties of seeds, locally adapted. FAO provided foundation seeds. Local cooperatives received equipment (motorized rice mill, etc.). A payback mechanism allowed provision of seeds to the Ministry for their use in other projects. Success achieved brought to revitalization of the seed chain in Liberia, which is now self-sufficient in certified rice seed production.
- (ii) **Integrated Pest Management (IPM).** Post-conflict FAO interventions in Liberia focused on input distribution for crop production and, from 2006, increased focus on IPM with specific training for extension agents. The 2009 massive pest infection called for a major support from FAO experts and special IPM training and complementary tools were delivered. In the DRC, FAO focused on the dissemination of cassava varieties tolerant to the mosaic virus to many areas in Central Africa and provision of information/training. Current attention is on cassava brown streak virus disease and banana bacterial wilt.⁹¹ Information on plant pests and diseases has been widely disseminated by the Food Security Cluster. The sub-office in eastern DRC is actively sharing experiences across borders with the Great Lakes Region, with workshops in Uganda.
- (iii) **Enhanced veterinary services.** Within the “Integrated National Action Plan for Avian and Human Influenza” – prepared by the Government, FAO and OIE⁹² – FAO supported the rehabilitation of the “Central Veterinary Laboratory” in Liberia in 2008 to increase diagnostic and reporting capacity of veterinary services on animal diseases, and provide livestock owners with advice on better husbandry practices. Technical support was provided by the “Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases” (ECTAD) in Bamako, Mali. A basic network of livestock officers and veterinary technicians was established to conduct epidemiological surveillance and provide livestock and poultry advisory services in 15 counties, focusing on possible outbreak of avian influenza in neighbouring countries, and providing a roadmap for preparation for, and prevention of transboundary animal diseases. FAO, in collaboration with OIE in Bamako and AU/IBAR,⁹³ supported ECTAD also to assist 23 countries (15 in West Africa and 8 in Central Africa), with funding from Sweden, Canada, France and USAID. The regional network was recently reduced. Current activities focus on Cape Verde (swine pest and horse pest) and Togo (policy document known as “Cadre Stratégique Elevage”), as well as support to a USAID-funded “IDENTIFY” project in Congo basin on pandemic diseases.

265. Country offices have attempted to overcome constraints to their limited technical competencies by outsourcing some of these responsibilities to external organizations with broader in-depth experience in some of those specific areas, or have been sub-contracting some of these tasks to implementing partners (e.g. in Uganda) to reduce the workload of implementation responsibilities.

⁹¹ There are no tolerant varieties for banana bacterial wilt it can be controlled through (hygienic) management practices that FAO is disseminating through workshops and brochures.

⁹² The World Organisation for Animal Health

⁹³ African Union / Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources

Suggested Action 15:

The Organization should require all personnel that have major responsibilities in making strategic decisions at the country level relevant for launching, proposing, preparing and approving new initiatives in crisis-prone countries and fragile states or situations that they have proven critical appraisal skills in addition to their traditional technical qualifications, including cross-cutting multidisciplinary professional competencies, great familiarity with the local context, including its political economy and conflict conditions, which would allow to have a strategic approach to the interventions or programmes.

4.7.3 Information systems and data analysis for transition

Findings:

- In most countries visited by the evaluation team, FAO provides support to relevant ministries in data analysis and information systems in several ways. However, that support often appears fragmented and ad-hoc and not part of a strategic plan based on a systematic assessment of information support needs.
- FAO appeared to have been relatively effective in supporting, assembling and analysing relevant information for transition, which were used by international and national partners/institutions, although assessments were mostly confined to short-term needs and requirements.
- The IPC is an important tool for creating consensus among national stakeholders (and an increased level of accountability) in cases of emergencies, as well as indirectly supporting resource mobilization. Furthermore, the IPC serves an important function by encouraging local level coordination around food security issues (stakeholders meeting at the same table at national and sub-national level). Whereas the IPC Acute Scale is useful for humanitarian responses, the IPC Chronic Scale promises to prove useful to inform transition work and the resilience framework, and for medium and long-term decision-making in protracted (food security) crises.
- The Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA), though still quite new, appears to be a relevant tool for assessing resilience at intra-country level and has been used for developing baselines, e.g. in West Bank and Gaza Strip. The weakness is, however, that it cannot be used for comparison across countries and that it requires high quality statistical data.
- FAO has been actively involved in various types of food security, land use and crop and food supply assessments, most often in collaboration with government and other UN agencies in countries visited. There were also cases where FAO's role was less prominent.
- There was no evidence that conflict assessments had been carried out in the visited countries despite the prevalence of conflicts, in line with the findings regarding the CPFs.
- Overall, FAO was found better organized and equipped around post-*disaster* needs assessments than post-*conflict* needs assessments.

266. FAO is actively involved in information system and data analysis, both at the global and the national level and often in providing support to countries in strengthening their analytical capacity. Information is key for any and all types of development assistance and emergency aid, and some of the information systems which FAO supports are particularly useful in assessing the progress and evolution of food insecurity and vulnerability in crisis-

related situations. Some are also useful to provide early warning of impending slow-onset food security crises and food chain crises (including plant and animal pests and diseases). Also, these systems and tools are often key to monitoring the progress of a crisis situation in order to be able to better respond with the range of short, medium and long-term interventions available. In most of the countries visited during the mission, FAO provided direct support to various types of national information systems.

(A) The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification System (IPC)

267. IPC is a set of analytical tools and processes to analyse and classify a food security situation, based mainly on processing a wide range of secondary data, greatly contributing to the analysis called for above. It is global and multi-partner initiative which informs food security policy and programming. It is also a forum involving different stakeholders that conduct joint food security analysis to reach technical consensus on the nature and severity of food insecurity at the country level. A specific feature of IPC is the use of a common standardised scale for severity classification and early warning, which enables comparability of results from place to place and over time. As such, it represents a good basis (even if not the only one) to assist decision makers on matters of food insecurity in both emergency and development contexts.

268. IPC distinguishes between acute and chronic food insecurity. The *Acute Food Insecurity Scale* takes a ‘snapshot’ of gaps in the quantity of food intake, livelihood changes, and levels of wasting and mortality, identifying levels of severity that threaten lives and/or livelihoods. As such, it informs only short-term strategies and objectives. While it may be very useful as a basis for immediate humanitarian response, it is less relevant for the transition process, as it neglects causal relationships and context specificity.

269. The IPC is currently rolling out the new *Chronic Food Insecurity Scale* (CFI). This scale captures a state of food insecurity that persists due to structural causes. It is a notion that informs medium and long-term strategic objectives, such as resilience building and promotion of relief to rehabilitation, recovery and development. Four different levels are identified: 1) minimal/none; 2) mild; 3) moderate; and 4) severe.

270. Moreover, a new nutrition classification system is being piloted, linking it to the acute and chronic scales. While the Acute Scale gives an idea of severity, the chronic pays more attention to quality of food, and it includes nutrition indicators and vulnerability elements (such as the poverty line). The Chronic Scale can also provide a baseline and as such will be particularly useful to inform the Resilience Framework and medium and long-term decision-making in protracted (food security) crises. The approach adopted by IPC is that the two types of scales (Acute and Chronic) are to be used simultaneously by decision-makers. The introduction of CFI is still at a pilot level and it makes IPC more suitable to inform both crisis mitigation and prevention as well as structural and developmental policies and programmes.

271. At the country level, the uptake and use of IPC analysis in emergency and development policy and programming requires a strong involvement and significant capacity development by the decision-makers that are expected to make use of IPC for practical purposes.

272. The evaluation team could verify through its country missions the application of IPC in different countries, where often the IPC has been appreciated (e.g. in Kenya) as a useful tool “to raise the flag” in case of acute cases of food insecurity. Even if appreciated, some stakeholders criticised national IPC (e.g. in Uganda) since it provides information at too a

high level, not covering district and sub-national data. In that case, it is not regarded as a useful tool for programming.⁹⁴

273. In the Philippines, IPC has been institutionalized as an assessment tool, although the government does not use it as a decision-making tool. IPC is not implemented in West Bank and Gaza Strip, where FAO partners did not find the tool suitable for urban settings, although the introduction of the CFI scale may become relevant in that context. In Mali, instead of the IPC the “Cadre Harmonisé (CH)” is applied, which adopts a similar classification system.

274. The IPC constitutes the current major contribution of FAO in DRC in support to information and data analysis, although donors are currently reluctant to fund it. Introduced in 2007, the analysis is conducted twice a year at provincial and national level. Its use is considered very important for advocacy purpose (getting attention on humanitarian crisis) and resource mobilization⁹⁵. However, the IPC has not been taken up by the DRC government, and lack of government’s commitment creates problems for its sustainability. DRC has been included among the pilot countries for the roll-out of the IPC Chronic Scale.

275. IPC is limited to a situational analysis of food insecurity and does not usually include a response analysis, purposely to remain neutral. Therefore, it needs to be complemented with other analytical exercises in order to support programming of a transition from relief to development, which calls for a comparative analysis of different options that address acute and chronic phases of food insecurity. In Uganda and Tanzania, however, the IPC has been used including also a response analysis.

(B) Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA)

276. The RIMA is an econometric tool used to compare across different livelihood groups within a country; the tool cannot be applied for comparison across countries. The tool was developed in relation to the work on protracted crisis in FAO’s Agricultural Development Economics Division (ESA). The RIMA is based on the following parameters (resilience index): Income and Food Access; Access to Public Services; Adaptive Capacity; Assets; Social Safety Nets; and Stability. The tool requires statistically sound primary data. A number of donors (e.g. the World Bank), and also regional organizations (e.g. CILSS and IGAD) have adopted the tool.

277. FAO has applied RIMA in a number of countries to create a baseline, e.g. West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Somalia. The West Bank and Gaza Strip Baseline Study is currently under preparation, and applies the resilience analysis tool for various groups (urban/peri-urban; mixed farming and herding livelihoods; farming livelihoods, herding livelihoods) as a basis for targeting beneficiaries.

(C) Multi-cluster Sectorial Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) and DALA/PDNA

278. The country case study of the Philippines in the context of the L3 response offered the opportunity to review various types of emergency-related assessments. Immediately after the Haiyan Typhoon in the Philippines, a *Multi-cluster Sectorial Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA I)* was conducted at community level. The purpose was to establish an evidence base of the impact of the Typhoon. The MIRA was led by WFP at the technical level and OCHA as

⁹⁴ A Karamoja IPC was introduced with district-level data, which is regarded as a useful tool for programming.

⁹⁵ The Belgium Food Security Fund used several cycles of the IPC to identify regions that have been the most food insecure over time for targeting purposes.

coordinator; 40 agencies participated in the assessment. FAO contributed to the design of a questionnaire, and the analysis and reporting in relation to food security, agriculture and fisheries. As a follow-up a *Multi-cluster Needs Assessment (MNA)*, also referred to as MIRA II, was carried out at household level in December 2013. FAO was again involved in the design of the questionnaire and also collaborated with regard to data analysis and reporting. This is the first time that MIRA⁹⁶ has been applied in a two-phased approach, including also collection of data at household level.

279. The country case of the Philippines offered also the opportunity of reviewing FAO's contribution to the "Damage and Loss Assessment" (DALA). FAO provided input to DALA in the form of analysis of basic information on agriculture and prepared thematic maps (using GIS) of the affected areas (agriculture-specific maps, e.g. coconut, fishery, agro-ecological maps). FAO also contributed to the "*Post-Disaster Needs Assessment*" (PDNA) conducted by the government with support from the World Bank, providing an input on the agricultural sector and policy recommendations, through a highly participatory process with regional consultations and surveys at municipality level.

280. Overall, in a very difficult situation like the aftermath of the Haiyan Typhoon, with the problem of accessibility in the affected areas, assessments of loss and damages of reasonable quality data (despite some shortcomings) were conducted and FAO's contribution (particularly with regard to the MIRAs) was recognized.

(D) Food security analysis, land use and crop assessments

281. In all countries visited, FAO has been involved in various types of food security, land use and crop assessments. The food security and the crop assessments were often conducted in collaboration with WFP.

282. In Uganda, two assessments have been recently conducted in Karamoja (a drought assessment in 2013 and a food security assessment in 2014). In Northern Uganda, a study of land access in the conflict-affected areas (Land Access and Land Use Mapping in Northern Uganda) was conducted by the Emergency Unit of FAO-Uganda in 2006 in collaboration with the WFP VAM Unit.

283. In West Bank and Gaza Strip, FAO has been actively involved in the preparation of a widely used survey, the Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey (SEFSEC), supported by FAO's ESA Division.

284. In Liberia, a comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey (CFSNS) was carried out in 2006. FAO provided financial support, although substantive contribution came from WFP and UNICEF, and not FAO. Various interviews in the mission highlighted the need to intensify FAO's support to data collection and analysis in the Ministry of Agriculture.

⁹⁶ See *Operational Peer Review*, 3 February 2014, p. 14

Suggested Action 16:

The Organization should promote needs assessments of government food security information systems of relevant ministries in countries in crisis and post-crisis situations as bases for FAO's support to information for crisis contexts (and transition).

Suggested Action 17:

The Organization should enhance corporate capacity for conducting post-disaster and post-conflict needs assessments as a tool for better design of transition processes, in particular at country level, especially in countries in protracted crises and fragile states or situations.

4.7.4 *Capacity Development*

Findings:

- Capacity development does not appear prominent in FAO's work in crisis- or post-crisis contexts even though it is one of its Core Functions. It is mostly limited to individual training, except a few cases where organizational capacity development is promoted. Capacity development in transitional activities was too often limited to short-term technical training, not sufficient to ensure sustainability, although it was very relevant.
- Lack of an overall framework for capacity development was often claimed as a key constraint, which may have been overcome if FAO's Corporate Capacity Development Strategy had been adapted to the country within the CPF. There was little awareness of how to programme capacity development initiatives of overall relevance in difficult circumstances.
- Farmer Field Schools (FFS) and Pastoralist Field Schools (PFS) are part of a successful capacity development methodology promoted by FAO and implemented as a complement to emergency operations. It is highly appreciated by recipient countries.

285. In countries in complex emergencies and protracted crisis, there are specific challenges to longer-term capacity development, including the difficulties generated by fragile institutions, prevailing instability and chronic structural problems, associated with the prolonged consequences of the crisis on vulnerable people. Is FAO, with its activities, providing the right response to the need for capacity development in those crisis situations?

286. FAO's activities in crisis-related contexts can affect capacity and its development, and this makes a difference in terms of ability of affected institutions, communities or persons to improve livelihoods and break the vicious circle that slows achievement of resilience. In this section, focus is on "*whose capacities*" will be affected by transitional activities in order to ensure a long term improvement of livelihoods as condition to build resilience.

287. Reviewing past country evaluations, one finds that in rehabilitation initiatives linked to emergency, the time horizon was too short to allow growth of capacity and impact was necessarily limited. Capacity development in transitional activities was too often limited to short-term technical training, not sufficient to ensure sustainability. Several past evaluations

confirm that, in general, FAO has focused its capacity development efforts in the area of policy development. Lack of an overall framework for capacity development was often claimed in past evaluations as key constraint to capacity development, which may have been overcome if the overall FAO corporate strategy for capacity development had been adapted in the country within the CPF, to be aligned with a broader UN-wide approach to capacity development.

288. Past evaluations seem to suggest that FAO may have neglected capacity development in emergency conditions on the assumption that development initiatives (and capacity development efforts are considered long-term development initiatives) demand stable conditions that are not met in crisis or fragile states. Moreover, the available funding, linked to short-term financing, was preventing the launch of any long perspective approach to capacity development and initiatives had to be limited to some short-term training, often uncoordinated and not linked to a coherent programme of ambitious capacity development strategy.

289. The alternative position would be that what is required in crisis or post-crisis situations is a more intensive efforts through development interventions that however should adopt a different approach, more influenced by some concerns of humanitarian assistance, e.g. by giving more attention to vulnerability, while pursuing their overall long-term goals.⁹⁷ The question is not how to extend short-term interventions of capacity development to have a longer duration, but rather how to programme development initiatives in difficult circumstances since the earliest stages, so that a comprehensive training programme could be designed at the earliest stages, even if implemented at different steps, but with an overall dimension of skill requirements of the most vulnerable populations that are going to attend the training sessions. Such a programme would require a significant revision of the way capacity development is often conceived, not limited to “one-off” training engagement,⁹⁸ which relies excessively on the effectiveness of one-time transfer of skills, which would take place through short training sessions.

290. The FAO Corporate Strategy on Capacity Development provides the basis for a better approach to capacity development, going beyond the notion of capacity building linked exclusively to training activities, stating instead that “capacity development” has the three interlinked dimensions: 1) individual, 2) organizational and 3) enabling environment.

291. The evaluation team has assessed, through the information gathered on country missions and consultations with headquarters and regional offices, the extent to which FAO is already making progress in promoting capacity development in situations of protracted crisis and complex emergencies. For all six countries visited, the evaluation team observed that capacity development interventions focused mainly on the individual dimension (training), whereas very limited was the focus on the organizational dimension (with the exception of Uganda), and hardly any effort focused on the third dimension of ‘enabling environment for capacity development,’ with the exception of West Bank and Gaza Strip. This is in line with the findings of the 2010 Evaluation of Capacity Development in Africa already quoted. In a few cases (e.g. West Bank and Gaza Strip and the Philippines) there was a distinction

⁹⁷ See Simon Levine and Irina Mosel, *Supporting resilience in difficult places—A critical look at applying the “resilience” concept in countries where crises are the norm*, HPG, ODI, March 2014, and Irina Mosel and Simon Levin, *Remaking the case for ‘linking relief, rehabilitation and development – How LRRD can become a practically useful concept for assistance in difficult places* HPG, ODI, March 2014.

⁹⁸ See Irina Mosel and Simon Levin, op. cit. page 15.

between capacity development interventions related to emergency projects and capacity development interventions related to development projects. It was reported by stakeholders that capacity development interventions tend to focus on the needs of FAO programmes and projects rather than on the needs of the country or the government. Moreover, achievements in capacity development are often undermined by the short-term duration of the interventions, not producing lasting effects.

292. FAO implemented several training initiatives in Liberia, including training-of-trainers, and work with re-integration of ex-combatants. The long term impact of this training could not be verified. In any case, trained ex-combatants in producing farming tools and agro-processing machines did not produce lasting impact as beneficiaries moved to urban centres. Major causes for this ineffectiveness could possibly be faulty design or excessively short duration of project life.

293. The “practical” rule to operative in fragile states or situation, namely “*act fast but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance*” (see box 4), basically suggests that, given the low capacity prevailing in fragile states, and the extreme challenges that they face, engagement should be of longer-duration. The rule suggests that capacity development in core institutions may require at least ten years, while most projects observed in Liberia with training components did not last not even one year.

294. In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, capacity development regarded disaster preparedness, covering either one-year emergency projects or 3-year development projects, national NGOs, and private sector workers. With regard to the *organizational dimension*, capacity development interventions supported the Palestinian National Authority Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) measures and, through regional or global initiatives, various government agencies, NGOs and farming communities on IPM and responsible fisheries in the Eastern Mediterranean.

295. In DRC, capacity development is particularly challenging, due to inadequate initial competence of potential trainees, frequent staff turnover and lack of a conducive environment to apply new capacities. Capacity development of the government mainly seems to take place with regard to the Ministry of Environment for the REDD+ programme. FAO work on capacity development at field/community level was very much appreciated, adopted the FFS approach. Government officials (also at provincial level) have been involved in FAO training and workshops in DRC and abroad on IPC and IPM.

296. In Uganda, the main instruments for capacity development at individual level have been the Farmer Field Schools (FFS) and Agro-Pastoralist Field Schools (APFS). On organizational development, capacity development was provided to the National Agricultural Research Organization in relation to the rehabilitation of cassava production, strengthening animal disease surveillance and diagnostic services; Community Animal Health Workers (CAWs), capacity development in relation to early warning, preparedness, and contingency planning and response system was provided at the district government level.

297. In the Philippines, no capacity development measures were included in the response to the Haiyan Typhoon. Projects prepared for the recovery phase include some capacity development (individual level) in risk assessment and climate resilience and integration of soil conservation with trees in sloping areas. Training will be provided through Climate Smart Field Schools and Farmer Field Schools.

298. In Mali, the capacity development, on the individual dimension, focused on the *Cadre Harmonisé* (the Francophone equivalent of the IPC) and other food security information systems in cooperation with WFP (VAM), seed security assessment methodology for NGOs, project requirements for local NGOs and cash-for-work by the FSC coordinator. Pastoralist Field Schools were not implemented in Mali.

Box 11: The experience of the Farmers Field Schools (FFS) and Pastoralist Field Schools (PFS)

The FFS/PFS promotes a participatory and “learning by doing” approach. FFS/PFS are mainly used as development initiatives. Countries that use them as emergency tools are Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda; Burundi, Congo and Ethiopia.

The experience accumulated with the Farmers Field Schools (FFS) and Pastoralist Field Schools (PFS) provides a useful tool for FAO in transition contexts. In Uganda, FFS and PFS were instrumental in developing capacity at farmer and pastoralist level, flexibly adjusting their modality from emergency to recovery/development. FFS/PFS also proved important for creating social cohesion at intra-community and inter-community level, as well as in terms of enhancing gender equality. In three areas, however, that experience in Uganda was not up to the task: 1) conflict resolution/mitigation (indirect positive side-effect was noticed but was not deliberate); 2) targeting of youth; and 3) land tenure/assessment and conflicts in relation to land. These areas should eventually be covered by the FFS/PFS, adjusting curricula to ensure that implementing partners have these competences in providing their training.

A new Manual for PFS prepared in collaboration with the Belgium VSF and ACTED has just been launched and includes a chapter on conflict management and peace building. However, FFS/PFS have addressed conflict aspects only marginally.

While national FFS/PFS projects in Uganda gave insufficient attention to youth, other projects target youth: Junior Farmer Field Schools (JFFS) have been implemented in conflict situations and refugee camps and targeted HIV/AIDS orphans in Eastern and Central Africa.

Interviewees commented that FFSs also contribute to creating social cohesion at community level (e.g. in DRC), and in general have considerable social impact, including in many cases positive impact on gender equality. However, the problem is that most often the social impacts of the FFS are not documented and are not being monitored as part of the M&E system.

FFS/PFS approach is useful in approaching communities as entry point for sensitive subjects. In conflict-prone situations, the FFS will not be the first type of intervention. However, according to FAO Nairobi, it is useful to rebuild the psychological and human environment. In refugee camps in Kenya, the FFS was able to build social cohesion and trust, as well as develop technical skills. FFS have also proven to be relevant in Mau in Rift Valley, Kenya, highly affected by the post-election violence. According to FAO Nairobi staff, the FFSs helped in healing process and created social cohesion at community level.

There is no consolidated overview of the lessons learnt with FFS/PFS in the documents available.⁹⁹ FFS/PFS has no “home” in FAO headquarters but crosses among different divisions. There is limited collaboration with regard to FFS between divisions. The FFS/PFSs at country-level are managed and implemented by NGOs and it is not possible to get a complete overview of their implementation and effectiveness. It would be useful to FAO to carry out such an overview or evaluation of the role of the FFS concept in crisis-related transition.

⁹⁹ One exception is *Farmer Field Schools in Emergency, Preparedness and Pastoral Settings. Lessons Learned and Strategy Recommendations*. 2009. FAO Nairobi/EU.

Suggested Action 18:

Capacity development is instrumental to build resilience in crisis and post-crisis situations. FAO should consider formulating all-inclusive country-level plans for capacity development in crisis and post-crisis situations, using a comprehensive approach to programming enhancement of national capacities and competencies at individual, community, institutional and societal level. Among the tools which could be used, prominence should continue to be given to the Farmer Field School approach, supporting national structures and strengthening decentralized and peripheral institutions and organizations at the community, district and provincial level in full participation and dialogue with national beneficiaries and international partners.

4.8 *Partnerships in transition contexts*

4.8.1 *Partnerships in FAO*

Findings:

- FAO realizes that leadership in its mandated areas in crisis or post-crisis situations requires mobilization of knowledge and capacities that are not necessarily always within the Organization. This requires the establishment of partnerships and alliances with all types of different organizations, within the UN system, research circles, government and public institutions, civil society organizations, NGOs and private sector, inter-governmental and regional entities, to collaborate for a common purpose.

299. This section will assess the extent to which FAO establishes relevant partnerships to facilitate progress in pursuing its mandates even in crisis contexts. Partnerships and alliances represent one of the eight core functions of FAO, as its leadership in international governance of agriculture and agricultural development matters requires mobilization of the pertinent best knowledge and capacities that do not reside only in FAO.

300. In the course of the past years, FAO has developed a number basic strategic documents to guide its work and efforts in enhancing partnerships and building strong alliances (including FAOs Organization-wide Partnership Strategy,¹⁰⁰ FAOs Strategy for Partnerships with Civil Society,¹⁰¹ FAOs Strategy for Partnerships with the Private Sector,¹⁰² Directions for Collaboration among the Rome-based Agencies),¹⁰³ identifying potential areas of collaboration (policy dialogue, normative work, technical and field programmes, advocacy and communication, joint use and mobilization of resources and knowledge sharing.

¹⁰⁰ http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/corp_partnership/docs/stratbrochure_en_web.pdf

¹⁰¹ <http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3443e/i3443e.pdf>

¹⁰² <http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3444e/i3444e.pdf>

¹⁰³ <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/017/k5809e.pdf>

4.8.2 *Partnering with the government: evidence from country case studies and consultations with multiple stakeholders*

Findings:

- FAO has traditionally and by constitution maintained close partnerships with government institutions. High levels of trust between FAO and national governments at times gave FAO a unique position in influencing policy and negotiating on behalf of the UN Country Team and other development partners, even in difficult crisis-related contexts. When conditions improve, this prolonged presence of FAO gave it a special comparative advantage, which is often positive to promote a transition process. However, in conflict-related contexts that close relationship to governments may be problematic, running the risk of compromising the application of the Humanitarian Principles of humanity and neutrality toward vulnerable populations.

301. Given the nature of FAO as an inter-governmental organization, special attention has traditionally been paid to FAO's partnerships with government institutions. FAO's partnership with the national government, and the high levels of trust that national governments give to FAO, uniquely position the Organization in playing an effective role in influencing policy and negotiating on behalf of the UN Country Team and sometimes the donor community, in often difficult crisis-related contexts. This was the case in a few controversial circumstances like Myanmar, where FAO has kept relationships with the Ministry of Agriculture in past years while other UN agencies had their operations temporarily closed. When conditions improve, this prolonged presence of FAO gives it a special comparative advantage compared with other development partners, which may often be positive to promote a transition process.

302. However, in crisis-related contexts that include internal conflict, that close relationship to governments may become problematic. In those conditions, decisions and priorities of the government might be influenced by specific interests supported by state institutions, not necessarily aligned to the needs of the most affected populations. If this is the case, FAO could face a situation where Humanitarian Principles of humanity and neutrality are bypassed, which may have negative consequences on the transition phase. This can be true especially when a crisis might be unravelling and longer-term objectives may require addressing the root causes of the conflicts. Case in point is the humanitarian crisis in Syria, which the UN (but not FAO) declared Level 3 emergency, where FAO faces the hard challenge of negotiating a tough political hurdle of ensuring access to its humanitarian response by affected populations across both sides of the political divide of the ongoing conflict, or otherwise compromise its reputational risk by ignoring basic humanitarian principles.

303. In Gaza FAO's partnership with both the Israeli government and Hamas plays a pivotal role in facilitating the export of high value crops from the Gaza strip. Informally FAO is also advocating with the Israeli government the extension of fishing limits beyond the 6 nautical miles limit presently imposed by the Israelis on Palestinian fishermen. This high-level access to policy and decision makers served an effective role in supporting transition efforts within those difficult crisis-related contexts.

304. In the Philippines, where the policy space was primarily occupied by the Government during the typhoon Haiyan response, FAO's close long-standing partnership with the

government, based on mutual respect, allowed the Organization to play a more effective role in the response. Working groups on Coconut and Fisheries, set up under the Food Security and Agricultural cluster during the L3 emergency response (co-led by FAO and WFP), assisted in communicating policies around quality standards and were considered important FAO inputs to the promotion of the transitional phase launched during the response phase.

4.8.3 Partnering with UN agencies, regional and sub-regional institutions and international development partners

Findings:

- Partnerships with UN agencies were frequent in countries in crisis, especially with WFP and UNICEF. In Africa they focus on joint positions on resilience. Other UN partners are UNDP, ILO, IFAD, and UNEP, *inter alia*. Rivalries and competition too are frequent. Another opportunity for partnership includes that with UNHCR around Durable Solutions, where FAO is well positioned to contribute to land tenure dimensions of UNHCR's work with IDPs and Returnees.
- Partnerships with regional bodies were found to be more visible and well defined when FAO plays the role of a key partner.

305. When looking at the African context which the evaluation focused on, partnerships with UN agencies are increasingly around the conceptualization and operationalizing of the Resilience Agenda. This includes partnerships with WFP, and UNICEF increasingly work together on joint programming. In Somalia and Uganda a common resilience strategy was developed with WFP and UNICEF, and a similar strategy is being developed in Ethiopia. This partnership is rooted in the common underlying food security and nutrition agenda shared by the three UN agencies.

306. In some countries visited for this evaluation, tension and competitiveness between FAO and some of the UN agencies was highlighted, mostly due to rivalry in resource mobilization or possible competition in FAO-mandated areas, where FAO feels it has specific comparative advantages. When these tensions appear, they reduced the potential for partnerships and collaboration.

307. On the other hand, country missions also allowed verifying several occasions where FAO collaborated with other UN agencies in joint initiatives and parallel harmonized programmes. Interaction between FAO and WFP and mutual understanding for harmonized interventions were frequent. The same applies to several initiatives with UNDP and, to a lesser extent, to UNEP and IFAD, *inter alia*.

308. Partnerships with regional bodies were found to be more visible and well defined with regional and intergovernmental platforms, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in East Africa, with whom FAO is a key partner in the platform known as IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI). Other regional resilience initiatives in which FAO represents a strategic partner include AGIR (Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative - for the Sahel and West Africa) and SHARE (Supporting the Horn of Africa's Resilience – for the Horn). These regional initiatives work to bring

together regional institutions and national governments to set up resilience action plans at country level but also at regional levels. FAO partnership with these initiatives and platforms is visible and appreciated by most stakeholders.

309. Opportunities for increased partnerships with donor institutions exist at both the global and country levels, and there is significant scope for capitalizing on these partnership opportunities for greater impact and achievement of FAO's strategic objectives. These include a partnership with some of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund being set up by the World Bank for example for Somalia and for DRR programming across Africa in which the World Bank has expressed an interest on capitalizing on FAO's comparative advantages, developing closer working relationships with the organization.

310. Other opportunities for partnership include a partnership with UNHCR around Durable Solutions, where FAO is well positioned to contribute to the land tenure dimensions of UNHCR's work with IDPs and Returnees. Partnerships with UNDP and the IASC have also evolved out of the participation of FAO in a number of cross-agency platforms and have contributed to FAO's own learning and effectiveness in furthering the transition agenda in crisis-related contexts.

4.8.4 *Partnerships with Civil Society*

Findings:

- In spite of great progress at the global level in FAO's efforts to partner with civil society, at the national level, FAO's engagement with the civil society has not yet played a key role in responding to crisis and post-crisis situations. In occasional cases, relationships with some CSOs are discouraged by the national government.
- Partnerships of FAO with civil society in emergencies at the country level are predominantly with NGOs and are predominantly for service delivery as implementing partners of FAO's activities, not really a true partnership, which could use the unique position of the local NGOs for their knowledge of local conditions. Nonetheless, in some cases, FAO has direct and non-contractual relationships with NGOs and CSOs, e.g. in the context of the Clusters.
- In many cases, FAO has more limited engagement with local NGOs and CBOs as compared with other UN agencies, although use of local NGOs as implementing partners of FAO projects is frequent in emergency operations, and often essential in areas where security constraints are severe.

311. Partnerships with civil society at the country level are predominantly with NGOs (both national and international) and less so with academic institutions, unions, cooperatives, associations, clubs or other informal institutions such as community-based organizations that are representative of the civil society.

312. Common throughout the countries visited were partnerships with national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs and INGOs) making use of the Letters of Agreement (LoAs), which could more accurately be described as service delivery agreements, as Implementing Partners (IPs). This approach is a great limitation in the way FAO interacts with NGOs, since it confines them to the delivery of services or implementing a set of interventions prescribed by FAO's programming through detailed Terms of Reference.

313. FAO staff at the country level are also aware of this shortcoming and in some countries such as West Bank/Gaza, the country office is actively working to develop 'true partnerships' with national and international NGOs operating in that territory beyond a solely financial relationship. True partnerships with NGOs and INGOs might also help overcome the challenges of sustainability which has been repeatedly voiced by both FAO and IPs and which stems from the fact that LoAs set the tone of a partnership as one which ends with the end of the LoA.

314. FAO's partnerships with NGOs and INGOs seems to be shaped by the nature of FAO's funding which is predominantly short term in emergency contexts. This short term nature of funding does not allow for a more strategic and long term engagement with (I)NGOs, drawing on synergies between FAO's and partner organisations' programming. Local NGOs, mostly used for service delivery, could play a much more crucial role in conflict contexts where they are more closely linked to communities and have access to areas that may be out of reach for their international or national counterparts. Their knowledge of local conditions can sometimes uniquely position them as a source of information and can help avoid problems, disputes, or establishment of parallel systems.

315. In post-conflict situations new partnerships with community-based organizations (CBOs) and NGOs in areas where conflicts are intensive and crucial but also difficult to establish. A few evaluations show that in some cases FAO has more limited engagement with NGOs and CBOs, such as farmer organizations compared with other UN agencies, partly because of restrictions imposed by central/provincial/district authorities (e.g. in Somalia). However, the country evaluation of Somalia reflects on the example of other UN agencies that have been able to establish broader connections with NGOs and CBOs in spite of being subject to the same restrictions as FAO, and arrives at the conclusion that more efforts are required by FAO representation to undertake the necessary steps to ensure a broader selection of partnerships and promote greater interaction with the civil society in promoting increase support to the most vulnerable groups.

316. Civil society, the state and the private sector each have a role to play in the delivery of agricultural inputs and services, but there is no template as to what these roles should be. Several FAO policy statements emphasize the fundamental role of the private sector. Although the evaluation found evidence of attempts of promoting private enterprises in agriculture, especially in the context of value chain initiatives, little can be said about the overall practical significance of those initiatives.

Suggested Action 19:

The Organization should continue its efforts to expand its collaboration with NGOs, in particular with national NGOs, as a way to expand its options to support the transition process in crisis or post-crisis situations, not only using them as Implementing Partners but also as real partners involved in a dialogue that may favour participatory programming at the country level. This could be particularly useful in conflict or post-conflict situations. FAO should also encourage a better dialogue between CSOs and national governments, in conformity to the approach identified in the new Partnership with Civil Society, making use of its 'moral-suasion' with national authorities.

4.9 *Advocacy for a new approach to transition and resilience*

Findings:

- Concern for advocacy for a new approach to transition and resilience is very present in several initiatives promoted by FAO, especially (but not only) since the adoption of the Reviewed Strategic Framework.
- FAO is trying to advocate for a resilience agenda promoting concepts and interacting with other actors in the international scene in order to promote this new approach to crisis-response, integrating long-term initiatives with short-term concerns from the very start.
- At the country level, FAO's advocacy has been particularly effective as a resource mobilization tool in some cases (e.g. Philippines, Uganda, Somalia), making use of its main catch-phrase: "saving livelihoods."
- With the exception of West Bank and Gaza Strip, Somalia and South Sudan, FAO has not been very pro-active and effective in doing advocacy in a conflict-related situation, avoiding politically sensitive themes even if they are related to the ultimate purpose of the resilience agenda. Not enough attention has been given to the use of advocacy work to focus on key issues for the resilience agenda, including selection criteria, protection of the livelihoods of the most vulnerable populations, land tenure and other themes that are behind conflicts and tensions within the country.

4.9.1 *Advocacy and transition, resilience and recovery*

317. Successful transitions critically depend on the ability to communicate to stakeholders, right at the outset, the importance of thinking and planning long term. FAO has been successful in crafting an advocacy message around 'livelihood savings' that gives a role for recovery activities in the emergency phase and opens up the programming potential for linking relief with development.

318. FAO's comparative advantage when it comes to advocating for transition is the global recognition that the Organization is a key source of technical competency and is perceived as a neutral interlocutor able to play a bridging and facilitating role linking government programmes with relief/development. Because of the quality and professionalism of its technical staff, FAO is seen as a trusted source of information for the media, NGOs and civil society, and this positions the Organization uniquely when it advocates for transition.

319. Concern for advocacy for transition and resilience is very present in several initiatives promoted by FAO, especially since the adoption of the Reviewed Strategic Framework and the corresponding SO-5 on resilience. On various occasions, at the headquarters, regional/subregional and country level, the evaluation team could verify how actively FAO has been trying to advocate for a *resilience agenda* over the latest several years. TCE in particular has been very active in promoting concepts and interacting with other actors in the international scene in order to promote this approach to crisis-response, integrating long-term initiatives with short-term concerns from the very start. Through TCE and FAO liaison offices in Geneva, New York and Brussels, but also through its regional and sub-regional structures (in particular through the work of the REOA "resilience hub" in Nairobi), FAO has been able to call the attention of donors and other UN agencies and non-UN multilateral

organizations to the need for a new approach to emergency response, especially in conditions of protracted crisis in fragile states.

320. Consultations conducted for this evaluation suggest that FAO's work on advocacy in support to transition and resilience, whilst recognized worldwide, is nonetheless fragmented and piecemeal and grounded in specific aspects that define the technical work of the Organization on transition. The main challenge that FAO faces in this domain is therefore its ability to do advocacy in an integrated way.

321. FAO's advocacy work in the field of resilience and recovery comes across visibly in the FAO-inspired "*Dare to prepare*" report recently produced by ODI which addresses issues related to financing of capacity development for emergency preparedness at the country level. That report documented how international support for country preparedness has typically been piecemeal, at project level, and ad hoc, in part due to a plethora of funding streams that encourages programme fragmentation and discourages comprehensive approaches and joint programming. This analytical work has contributed to the formulation of an IASC/UNDG/ISDR "*Common Framework for Preparedness*", which is expected to be rolled out for the development of joint programmes that are going to be systematically formulated to promote preparedness capacity.

322. The FAO liaison office in Geneva (FAO-LOG) is playing a lead role in the dialogue with donors and partners, contributing significantly in shaping multiple agendas that represent the future of how international agencies will be doing business in relation to the transition agenda, trying to get their support on finding the best way to approach crisis response by integrating long-term with short-term response from the very start.

323. Such contributions of FAO to the work on transition and resilience will undoubtedly be important to support newer and more global initiatives, such as the involvement of FAO in the New Deal for engagement in fragile states, an initiative which recognizes that the current ways of working in fragile states and situations need serious improvement.¹⁰⁴

324. Other platforms where FAO is actively pursuing and advocating for transition related issues include: the work being led by UNCHR on rethinking *Durable Solutions*, the *Geneva Peacebuilding platform* whose work will impact and shape the Peacebuilding architecture over the coming years. FAO is contributing to articulating the nexus between food security, conflict and natural disasters, with likely repercussions for the work that FAO is doing under the CFS Agenda for Action for Addressing Food Security in Protracted Crisis.

4.9.2 *A regional and country perspective*

325. FAO's advocacy efforts in transition-related issues is also evident at the *regional level* where, for example, REOA is using evidence from its work in nutrition to advocate on platforms such as SUN (Scaling Up Nutrition) and REACH (Renewed Efforts Against Child Hunger and under nutrition), where FAO is one of the UN partners. Through these platforms FAO is pushing the agenda of nutrition in agriculture, shifting donors' funding interests towards nutrition-sensitive agriculture.

¹⁰⁴ FAO is already present in the New Deal, working on '*Transition related issues*' as these might relate to food security, agriculture fisheries, and forestry in countries such as DRC, Afghanistan, South Sudan and Pakistan – countries that have signed up to the 'New Deal'.

326. In Africa FAO is among the leading agencies advocating for the resilience agenda and driving it forward. The contribution of FAO heavyweights and thinkers at both regional and global fora is helping to shape how and where the resilience agenda is being realized at the country levels. FAO REOA is a leading member of the technical working group on resilience measurement, established under the Food Security Information Network initiative, the application of the Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA) and the support provided to key regional policy processes (SHARE and AGIR), in particular the experience of the Resilience Analysis Unit in the Horn of Africa.

327. A crucial area where advocacy for transition should have its main focus is through the fundamental message of FAO on the importance of focusing on early interventions in agriculture to enhance livelihoods in rural areas. The communication slogan of FAO is 'saving livelihoods' and around it FAO has developed a long-standing reputation through seed distribution programmes and emergency veterinary interventions that have seized the attention of the humanitarian community including resource partners. When this advocacy message coincides with the analysis and request of the government (Philippines) that message adds weight. At the country level, FAO's advocacy has been particularly effective as a resource mobilization tool in the Philippines.

328. The effectiveness of the over-all advocacy role of FAO on key thematic issues may differ from country to country. In the Philippines, this does not seem to have been clearly defined nor prioritized, as compared with the intent to mobilize resources, although the UN resident coordinator has recognized the important role played by the FAOR as the "transition coordinator". In Uganda, FAO is responsible for leading the work on land tenure and consequently is responsible for advocacy work on that theme, although it was suggested to the evaluation team that FAO is struggling to get traction on this important thematic issue. Advocacy on land issues appears to be high priority also in Liberia, although it is not clear to what extent FAO's advocacy work in that country focuses on that topic.

329. Differently from relief agencies, FAO has a comparative advantage in promoting longer-term solutions to agricultural problems, and its focus is advocating for greater investment in agriculture, beyond free distribution of seeds and tools. In some cases, advocacy messages from FAO make a very strong case to justify the double mandate of FAO, maintaining both an operative and a normative arm that feed each other, even though this message does not always find a receptive audience with the other partners. In Uganda, the CPF priority areas have been used as topics for advocacy work. FAO is concerned for the exclusion of vulnerable people from the benefits of development processes, and focuses on who is left out in humanitarian interventions and development initiatives. However, it was not always possible to find hard evidence of the strength of advocacy work in this direction.

330. FAORs in country offices have repeatedly highlighted in their dialogue with resource partners the contradiction between short-term funding for emergency and a longer time horizon development initiatives. This advocacy message underlines a basic contradiction in promoting longer-term changes with short-term funding. In Liberia, FAO has been very vocal in highlighting the risks for the transition process associated with the end of the big emergency and peacekeeping efforts expected in 2017, which will entail a huge decline in funding, making impossible to launch several critical initiatives for transition.

331. In West Bank and Gaza Strip, FAO has been doing advocacy work since 2013 regarding vulnerability and harsh working conditions of fishermen in Gaza (ILO is preparing a strategy for this extremely vulnerable sector, with FAO's assistance). This FAO office

appears to have been very pro-active and effective in doing advocacy in a crisis-related situation, applying a “conflict-smart approach” and “conflict-sensitive approach”, differently from other countries, even in post-conflict or conflict-related situations, where FAO’s advocacy work often avoids these approaches and any politically sensitive theme related to the ultimate purpose of the resilience agenda, even if they are relevant for the food security situation and the functioning of the agricultural economy. In Gaza, the message that FAO tries to send – let’s go beyond “prison agriculture practices” – is very carefully crafted, even if it prefers a low-profile advocacy strategy.

Suggested Action 20:

FAO’s advocacy role at country and regional levels should be linked to the strengthening of political economy and context analysis, to local partnerships and strategic communications. FAO needs to articulate its advocacy message in clearer terms on the context-specific application of SO-5 and the Resilience Agenda at the country level with national governments, national institutions and beneficiaries of its transitional activities in order to gather consensus and buy-in on its operationalization. It needs to make use of its comparative advantage in promoting longer-term solutions to agricultural problems even in crisis contexts, and advocate for greater investment in agriculture, beyond distribution of seeds and tools.

5 Conclusions and Strategic Recommendations

332. Findings of this evaluation cover a wide range of issues and cut across a number of conceptual debates, agendas, and internal and external reforms. The interaction between these factors is at the centre of the analysis. Specific recommendations (“Suggested Actions”) are offered on individual topics in the previous sections and summarised in Appendix 2. This final chapter presents the evaluation’s overall conclusions and strategic recommendations.

333. As a strategic, process exercise, this evaluation has not assessed so much “what” FAO does (or needs to do) to promote transition in crisis conditions but “how” to do it in difficult and challenging circumstances: the “what” is almost straightforwardly defined by FAO’s mandates and its accumulated knowledge and experience in its specialized areas, whereas the “how” is often forged only by context conditions, which determine what is feasible and advisable so as to respond to vulnerability requirements and development needs.

5.1 Overall conclusion on the success and importance of FAO’s role in crisis response and transition

334. First of all, the evaluation was impressed with the direction FAO is taking, very actively, in the area of transition work, now embedded in the larger “Resilience Agenda” and the rest of the new Strategic Framework. Findings of the investigative phase leave no doubt that FAO has a widely recognised comparative advantage, highly appreciated by its peers and partners, in working in this area of crisis response. It contains within its mandate all the elements for an early response to crises which should effectively link relief, rehabilitation and development. A number of factors have come together to allow FAO to position itself – in food and agriculture – as the ideal ‘transition agency’ in situations of crisis response of all types:

- the recognition of its mandate to carry out its development role in all conditions, including both short and longer-term crisis response and emergency work;
- the strengthening of its coordination role in crisis response through co-leadership of the Global Food Security Cluster;
- the recent reforms decentralizing emergency operations to country level and, especially, integrating them with development work;
- the adoption of the powerful and streamlined ‘L3 Protocol;’ and
- the development of a more integrated and coordinated Resilience Agenda led by the new Strategic Objective 5 and supported by the other four SOs, encompassing both immediate and longer term response to crises.

335. While practical implementation of many of these lofty goals and concepts has been subject to the ups and downs of institutional reform described and analysed in this report – and inherent to any major change process – overall the evaluation would like to strongly encourage FAO to continue in the direction on which it has embarked with regard to linking its development role with the special needs of crisis contexts.

Recommendation (or rather, positive encouragement):

Continue and strengthen development of the conceptual, strategic and institutional direction that the Organization is taking in capitalizing on its comparative advantages and new Resilience Agenda to build stronger links between the relief, rehabilitation and development aspects of its emergency response work.

5.2 *Transition for whom? Keeping the focus on the affected populations*

336. If it is pursuing its corporate vision, global goals and strategic objectives, FAO's commitment to promote transition ***must respond first and foremost to the needs of the poor, the food insecure and the vulnerable***. No doubt the most important overall conclusion of this evaluation is (1) how important and unavoidable it is, if FAO is to accomplish its mandate and strategic goals, for the Organization to work in a growing number of crisis-related contexts, and (2) that this implies that FAO, working on transition in these settings, cannot avoid the need to go beyond its usual focus on the technical solutions for material aspects of vulnerability (assuming them to be politically neutral), to confront and help constructively shape difficult socio-political realities. **It is impossible, without taking on this latter aspect, for FAO to be fully effective in assisting the populations affected by crises**, whose livelihoods are at risk, and whose destiny is ultimately at the core of FAO's action and its goals.

5.2.1 *The need for 'real' impact monitoring to understand FAO's 'real' contribution*

337. Country programmes reviewed are rich in relevant interventions that can potentially produce benefits to affected populations. However, **impact on livelihoods of individual FAO activities is seldom verified, due to inadequacy of monitoring mechanisms**, always focused on timely delivery of outputs, neglecting outcomes or broader impact on livelihoods. The review of a large number of evaluations and the investigations at country level both confirm an often-heard observation, that FAO, as an institution, generally fails to learn from its own mistakes, and has an inward-looking approach when assessing its own performance: "did we manage to deliver what we planned?" rather than "did we improve the lives of the poor and hungry?"

338. CPF results monitoring is weak, though FAO headquarters is currently finalising a results-monitoring system to support implementation of the Strategic Framework, which should provide a deeper look at the real impacts of FAO's work once implementation of the system is underway.

339. But the real question will be: is FAO genuinely taking on the commitment made in the new Strategic Framework, to keep the focus of FAO's work on *results* at the level of the poor, food insecure and vulnerable? In the assessments made by this evaluation, in no case was FAO actively looking at changes in the lives of the poor and vulnerable as a measure of success for its work. Again, all monitoring and reporting remained at the level of outputs, processes and management, not looking at impact on affected populations except anecdotally.

5.2.2 Context-specificity and contextual analysis in transition in 'difficult places'

340. The environment in which FAO promotes transition is increasingly that of protracted crises, complex emergencies and fragile states.¹⁰⁵ Even much of the work on sudden or slow-onset natural disasters and food chain crises takes place in countries that would fall into this category. FAO shares with most UN agencies and several bilateral and multilateral organizations the commitment to apply this integrated approach to transition in these difficult circumstances.

341. In these countries unresolved tensions and stress factors in the socio-political environment exist alongside climate risk, fragile environments, and other factors accentuating the vulnerability of poorer populations. FAO's activities are not immune from the influence of the key drivers of these tensions and risks. To deal with them, successfully requires an assessment not only of the technical challenges to its mandated areas but also of the influence of the overall context in which FAO operates. This is why in dealing with crisis response, **FAO needs to adopt context-specificity as a condition for designing transition work.**

342. In fragile conditions, bad performance of the state in meeting basic needs means that concerns often focus mostly on political challenges, where what matters is vulnerability associated with internal inequalities, conflict or risky environmental conditions.

343. Links between state fragility, natural disasters and widespread and chronic conditions of poverty in rural areas, or extensive food insecurity, are strong. They are both causes and consequences of that fragility. One corollary of these links is the centrality of context-specificity for the design of FAO's operations in those fragile states.

344. Context-specificity entails focusing on factors such as: access to land; prevailing rural livelihoods; and political and social constraints including power relationships, social mobility and social exclusion, gender relationships, institutional architecture, and prevailing patterns of income and wealth distribution. Such a focus serves to identify multiple causes of food insecurity and vulnerability. It is linked to weak governance and inadequacies of public administrations, and leads to increasing vulnerability to other shocks (e.g. climatic events, price shocks). They define the overall context for FAO's work.

345. In most cases, **current FAO Country Programming Frameworks (CPFs) are not based on an adequate context analysis**, especially one containing the elements related to crises. Their situation analyses have neglected addressing prevailing socio-economic tensions and power imbalances and their implications for the situation in agriculture and food security, even when FAO operates in countries where conflicts are ongoing or have had a major role in recent past. Links between the political economy of crises, poverty, natural resource management, and food insecurity, have often been missed or barely mentioned behind a rapid review of the sector. The complex cause and effect relationships that determine vulnerability to crises have been generally ignored in CPFs.

346. Inadequacy of the context analysis is found also at the level of individual projects, where vulnerability and conflict analysis and attention to "do-no-harm" approaches are generally absent. Rarely is any attention given to the controversial but critical issue of the

¹⁰⁵ Although fragility is not a notion frequently used within FAO, much of its action in protracted crises takes place in conditions where state fragility prevails, whether for the country as a whole or in the sub-regions in which FAO's intervention focus.

relationship between the root causes of crisis and vulnerability on the one hand, and, on the other, community power structures, gender, land tenure, or agriculture and food insecurity. Nor was there evidence of awareness among FAO staff of the many tools currently available to undertake vulnerability and conflict-sensitivity analysis in the course of their technical assistance work.¹⁰⁶ Even assessments conducted by FAO in post-conflict countries were found not to consider the consequences of conflicts.

347. Overall it appears FAO is better organised and equipped for post-*natural disaster* needs assessments than post-*conflict* needs assessments.

348. Inadequacy of context-specificity extends also to other areas, particularly *targeting*, which is of course a key element in efforts to achieve positive impact on the lives of the poor and most vulnerable. This has been addressed with different approaches in different contexts, but overall the evaluation found that FAO often had difficulty in introducing effective targeting processes because of time pressure, security concerns, resources or other circumstantial difficulties. In the examples reviewed, targeting was conducted without consultation with the target population. Little attention was paid to conflict, particularly in geographical targeting and in community-level targeting, where preference was for a blanket approach or dependence on traditional community systems. In spite of the availability of powerful tools for targeting such as the IPC, the Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis tool, or the Livelihood Assessment Toolkit, this analysis is not yet well integrated in project and CPF design.

349. Although women are among the most vulnerable groups in situations where crises and social upheavals occur, most projects observed did not effectively integrate a gender perspective, nor was gender adequately mainstreamed in the CPFs reviewed. Even when present, with a few exceptions gender was dealt with by seeking to include women beneficiaries in project activities, rather than designing project interventions to attack the root causes of gender inequalities. This is all the more surprising considering the existence of a clear corporate policy on gender equality, and the availability of guidelines to integrate gender issues in FAO initiatives and country programming.

350. The overall conclusion with regard to context specificity is that in spite of some isolated examples, there has been almost no recognition in FAO of the relationship between the dynamics of agriculture, vulnerability, and stability.¹⁰⁷ The evaluation found that FAO has not so far been able to integrate these dimensions through sensitive context analysis into an overall strategy.

¹⁰⁶ For a summary of these tools, see Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, *How-to guide to conflict sensitivity*, February 2002.

¹⁰⁷ See Sue Lautze, Angela Raven-Robers, Diana Sotomayor, Fatouma Seid, and Marjolaine Martin-Greentree, *Agriculture, Conflicts and Stability: A call for renewed focus on protection and conflict sensitive programming in agriculture and food security*, High-Level Expert Forum on Food Security in Protracted Crises, Rome, 13-14 September 2012

5.2.3 Programmes rather than projects: the need for more flexible CPFs to maintain relevance

351. A basic feature of countries affected by major crises or in protracted crisis is that reality on the ground is constantly changing. This requires a continuously adjusted response from FAO. Strategies for resilience-building in conflict-affected countries or protracted-crisis conditions, and also in the presence of major natural disasters, call for flexible programming approaches. **These should be based on a programme approach** rather than the more common and more fragmented ‘project approach’ that still characterize FAO’s country programmes, as much in emergencies as elsewhere. A programme approach would help to achieve the flexibility needed to be able to adapt to changing circumstances, as dictated by volatile conditions, where ‘emergency’ is frequently not an exception but the norm. The example of the FAO Somalia programme (an exception from the norm) left little doubt as to the advantages of this approach.

352. Activities programmed by FAO on the ground show a great variety of interventions. However, certain aspects of the prevailing programming approach adopted by FAO contrast with the demand for increasing flexibility. **The CPFs reviewed show a limited capacity for flexible programming**, since they cannot be easily adjusted to a continuously changing environment due to their inadequate attention to context analysis (as observed above), still insufficient integration of emergency and longer-term operations (other than in formal terms), rigid and lengthy formulation procedures, impractical revision and updating process, and the low emphasis on monitoring mechanisms. Efforts are currently underway to correct some of these shortcomings, but during this review they were still very visible.

353. FAO’s work at country level continues to be dominated by a fragmented approach, with myriads of small and often uncoordinated projects, with visible impact limited to short-term benefits. This is particularly so in countries with crisis situations, as actions are constrained by emergency funding mechanisms that favour short-term interventions only.

354. Taking advantage of its unique position ‘on the bridge’ between relief and development in food and agriculture, FAO should further develop the CPF to include specific provisions for a purpose-designed *and highly flexible* country planning approach for crisis contexts. This approach must include appropriate development and resilience programming, combining the four pillars of SO-5: DRR, preparedness and resilient livelihoods at local level; institutional strengthening for crisis management; information and early warning; and relief and other crisis response work. It must carefully link the anticipation and provision of emergency relief interventions, when needed, with a longer-term view of development needs and options.

355. The CPF for such countries and contexts has to be a rather different document from the CPF for stable conditions. For the (up to 40) countries with complex and protracted crisis situations, or classed as fragile states, or in cross-border food chain emergencies (e.g., locusts, or disease outbreaks), or the long post-disaster recovery phase of major natural disasters (Pakistan floods, Philippines typhoon, etc.), FAO’s task is to be prepared to apply its technical and development work to emergency relief and post-crisis conditions. This must be based on conflict- and crisis-aware context analysis, information and close monitoring of instability and food insecurity (e.g. with IPC), flexibility and constant adaptation to the evolving fragile environment(s) in the country. It could be designed around a few key areas of intervention agreed with national authorities and the UN Country Team (e.g., as part of the Strategic Response Plan when present) where FAO can contribute in particular to greater

stability (supporting markets for inputs and produce, technical services to farmers, post-harvest loss reduction, nutrition, surveillance and protection from plant and animal diseases and pests, etc.).

356. In adopting such flexible and resilience-focused programme for crisis contexts, FAO could **develop short project concept notes**, rather than traditional (and rigid) full project documents. Such notes, giving the objectives and general lines of intervention planned, could be more flexibly adjusted as conditions evolve. This could be a tool to encourage more creative approaches to food insecurity in fragile states and protracted crises, using the crisis situation as an opportunity rather than an obstacle for building resilience.¹⁰⁸

357. Following on the experience of South Sudan, the aim of such a system would be to maintain a team of experts in the appropriate areas (crops, livestock, institutions, social mobilisation, locusts, nutrition, extension, seed production, etc.) experienced in both relief and development, constantly monitoring the country for evolution of the situation. The team, *under strong leadership*, would adjust the doses of the different types of assistance (the four pillars) at different times and in different places around the country as needed.

358. To fund this new approach to country support, donors would be presented with a convincing, integrated and flexible 'recovery, development and relief plan' with project concept notes, seeking soft-earmarked contributions allowing FAO the necessary programming flexibility.

RECOMMENDATION 1: Transition for whom?

d) In line with its Corporate Vision, Global Goals and Strategic Objectives, FAO's work in transition must respond first and foremost to the needs of the poor, the food insecure and the vulnerable.

e) This means that FAO must measure and report on its work in crisis contexts in terms of impact on these affected populations, including analysis of gender and other inequalities, and in particular the longer-term impact on livelihoods and resilience. Reporting on delivery, operational processes and outputs is not enough.

In order to do this effectively, FAO needs to do continual context analysis during its work in transition contexts in order to be able to respond *flexibly* to rapidly changing circumstances.

f) Together with this contextual analysis, in complex crises, fragile states and protracted crisis/post-crisis contexts, FAO should further develop the CPF to include specific provisions for a purpose-designed *and highly flexible* country planning approach for such crisis conditions. This approach must include appropriate development and resilience programming, combining the four pillars of SO-5. It must foresee the provision of emergency relief interventions when needed, but carefully linked to a longer-term view of development. These CPFs, with accompanying project concept notes, should also serve as a powerful resource mobilization tool.

¹⁰⁸ See on this the analysis and suggestions highlighted by Susanne Jaspars and Dan Maxwell, *Food security and livelihoods programming in conflict: a review*, HPN Network Paper, ODI, No. 65, March 2009.

5.3 *What should FAO's role be in crisis response, and in transition?*

359. As stated at the very beginning of this report, according to its basic mandate, FAO is a technical assistance agency focused on supporting sustainable development of the food and agriculture¹⁰⁹ sectors.

360. The reason this evaluation was tasked with examining FAO *in the context of crisis response* is that, as observed and concluded by the evaluation, **FAO has developed over time a special sub-set of its development skills that allow it to put its technical support to work in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, or in the midst of a protracted crisis, or at the outbreak of a food chain crisis**, with emergency interventions that bring to bear its technical capacity in accelerating the emergence from crisis and the resumption of a positive trajectory of development. These skills have been so well developed that this work has become one of FAO's recognised comparative advantages.

361. FAO, therefore, is a development organization that is able to apply its development role and abilities in wide range of situations, including in crisis response and humanitarian emergencies.

362. Under its *Reviewed Strategic Framework*, FAO's emergency response work now comes mainly under Strategic Objective 5: "*Increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises.*" All Strategic Objectives, however, contribute to the Resilience Agenda, including SO-1 on food security policy; SO-2 on sustainable production, SO-3 on rural poverty reduction and SO-4 on food and agricultural systems. Also, transition is as much about development as about emergencies, and about ensuring development support includes the factor of crisis and threats of crisis ("two-way LRRD" – see section 3.3), so that all the SOs have a role in ensuring effective transition.

363. Transition (and this evaluation), again, takes place in the *crisis response* part of FAO's support to countries. Transition is only a minor part in the SO-5 narrative, but in terms of financial, human and time resources at country level, crisis response is by far the largest area of emergency and resilience activity for FAO. Transition is central to the Resilience Agenda in contexts of crisis-related response – a 'good transition approach' is an essential means for achieving the *outcome* of "resilience." And **the in-built ability (and mandate) to link relief to development is one of FAO's major comparative advantages in crisis contexts.**

364. The overarching integration of all aspects of development support and emergency response are now viewed as a necessary condition for FAO to achieve its goals and objectives, and is central to the Resilience Agenda. Transition in crisis contexts remains a major part of FAO's resilience work, and this evaluation should be especially useful to the Agenda because it serves to illustrate integration in action in the context of crisis response.

¹⁰⁹ Again, the word "agriculture" in this report refers to the wide definition of agriculture that is FAO's mandate, including plant production, animal production, forestry and fisheries.

365. Four key aspects of FAO's role in transition discussed below are: integration, funding, coordination and technical contributions.

5.3.1 Integration of emergency and development work and FAO's commitment to an integrated approach to transition

366. Integration between emergency and development appears in this evaluation from two different angles: as a management reform issue (related to the decentralization of emergency responsibilities) and as a conceptual challenge debated within the international aid community around the notion of transition and LRRD. Much tighter integration between these two parts of FAO (until then mostly separate) is a means for the Organization to bring the "contiguous" vision of transition into reality.

367. Regarding the decentralization, the evaluation observations raised questions on whether, within FAO, maintaining a critical mass of centralized expert resources and supporting constant global exchanges may ensure more dependable and consistent levels of support to countries where transition is relevant. This is particularly important as FAO, though a technical organization, increasingly confronts the need to help shape contentious issues of political economy that are root causes of the poverty and vulnerability which it is seeking to end. The conclusion of the evaluation is that "integration" should be pursued to its logical completion as quickly as possible, but "decentralization" as it relates to the critical mass of capacities needed to affect fundamental changes in complex socio-political dynamics, may need to be addressed more cautiously, particularly in the short term.

368. Although it is premature to assess the implementation of the reforms, since it is recent, the extensive information gathered confirms FAO's commitment to addressing transition from relief to development in this integrated way. This is slowly leading staff to move away from the view of LRRD as a time sequence of separate phases and an exit strategy for emergency operations. There is growing recognition that it is a complex mechanism often with the simultaneous interaction of shocks, threats, crises, livelihoods dynamics and development processes.

369. This commitment, however, is not in itself enough to overcome the challenges to this integrated process due to the limited financial and technical resources on the ground. There is still much to be done at the country and regional level. **A culture change is still needed** to ensure the principle of integration becomes a part of everything FAO does in crisis or crisis-prone contexts. This means constant awareness among emergency staff of long-term development goals such as economic growth and poverty eradication (often neglected when only short-term needs are addressed). It also means, importantly, that those who focus on development must be aware of the root causes of vulnerability to crises, and always plan development in these contexts as if a crisis were about to hit.

370. The application of the *L3 emergency response protocol* for Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines and in the severe conflict crises of South Sudan and CAR gave a major boost to the application of the new Resilience Agenda. In the Philippines, the very positive initial outcomes with regard to integration and transition, as observed by the evaluation team, confirmed the significance of strong leadership, close interaction with government, and integrated technical support from headquarters, regional and country staff. As a group, these staff combined emergency competencies with strong technical background and excellent

context knowledge. The case of South Sudan underlined the value of a well-funded development programme before the crisis exploded, as the emergency response relied on long term activities already launched and on the strong contextual integration (e.g. an IPC report had just been completed).

371. The country-level integration of emergency and development programmes has also been an opportunity for addressing the five new Strategic Objectives in a holistic manner by combining the pursuit of their long-term dimensions with actions that anticipated the risk of recurrence of crises and their consequences.

5.3.2 *The funding challenge*

372. Funding continues to be a headache in seeking to ensure a smooth link between emergency response and relief, and interventions structured around longer-term issues and objectives, classed as ‘development’ activities.

373. Financial resources in crisis and post-crisis situations have generally been mobilised from donors’ emergency funding windows, which are very short-term (3-18 months). This is a challenge for transition work. When emergency funding is declining in a country in protracted crisis or in fragile states or in a post-emergency phase, donors may not be able to replace generous humanitarian budgets with analogous amounts of funds for longer-term development. FAO tries to find the right mixture of short- and long-term funding to support the transition process, though the real challenge is to link short- and long-term horizons with a sufficient degree of certainty, reliability and flexibility.

374. Nonetheless, while the above applies to many individual country cases, the evaluation found a small but growing availability of funding for transition, as donors develop new funding windows in the context of emerging ‘Resilience Agendas.’ This trend should increase options for FAO to find adequate financial resources to support transitional activities.

375. One such mechanism is pooled multi-partner trust funds (MPTF) that appear in the recovery phase following a major crisis, usually sponsored by one of the International Financial Institutions such as the World Bank, and that can play a critical role in recovery, rehabilitation and transition to development. MPTFs often include a wide range of funders and can foster synergies across humanitarian and development assistance. Some of these new windows specifically address transitional development assistance or resilience-building. Although this evaluation did not analyse the functioning and performance of these financial mechanisms, its findings confirm the importance for FAO to look carefully at such innovative funding options.

376. FAO has, as noted, advocated hard for donors and partners to overcome this division, most recently with its own ‘Resilience Agenda’ and close interaction with the resilience agendas of donors and partner agencies. FAO’s message must be clear: to respond effectively to a crisis, you *need* an agency like FAO, a development institution fully capable of **functioning effectively in the humanitarian response arena, but with development-oriented contributions.**

377. Funding challenges for FAO in transition contexts may have been further accentuated by the greatly reduced role in resource mobilization of the headquarters Emergency and Rehabilitation Division (TCE) following its downsizing in 2012. While part of this role has been passed on to the Donor Liaison and Resource Mobilisation Unit (TCSR), most of the responsibilities were moved to country level, where the skills and motivation needed are often lacking. The evaluation found, however, that when the FAO country office is under dynamic leadership (often an ex-TCE staff member) it is able to develop an integrated programme strategy, communication strategy, efficient delivery during the emergency phase, and a network of partnerships. In such cases, it is often also able to raise significant funds at country level for livelihood recovery and for programming for relatively longer durations, especially if the FAO office adequately demonstrates its comparative advantage of proximity to the government and its ability to carry out its technical support mandate in humanitarian as well as development contexts.

5.3.3 *FAO's role in coordination for transition*

378. Field missions have confirmed the importance of FAO's responsibility in coordination in crisis response. Over the past two decades, FAO has played a greater or lesser coordinating role for assistance to the agriculture sector in many emergency situations. In recent years this role has mainly been through co-leadership (together with WFP) of the global Food Security Cluster (gFSC) and as co-leader of Food Security Clusters (FSCs) which were set up in several countries in emergencies.

379. The challenge for FAO – to support transition processes – is to continue to provide its positive contribution to coordination, linking relief, rehabilitation and development, also in post-crisis or in protracted-crisis situations, even after the 'emergency' is declared formally over, or when funding dwindles.

380. While there is a broad consensus on the importance of this role in coordination, evidence from field visits show that the effectiveness with which FAO exerts this function depends on the quality of the FAO Representative and his/her staff, and of the cluster coordinators, as well as on the support that they receive from other levels of FAO. While FSCs represent formidable opportunities to establish a dialogue with other actors, including local NGOs and CSOs, they also face challenges in their interaction with national entities, including both governments and sometimes NGOs and CSOs (when they find it difficult to participate). Performance of FSCs at sub-national level may be a challenge for FAO, if no appropriate financial and technical support is provided.

381. This latter issue is also related to the problem found in all cases reviewed, that the clusters are poor at handing over responsibilities to national authorities or other suitable entities when they are withdrawn. Integration with national systems is generally weak, with the clusters functioning simply as a mechanism for the international aid community. FAO's more development-oriented role in the FSC could be a basis for advocating with the IASC for stronger engagement and better handovers.

382. It was also clear that the Cluster system is not yet the ideal vehicle for transition coordination, as it is still very emergency focused, with little attention to the issues of rehabilitation and development. In fact, even the "Early Recovery Cluster" which was under UNDP has ultimately been dropped in favour of seeking to integrate the concept of early

recovery as a cross-cutting theme in other clusters. The clusters serve as an excellent platform to lay the groundwork for further coordination work when the clusters are ended in any given crisis, but the clusters themselves need to be made more sensitive to longer term transition concerns. This is the case for the IASC Transformative Agenda as a whole as well.

5.3.4 *FAO's technical contribution to transition processes*

383. FAO provides key technical contributions to transition through a great variety of activities. It has an important role as a knowledge organization in the technical areas of its mandate. While FAO produces a significant volume of normative products (documents, guidelines, etc.) related to transition, these have had a low impact on transition work due to low uptake and use at country level. The lack of an explicit and coordinated communication and dissemination strategy also reduces positive impact.

384. FAO has played a key role in assembling and analysing information that is relevant to transition processes, including recent progress in scaling-up the IPC (including introduction of the Chronic Scale).

385. Regarding technical personnel in decentralised locations, while technical competencies of staff employed in project activities may be appropriate to the technical tasks assigned to them, the technical capacity of FAO's decentralized offices – country, sub-regional and regional offices – has serious limitations, due mainly to funding constraints.

386. Capacity development is instrumental to build resilience and is crucial to promote an effective transition to development. However, past evaluations and country visits show that it has not been prominent in FAO's work in crisis and post-crisis contexts, in spite of being one of FAO's Core Functions. Capacity development in transition contexts is mostly limited to individual training, often of short duration, with a narrow time horizon and thematic coverage. Lack of a strategy for capacity development at country level is a key constraint.

387. One particular experience, that of Farmer Field Schools (FFS – and in some places 'Pastoralist Field Schools'), is a flagship activity for the Organization in several countries since many years, though this is a very limited example of dissemination of a specific technical approach. However if seen at the level of developing a national programme and (re)building national extension capacity, the FFS approach is quite effective, adapting to difference circumstances and requirements.

RECOMMENDATION 2 on FAO's role in Transition:

FAO is a technical agency and development organization with an exceptional capacity to act in early response to crisis, giving it a distinct and widely recognised and appreciated comparative advantage in supporting crisis-related transition.

- d) FAO needs to strongly advocate for recognition of this comparative advantage among donors, partners and member countries, also as a key tool to press resource partners to overcome the humanitarian-development divide.

FAO must get the message across that to respond most effectively to an emergency, you *need* an agency like FAO, a technical assistance and development institution fully capable of functioning effectively in the humanitarian response arena, but with development and resilience-oriented contributions.

This should be done actively both at global level and in countries.

The new Resilience Agenda under Strategic Objective 5 provides an excellent framework for this advocacy.

- e) FAO should capitalise on its role as co-leader of the Global Food Security Cluster to advocate for much greater integration of long-term (transition and resilience) thinking and planning in the cluster system at inter-agency level, as well as in this specific cluster.

Internally, in addition to ongoing formal integration of emergency and development work,

- f) Management needs to effect a culture-change, advocating for 'good transition work,' integrating it across the organization, especially regarding 'two-way LRRD,' where development policy in crisis or crisis-prone countries or areas is determined by crises and crisis planning (which is not at all the case at present).

This particularly aims to obtain the participation and contribution of all development units in the context of FAO crisis response and transition and resilience work. Management should find a resource-effective way to extend the positive effect of the L3 response protocol in mobilising development staff to participate in other (non-L3) emergency work.

5.4 The importance of revisiting FAO's role in transition in conflict-prone contexts

388. For an organization like FAO, the challenge of promoting a good transition approach in a conflict-prone and fragile environment such as South Sudan, Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo, or Somalia poses the problem of the nature of FAO's contribution. FAO generally sees itself narrowly confined to (ostensibly 'neutral') technical work in its mandated areas, as opposed to other international actors, including some UN agencies,¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ Seven United Nations agencies and departments (UNEP, UNDP, UNHABITAT, PBSO, DPA, DESA and IOM), coordinated by the UN Framework Team for Preventive Action, have partnered with the European Union on a research and action agenda for Land, Natural Resources and Conflict Prevention to help countries identify, prevent or transform tensions over natural resource as part of conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes.

who may be better equipped to take an integrated view of the conflict context, and, for example, support investment in several domains. In such cases, capacities in conflict resolution, peacebuilding and governance seem to be more relevant than FAO's competencies in agriculture and natural resource management. However, though the latter are the ones in FAO's mandate, capacities in conflict management cannot be completely outside of the responsibilities of any agency active in fragile states, if its goal is to help vulnerable populations.

389. The Committee on World Food Security (CFS) has recently launched a consultative process to elaborate an **Agenda for Action for Addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted Crisis** to be submitted to the 41st session of the CFS in October 2014. This Agenda for Action explores inter alia: (1) linkages between food insecurity and fragility, including through fragility assessments; and (2) the role that food security and nutrition can play in fragile and conflict-affected states, particularly in the specific context of the Busan New Deal *Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals*.¹¹¹

390. Context specificity, conflict sensitivity and “do-no-harm” are important principles of any transitional intervention. These principles have been strongly endorsed by the international community. However, the evaluation feels strongly that FAO is not paying sufficient attention to these and other basic principles, and appears lacking in the relevant technical qualifications for conflict analysis and conflict-sensitive programming, in spite of its mandate in such key areas as tenure of land and other resources. Overall the evaluation felt that there is still a tendency in FAO to consider technical assistance as neutral, non-political and non-conflictual. This, however, is questionable, as in situations of conflict, no intervention is neutral. Who receives it and who does not, and what it changes with respect to use of and control over resources, are some of the ways in which even the most technical of assistance can affect conflict.

391. The general principles include:

- Country and context-specificity;
- “Do-no-harm” approach to avoid inadvertent damage to the conditions of the most vulnerable populations;
- Governance enhancement (institution strengthening) and strengthening of public services;
- Analysis of links between political, security and development objectives;
- The Busan *Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals* (PSGs) as supported by UNCEB and UNDG;
- ‘Non-discrimination’ as a basis for inclusive and stable societies;
- Capacity development at individual, institutional and environmental level.

392. The evaluation visited a number of countries that are in a post-conflict situations or still in conflict conditions, or that are characterised as fragile states. Such countries represent a growing part of the priority countries for FAO support, as clearly recognised by FAO's Strategic Framework, which dedicates one of its five strategic objectives specifically to building resilience in situations of crisis or potential crisis. In some cases, it may not be at the level of a whole country, but can be areas targeted by FAO that have internal tensions and the

¹¹¹ See Community of Practice on Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises, *Mainstreaming Food Security into Peacebuilding Processes – Agenda for Action for Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises*, Online discussion: 27 November – 18 December 2013.

risk of conflict even in more stable countries, such as Mozambique, Indonesia, and even the Philippines (e.g., in Mindanao).

393. As already noted, the evaluation found shortage or absence of competencies among FAO decentralized staff and management in key areas of great importance for protracted crisis countries and fragile states, such as: social analysis, political economy analysis, conflict sensitiveness, and conflict analysis, management and prevention. There are further competencies of importance for these contexts which FAO has in HQ but which are weak at decentralized levels (especially in country offices), such as strategic analysis, land and resource tenure, disaster risk reduction, and communications and advocacy. This causes problems in promoting technical interventions, as these require proper knowledge of the socio-political (and conflict) dimension which is a key part of the context for technical work in such conditions. This constraint is also linked to the limited capacity to undertake thorough context analysis as highlighted above.

394. The evaluation was obliged to reflect upon and discuss a key dimension of this problem encountered in some of these contexts: the relationship between FAO and national governments in conflict-prone situations in which government is party to the conflict. This can be a highly charged issue, though such matters may vary significantly from case to case. As a general rule, compared to most other UN organizations and to development partners generally, FAO has exceptionally close relationships and high levels of trust with national governments, especially with the institutions and authorities in charge of agriculture, rural development and food security. As evidenced in innumerable evaluations, this is a major comparative advantage for FAO, and working exclusively through the national government is a part of its basic constitution.

395. However, in conflict-related situations, there may be times when assisting the poorest, most food insecure or most vulnerable may not be fully compatible with this exclusive channel of communication and action. The Vision, Global Goals and Strategic Objectives of FAO's current Strategic Framework are all stated in terms of impact of FAO assistance on the ultimate beneficiaries, who are precisely the poorest, most food insecure and most vulnerable populations. Of course FAO must first try to use its 'trusted partner' role with government to advocate for action in food and agriculture in favour of all affected populations. FAO has often tackled challenges effectively in this way thanks to the value of its technical contribution and its ties to government.

396. The evaluation identified only a few rare cases where FAO has demonstrated its ability to make use of partnerships with INGOs and local NGOs in those high-conflict contexts, supporting them also as intermediaries with the non-state actors and improving access to insecure areas, while managing to maintain good relationships with government authorities (e.g. in Somalia). This allows FAO to be present in situations where its technical support to food and agriculture can play a major role in defusing tensions and conflict.

397. Another important aspect of FAO's role – or potential role – in conflict-prone situations derives from the fact that agriculture is a major source of job creation, income generation and economic activity, in addition to food production. This is true as much in fragile states and conflict situations as elsewhere. The resumption and development of agricultural activity has an huge potential in helping stabilise and neutralise situations of conflict which cause terrible hardship to affected populations. FAO therefore has the ability, and, this evaluation suggests, *the responsibility*, to make a positive contribution to conflict resolution and peacebuilding through its technical role in support of agriculture and food

security. FAO's potential role in conflict prevention – which is all about moving from crisis into development, and therefore about transition – is both enormous and important, but developing this role will require significant commitment, skill development and investment of resources. **This justifies a paradigm shift in the way FAO deals with conflict situations** taking into consideration in all circumstances the impact (hopefully positive) on conflict and peace of its interventions.

5.4.1 *Partnerships and transition processes*

398. The evaluation examined FAO's experience in establishing partnerships in crisis situations. This is particularly relevant in conflict areas, where FAO uses the collaboration with other UN agencies and national or international NGOs to compensate for its own lack of competencies in areas such as conflict analysis, or to help reach otherwise inaccessible geographical areas and socio-economic groups.

399. Evidence from past evaluations and field visits shows some good examples of strategic alliances and partnerships with UN agencies, especially with: WFP and UNICEF in formulating joint resilience strategies or common approaches issues such as food security or drought resilience; UNDP and UNEP on environmental issues; IFAD and ILO in different areas related to rural livelihoods and employment; UNHCR around Durable Solutions for refugees (which is the angle with which UNHCR addresses issues of longer-term transition to development); and UN-Habitat in addressing issues of land tenure.

400. Partnerships with NGOs and CSOs are generally more limited in scope, where the NGOs have the role of implementing partners for FAO projects for delivering specific services. They have not often been used as real alliances and vehicles to enhance the dialogue between FAO and local society, or as a means to stimulate a critical engagement of civil society in determining FAO priorities. So far, evidence from the field is quite limited in this area, although over the years FAO has made great progress at the global level in its efforts to include civil society input in the governance mechanisms of the Organization.

401. Experience accumulated with other stakeholders involved in humanitarian assistance and development cooperation, and evidence from international business practice and (usually indirect) engagement of the private sector in peacebuilding in fragile environments, suggest that governments, development institutions and business firms can work together to promote transition in fragile states. Working jointly, they can help create the premises for a positive interaction between economic development and conflict prevention, ensuring that job creation and provision of basic services to needy social groups generate the desired results.¹¹² The evaluation found limited evidence of FAO engagement of the private sector in these contexts however, mainly through such activities as the use of vouchers to encourage private production and sale of seeds, inputs, livestock, or production materials (e.g. tools, fishing boats).

RECOMMENDATION 3:

d) In a paradigm shift, the *relationship of food security and agriculture* (including tenure, employment and income) *to conflict and potential conflict management/ resolution*

¹¹² See Brian Ganson (2014), *Business in Fragile Environments: Capabilities for Conflict Prevention*, IACM, page 123.

should be a paramount concern in FAO's crisis response work in conflict or conflict-prone situations, and FAO's intervention should begin with a contextual analysis examining that relationship in each case. Interventions and support should be designed keeping in mind the positive impact they could potentially have on conflict reduction through hunger reduction and support to economic activity. To do this well, FAO will need to expand its analytical competence.

- e) Central to this contextual analysis must be strong political economy analysis and conflict analysis. This is key in any crisis context. Tenure of land and other natural resources is a key factor in the potential for conflict.

This contextual analysis should be fully integrated with strategy development, targeting, intervention design, planning, implementation and monitoring for each transition environment.

- f) Such analysis will need to be conducted in partnership. FAO is not in a position to have all the information and skills needed for the analysis, and will need to work closely with other stakeholders.

APPENDIX 1

Building Blocks for Crisis-Related Transition

The table below expands on the contents of the boxes under the heading “Transition Building Blocks” in **Figure 3: Breakdown of the elements of transition** at the end of Chapter 3. For each building block, there is a list of examples.

<u>BUILDING BLOCKS FOR CRISIS-RELATED TRANSITION</u>	
BUILDING BLOCKS	Thematic Emphases, Tools, Mechanisms, Actions
1. Livelihoods of vulnerable population	<i>Includes food security as access to food, utilization of food (including nutrition), and stability (of supply, access and conditions for utilization): food and nutrition analysis; right-to-food; macro-nutrients and micro-nutrients; poverty analysis and livelihoods analysis; vulnerability analysis; safety nets; unemployment and underemployment; gender equity and gender mainstreaming; social inclusiveness; CFW; promotion of food security initiatives, both advocacy and pilot interventions with vulnerable groups, targeting of emergency and rehabilitation interventions; access to assets and distribution of wealth and income, targeting and conflict sensitivity</i>
2. Productive systems	<i>Includes food security as availability of food: promotion of agricultural production, including quality seed production; promotion of livestock, fisheries and forestry products; value chain, food processing activities and post-harvest activities; market functioning; rural credit; trade mechanisms; productive investment</i>
3. Environmental dimensions of crises	<i>Natural resource management, climate change, droughts, floods, tsunamis, typhoons, pest controls, transboundary animal diseases, desertification, deforestation, soil degradation, carbon sequestration, urbanization & environment, water pollution, instruments like the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, conflicts and environment</i>
4. Infrastructures & institutions	<i>Physical infrastructures: irrigation and dams, rural roads, transportation sector, storage facilities, coastal structures and infrastructures for fisheries; Institutions: government and non-government institutions for food security and poverty reduction (ministries, departments, committees, charities, education institutions, etc.), custom structures and institutions, laboratories for food safety or for animal diseases, seed certification centres, etc.</i>
5. Power relationships	<i>Power relationships and power sharing, access to resources (including credit), asset distribution, land tenure, water rights, control of decision-making structures, public vs. private influences in power sharing, social mobility, traditional institutional mechanisms also at local level, gender relationships, ethnic tensions, migrations, demographic growth, urbanization, other social tension</i>
6. Policies, strategies and plans	<i>Design of policies, strategies and plans; governance of food and agriculture; decentralization of public functions; legislative reforms; performance of public institutions in charge of food security; national advocacy campaigns; sectoral plans for agriculture, fisheries, livestock, forestry, irrigation, etc.; use of FAO normative tools at policy level</i>
7. Information	<i>Early warning systems; agricultural statistics; hunger and poverty statistics; vulnerability mapping systems (e.g., IPC); information systems for technical and scientific information for food and agriculture; information clearinghouse; marketing information systems; trade information and monitoring of global markets</i>
8. Capacity development (CD)	<i>National ownership of the transition process; CD at central and decentralized level, government-level, farm- herder- fisher-level; FFS; training at all levels; institution-building; support to CD strategy (or strategies) with Government and UN system; FAO and water users associations and farmers associations and cooperatives</i>
9. Peacebuilding and post conflict arrangements	<i>Conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity analysis, appeasement process, political governance and rule of law, CBOs and national debate on democracy and participation in development process, potential contribution of FAO to peacebuilding and political/social stability, FAO’s programmes with victims of conflicts, interaction of FAO with CBOs and local NGOs in conflict situations</i>
10. DRR and future threats	<i>DRR institutions and mechanisms; early warnings and prediction mechanisms; preparedness for crises; institutional mechanisms for mitigating effects from future shocks; national policies on DRR; resilience to future threats; interaction with networks</i>

APPENDIX 2
Table of the Suggested Actions

Suggested Actions (specific recommendations)	
Decentralization and integration of emergency responsibilities	
1	The Organization should encourage continued support and strengthen to the decentralization of emergency operations and their integration into the overall structure of FAO offices at the country level, emphasizing the need for culture change among both development and emergency staff and managers. Success of the reform will need to be measured in terms of <u>outcomes</u> , the impact of FAO's work on affected populations.
Support to Decentralized Offices	
2	<p>A new – and more effective – system is needed for follow-up to requests from country offices, in particular in crisis situations, involving all levels of the organization (HQ, ROs and SROs). This could be through focal points (as intended under the multidisciplinary S-5 team), though they need to have the right incentives.</p> <p>Also, in crisis situations, support to the Regional Offices from HQ needs to be strong and rapid in order to strengthen their ability to provide adequate support to countries.</p>
Subregional structures for transition: the Resilience Hubs	
3	<p>Regarding the Resilience Hubs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The hubs should be able to provide overall policy advice in crisis situations, and where needed, liaison support with technical capacities available within the Organization, as well as guidance and assistance in resource mobilization for resilience building and promotion of transition. • The hubs should have specific capacities needed in emergencies which are lacking elsewhere, such as political economy analysis, deep knowledge of the specific contexts of countries with crises, strong regional partnerships, etc. • RAF should prioritize the strengthening of its Resilience Unit and the use of expertise available in the Resilience Hubs to support country office staff in charge of transitional and resilience activities. • The Resilience Hubs with the Resilience Unit should facilitate networking opportunities for FAO staff working on resilience in the region. • The mandate and reporting lines of the Resilience Hubs must be better defined and clear to all stakeholders. The hubs should have operational responsibilities (as well as resources) decentralized to them from Accra, and be given 'budget holder' control over their own activities.
Context analysis and country programming	
4	The CPFs should be prepared on the basis of a <i>thorough analysis of the context (including in particular the crisis-related contexts)</i> in which FAO operates, including adequate consideration of key political economy factors and existing inequalities that are root causes of conflict and vulnerability. This is a necessary condition if the short, medium and long-term needs and their interactions are to be addressed simultaneously. The CPF Guidelines should reflect this.
5	In complex emergencies and protracted crises, the CPF must include different and context-

	appropriate characteristics, unlike those appropriate for more stable countries. Among others, it should include an emergency response component or pillar which can be activated rapidly when needed, it should include the ‘resilience building’ concept in all its objectives, and it has to be conceived as a much more <i>flexible</i> programming instrument than the present guidelines suggest, capable of adjusting rapidly to a changing environment. It should be linked to the CAP, SRP, or other inter-agency emergency planning documents.
FAO’s ability to raise resources for its transition work	
6	FAO should continue to explore the potential use of newer mechanisms for funding transitional activities through such mechanisms as Multi-Partner Trust Funds or other innovative funding for transition. It should review its internal rules in order to facilitate its access to these funds. FAORs should become more aware of the role that they can play to mobilize resources also by showing evidence of results of their field work.
Programming individual projects	
7	Design of individual projects needs to be upgraded by making use of available planning tools such as IPC, resilience analysis, conflict analysis, integrating a “do-no-harm approach” in order to foster resilience in the local context and in relations to specific target groups. DRR/M capacity building should be enhanced for decentralized offices.
8	FAO should intensify the use of flexible tools at the level of individual initiatives, e.g. through a more extensive use of concept notes, drawn from in-depth analyses but less labour-intensive than traditional project documents, in order to increase FAO’s ability to respond to crisis and post-crisis situations adjusting to continuously changing circumstances.
Support to transition for affected populations: livelihoods, targeting and gender	
9	Given the paramount importance of proper livelihood, social and needs assessments for the success of interventions, even in the most urgent of circumstances, FAO must develop a culture of carrying out such assessments as a matter of rule. In spite of the urgency of crisis situations, there is always the time to do this if it is a priority, which it should be. Resources (financial, human and <i>time</i>) must be made available by FAO from the very start of its response to conduct livelihood-based studies in crisis and crisis-prone contexts. This can then also serve as a baseline to measure the impact on livelihoods of FAO’s response.
10	Since the support to livelihoods in crisis-related transition is central to build resilience, both in natural disasters and in complex emergencies and protracted crises, it is urgent that thorough vulnerability, gender and livelihood analysis be adopted by FAO as part of the contextual analysis (see section 4.2) which should be the basis for CPFs and transition planning. This analysis should make best use of IPC, LAT, SEAGA for Emergency and Rehabilitation Programmes, and other analytical frameworks, to ensure appropriate and gender-sensitive design and targeting, and greater positive impact of FAO’s work on livelihoods. This work must be effectively monitored in a timely manner, and necessary adjustments introduced to FAO’s work as circumstances change.
11	FAO should make the required changes in its programming procedures so that conflict sensitivity analysis and do-no-harm approaches are systematically included in determining geographical, community-level and household-level targeting to ensure that decisions in programming transitional activities benefit groups and territories that FAO considers of the highest priority, taking into account government priorities and security constraints, and,

	most importantly, after consulting potential beneficiaries.
Coordination	
12	<p>On its role as co-lead of the Food Security Cluster:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FAO should confirm and build on the potential of its role in the Cluster coordination system at country level to have a positive impact on the transition process. • FAORs should actively support the Cluster Coordinators, also at the sub-national level, taking charge of this supervisory function. Since selection of good quality coordinator is crucial for the performance of the coordinating function, the Organization must devote maximum attention in selecting qualified candidates for that function. • To be an effective forum to support transition, coordination clusters should be set up from the very start of a crisis. • FAO should advocate (probably with the IASC, or OCHA) for changes to the cluster system to overcome the current fragmentation, which hinders effective coordination. While they may evolve depending on context, it is imperative that the terms/scope of the cluster in which FAO operates and its relationship with other clusters are clearly defined at any given point in time. • The clusters should be set up where decisions are taken (usually at the capital) as well as where action is taking place (sub-national level or where disaster struck). Clusters where possible should incorporate local NGOs/CSOs and government stakeholders from the outset.
Contribution of normative products to transition	
13	A consistent and articulated communication and dissemination strategy regarding normative documents, including through a user-friendly online repository, possibly open to external audiences, would facilitate access to them by country, regional and sub-regional offices and their application in crisis or post-crisis situations
14	Greater involvement of country, regional, sub-regional offices in planning and developing guidelines, strategic documents and reviews of good practices on transition would ensure better suitability of those normative products to the needs of the end users, while ensuring at the same time feedback on their use, generating lessons learnt and an improvement of their quality.
Competencies of FAO staff for transition	
15	The Organization should require all personnel that have major responsibilities in making strategic decisions at the country level relevant for launching, proposing, preparing and approving new initiatives in crisis-prone countries and fragile states or situations that they have proven critical appraisal skills in addition to their traditional technical qualifications, including cross-cutting multidisciplinary professional competencies, great familiarity with the local context, including its political economy and conflict conditions, which would allow to have a strategic approach to the interventions or programmes.
Information systems and data analysis for transition	
16	The Organization should promote needs assessments of government food security information systems of relevant ministries in countries in crisis and post-crisis situations as bases for FAO's support to information for crisis contexts (and transition).
17	The Organization should enhance corporate capacity for conducting post-disaster and post-

	conflict needs assessments as a tool for better design of transition processes, in particular at country level, especially in countries in protracted crises and fragile states or situations.
Capacity Development	
18	Capacity development is instrumental to build resilience in crisis and post-crisis situations. FAO should consider formulating all-inclusive country-level plans for capacity development in crisis and post-crisis situations, using a comprehensive approach to programming enhancement of national capacities and competencies at individual, community, institutional and societal level. Among the tools which could be used, prominence should continue to be given to the Farmer Field School approach, supporting national structures and strengthening decentralized and peripheral institutions and organizations at the community, district and provincial level in full participation and dialogue with national beneficiaries and international partners.
Partnerships with Civil Society	
19	The Organization should continue its efforts to expand its collaboration with NGOs, in particular with national NGOs, as a way to expand its options to support the transition process in crisis or post-crisis situations, not only using them as Implementing Partners but also as real partners involved in a dialogue that may favour participatory programming at the country level. This could be particularly useful in conflict or post-conflict situations. FAO should also encourage a better dialogue between CSOs and national governments, in conformity to the approach identified in the new Partnership with Civil Society, making use of its 'moral-suasion' with national authorities.
Advocacy for a new approach to transition and resilience	
20	FAO's advocacy role at country and regional levels should be linked to the strengthening of political economy and context analysis, to local partnerships and strategic communications. FAO needs to articulate its advocacy message in clearer terms on the context-specific application of SO-5 and the Resilience Agenda at the country level with national governments, national institutions and beneficiaries of its transitional activities in order to gather consensus and buy-in on its operationalization. It needs to make use of its comparative advantage in promoting longer-term solutions to agricultural problems even in crisis contexts, and advocate for greater investment in agriculture, beyond distribution of seeds and tools.



Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United
Nations

Office of Evaluation

Evaluation of FAO's contribution to crisis-related transition

Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development

Annexes

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Annex 2: List of People Met

Annex 3: List of Normative Products

Annex 4: Meta-analysis – Lessons learnt from past FAO evaluations

Annex 5: Expert Panel Inputs to the Final Report

Annex 6: Profiles of Team Members

Annex 7: Profiles of Advisory Panel Members

Annex 1 - Terms of Reference

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Annexes Terms of Reference

- a) Strategic Objective I, Organizational Result 3: Countries and Partners have Improved Transition and Linkages between Emergency, Rehabilitation and Development
- b) List of Persons Met During the Preparation Phase
- c) List of Fragile States in the Scope of the Evaluation
- d) FAO Strategic Framework 2010-2019
- e) Initial Mapping of FAO’s Normative Work on Transition
- f) Terms of Reference – Expert Panel
- g) Reference Group

Acronyms


CPF	Country Programming Framework
DDR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
FPMIS	Field Programme Management Information System
GPPI	Global Public Policy Institute
IASC CWGER	The Inter-Agency Standing Committee - Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery
IDS	Institute of Development Studies
INCAF	International Network on Conflict and Fragility (OECD-DAC)
LRRD	Linking Relief to Rehabilitation and Development
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OED	FAO Office of Evaluation
OR	Organisational Results
OR3	Organisational Results No.3
PBF	United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
PC	Programme Committee
PCNA	Post-Conflict Needs Assessments
PDNA	Post-Disaster Needs Assessment
PIRES	FAO strategic planning and budgeting system
SO	Strategic Objectives
SOFI	State of Food Insecurity in the World
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats
TCE	Emergency Division
TCE	Emergency Division
TCER	Emergency Rehabilitation and Humanitarian Policies Unit
UNDG-ECHA	United Nations Development Group - Executive Committee on Humanitarian Assistance
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

1 Introduction

1. Over the past decade, FAO’s work in disaster risk management (DRM) has grown significantly: in 2002, FAO delivery on emergency and rehabilitation projects totalled USD 183 million; by 2012, this figure had almost doubled, growing to USD 355 million. Efforts by the Organization have sought to address prevention, response and recovery needs arising from shocks and crisis¹. Under FAO’s Strategic Framework 2010-2019, “improved preparedness and response in emergencies” was one of eleven corporate Strategic Objectives (SO). Within it, “improving transition and linkages between emergency, rehabilitation and development” was established as one of the three Organisational Results.

2. Box 1 below illustrates how FAO initially conceptualized the (sequential) linkages between these areas of intervention under SOI. Thinking has evolved since then with the recognition that a) recovery focussed work can start right from the beginning of the response, and b) that shocks/disasters provoking emergency responses are not one-offs but often occur on a cyclical or recurrent¹² basis.

Figure 1. FAO Disaster Risk Management Concept under SOI



Source: FAO Strategic Objective I (SO I) Briefing Toolkit, 2011.

3. The Office of Evaluation (OED) has carried out a number of evaluations which have examined FAO’s interventions in post- natural disasters and crisis phases. The thematic evaluation of “FAO’s Preparedness for, and effective and sustainable response to, food and agricultural emergencies” carried out in 2003 found few activities aimed at promoting effective transition from relief to rehabilitation and development, and no examples in which FAO had played a decisive role in such a transition. Furthermore, while the evaluation

¹ FAO categorizes the causes of crisis as being driven by natural disasters, food chain emergencies, socio-economic crisis, violent conflicts or a prolonged mix of the above (protracted crisis). SO5 21/09/2012.

signalled FAO's effectiveness in post-disaster settings, it identified as a weak area the organisation of assistance in the transition period following conflict-related emergencies.

4. Since that first evaluation, a number of country evaluations have been completed in countries experiencing conflict or just entering a post-conflict phase, namely the Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Tajikistan, Sri Lanka and most recently Somalia and Afghanistan. In 2012-2013, the Evaluation of FAO's work and role in Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) in Asia and in Latin America and the Caribbean focussed on the Organization's efforts to enhance prevention and preparedness for natural disasters. A number of thematic evaluations have also touched on FAO's work in post-crisis transition² including an ongoing joint WFP/FAO evaluation of Food Security Cluster coordination which will examine, inter alia, how the lead agencies promote appropriate transition through humanitarian coordination structures.

5. Given the specific challenges of supporting countries in post-crisis recovery, the significant financial and human resources that have gone into such support, and the fact that transition and recovery dimensions of FAO's emergency work have not been systematically evaluated, in 2012 the Governing Bodies endorsed the proposal of an evaluation of FAO's work in post crisis transition.

6. The evaluation comes at the time of full implementation of the decentralization of management responsibility for emergency programmes to country level: this key step amongst other transformational changes taking place in FAO should allow for more and better linkages between the Organization's emergency and development work, managed by the FAO Representation at country level and should bear particular relevance for FAO's interventions in post-crisis phases.

7. The evaluation will also feed into current thinking and debate within the Governing Bodies³ and FAO management on programming strategies for shifting to developmental approaches while recognizing vulnerabilities arising from emergencies.

8. In the context of the reviewed Strategic Framework, within what is now SO5, the focus of FAO's work in this area has shifted to "Increasing the resilience of rural livelihoods to threats and crises". The evaluation should thus contribute to organizational thinking about how FAO's crisis/post crisis work contributes to resilience.

9. Finally FAO, in its role as secretariat to the Committee on Food Security (CFS), is currently supporting the elaboration of the CFS Agenda for Action for Addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted Crisis. The results of the evaluation, shared along the way, may help shape the Agenda and contribute to the policy document being prepared by ESA and TCE for presentation to the CFS 41 in October 2014.

² The Joint Multi-donor Evaluation of the FAO Kosovo Emergency Agriculture Programme (2001), the Strategic Evaluation of FAO Country Programming (2010), Strategic Evaluation of FAO's Work on Tenure, Rights and Access to Land and Other Natural Resources (2012), STRATEGIC EVALUATION OF FAO'S ROLE AND WORK IN FORESTRY (2011), Strategic Evaluation of FAO Country Programming, including the NMTPF mechanism (2010)

³ In November 2013, for example, Permanent Representatives attending a FAO/TCE presentation questioned the relevance of FAO's work in cash and voucher programming.

2 The international debate on transition

2.1 Definitions

10. This evaluation will adopt the working definitions shown in Box 2 below.

Box 1.

Transition is a process of linking immediate objectives (meeting the immediate needs of the disaster/shock-affected population through emergency operations) to medium and long term development objectives. Transition, therefore, begins in the immediate aftermath of a shock. (FAO 2011).

Resilience is “the ability of a social or ecological system to absorb disturbances while retaining the same basic structure and ways of functioning, the capacity for self-organisation, and the capacity to adapt to stress and change” (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change).

A complex emergency, as defined by the IASC, is “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country programme” (IASC 1994).

A fragile state refers to a region or state that has weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society. Fragile states are also more vulnerable to internal or external shocks such as economic crises or natural disasters. More resilient states exhibit the capacity and legitimacy of governing a population and its territory. (OECD, 2012a).

2.2 The evolution of approaches

11. While intrinsically attractive in seeming to provide coherence to, and minimize the costs of aid interventions in emergencies,⁴ the idea of linking relief to rehabilitation and development (LRRD) has been hotly debated among the development and humanitarian communities for decades.

12. The LRRD framework was conceived to respond to the programming and strategic challenges arising in the aftermath of the sudden onset of natural catastrophes. The model, however, was found to be inadequate in two ways: first, in the sequential linearity in which a relief-rehabilitation-development continuum was conceived; and second, in failing to consider the political and security fallacies generated by uncritical acceptance of such linear progression,⁵ particularly in complex emergencies.


13. The growing realisation that this kind of model didn't fit the different post-crisis settings it had been applied in, led to recognition that LRRD should be understood differently

⁴ Many argue that these processes allow countries to move away more quickly from more costly relief efforts such as food aid. The UNDG/ECHA WG Report on Transition Issues (2004) states that “sustained transition should aim at scaling down humanitarian assistance”.

⁵ Macrae et al 1997

in post-disaster and post-conflict settings. Progress has been made and presently the aid community adopts a more nuanced classification, not devoid of its own overlaps and ambiguities, articulated into slow and sudden onset natural disasters, compounded crises, protracted crises and fragile states, conflict and post-conflict or complex emergencies. Box 3 below shows an alternative model for thinking about post conflict situations, highlights these overlaps between different moments and the kind of intervention needed.⁶

Figure 2. Approaches to responding to conflicts and promoting peace and recovery



Source: Sarah Bailey 2009

14. Despite the diverging views and on-going debate, including on what constitutes good practice, some conclusions have been agreed upon throughout the years, emerging from collective experience and reflection. These are highlighted below.

15. Some of the potential risks identified in the literature associated with unduly protracted humanitarian assistance and an inability to shift to developmental interventions include inter alia disruption of markets, environmental depletion, delays in re-establishment of a normal income tax base and normalization of social safety nets within Government budgets, and negative impacts on community and Government accountability to its citizens for protection and social services.

16. On the other hand, the literature suggests that some of the costs, trade-offs and risks of a premature shift from humanitarian relief to development, without an adequate assessment of the context, can include negative effects such as the exclusion of the most vulnerable from development interventions due to an inappropriate focus on sustainability and productivity, endangerment of the welfare of affected populations when international assistance provides

⁶ Bailey et al 2009

institutional support and capacity building to those who have contributed to the humanitarian situation, as well as exacerbation of conflict by rebuilding of infrastructure/community assets that can become war targets and/or be the source of between group conflict.⁷

2.3 *International Stakeholders, Alliances and Commitments*

17. Governments and the UN have launched a number of initiatives to tackle the specific challenges associated with implementing development interventions in complex crisis. Among these are worth mentioning:

- The Busan Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness and the New Deal (2011): the Forum on conflict and fragility brought together 32 States including the G7 and 19 conflict affected and fragile countries and 5 multilateral actors to discuss the New Deal; participants committed to manage resources more effectively, through stronger alignment and better accountability. Seven countries self-nominated as pilot countries for country level implementation.
- OECD-DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF): this was founded in 2009 and works in close partnership with the UN, NATO, the World Bank and other bilateral and multilateral agencies dealing with conflict and fragility on issues of peace, security, governance and development effectiveness, facilitating coordination and providing a platform for sharing experiences. INCAF has published a suite of documents on transition funding.
- UNDG-ECHA Working Group on Transitions and IASC Early Recovery Cluster Working Group: both these two groups aim at improving the UN's effectiveness and impact in post-crisis settings: while the UNDG/ECHA Working Group supports the UN system's work to develop policies, guidelines and methodological approaches to support countries in post-conflict transition settings., the IASC CWGER focuses specifically on the identification and implementation of initial early recovery activities at the onset of the transition process. Together they have produced inter alia a guidance note on funding in transition that maps the purpose, function and usability of different funding mechanisms established for countries emerging from crises or mired in protracted ones.

⁷ Bradbury 1998: 330.

3 FAO's work in post-crisis transition

3.1 Overview

18. FAO defines transition as “the process of linking immediate objectives (meeting the immediate needs of the disaster/crisis affected population through emergency operations) to medium and long-term development objectives”.⁸ This definition is very much in line with what has been termed the concept of a relief and development *contiguum*. The agency promotes a “twin track” approach to ensure immediate hunger relief interventions while planning longer term agricultural development interventions that address root causes of acute and chronic food insecurity. In 2011, FAO prepared a policy note on FAO's work in transition (Annex a) which outlined the debates and also identified the main external factors⁹ which have a bearing on transition work. The paper makes a distinction between complex/protracted emergencies and those resulting from sudden onset natural disasters (see para 12) – the response in the former allowing for a *contiguum* approach while the later often follows what has been termed the “continuum” model, where more developmentally focussed work is linked to the relief response but follows later, after the relief phase is over.

19. The literature and scoping interviews with FAO staff during the preparation phase for the current evaluation suggest more concretely that specific processes associated with transition in FAO programming include:

- Inclusive assessment and planning, involving national actors and the affected population in response and recovery planning (including planning for Embedding resilience building and risk reduction¹⁰ into recovery work;
- Support to Government for a revisiting of development objectives (particularly in cases where there have been significant changes in the context and institutions due to the shock);
- capacity building at individual, organizational and institutional levels, with the medium to long term objective of State take-over and appropriation of components of the humanitarian and recovery response that are the mandate of the State;¹¹
- shifting away from asset-replacement to asset-building interventions with a stronger focus on income generation and markets for those with viable livelihoods, while safeguarding the support provided to those more chronically food insecure. In this context, targeting becomes a key issue;
- moving from humanitarian planning tools, coordination mechanisms, funding sources and staffing to more developmental processes and actors;
- Ensuring internal organizational arrangements are clear, aligning management and technical resources with the needs of the programme;

⁸ FAO/SOI Indicator Compendium.

⁹ Including inter alia the structure of donor institutions, political and strategic considerations affected Government decision making, the UN systems position and operational funding and coordination mechanisms in place, and FAO's own internal processes related to funding/finance, management decision making and technical backstopping. OR3 policy paper FAO 2011.

¹⁰ 90% of the last decade's civil wars occurred in countries that had already had a civil war in the last 30 years. World Development Report 2011.

¹¹ Implicit here is the assumption that in humanitarian crisis Government is often overwhelmed and either unable or unwilling to assume its responsibilities vis a vis the food security needs of its vulnerable groups. In some cases, civil governance structures and systems in parts or all of a country may have been destroyed as result of prolonged conflict e.g. Somalia, South Sudan, Afghanistan, etc.

- Specific to conflict contexts, transition implies an important focus on conflict sensitive analysis and programming including elements of protection and peacebuilding.

20. During the acute phase of an emergency, agriculture activities may all but cease. The initial humanitarian assistance offered typically includes shelter, food, protection, water and basic health services. FAO staff interviewed generally believe that “FAO does not do immediate relief”, since its interventions are not life-saving. However, FAO’s interventions can indeed prove life-saving for households in emergencies¹² and in 2010 CERF¹³ funding recognized agriculture activities under the *Rapid Response*¹⁴ window. Short-term agricultural assistance, typically provided through free input distributions, animal-life saving interventions, cash for works programmes, etc. aim to resume household livelihoods and re-establish food production after crisis onset, the idea being to return the affected population back to their livelihood activities as soon as possible.

21. FAO is also often involved in undertaking damage and needs assessments that feed into both immediate and longer term recovery plans and strategies. FAO, together with WFP, co-leads food security cluster coordination at global and country level – the mechanism having a specific role in promoting relief to development transitioning. In the case of natural disasters and prolonged conflict, FAO support has frequently been provided for rehabilitation of disaster damaged infrastructure (irrigation systems, fish landing sites, public buildings, etc.).

22. However, transition approaches imply more than just different project typologies. Post crisis/conflict strategies should include a portfolio of interventions involving capacity building at individual, organizational and institutional levels. In such contexts, crisis and post-crisis programming often faces significant political and operational challenges. Poor security conditions for staff represent a major obstacle¹⁵ limiting the ability of FAO and partners to carry out comprehensive needs assessments, consult with communities, reach the most vulnerable, and monitor the impact of interventions. Other important constraints include physical access (particularly in the case of natural disasters), lack of funding streams for recovery work, political barriers¹⁶ and lack of political will and/or government capacity to tackle both the acute and developmental problems, particularly those rooted at the policy level.

Box 2. Case study: Sudan Productive Capacity Building Programme (SPCRP) was a four year US\$90 million recovery programme funded by the EU and implemented by FAO and partners between 2007-2012. It supported post peace agreement capacity development (individual, organizational, enabling environment) in 10 States in both north and southern regions of Sudan. While representing an important model of the “twin track” approach, the final evaluation noted inter alia that “*the design did not acknowledge the extremely low public administration and governance capacity*” in the aftermath of a 25 year civil war.

¹² Neil Marsland and Sue Lautze, personal communication.

¹³ Central Emergency Response Fund. OCHA

¹⁴ http://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/cerf/final_life-saving_criteria_26_jan_2010_efs.pdf

¹⁵ This is a consistent finding in a number of evaluations, notably the Somalia, Sudan and Afghanistan country evaluations as well as the evaluation of FAO’s Flood Response 2010 in Pakistan.

¹⁶ International community sanctions against certain countries (past examples include i.a. Myanmar, Sudan and Zimbabwe)

23. Determining the total budget which has been devoted to FAO's work in transition over the past 6 years is a challenge. Net appropriations for FAO's emergency and rehabilitation work (SOI and now SO5) over the last two biennium have been small and averaged approximately USD 4 million per year¹⁷ of which 25-25% has been allocated towards OR3/transition related work. Coding of extra-budgetary projects to SOI and the three respective ORs has been undertaken for much of the period under evaluation – but a review of project descriptions reveals a significant degree of misclassification. FAO systems (FPMIS) indicate that, over the period 2009-2013, 125 transition projects have been implemented. Two thirds of these projects (for a total of approximately US\$250 million) took place in countries affected by conflict related crisis. The main partners who have funded FAO transition work include the EU (by far the largest contributor), the USA, Canada, the UK, and the United Nations Peace Building Fund¹⁸. At the other extreme, the total value of FAO's programming in transition might be estimated as the total of its programming portfolio by country, including all countries that have experienced crisis over the past 7 years – and this would not include work done at the global level, e.g. in the development of normative work related to transition, or as is the case at present, it's support to the Committee on Food Security in establishing global policy on addressing food insecurity in protracted crisis.

3.2 *Internal Stakeholders and Institutional Mechanisms*

24. Within the originally formulated SOI, TCS, the policy unit of the Technical Cooperation Department, and TCE, the Emergency and Rehabilitation Division, took the lead role within the Organization for the planning of FAO's transitional assistance. Under TCER coordination, a Transition Team (OR3), was established in 2011 comprising the following divisions: AGP, AGS, ESA, FID, FIP, FIR, REU, SFE, TCE, TCI, TCS. A Transitional Programming Thematic Group was also formed but never became operational. With the shift that has resulted from the reviewed strategic framework and revised formulation of SO5, these groups have been dissolved and four new programmatic groups have formed, transition being an explicit but non-specific element in each¹⁹.

25. At country level, SOI related work was led by the Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordination Units (ERCU) which were staffed and managed by TCE. In 2012 under the transformational changes process, staff, authorities and responsibilities were rapidly decentralized and the full responsibility for the ERCU and related programmes was transferred to the FAO Representative. Boxes 4 and 5 below show the institutional arrangements and changes thereof.

26. While the decentralization of “regular” emergency and recovery operations were decentralized, new protocols for FAO's response in large scale level 3 emergencies were put in place (DG Bulletin 2013/32) which define standard operating procedures and key authorities in such circumstances. Such protocols are seen system-wide within the UN, framed within the 2012 IASC Transformative Agenda for humanitarian action.


¹⁷ C 2011/3 MTP 2010-2013 (Reviewed) and Programme of Work and Budget 2012-13.

¹⁸ Donor partners information available for projects 2009-2013 that have been coded as OR3 projects in FAO's financial tracking system - FPMIS.


¹⁹ 1) Countries and regions adopt and implement legal, policy and institutional systems and regulatory frameworks for risk reduction and crisis management, 2) Countries and regions provide regular information and early warning against potential, known and emerging threats, 3) Countries reduce risks and vulnerability at household and community level, 4) Countries and regions affected by disasters and crisis prepare for and manage effective responses.

27. As of January 2014 the revised strategic framework is now in play. Transition is embedded not only across all pillars of SO5 but is also a part of all of the other SOs²⁰. The range of internal stakeholders with interest in the evaluation thus has expanded to include a number of other divisions and actors.

Figure 3. Institutional Arrangements 2008-2012



Institutional Arrangements as of 2013



3.3 *FAO's Normative Work in Transition*

28. Though a number of initiatives, both within the OR3 framework and beyond it, can be said to relate to the umbrella term “post crisis transition”, and a certain effort went into discussing the concept, it is generally agreed that there is no shared understanding of its implications within FAO. There are, however, a number of documents and normative products that provide guidance on the role of FAO in transition (see Annex e for an initial mapping), one of the earliest and perhaps most important being the ‘*Anti-Hunger Programme. A twin-track approach to hunger reduction: priorities for national and international action*’. FAO 2003

4 **Evaluation purpose**

29. Evaluations serve the dual objectives of accountability and learning. As such, the evaluation will:

- Assess and report on the appropriateness and effectiveness of FAO’s work in post crisis transition at country level over the past 6 years (accountability), and;
- Will examine FAO’s comparative advantage in supporting timely transition, formulating recommendations on the future implementation of SO5 in this respect (learning).
- Proactively seek to inform the global agenda on agriculture and food security in protracted crisis – in particular, FAO’s strategy and guidance for delivering in L3 emergencies and the CFS Agenda for Action.

5 **Evaluation framework**

5.1 *Scope and criteria*

30. The Evaluation will adopt, as a starting point, the Organization’s definition of transition, already stated above, as the over-arching criterion for assessing the work of the Organization. This is “*the process of linking immediate objectives (meeting the immediate needs of the disaster/crisis affected population through emergency operations) to medium and long-term development objectives*”.²¹


31. In line with this, the evaluation of how FAO operates in a post-crisis transition context will mean looking beyond the assessment of the Organization’s work in relief, i.e. providing agricultural inputs to replace lost livelihood assets, and broadening the analysis to include the extent to which the relief operations are in line with, are informed by, and pave the way for the delivery of the Organization’s core functions, i.e. policy advice, knowledge generation, assembly, analysis, monitoring and enabling access to data and information on food security, capacity development.

32. The evaluation will examine how FAO has promoted transition both during and after the more acute phases of the crisis (contiguum and continuum concept – see diagram below) – and with what results. While all crisis contexts are included within the scope of the

²¹ FAO/SOI Indicator Compendium.

evaluation, given the number of previous evaluations covering FAO’s work in disasters (in particular the recent DRR evaluation 2012) and the specific challenges of working in conflict settings, the evaluation will have more focus on transition in fragile states which have experienced conflict-related emergencies, comparing and contrasting FAO performance in such setting with that in disaster settings.

Figure 4: Evaluation Depiction of the Twin Track Approach²²



Source: Adapted from the Guidance note on early recovery, Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery, April 2008.

33. The evaluation will assess FAO’s work in all regions over the period 2007-2013. Countries to be considered will include all countries classified by the OECD/INCAF as fragile states that have faced important emergencies over the past decade (Annex c). As a large number of these countries are in Africa, this region will receive proportionately more attention in terms of data gathering and analysis for the evaluation.

34. The evaluation will primarily focus on FAO’s performance at country level; in doing so, it will also determine what roles other units within the organization, namely decentralized

²² This figure depicts a twin track approach in a very large scale emergency context or what is called by the IASC a “Level 3 Emergency Response”. The set up on the left depicts roles, responsibilities and mechanisms as per the DGB 2013 on L3 Emergencies.

offices and units and HQ, have played, what support they have provided and what have been the results. How FAO builds on its comparative advantage and draws on the organizations core functions will be particularly important in this respect.

35. The extent to which FAO has considered gender equity and social inclusion in the design and implementation of its transition strategy will also be examined. Data collected will be disaggregated by sex and age, and when possible, by further parameters such as ethnic or livelihood group to understand how these groups have been affected differently by FAO's work in crisis/post crisis periods.

36. During the period 2007-2013 FAO has had three strategic frameworks, each giving a slightly different focus to FAO's emergency and rehabilitation work. The Strategic Framework 2010-2019 provides the most explicit framework for FAO's work in post-crisis transition (Strategic Objective I, organizational result 3). The evaluation will use this framework and related indicators as a starting point for assessing the organizations performance but will go further, particularly in light of the latest strategic framework which most clearly frames FAO's work in this area under the rubric of resilience (SO 5).

37. The evaluation will assess FAO's work in post-crisis transition against the internationally accepted evaluation criteria, namely relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. In compliance with OED policy, the recent introduction in FAO of the UN programming principles and the relevance of the Humanitarian principles in this context, the evaluation will also use the following criteria during its assessment, as appropriate:

- Gender mainstreaming for gender equality;
- Mainstreaming of Capacity Development;
- Integration of Human Rights, Right to Food and Decent Work principles;
- Connectedness, partnerships and alliances;
- Do No Harm

5.2 *Theory of change*

38. In the absence of a specific stated aim²³ for FAO's transition work, the evaluation has as an interim measure established the main goal of transition as *reducing the dependency of national Government and the population on international relief and encouraging self-reliance and productivity while safeguarding and improving the food security of the affected population.*²⁴ FAO seeks to contribute to this goal through support, in different measures, for capacity development at individual, organizational and enabling environment levels. Interventions associated with this approach may involve context and conflict analysis, needs and capacity assessments, strategic planning and development of assistance (and exit) strategies, forging of partnerships, resource mobilization (for country recovery plans and for FAO's support to it), technical support, policy advice, etc. and involve a shift in perspective from seeing the international community as responsible to seeing Government and other national actors as the duty-bearers and owners of the relief and recovery process.

²³ SOI's overarching objective is improved preparedness and response in emergencies which does not seem to be clearly linked to the transition strategy except insofar as transition builds in resilience/preparedness and that post crisis work is part of FAO's overall "response".

²⁴ This goal is distilled from the literature including UNDP Early Recovery approaches.

39. FAO’s own guidance (annex a), suggests that the elements of a successful transition approach include inter alia:

- Interventions (project/programme) that meet the immediate needs of the affected population and are in support of national strategy and policy in the sector
- Emergency/rehabilitation interventions that are couched in existing and planned institutions
- Programmes and interventions that have a clear exit strategy
- Building resilience and reducing risk
- National ownership

5.3 *Evaluation questions*

40. The evaluation will structure the assessment around the guiding questions below. As both an accountability and learning focussed exercise, the evaluation will seek to explore the reasons why changes have or have not been seen in each of the areas of inquiry – and what the implications are of these changes. The questions will be further refined and finalized by the team leader after the evaluation meta analysis (phase I), identifying sources of data to answer each question and judgement criteria within an evaluation matrix.

Question 1

To what extent has FAO promoted and played an active role in supporting effective transition from relief to rehabilitation and development? What have been the results?

Question 2

To what extent has FAO’s work in crisis/post-crisis settings empowered disadvantaged people/groups/communities?

Question 3

To what extent is the recent decentralization of emergency and rehabilitation operations to country level resulting in a more integrated (twin-track) programming approach in a post-crisis context? How has the role out of the Reviewed Strategic Framework and the establishment of the Protocol for Level 3 Emergencies affected FAO’s ability to programme for transition?

41. These overarching questions will be further articulated as shown in Box 3 below.

Box 3. Guiding questions and sub-questions for the evaluation

N.	1. To what extent has FAO promoted and played an active role in supporting effective transition from relief to rehabilitation and development? What have been the results?	Related evaluation criteria
<i>1</i>	How well has FAO supported countries (Government and partners) to collect and analyse information on needs and capacities (3 levels) during and after the onset of an emergency, and to undertake conflict analysis? (SO5/O3.3) Have assessment and monitoring tools been adequate to allow for disaggregated analysis and to gauge the timeliness, appropriateness and cost-effectiveness of shifting from one assistance modality to the other? Has information generated been used	Effectiveness

	to adapt programming and targeting?	
2	Has FAO supported countries to develop and deploy rehabilitation plans or resource mobilization strategies for agricultural recovery and transition? (SOI/I3.1)	Effectiveness
3	To what extent has FAO's normative work (standard, guidelines and good practices) been useful to assist countries in transition? How is learning engendered between countries on successful approaches to transition?	Effectiveness
4	As crisis affected households shift from food aid recipients to food producers, and as their agricultural input needs increase, input/output markets become increasingly important. To what extent has FAO's crisis and post crisis work built on and affected markets? (SO5/O3.2) How has this affected male and female livelihoods?	Effectiveness
5	To what extent has FAO supported capacity development post-crisis? Has this lead to adoption and implementation of measures to strengthen the resilience of food and agricultural systems? (SOI/I3.2)	Impact
7	What has been the contribution of FAO work to both food security and economic growth in the post crisis period? Where has been the focus and has this been justified?	Impact
8	Have there been any unintended impacts associated with untimely (too late/too early) shifts from a humanitarian to a developmental assistance modality?	Impact
9	Have FAOs emergency and rehabilitation efforts used existing and planned institutions (avoided creating parallel systems)? What have been the challenges? In what way have other partnerships been important and how have these changed?	Sustainability
10	Do FAO-supported emergency interventions include exit strategies and are they linked/consistent with medium- to long-term recovery and development objectives? (SOI/I3.3). To what extent has FAO supported revisiting of development objectives in situations where the context has changed significantly as a result of the shock/crisis?	Sustainability Effectiveness
11	How timely has FAO been in shifting the types of interventions from asset replacement to asset building? How well has the organization been able to mobilize resources for transition programming work?	Efficiency
12	How appropriate is FAO's reviewed strategic framework and approach for supporting transition approaches? Are the outcomes and indicators related to transition appropriate?	Relevance
13	Does FAO have a comparative advantage in emergency contexts to support and advocate for a twin track approach and early recovery? How effectively has FAO leveraged partnerships (global, regional, country level) in transition efforts?	Relevance
14	What factors have contributed to FAO's achievements and which factors have constrained them?	

	2. To what extent has FAO's work in crisis/post-crisis settings empowered disadvantaged people/groups/communities?	
15	Has FAO contributed to livelihood diversification, including social protection for the more chronically vulnerable? (SO5/O3.1) How has FAO's analysis and programming differentiated amongst the needs of	Effectiveness

	males and females and between different groups? How effective has FAO's targeting been?	
16	Where the crisis affected-populations are vulnerable to recurrent natural shocks, has a disaster risk reduction approach been incorporated?	Effectiveness
17	Has FAOs work consistently taken gender into consideration from planning to implementation to monitoring of results? Have there been sufficient resources to do so?	Effectiveness
19	How has FAO engaged with affected communities to understand the needs and priorities from their perspective? How good have the mechanisms been for gathering feedback from these communities on the results of FAO supported implementation in the crisis/post crisis period?	Relevance
20	What factors have most affected FAO's ability to empower and strengthen the resilience of the most disadvantaged communities/households/groups?	

	3. To what extent is the recent decentralization of emergency and rehabilitation operations to country level resulting in a more integrated twin-track programming approach in crisis/post-crisis contexts?	
21	Do Country Programming Frameworks include a holistic analysis of acute and chronic food insecurity problems in the country? Do CPFs communicate a clear framework linking humanitarian and medium to long-term development objectives?	Relevance
22	Do staff have the necessary competencies to contribute to an FAO's transition strategy and its implementation? Are there special requirements for support to transition?	Effectiveness
23	To what extent has technical and investment officer support for the delivery of support to recovery and transition changed over the last 1-2 years? What are the reasons for this change?	Efficiency; Effectiveness
24	How well have country offices been able to balance the need to work according to humanitarian principles and their mandate to deliver on FAO's core functions?	Relevance Effectiveness
25	How effective is FAO in advocating for/promoting timely transition at global and country level? E.g. strategy development, resource mobilization, etc.	Effectiveness
26	How much of any observed change in FAO's ability to affect a twin track approach is associated decentralization – compared with other factors e.g. the reviewed strategic framework or implementation of the DGB/ 2013/32 and /or external factors?	
27	What issues still need to be addressed to ensure that FAO effectively implements and promotes/advocates for timely transition?	

5.4 Stakeholders analysis

42. FAO's work in emergency and recovery involves a broad range of different stakeholders. Box 4 below provides an overview of important stakeholders, their interests and role relating to FAO's work in transition work. It also shows how the evaluation plans their involvement in the process.

Box 4. Stakeholder Analysis

Stakeholders	Interests and role	Involvement in the evaluation
<i>FAO Governing Bodies through the Programme Committee</i>	Provide high level strategic direction to the Organization. Influential in driving and resourcing FAO programme strategy at global and country levels.	Endorsed the evaluation and will discuss the final report and Management response.
<i>Management of FAO (global level)</i>	Provide programmatic guidance in core areas of the SF including SO5.	Inception meeting; interviews; learning workshop; comments on final draft report; author of Management Response
<i>TCE staff</i>	Specific responsibility (SO Coordinator) for SO5; Advocacy and Resource mobilization at global level for transition activities	Inception meeting; on-going consultations; representation in reference group; interviews; data exchange; learning workshop; comments on final draft report; contribution to Management Response
<i>Technical Divisions, MDTs (RO/SRO), cross cutting theme groups²⁵, OSD, OSP, etc.</i>	Provide substantive input on FAO's delivery, including in post-crisis contexts.	Interviews; learning workshop; comments on final draft report
<i>FAO Management and staff at country level</i>	Responsible for country-level programming (CPF) and delivery; local resource mobilization for emergency, recovery and development related interventions.	Interviews in case study countries; survey; debriefings.
<i>Donors supporting FAO's Emergency and Development programming</i>	Substantial financial contributions to FAOs SO5 related work. Involved in donor global strategy on building resilience.	Interviews with selected donors at global and country level. Might use evaluation findings when determining future policies on funding transition and resilience

²⁵ Gender, Core Function Groups (Capacity Development, Partnerships, etc).

		work.
<i>People affected by conflict related crisis</i>	Benefit from successful transition and bear the costs of failed transition. Have no direct influence on FAO programming and delivery, except through consultative mechanisms such as needs assessments.	Interview in case study countries.
<i>Government Ministries and Civil Society Partners at country level</i>	Benefit from successful transition and bear the cost of failed transition. Depend on FAO as a partner. Influence FAO at country level through joint planning and cooperation efforts.	Interview in case study countries.
<i>UN agencies, in particular UNDP, OCHA and WFP, IASC Working Group on Transition and the UNDG-ECHA WGER</i>	Coordination among UN Agencies at country level on transition strategies; Within UN cluster system, UNDP leads on Recovery. WFP is co-leader on the FS Cluster and shares common FS objectives with FAO. Other agencies experience similar challenges in post-crisis transitioning and FAO may be able to learn from them.	Selected interviews at global and country level.

6 Evaluation methodology

6.1 Approach

43. The Evaluation will adhere to the UNEG Norms and Standards,²⁶ will be forward-looking and adopt a participatory approach, seeking and sharing opinions with stakeholders at different points in time. It will include in its assessment of FAO's role and work, the point of view of clients and users of its products and services, as well as of its partners.

44. Triangulation by the Evaluation team members of information gathered from stakeholders and through different tools will underpin the analysis and validation of evidence gathered. In addition, the team members will apply their own technical judgment in the assessment of, for example, the quality of normative, project and process outputs. Independence and rigour of analysis will inform the whole evaluation process.

45. The evaluation approach is defined by the guiding questions and the theory of change. An evaluation matrix will be prepared relating issues and questions to methods and tools, indicators and sources of information.

46. Due to the nature of the subject under evaluation, most of the analyses conducted will be qualitative in nature. Quantitative analysis tools will also be used as feasible and appropriate.

²⁶ United Nations Evaluation Group, <http://www.uneval.org/normsandstandards>

47. Time and space will be created for strategic conversations with FAO management at key points within the evaluation process – and efforts will be made to feed initial analysis into ongoing organizational planning processes where possible.

6.2 *Methods and tools*

48. The evaluation will be based on analysis of both primary and secondary data from a variety of different sources. Main tools planned are described below.

6.2.1 *Meta-analysis of OED past evaluations*

49. A meta-analysis of past OED’s evaluations of the work of the Organization in transition contexts will be a core tool of the evaluation. It will help to refine the theory of change and bring additional focus to the evaluation questions; determine where solid evidence already exists and where additional primary data gathering may be necessary. The meta analysis represents the first analytical stage for discussion with the expert panel.

50. The meta-analysis will also assess in detail the recommendations formulated by the past evaluations that tackled issues related to FAO’s work in crisis and post-crisis transition contexts. The accepted recommendations and the related actions planned through the Management Responses will inform the final list of evaluation questions and the questionnaire survey for FAO Representatives (see below), to provide a benchmark for corporate action in this area of work.

51. The meta-analysis will include evaluations that took place between 2007 and 2013. Approximately 50 country/ thematic/project evaluations have been identified. The 2012 Evaluation of FAO’s work in Disaster Risk Reduction will also be reviewed as this evaluation considered DRR in the post disaster context and it may prove useful to compare and contrast transition in conflict with transition post natural disasters.

52. Tasks and responsibilities: A senior consultant who is an expert in a transition related topic and an experienced evaluator will be recruited to undertake the review. Several team leaders from the more relevant evaluations will be invited to validate the synthesis and contribute to the other data gathering tools as members of the expert panel.

6.2.2 *Assessment of FAO’s work at country level*

53. A key analytical step in the evaluation will be the assessment of FAO’s efforts to promote transition at country level in both crisis and post-crisis situations, to assess the extent to which the Organization has been able to adjust its support to changing needs and conditions.

54. Desk reviews of key documents such as FAO’s Country Programming Frameworks (CPFs) and project documents and project evaluations will be important for examining how FAO considers the “twin track” approach at the programme formulation stage. This may be complemented by telephone interviews with a number of FAO Representatives to explore performance issues.

55. Countries to be visited will be selected based on a number of criteria, including:

- Portfolio size of so-called transition projects over the period;

- Diverse characteristics and dimension of the crisis, including both conflict-related and mixed conflict/natural disaster causes;
- On-going versus post- crisis context;
- Avoidance of overlap with other recent or on-going evaluations;
- Status as a New Deal pilot country.

56. Based on these criteria, the following countries are tentatively identified for country visits: Democratic Republic of Congo, Philippines, Uganda, Liberia, Mali and West Bank Gaza. A country evaluation in Colombia, while focussing on FAO's entire portfolio of work, will also provide specific information and analysis on FAO's work in transition. As South Sudan represents a rich case study but is currently not accessible due to security reasons, the evaluation will seek to examine FAOs work and performance using desk review and telephone interviews. Finally, a short mission to Myanmar (specifically look at the funding modalities in place there) is planned.

6.2.3 *Survey questionnaire of FAO Representatives and Partners*

57. The evaluation will conduct a survey of FAO Representatives and potentially partners in order to capture the views of these key stakeholders in all countries meeting the crisis/post crisis criteria with respect to the main evaluation questions. Answers will be treated anonymously.

6.2.4 *Other tools*

58. The evaluation team will complement the country-specific data gathering work with additional data gathering²⁷ and analysis at global level. These will help to better understand how FAO has corporately supported country level post crisis work. Interviews in headquarters and in regional offices will enable the evaluation team to capture the views of important FAO stakeholders and key resource partners. As part of the global and regional research, the following activities are foreseen:

59. To explore the regional dimensions of FAO's work in transition, the evaluation team will visit FAO Regional Offices in conjunction with country visits in the same region, including RAP and the regional UN/donor/NGO humanitarian hub in Nairobi.

60. The evaluation team will conduct a series of interviews (mostly by phone, where possible face-to-face) with global internal and external stakeholders. They include the SO5 Coordinator and SO5 core team, the members of the inter-departmental SO5 team, Office for Support to Decentralized Offices (OSD), donor representatives from the main countries support FAO's transition work, WFP (OS Department), UNDP focal points for Early Recovery (programming and resource mobilization), and members of the IASC Working Group on Transition and the UNDG-ECHA WGER.

²⁷ Rich sources of information that will be exploited through desk review include the Country Programming Frameworks and existing reviews, Self-Assessments of Country Offices undertaken in 2012 in the context of the decentralization of emergency operations to country level, portfolio analysis and review of country project documentation, etc.

61. The evaluation team will also review FAO normative products²⁸ on the theme of post-crisis transition. The review will examine the coherence between the various normative products. The survey and country missions will inquire about the usefulness and perceived quality of the products. Normative work to be examined include:

- FAO Products listed in section 3.3. above;
- Relevant non-evaluation documentations related to lessons learned exercises;
- Global strategies on transition and resilience by other partners.

6.3 Risks, Challenges, and limitations

62. Evaluating a complex construct such as transition involves specific challenges, risks and limitations. This section explains the main challenges and how the evaluation will address them.

63. The decentralization of FAO's emergency operations is very recent and assessment of its results, and the impact of other changes associated with the reviewed strategic framework and the new L3 protocols, may be premature. The evaluation will limit itself to examining how the decentralization is affecting FAO's programming (planning) and resource mobilization strategies.

64. Finally, the survey is a very important data source for this evaluation. The survey administered for the recent DRM evaluation had too low a response rate to be used. To maximize country coverage, the questionnaire will be limited to essential questions and non-responses will be followed up with requests for telephone interviews.

6.4 The evaluation report

65. The evaluation report will address the evaluation issues and questions based on analysis of data and evidence collected through the primary and secondary sources. The report will objectively assess FAO's performance in post-crisis transition context against the evaluation criteria defined above. The report will focus on findings, conclusions and recommendations. It will include an executive summary. Supporting data and analysis should be made available as annexes of the report when considered important to complement the main report and for future reference.

66. The structure of the report should facilitate linkages between the body of evidence, analysis and formulation of recommendations. These will have to be evidence-based, relevant, focused, clearly formulated and actionable and should be addressed to the different stakeholders.

67. The Team Leader and the Evaluation Team will agree on the outline of the report early in the evaluation process and the report will be prepared in English, following the Basic standards for OED evaluation reports.

²⁸ The evaluation will apply relevant guidance found in the UNEG Handbook for Conducting Evaluations of Normative Work in the UN. 2014.

6.5 *Quality assurance*

68. An expert panel will be assembled to provide independent and high-quality technical inputs to the evaluation, playing an advisory role to the evaluation team. The expert panel will provide its comments and suggestions on evaluation outputs and in particular the final draft report. See Annex f.

69. FAO Office of Evaluation has developed quality assurance processes and tools (peer review, checklists, templates) based on the UN Evaluation Group norms and standards which will be systematically applied during the course of the evaluation.

7 **Organization of the evaluation**

7.1 *Roles and responsibilities*

70. The Evaluation Team is responsible vis-à-vis FAO Office of Evaluation for the technical and substantive contents of the evaluation. The Evaluation Team Leader will be responsible for the quality of the substantive contents of the report; nevertheless, OED through the peer-review mechanism will retain the responsibility for ensuring the overall quality of the report in terms of comprehensiveness of the evidence gathered, robustness of the analysis, coherence, logic and clarity of the links between evidence and conclusions and recommendations.

71. The team will produce written outputs at each stage of the evaluation (synthesis report, aid-mémoire for country missions, survey report, interview notes, etc.), structuring the findings around the key evaluation questions. Team members will contribute to the draft evaluation report, will consider comments on the report in its finalization, and will support the design and implementation of evaluation learning and dissemination events.

72. FAO will prepare its Management Response to the final evaluation report, in which it will express its overall judgment of the evaluation process and report and accept, partially accepts or reject each recommendation. For accepted recommendations, responsibilities and timetable for implementation will also be indicated; for rejected recommendations, a justification should be provided.

7.2 *Profile of the evaluation team and composition*

73. The Evaluation will be led by an independent senior consultant who will guide the work of the other independent team members (3). Managerial, administrative and logistics support will be provided by OED. Gender and regional balance will be pursued in the team composition to ensure diversity of perspectives – and at least one of the team members will have proven experience in integrating gender and human rights considerations in evaluations.

74. All team members will have considerable professional experience in humanitarian and development settings; they will have no previous direct involvement in the formulation, implementation or backstopping of FAO's work in the Region during the period under evaluation. All will sign the Declaration of Interest form of the FAO Office of Evaluation.

75. The team will comprise the following skill-mix: expertise in conflict analysis and programming in conflict and post-conflict contexts, experience in independent thematic evaluations, expertise in technical areas related to rural development/agriculture related livelihoods, and with a demonstrated ability to work at a policy/strategic level. Team members will demonstrate an ability to write succinct evidenced based analysis.

76. FAO Office of Evaluation will be part of the Evaluation Team with the following resources:

- the Evaluation Manager, who is responsible for managing the process and will contribute guidance on issues relating to FAO structure, working mechanisms and procedures, project and programme management and evaluation methodology;
- one Evaluation Analyst, who will be responsible for desk studies, survey management, the analysis of FAO's procedures for operations and administration and for providing knowledge on FAO during the country visits.

7.3 *Organizational aspects and time schedule*

77. During the preparatory phase, the OED team assigned to the evaluation carried out an extensive interviews with FAO stakeholders and external partners, to define the scope, purpose and methodology of the evaluation and identify the key evaluation questions. The final output of the preparatory phase is the present overall Terms of Reference for the Evaluation including the evaluation methodology.

78. OED will identify and recruit the Team Leader and team members for the evaluation and organize the work of the team. The Team Leader will contribute, insofar as possible, to the preparation of the evaluation tools.

79. OED will compile background documentation on FAO's work in post-crisis transition and on the countries to be visited, based on FAO databases and other sources. This will include detailed information on FAO's work in the countries, funded through all sources and provided from all locations, information on the countries to be visited, relevant FAO's policies, findings from the first round of meetings.

80. Individual Terms of Reference will be prepared for each team member, indicating specific areas of work and evaluation issues to be assessed. OED will organize an internal briefing session for the Evaluation Team at the beginning of the first mission, to allow all team members to have access to information on FAO as a global organization, on evaluation methods and approaches and on their respective tasks in the team.

81. The synthesis of previous relevant evaluations will be completed in February 2014. The team will assemble in FAO HQ at the beginning of March, to be briefed by OED, to discuss the synthesis and to prepare data gathering and analysis tools and methods. HQ interviews will take place prior to the start of country visits, which carried out in the period March-April 2014.

82. Once country visits and all data-gathering and analytical work have been completed, under the Team Leader's coordination, the team will prepare its draft report. This will be circulated to FAO internal stakeholders in June 2014, allowing three weeks for comments and suggestions. The team will integrate these as appropriate in the final report, which will be completed by late July 2014.

83. The tentative time-schedule for the evaluation is shown in Box 5.

Box 5. Tentative evaluation time-schedule

	Data Gathering & Analysis				Report Writing	Management Response	Support to diffusion	Discussion Programme Committee
	Jan	Feb	March	Apr	May-July	August-September	October-November	November
<i>ToR finalization; identification and recruitment of evaluation team members</i>	x							
<i>Meta-evaluation</i>	x							
<i>Desk review of normative products, CPFs and other key documents</i>	x							
<i>FAOR Survey</i>			x					
<i>Mission preparations</i>	x	x	X					
<i>Country and Regional Missions</i>			X	x				
<i>Report drafting, review and finalization</i>					X			
<i>Management response</i>						X		
<i>Support to diffusion within FAO</i>							x	
<i>Discussion at the FAO 116 Programme Committee</i>								X

ANNEXES TERMS OF REFERENCE

Annex a) Terms of Reference

Strategic objective I, Organizational result 3: Countries and partners have improved transition and linkages between emergency, rehabilitation and development

Transition: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development

The concept of ‘transition’ often raises the question - transition to what? The focus here is moving from life-saving/sustaining (emergency relief) conditions towards market, government, natural resource management and productive asset improvements (rehabilitation) and onwards to longer-term development. The latter may be defined in terms of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) or other government-defined strategic development objectives.

FAO defines ‘transition’ as a process of linking immediate objectives (meeting the immediate needs of the disaster/shock-affected population through emergency operations) to medium and long term development objectives. Transition, therefore, begins in the immediate aftermath of a shock.

Transition implies that we understand the development phase as static and we can build towards it. This assumption may be questionable if the shock (sudden or protracted) of a crisis alters the conditions needed for development and a return to pre-shock processes may no longer be appropriate. Therefore, successful transitions should question the pre-existing development objectives and processes to consider how best to move toward new scenarios and re-defined objectives.

The challenges of linking relief, rehabilitation and development has occupied humanitarian and development debate for at least three decades. It has been argued that emergencies are costly in terms of life and resources; disruptive of development; demand long period of rehabilitation and spawn bureaucratic structures, and create conflicting lines of communication and organisational structures.

In an effort to link emergency, rehabilitation and development, the UN humanitarian system established cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER), as part of the overall humanitarian reform process in 2005. FAO has actively participated in CWGER²⁹ supporting the development of a framework on Early Recovery (ER) as a way to ensure transition. By definition ER is “... a multidimensional process of recovery that begins in a humanitarian setting. It is guided by development principles that seek to build on humanitarian programmes and catalyze sustainable development opportunities. It aims to generate self sustaining, nationally owned, resilient processes for post crisis recovery.”

Current FAO framework on transition is based on the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review (TCPR) of 2007 (A/C.2/62/L.63). The TCPR recognizes the role of the UN

²⁹The Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER) includes 24 international UN agencies and NGOs

development system in transition from relief to development, requests that the system “*strengthen interdepartmental and inter-agency coordination in order to ensure an integrated, coherent and coordinated approach to assistance at the country level*”. The TCPR emphasizes the need to adapt to the specificities of each country setting, to respond to national demand and to focus on capacity development, and calls on countries to “*provide timely, predictable and sustained financial contributions for the operational activities of the United Nations system for early recovery and long-term development for countries in transition from relief to development.*”

The implications of linking relief, rehabilitation and development are, (i) relief should take into account the rehabilitation, recovery and development needs – at best contribute to long term development objectives and at least ‘do no harm’ to the process of development; (ii) development planning should identify disaster risks and institutionalise preparedness for and response to disasters while protecting vulnerable households against risks as part of the development agenda.

Notwithstanding the merits of transition as a process and the importance of backward and forward linkages across the emergency-development space, it is important to bear in mind that *external factors*, often influenced more by policy than technical considerations, often determine when interventions shift from humanitarian to development. Firstly, the structure of some donor institutions may not allow for a smoothly integrated transition, as different entities within a donor institution may be responsible for emergency, rehabilitation and development financing. The exit and entry of different players can disrupt support for transition across the emergency-development spectrum.

Secondly, political and other strategic considerations may influence government decisions to announce the end of one phase and the start of another. Sometimes national governments may not even consider declaring an emergency, despite overwhelming evidence.

The UN system itself often sends signals on transition through decisions to deploy or withdraw a UN Humanitarian Coordinator (UNHC), which in turn influence the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) and donor funding responses. While these are operational rather than theoretical principles, the presence or absence of a CAP funding mechanism, donor emergency funding resources and a UNHC function are in practice the main triggers of a transition phase, and are often not well synchronized with relief and development objectives.

Lastly, internal FAO processes are not well suited to supporting successful transition and need to be improved. Emergencies are either declared or understood through a combination of national and international mechanisms, triggering the involvement of the FAO Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division (TCE). Not infrequently, other FAO technical units are involved to check project quality or support programme development but the involvement is limited and the processes are seldom explicit. A reduction in humanitarian funding and government decisions to curtail emergency operations, usually mark the end of the emergency phase.

The challenge for the OR3 group is to promote transition through an enabling internal FAO environment and to avail of external opportunities to link emergency, rehabilitation and development in agriculture, forestry and fisheries work.

Programme support costs (PSC) is an important issue requiring attention. In the absence of TCE surge-capacity, FAO country and regional offices may not have sufficient resources to handle a sudden increase in operations. These are some of the challenges the Organizational result 3 (Or3) group will consider to facilitate an internal environment that enables successful transition.

The Continuum/Contiguum Debate³⁰

Experiences from Indian Ocean Tsunami, Afghanistan, Somalia, Uganda, Sudan, DR Congo and elsewhere have highlighted an additional dimension in the debate and its implications for relief and development practice. The '*relief-development continuum*' model clearly defines the relief, rehabilitation and development phases and how different actors responsible for the respective phase may smoothly enter and leave the pitch handing over responsibility to the institution responsible for the next phase, resembling a relay race.

Several studies have shown that a linear transition is neither feasible nor effective in most cases. It is frequently necessary to simultaneously engage in relief operations, recovery and development over the same space and time. This calls for an integrated approach that removes or blurs the boundaries between different phases.

The '*contiguum approach*' attempts to address acute needs and simultaneously contribute to development processes and plans with a view to reduce vulnerability and exposure to risk while contributing to achieving development objectives. The contiguum approach emphasises the fact that compartmentalising post-disaster efforts into relief, recovery and development phases can be counterproductive to the countries best interests. Early Recovery, as mentioned earlier, is one of the mechanisms to implement the contiguum model and is applied at the beginning of a crisis.

FAO, as part of reform process has embarked on an effort to implement the *contiguum model*. This is captured under Strategic objective I, Organizational result 3: Countries and partners have improved transition and linkages between emergency, rehabilitation and development. The challenges to implement this strategic objective are numerous; some of which are internal to FAO and some external. However, a sustained effort over a period of years to build the internal and external partnerships, improve communication with stakeholders, to provide the needed tools and new working practices should improve cohesion and rally support for an improved corporate FAO approach to transition.

Notwithstanding the challenges, FAO is in a good position to ensure relief-development contiguum as much of its emergency work is in recovery and rehabilitation, where building synergies and linkages with long-term development can build upon existing technical capacity and institutional relationships. In addition, FAO is in the process of defining its strategic objectives and streamlining its organisational results in support of its mandate. This presents a unique opportunity to ensure strong internal linkages that support the relief-development contiguum.

³⁰ This section draws on the following literature:

1. Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell: Linking relief and development: An introduction and overview.
2. Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri: Tsunami evaluation coalition: LRRD – A review of the debate, 2005.
3. Tania Kaiser, Williams S, Smilie I: LRRD Policy Study, 2006.
4. VENRO Working Paper, Feb. 2006: LRRD, Approaches and financing instruments to improve the transition between relief, rehabilitation and development cooperation.
5. Ian Christoplos, July 2006: LRRD – Risk reduction indicators.

In its recent Operational Strategy, TCE addressed a number of issues that begin to link relief, recovery and development by addressing some of the internal challenges. The Operational Strategy advocates a programme approach informed by a thorough needs assessment in collaboration and partnership with FAO's technical divisions and other international partners. This would, in theory, allow FAO to consider an emergency more holistically and ensure relief, recovery and development contiguity.

The involvement of FAO technical divisions in needs assessment and programme formulation or any other form of response formulation would allow for a more integrated approach by drawing on past experience and building synergies with existing projects, programmes and contribute to long term strategies. External partnerships can improve the efficacy of emergency interventions.

There need not be conflict between emergency, rehabilitation and development efforts. In fact they have to go hand in hand and the more these stages are tightly defined the more difficult it becomes to implement successful transition. In effect, the involvement of different players at different stages following an emergency is an internal management arrangement, which should be kept to a minimum.

The contiguity model may be best suited to slow-onset, complex and protracted emergencies, when simultaneous efforts are necessary to address immediate emergency needs and design programmes/plans to contribute to long term development objectives. The latter could include, institutions building, developing governance rules and regulations for natural resources management, strengthening service delivery systems, production systems, and information systems.

In sudden onset disasters, when food and livelihoods security are suddenly disrupted and existing institutions have exhausted their capacity to respond, there may be a case for using the continuum model. This would ensure that response efforts are focussed intensively on the immediate needs of the affected population before incurring the costly and long-term consequences of food and livelihoods insecurity. The continuum model, while focusing on a specific geographic area and population as a priority response to a sudden-onset disaster, will also ensure synergies with medium and long term development objectives.

Some elements of the relief-development continuum/contiguity are highlighted below and may lend themselves as indicators for 'transition'.

- Seamless transition: Relief should be couched as part of the overall needs of the affected population with consideration for medium- and long-term needs. Relief and recovery efforts should lay the foundation for more resilient livelihoods that can withstand shocks in the future.
- Enhance capacities: Relief and rehabilitation efforts should build on local coping mechanisms and fully based on strategic use and management of natural resources, guided by socio-economic, cultural and environmental contexts with a view to strengthen community and household resilience.

- Avoid reinforcing vulnerability: Relief and recovery should be designed to avoid the return to faulty pre-existing systems, institutions, production systems or natural resource management systems, which may inadvertently reinforce vulnerability.
- Inclusive assessment and planning: Relief and recovery planning should recognise that the affected population and their institutions are at targets for sustainable recovery and should be consulted and involved in the assessment and planning of relief and recovery operations.
- Link with disaster preparedness: Relief and recovery operations should have a direct link with disaster preparedness with a view to build capacities and resilience among local and national stakeholders to better cope with future disasters, reduce vulnerability and enhance future development prospects.
- Revisit development objectives: Transition to a specific set of government endorsed objectives (e.g. medium- to long-term development objectives) are at the core of the transition concept. In view of the changes in natural resource base, institutional arrangements, social capital and other changes as a result of the shock, it is necessary to revisit the objectives where transition efforts are heading.
- Internal organisational arrangements: Roles and responsibilities throughout the transition need to be clearly defined to ensure that an internal management issue does not translate into a project problem and hence compromise the efficacy of any interventions. Some of these may be spelled out in the NMTPF and/or national strategies.

What constitutes a successful transition?

This question has partly been addressed in the previous section. To avoid a strict definition, we identify characteristics of successful transition that are relevant to FAO projects and programmes. These are intended as initial guidance that merits further development.

- ***Interventions (project/programme) meet the immediate needs of the affected population and are in support of national strategy and policy in the sector***: Almost all countries have developed national policies and strategies for the agricultural sector or sub-sectors (livestock, seeds ,irrigation, forestry etc.), either on its own or with assistance from international partners. A shock may have derailed the country from its path to achieving long/medium-term development objectives. A successful transition would meet the immediate and time-critical needs of the affected population and ensure that necessary measures (in the form of projects and programmes) are taken to set the country back on its path to development. For this to happen, the emergency and rehabilitation projects and programmes should be based on evidence of needs and the country's medium and long-term strategies, policies and programmes.
- ***Emergency/rehabilitation interventions are couched in existing and planned institutions***: Creating new institutions and lines of communications in parallel with development institutions have usually led to protracted emergency operations and hence an impediment to a smooth transition. A successful transition requires that emergency and rehabilitation efforts use existing institutions with additional temporary mandate and surge capacity. This may not always be feasible as some of

development institutions may not have sufficient flexibility to address emergency and rehabilitation efforts. In such cases, efforts should be made to keep new institutions and lines of communications to a minimum, directly related to the development institutions and, importantly, there has to be a clear exit strategy and an eventual integration of responsibilities in existing institutions.

- ***A clear exit strategy:*** Institutional exit strategy has already been covered as part of the institutional arrangements. Exit strategy here relates to a gradual integration of emergency and rehabilitation activities in development objectives, outcomes and outputs. For this to happen, the design of emergency-rehabilitation activities should aim to converge with development outputs and outcomes.
- **Building resilience and reducing risk:** Successful transition requires building household, community and institutional resilience and reducing future risks and vulnerabilities to disasters.
- **National ownership:** National institutions need to drive interventions in the aftermath of a disaster to ensure ownership, a necessary condition for transition. Large-scale disasters may have affected the operational and leadership capacities of national institutions and it may not always be feasible for national institutions to take immediate ownership of initial activities. However, measures should be taken to ensure national institutions are able to take charge within a reasonable period of time.

Annex b) Terms of Reference - List of Persons Met During Preparation Phase

Name	Unit	Title
Jeff Tschirley	TCER	Chief
Lucia Palombi	TCER	Programme Adviser
Laurent Thomas	TCDD	ADG
Richard China	TCS	Director
Cristina Amaral	TCEO	Chief
Daniele Donati	TCEC	Chief
Rodrigue Vinet	TCEO	Senior Project Coordinator
Sue Lautze	TCEO	Senior Programme Officer
Alex Jones	TCID	Senior Programme Development Officer
Neil Marsland	TCER	Senior Technical Officer / Food Security Analyst (LAT)
Gwynn Lewis	TCER	Humanitarian Policies Officer
Charlotte Dufour	AGN	Technical Officer (Nutrition)
Stephan Baas	NRC	Natural Resource Officer
David Phiri	TCS	Chief
Michael Griffin	TCS	Senior Policy Officer (EST)
Alexia Baldascini	TCSP	Programme Officer
Aziz Arya	TCSF	Food Security Officer
Yon Fernandez Larrinoa	OCE	Project Coordinator
Martina Buonincontri	TCER	Consultant
Nicholas Crawford	TCER	Policy Support to Emergency Operations
David Brown	FID	Fisheries and aquaculture officer
Florence Poulain	FID	Fisheries and aquaculture officer
Patrick Jacqueson	TCER	Senior Programme Officer
Sally Berman	OEK	Capacity Development Officer
Thomas Osborne	AGP	Senior Officer
Joseph Kienzle	AGS	Agricultural Engineer
Alexandra Rottger	AGS	Agricultural Economist
Fabrizio Cesaretti	TCEC	Liaison and Operations Officer
Rym Benzid	TCIA	Agricultural Officer
Tiziana Buffagni	TCEO	Operations Officer (now AGPM)
Luis Dias Pereira	TCIO	Economist (now TCIC)
Jim Hancock	TCIN	Natural Resources Management Officer (TCIB)
Yoshiko Ishihara	TCIN	Investment Support Officer (Now TCIB)
Julius Jackson	TCEC	Technical Officer (now ESA)
Wadzanai Katsande	TCIA	Investment Support Officer
Matthew Keil	TCEC	Operations Officer
Pamela Pozarny	TCIA	Rural Sociologist
Andrea Russo	TCEO	Operations Officer (now FAOW)
Sylvie Wabbes Candotti	TCEO	Liaison and Operations Officer
Luca Russo	ESA	Programme Coordinator
Sandra Avilez	FAOLOG	Senior Liaison Officer
Daniel Longhurst	FAOLOG	Humanitarian Officer
Vito Cistulli	TCS	Senior Agricultural Policy Support Officer (now ESW)
Alessandra Zamberlin	TCS	Officer

Annex c) Terms of Reference

Evaluation of FAO's Work in Post Crisis Transition - Fragile States which have experienced a major crisis in the last 10 years or have high vulnerability ratings as fragile/conflict states (within scope of evaluation)

		Fragility Assesment/ Protracted Crisis			Natural hazards/ Climate change		Country Evaluation?	Project Evaluations (list)
		2010 SOFI protracted crisis (FAO 22 countries in Protracted Crisis)	DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) (OECD-DAC INCAF)	OECD 2013 Fragile states	Centre for Global Development (CGD) Overall Vulnerability (*4)	Top 30 CGD 2011 (Quantifying Vulnerability to Climate Change dataset 2010)		
Africa	Angola (end of civil war 2002)	x		x				GCP /ANG/033/SPA
	Burundi (peace agreement 2000)	x	x	x	x	x		
	Central African Republic (current conflict)	x	x	x	x	x		
	Chad	x	x	x	x	x		GCP /CHD/026/LIB; GCP /CHD/028/EC; OSRO/CHD/905/EC;
	Congo (peace treaty 2003)	x			x			
	Comoros		x	x		x		
	Cote D'Ivoire	x			x			
	DRC	x	x	x	x	x	2007	GCP /DRC/028/BEL; GCP /DRC/031/BEL; GCP /DRC/033/BEL
	Eritrea	x		x	x	x		
	Ethiopia (drought)	x		x	x	x	2010	GCP /ETH/071/EC;
	Guinea	x		x	x	x		GTFS/GUI/019/ITA;
	Kenya (conflict and drought)	x		x				OSRO/KEN/002/SWE
Liberia	x	x	x	x	x		OSRO/LIR/903/SWE; GTFS/LIR/010/ITA	

	Madagascar (locust invasion - current)				x	x		
	Mali (conflict now)				x	x		
	Niger			x		x		GCP /NER/040/LIB; GCP /NER/047/MUL;
	Sierra Leone (end of civil war 2002)	x	x	x		x	2006	GCP /SIL/032/GER; GTFS/SIL/028/ITA;
	Somalia	x	x	x		x	2013	GCP /SOM/045/EC; OSRO/SOM/510/EC; OSRO/SOM/511/EC; OSRO/SOM/702/USA; OSRO/SOM/604/EC; OSRO/SOM/608/EC; OSRO/SOM/810/EC; OSRO/SOM/811/EC; OSRO/SOM/004/EC;
	South Sudan (2005 peace agreement w/north but ongoing conflict)		x	x			2009	
	Sudan (ongoing conflict Darfur)	x		x		x	2009	GCP /SUD/051/LIB; OSRO/SUD/816/EC; OSRO/SUD/620/MUL; OSRO/SUD/621/MUL; OSRO/SUD/622/MUL; OSRO/SUD/623/MUL; OSRO/SUD/917/EC
	Togo		x	x		x		
	Uganda (civil conflict in north LRA/Karamoja and droughts)	x		x				
	Zimbabwe (political/economic crisis since 2000 forceable land distribution campaign)	x		x		x	2010	OSRO/ZIM/903/SWE
Asia and the Pacific	Afghanistan (new govt since 2001 but ongoing conflict)	x		x	x	x	2013	GCP /AFG/039/GER; GCP /AFG/050/GER; UTF /AFG/051/AFG; UTF /AFG/035/AFG; GCP /AFG/046/ITA; GCP /AFG/052/GER; GCP /AFG/053/GER; GCP /AFG/061/LUX; GCP /AFG/058/NOR; GCP /AFG/063/EC; GCP /AFG/056/GER
	Bangladesh (floods and typhoons and tsunami)			x	x	x		GCSP/BGD/033/JPN
	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	x		x	x			OSRO/DRK/101/SWE
	Indonesia (floods, tsunami and typhoons)							OSRO/INS/512/SPA; GCSP/INS/073/JPN; OSRO/INS/601/ARC
	Kyrgyzstan			x				OSRO/KYR/901/SWE

	Myanmar (conflict and floods)			x	x	x		GCP /MYA/009/EC; OSRO/MYA/902/SWE;
	Nepal			x	x			
	Pakistan			x	x		Flood Eval 2011	OSRO/PAK/701/SWE
	Philippines (current major typhoon response and previous tsunami)				x			OSRO/PHI/501/JPN; GCP /PHI/050/ITA
	Timor Leste (conflict 1999)		x	x				OSRO/TIM/701/AUL
	Sri Lanka (Tamil conflict and Tsunami)			x			2012	GCP /SRL/057/CAN
North Africa and Middle East	Lebanon (current large scale refugee crisis)				x			OSRO/LEB/701/UNJ; OSRO/LEB/702/UNJ
	Iraq (US military withdrawal 2011)	x		x	x			OSRO/IRQ/405/UDG; OSRO/IRQ/406/UDG; OSRO/IRQ/602/UDG; OSRO/IRQ/407/UDG
	West Bank & Gaza			x				
	Syria (current political crisis)							
	Yemen (current conflict)			x				
Americas and the Caribbean	Colombia (regional conflict)						2014	
	Haiti	x		x	x	x	2011	UTF /HAI/023/HAI; GCP /HAI/021/SPA; GCP /HAI/026/EC

Annex d) Terms of Reference

FAO Strategic Framework 2010-2019

Box 1. *FAO Members Global Goals*

Global Goals 2010-13	Global Goals 2014-17
a) Reduction of the absolute number of people suffering from hunger, progressively ensuring a world in which all people at all times have sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life;	Eradication of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition, progressively ensuring a world in which people at all times have sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life;
b) Elimination of poverty and the driving forward of economic and social progress for all with increased food production, enhanced rural development and sustainable livelihoods;	Elimination of poverty and the driving forward of economic and social progress for all, with increased food production, enhanced rural development and sustainable livelihoods;
c) Sustainable management and utilisation of natural resources, including land, water, air, climate and genetic resources, for the benefit of present and future generations.	Sustainable management and utilization of natural resources, including land, water, air, climate and genetic resources for the benefit of present and future generations.

Box 2. *FAO Strategic Objectives and Organizational Results 2010-13*

Code	Title	Lead Unit
A	Sustainable intensification of crop production	AG
A01	Policies and strategies on sustainable crop production intensification and diversification at national and regional levels	AGP
A02	Risks from outbreaks of transboundary plant pests and diseases are sustainably reduced at national, regional and global levels	AGP
A03	Risks from pesticides are sustainably reduced at national, regional and global levels	AGP
A04	Effective policies and enabled capacities for a better management of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA) including seed systems at the national and regional levels	AGP
B	Increased sustainable livestock production	AG
B01	The livestock sector effectively and efficiently contributes to food security, poverty alleviation and economic development	AGA
B02	Reduced animal disease and associated human health risks	AGA
B03	Better management of natural resources, including animal genetic resources, in livestock production	AGA
B04	Policy and practice for guiding the livestock sector are based on timely and reliable information	AGA
C	Sustainable management and use of fisheries and aquaculture resources	FI
C01	Members and other stakeholders have improved formulation of policies and standards that facilitate the implementation of the Code of Conduct for	FI

	Responsible Fisheries (CCRF) and other international instruments, as well as response to emerging issues	
C02	Governance of fisheries and aquaculture has improved through the establishment or strengthening of national and regional institutions, including RFBs	FIE
C03	More effective management of marine and inland capture fisheries by FAO Members and other stakeholders has contributed to the improved state of fisheries resources, ecosystems and their sustainable use	FIM
C04	Members and other stakeholders have benefited from increased production of fish and fish products from sustainable expansion and intensification of aquaculture	FIM
C05	Operation of fisheries, including the use of vessels and fishing gear, is made safer, more technically and socio-economically efficient, environmentally-friendly and compliant with rules at all levels	FII
C06	Members and other stakeholders have achieved more responsible post-harvest utilization and trade of fisheries and aquaculture products, including more predictable and harmonized market access requirements	FII
D	Improved quality and safety of food at all stages of the food chain	AG
D01	New and revised internationally agreed standards and recommendations for food safety and quality that serve as the reference for international harmonization	AGN
D02	Institutional, policy and legal frameworks for food safety/quality management that support an integrated food chain approach	AGN
D03	National/regional authorities are effectively designing and implementing programmes of food safety and quality management and control, according to international norms	AGN
D04	Countries establish effective programmes to promote improved adherence of food producers/businesses to international recommendations on good practices in food safety and quality at all stages of the food chain, and conformity with market requirements	AGN
E	Sustainable management of forests and trees	FO
E01	Policy and practice affecting forests and forestry are based on timely and reliable information	FOM
E02	Policy and practice affecting forests and forestry are reinforced by international cooperation and debate	FOE
E03	Institutions governing forests are strengthened and decision-making improved, including involvement of forest stakeholders in the development of forest policies and legislation, thereby enhancing an enabling environment for investment in forestry and forest industries. Forestry is better integrated into national development plans and processes, considering interfaces between forests and other land uses	FOE
E04	Sustainable management of forests and trees is more broadly adopted, leading to reductions in deforestation and forest degradation and increased contributions of forests and trees to improve livelihoods and to contribute to climate change mitigation and adaptation	FOM
E05	Social and economic values and livelihood benefits of forests and trees are enhanced, and markets for forest products and services contribute to making forestry a more economically-viable land-use option	FOE
E06	Environmental values of forests, trees outside forests and forestry are better realized; strategies for conservation of forest biodiversity and genetic	FOM

	resources, climate change mitigation and adaptation, rehabilitation of degraded lands, and water and wildlife management are effectively implemented	
F	Sustainable management of land, water and genetic resources and improved responses to global environmental challenges affecting food and agriculture	NR
F01	Countries promoting and developing sustainable land management	NRL
F02	Countries address water scarcity in agriculture and strengthen their capacities to improve water productivity of agricultural systems at national and river-basin levels including transboundary water systems	NRL
F03	Policies and programmes are strengthened at national, regional and international levels to ensure the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity for food and agriculture and the equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic resources	NRD
F04	An international framework is developed and countries' capacities are reinforced for responsible governance of access to, and secure and equitable tenure of land and its interface with other natural resources, with particular emphasis on its contribution to rural development	NRC
F05	Countries have strengthened capacities to address emerging environmental challenges, such as climate change and bioenergy	NRC
F06	Improved access to and sharing of knowledge for natural resource management	OEK
G	Enabling environment for markets to improve livelihoods and rural development	ES
G01	Appropriate analysis, policies and services enable small producers to improve competitiveness, diversify into new enterprises, increase value addition and meet market requirements	
G02	Rural employment creation, access to land and income diversification are integrated into agricultural and rural development policies, programmes and partnerships	ESW
G03	National and regional policies, regulations and institutions enhance the developmental and poverty reduction impacts of agribusiness and agro-industries	
G04	Countries have increased awareness of and capacity to analyse developments in international agricultural markets, trade policies and trade rules to identify trade opportunities and to formulate appropriate and effective pro-poor trade policies and strategies	EST
H	Improved food security and better nutrition	ES
H01	Countries and other stakeholders have strengthened capacity to formulate and implement coherent policies and programmes that address the root causes of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition	ESA
H02	Member countries and other stakeholders strengthen food security governance through the triple-track approach and the implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security	ESA
H03	Strengthened capacity of member countries and other stakeholders to address specific nutrition concerns in food and agriculture	AGN
H04	Strengthened capacity of member countries and other stakeholders to generate, manage, analyse and access data and statistics for improved food security and better nutrition	ESS

H05	Member countries and other stakeholders have better access to FAO analysis and information products and services on food security, agriculture and nutrition, and strengthened own capacity to exchange knowledge	ESA
I	Improved preparedness for, and effective response to, food and agricultural threats and emergencies	TC
I01	Countries' vulnerability to crisis, threats and emergencies is reduced through better preparedness and integration of risk prevention and mitigation into policies, programmes and interventions	TCE
I02	Countries and partners respond more effectively to crises and emergencies with food and agriculture-related interventions	TCE
I03	Countries and partners have improved transition and linkages between emergency, rehabilitation and development	TCE
K	Gender equity in access to resources, goods, services and decision-making in the rural areas	ES
K01	Rural gender equality is incorporated into UN policies and joint programmes for food security, agriculture and rural development	ESW
K02	Governments develop enhanced capacities to incorporate gender and social equality issues in agriculture, food security and rural development programmes, projects and policies using sex-disaggregated statistics, other relevant information and resources	ESW
K03	Governments are formulating gender-sensitive, inclusive and participatory policies in agriculture and rural development	ESW
K04	FAO management and staff have demonstrated commitment and capacity to address gender dimensions in their work	ESW
L	Increased and more effective public and private investment in agriculture and rural development	TC
L01	Greater inclusion of food and sustainable agriculture and rural development investment strategies and policies into national and regional development plans and frameworks	TCI
L02	Improved public and private sector organisations' capacity to plan, implement and enhance the sustainability of food and agriculture and rural development investment operations	TCI
L03	Quality assured public/private sector investment programmes, in line with national priorities and requirements, developed and financed	TCI

Box 3. FAO Strategic Objectives 2014-17

1	Contribute to the eradication of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition
2	Increase and improve provision of goods and services from agriculture, forestry and fisheries in a sustainable manner
3	Reduce rural poverty
4	Enable more inclusive and efficient agricultural and food systems at local, national and international levels
5	Increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises
6	Technical quality, knowledge and services

Box 4. FAO Core Functions 2010-13 and 2014-17

Core functions 2010-13		Core functions 2014-17	
<i>a</i>	Monitoring and assessment of long-term and medium-term trends and perspectives		
<i>b</i>	Assembly and provision of information, knowledge and statistics	2	Assemble, analyze, monitor and improve access to data and information, in areas related to FAO's mandate
<i>c</i>	Development of international instruments, norms and standards	1	Facilitate and support countries in the development and implementation of normative and standard-setting instruments, such as international agreements, codes of conduct, technical standards and others
<i>d</i>	Policy and strategy options and advice	3	Facilitate, promote and support policy dialogue at global, regional and country levels
		4	Advise and support capacity development at country and regional level to prepare, implement, monitor and evaluate evidence-based policies, investments and programmes
<i>e</i>	Technical support to promote technology transfer and build capacity	5	Advise and support activities that assemble, disseminate and improve the uptake of knowledge, technologies and good practices in the areas of FAO's mandate
<i>f</i>	Advocacy and communication	7	Advocate and communicate at national, regional and global levels, in areas of FAO's mandate
<i>g</i>	Inter-disciplinarity and innovation		
<i>h</i>	Partnerships and alliances	6	Facilitate partnerships for food security and nutrition, agriculture and rural development, between governments, development partners, civil society and the private sector

Box 5. FAO cross-cutting themes 2014-17

Gender
Governance

Annex e) Terms of Reference

Initial Mapping of FAO's Normative Work on Transition

- Anti-Hunger Programme. A twin-track approach to hunger reduction: priorities for national and international action. FAO 2003.
- Transition: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development. FAO 2011.
- Agriculture, Conflict and Stability: A call for renewed focus on protection and conflict sensitive programming in agriculture and food and nutrition security. FAO 2012.
- Strengthening Agriculture and Food Security Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Transition through Programming and Capacity Building - 2013/2014
- Post-conflict land tenure. FAO 2006.
- Towards effective and sustainable seed relief activities. FAO/CIAT 2003.
- State of Food Insecurity in the World 2010: Addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises. FAO 2010.
- FAO in Emergencies Guidance Note. Transitional Programming. FAO 2013.
- High Level Expert Forum on Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises provided an open space for consultation and policy dialogue to increase understanding and strengthen collaborative efforts to avert or at least deal with food and nutrition insecurity in protracted crises. 2012
- From Crisis to Development: Good Practices for Food and Nutrition Security represents a compilation of programmatic initiatives identified as good practices in transition founded on core principles of national ownership and capacity development, inclusive planning, building in disaster risk reduction, and promotion of market based initiatives. 2012.
- Beyond Relief – Food Security in protracted Crisis. Luca Alinovi, Günter Hemrich & Luca Russo. FAO 2008.
- The Livelihood Assessment Tool-kit- Analysing and responding to the impact of disasters on the livelihoods of people. FAO 2008.
- Guidance Note - Cash-based transfers in FAO's humanitarian and transition programming. FAO 2013.

Annex f) Terms of Reference

Expert Panel

Role of the Expert Panel

Since 2006, corporate evaluations in FAO have benefited of the guidance of Expert Panels composed of representatives of international organizations, and of experts in their personal capacity, specialised in the areas of work of the evaluation's subject matter. Expert Panels are an integral part of the evaluation process, with an advisory role aimed at enhancing the quality of the evaluation.

Expert Panels meet twice in the course of an evaluation. In the early stages of the process, the Panel has an advisory role for the finalization of the evaluation's scope and key questions. They will meet virtually, providing their short report as input into the evaluation. At the end of the evaluation process, the Panel will meet physically and will review the draft report, formulating comments and suggestions for its finalization.

Tasks of the Expert Panel for the Evaluation of FAO's work in post-crisis transition

The Evaluation will be guided in its work by the ToR prepared by the Office of Evaluation, which contain evaluation issues and questions identified during the initial preparation phase. The draft version will be circulated for comments among FAO stakeholders, and to the members of the Expert Panel.

The first phase of the independent evaluation will consist of the systematic synthesis of previous evaluations. During its first (virtual) meeting (end of January 2014), the Panel will discuss the terms of reference and the draft synthesis report. Based on the knowledge, experience and institutional role of its members, the Panel is asked to provide comments on the relevance, importance and priority of the issues already identified and suggest additional issues if appropriate. The Panel should thus comment on:

- issues that it supports, and the reasons why;
- issues that it disagrees with, and the reasons why;
- additional issues it feels should be included in the work of the evaluation team;
- comments and recommendations on the structure and methodology proposed for the evaluation if appropriate.

The Panel's observations and comments should be summarized in a brief report (max. five pages) which the evaluation team leader will take into consideration, as appropriate, in the finalization of questions and data gathering tools to be used during the second phase field missions.

To facilitate its task, it is suggested that the Panel should select a Chairperson and a rapporteur, from among Panel members. FAO Office of Evaluation staff will serve as Secretariat.

During the final report writing phase of the evaluation, the Panel will reconvene physically in FAO/HQ, Rome. As for the initial meeting, the Panel will discuss the draft report and, based on the knowledge, experience and institutional role of its members, will provide comments on the quality of the evidence and analysis, in particular challenging the team to focus on the most important findings and ensuring the recommendations are clearly evidenced based. In particular, the Panel may wish to advise the team on their own assessment of FAO's past and future role at global level in the crisis transition, given the evidence.

The Panel's observations and comments should be summarized in a brief report (max. five pages) which the evaluation team leader will take into consideration, as appropriate, in the finalization of the evaluation report.

Composition:

Brian Ganson (Chairperson), Margie Buchanan Smith, Lilianne Fan, Herbert Mcleod.

Annex g) Terms of Reference

Reference Group

The Reference Group will be comprised of key stakeholders to the evaluation and serves to guide the evaluation and help ensure its relevance, independence and transparency. The group will act in an advisory capacity without management or decision-making responsibilities.

The group will provide background information and contextual knowledge, so as to help ensure that evaluation is relevant, appropriate and adds value to the existing body of work, and also that the evaluation positions FAO's transition work within the overall humanitarian and development architecture. Members will serve as focal points within their units. The Reference Group will be expected to review and provide appropriate and timely feedback on draft evaluation products (i.e. Terms of Reference and Final Draft Report).

Tasks

Areas of engagement and responsibilities with which the Reference Group is tasked are:

- Provide substantive advice and feedback at all phases of the evaluative process;
- Provide advice and technical guidance on the development of evaluation Terms of Reference (ToR), methodology and indicators;
- Make suggestions on the composition of the evaluation team and make recommendations of suitable independent experts;
- Provide relevant background documents to inform desk review;
- Review and provide appropriate and timely feedback on evaluation deliverables (i.e. ToR, evaluation plan, Inception Report, draft(s) of the final report).
- Facilitate the engagement of key stakeholder groups in consultations around draft documents to help ensure that their perspectives are adequately represented;
- Actively participate in meetings and correspondence related to the smooth functioning of the evaluation; and
- Assist Evaluation Manager in coordinating field missions for Evaluation Team, facilitating in-country support on both substantive and logistical issues.
- Support wide dissemination of the results of the evaluation and promote the follow-up of recommendations.

Time Commitment

Meetings will be both face to face and virtual, conducted via email and video/teleconference. It is envisaged that no more than 4-5 such meetings will be convened over the lifetime of the Reference Group.

Composition

The Reference Group is comprised of individuals who have engaged on the issue of Transition (under SOI/OR3 and or are involved at strategic levels in SO5 and corporate work on resilience) coming from a cross-section of FAO departments/units. The SO5 Coordinator (Dominique Burgeon, Director TCE) will serve as Chair of the Reference Group, coordinating and facilitating its work.

Participants: Reference Group

SO5 Core Team (HQ)

SOC and Deputy SOC	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Burgeon, Dominique (TCE); 2. Chaya, Mona (AGDD); 3. Alinovi, Luca (FAOKE)
Co-leader (HQ)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Ahmed, Shukri (EST); 5. Baas, Stephan (NRC); 6. Brown, David (FIPI); 7. Douglas, Ian (AGAH); 8. Dufour, Charlotte (ESN); 9. Hammond, Winfred (AGPM); 10. Jacqueson, Patrick (TCE) (+ Coordination team); 11. Kienzle, Josef (AGPM); 12. Manssouri, Mohamed (TCID); 13. Poirson, JeanMichel (AGDF); 14. Poulain, Florence (FIPI); 15. Russo, Luca (ESA); 16. VanLierop, Pieter (FOM); 17. Vinet, Rodrigue (TCE); 18. WabbesCandotti, Sylvie (TCE) (+ Coordination team)
Transition experts	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Arya, Aziz (TCSS); 2. Aviles, Sandra (FAOLOG) 3. Battista, Federica (TCE) 4. Jackson, Julius (ESA); 5. Jones, Alexander (TCIO) 6. Joshi, Indira (TCE); 7. Palombi, Lucia (NRC); 8. Tschirley, Jeff (TCE)

Consultations will also be held with the broader internal stakeholder group including Strategic Objective Coordinators for SO 1,2,3 and 4 as well as technical focal points for SO5 in HQ and in the DOs.

Technical Support (HQ)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 9. Acunzo, Mario (OCP); 10. Antonaci, Lavinia (ESA); 11. Canulla, Roberta (TCE); 12. Faures, JeanMarc (NRL); 13. Franchi, Valentina (ESW); 14. Gades, Anna (OSP); 15. Hernandez, Emilio (AGS); 16. Hofer, Thomas (FOM); 17. Kalas, Patrick (OEKC); 18. Kauffmann, Domitille (ESN); 19. Loppo, Sara (TCIA); 20. Marquis, Gerard (FOM); 21. Matras, Frederique (OEKC); 22. Mattioli, Laura (ESA); 23. Mustalampi, Unna (ESW); 24. Seevinck, Julia (TCIA); 25. Treinen, Sophie (OEKC)
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Coordination team (HQ)	26. Cheriére, AnneKlervi (TCE); 27. JuvanonDuVachat, Etienne (TCE); 28. Ridolfi, Carlotta (TCE)
Regional Focal Point	29. Boedeker, Gerold (REU); 30. Bonte, Alexis (FAORAF) (+output 4.3 co-leader); 31. Ettel, Toni (FAOEGY) (+ output 4.1 co-leader); 32. Meza, Jorge (FAOPY) (+ output 1.1 co-leader); 33. Minjauw, Bruno (FAOSNE); 34. Niino, Yuji (FAORAP) (+ output 3.1 co-leader); 35. Sobey, Andrew (FAORAP); 36. Szeker, Klara (REUT); 37. Thiombiano, Lamourdia (FAORAF); 38. VanWambeke, Jan (FAORLC)
Regional output co-leader	39. Fernandez, JoseLuis (FAOSN) (output 4.2); 40. Hannoun, Rana (FAOGZ) (output 2.2); 41. Lopez, Jose (FAOSO) (output 1.2); 42. Samaja, Mario (FAOZA) (output 3.2)

Annex 2 – List of People met

Name	Surname	Division	Organization	Country
Koffi	Akakpo	Head of the Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis Unit (VAM)	WFP	DRC
Eric-Alain	Ategbo	Senior Nutrition Specialist	UNICEF	DRC
Babone	Bahizire	Directeur National Énergies Renouvelables	Ministère de l'Agriculture et du Développement Rural	DRC
Paul Henri	Bansoba	Maladies de Plants	FAO - Coordination Zone Est	DRC
James	Bariyange	Chargé de Projet	FAO - Kinshasa	DRC
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Craig	Castro	Chef du Bureau PNUD Goma	UNDP Goma	DRC
Alain	Constant	Chargé des Opérations	FAO - Kinshasa	DRC
Emilie	Cordelier-Fernandes	Représentante RDC	Caritas International	DRC
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Michel	Disonama	AFAOR Programme	FAO - Kinshasa	DRC
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Ahmadou	Guisset	Coordinateur du Projet	UNDP Goma	DRC
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Fraije	Abdelrahim		World Bank	Kenya
Biondi	Aldo	Head of Regional Support Office	European Commission - Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO)	Kenya
Siclari	Andrei	Programme Officer - Horn of Africa	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation	Kenya
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Annex 3 - List of Normative Products

1. Anti-Hunger Programme. A twin-track approach to hunger reduction: priorities for national and international action. FAO 2003.
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Annex 4 - Meta-Analysis

Lessons learnt from past FAO evaluations on issues related to transition from relief to rehabilitation and development

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Acronyms

AG	Nutrition and Consumer Protection Division
AGN	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Department
AU-IBAR	African Union's Inter-African Bureau of Animal Resources
CAP	UN Consolidated Appeal Process
CBOs	Community Base Organizations
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CCRF	Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries
CFS	Committee for World Food Security
CFW	Cash-for-Work
CORAD	Consortium for Rehabilitation and Agricultural Development
COs	Community Organizations
CPF	Country Programming Framework
CVO	Chief Veterinary Officer
CWGER	IASC Early Recovery Cluster Working Group
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DPAC	Development Partnership Aid Coordination Committee
DDR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DOs	Decentralized Offices
ECHA	Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
ECTAD	Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases
ECU	Emergency Coordination Unit
FAOR	FAO Representative
FEWSNET	Famine Early Warning System Network
FFS	Farmers' Field Schools
FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
GIEWS	Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture
HPAI	Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IFAD	International Funds for Agricultural Development
IFIs	International Financing Institutions
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
MFARD	Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Development
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NMPTF	National Medium-Term Priority Framework
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (United Nations)
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OED	Office of Evaluation
OFTN	Operation Feed The Nation
OIE	World Organization for Animal Health
PPR	Peste des Petits Ruminants (Ovine Rinderpest)
RAP	FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific
REDD	Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
RTE	Real Time Evaluation

SAHSP	Somali Animal Health Services Project
SCN	UN Standing Committee on Nutrition
SEAGA	Socio-economic and Gender Analysis
SERECU	Somali Ecosystem Rinderpest Eradication Project
SFERA	FAO Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities
SIFSIA	Sudan Institutional Capacity Programme – Food Security Information for Action
SO	Strategic Objective
SWALIM	Somali Water and Land Information Management
TCE	Emergency and Rehabilitation Division
TCI	Investment Centre Division
TIPs	Trials for Improved Practices
TOR	Terms of Reference
TRA	Tenure, rights and access
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WFP	World Food Programme

Forward

The Office of Evaluation (OEC) has launched an evaluation on FAO's role and work in *post-crisis transition* (from now on referred to as "*core evaluation*") to be based on an analysis of both primary and secondary data. This report summarizes a meta-analysis of relevant past OED's evaluations, informing the *core evaluation* with key lessons, good practices, conclusions and recommendations drawn on them.

The meta-analysis is preceded in Chapter 1 (Introduction) by a brief review of basic notions and definitions that will be used in the rest of the report. They are concepts well recognized within the UN system or used by specific UN organizations. Notions used within FAO are also indicated. There is no attempt to open any analytical debate on these notions, since this would go beyond the purpose of this report, although key features and differences of these concepts are recalled for clarity's sake.

The remaining chapters contain the actual meta-analysis of a selected number of country and thematic evaluations, covering in general the period between 2007 and 2013, as listed in Chapter 2, section b. Chapter 2 also summarizes the analytical approach adopted in this meta-analysis, based on a series of basic evaluation questions contained in the *terms of reference* of the "core evaluation" of last December 2013, further articulated to take into account a reflection undertaken since then within OED in initial consultations.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 summarize findings of selected evaluations and their conclusions, taking account of basic questions raised in the *terms of reference* of the "core evaluation" (see Chapter 2, section c).

Chapter 3 focuses on a selected "country evaluations" in a number of post-crisis situations considered particularly relevant for the "core evaluation".

Chapter 4 focuses on a number of thematic evaluations on core activities of the Organizations that are relevant to promote *transition* to rehabilitation and long-term development in post-crisis countries.

Chapter 5 summarizes lessons learnt from specific evaluations relevant for *transition*, in particular those related to "emergency operations" within FAO in general, and a number of evaluations on post-hazard situations. Chapter 5 also identifies areas relevant for the "core evaluation" of FAO's role in *transition* that do not find adequate response in past evaluations reviewed for this meta-analysis. This thematic areas should be further analyzed in the course of the main evaluation.

Chapter 6 contains suggestions for a possible modification of the Theory of Change for Transition suggested in the *terms of reference* above indicated, on the basis of the elements drawn from this meta-analysis.

Throughout this report, findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons learnt reported are entirely based on the content of evaluations here reviewed and do not represent personal views of the author of this meta-analysis. In some cases, all evaluations or the majority of them converged on key points. In this case, the report summarizes these overall positions through synthetic statements, with no specific reference to the individual evaluations that inspired them. In some cases, only few evaluations supported specific positions, but issues raised are of general relevance. In this case, the text will specify that the conclusion only reflects the views expressed

in a group of evaluations. In other cases, divergent positions or conclusions emerge and the diversity of positions will be reflected, occasionally making anecdotal references. This meta-analysis avoids reproducing details of each individual evaluation reviewed in order to generate a synthetic illustration of the main conceptual approach emerging from these analyses. The author of this meta-analysis takes full responsibility for any misinterpretation or misreading of the findings and conclusions reached by individual evaluations here reviewed.

1 Introduction

1.1 On the concept of “transition” in the United Nations

A first approximation to the concept of *transition* is offered by OCHA, which defines it as “*the phase of a humanitarian crisis (conflict or natural disaster) in which acute vulnerability begins to decline, leading to a reduction in international life-saving assistance and an increase in early recovery, recovery and rehabilitation activities.*”¹ It entails an improvement from life-threatening conditions replacing them with concerns for longer-term development. For a relief agency, *transition* is the beginning of the end of their role (exit).

For WFP, transition is linked to the definition of its *exit strategies*² for emergencies. “Exiting” for WFP means either (i) the withdrawal of its assistance from an emergency operation or from a country, or (ii) a shift to a longer-term programme to protect and improve livelihoods and resilience. The appropriate moment to exit for WFP is when household’s access to food is restored to pre-emergency levels.

WFP recognizes that emergency responses are more effective if carried out within a longer-term strategy for capacity-building and resilience. *Transition* is the process from relief to the recovery and development stage.³ In *transition* situations food aid becomes less important than non-food inputs.

The *UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transitions* and the *IASC Early Recovery Cluster Working Group (CWGER)* refer to *transition* as “*the period of transformation when a country emerging from crisis undertakes a recovery process.*”⁴

All these definitions refer (either explicitly or implicitly) to *transition* as “a period”, stressing its time dimension, with a first phase, where emergency relief prevails, followed by a second *transition* phase.

UNDG/ECHA and CWGER also consider *transition* as a “**transformation**”, when referred to post-conflict situations: *transition* is the *creation of conditions for political stability, security, justice and social equity, and socioeconomic reconstruction*,⁵ and does not need take place only “after the acute crisis is over”.

In the early 1990s, the UN General Assembly introduced the notion of *relief-development continuum*, linking humanitarian assistance to a successive phase of recovery/development as a *continuum* process to avoid funding delays, and conceiving *transition* as a *linear process* of sequential time slots.

¹ See OCHA *On Message, Transition*, August 2010, <http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/policy/thematic-areas/transition-from-relief-to-development>

² WFP, *Exiting Emergencies – Programme Options for Transition from Emergency Responses*, WFP/EB.1/2005/4-B, December 2004.

³ WFP, *From crisis to recovery*. WFP/EB.A/08/4-A, 1 August 2000.

⁴ UNDG/ECHA-CWGER, *Introductory Note to the Transition Toolkit*, December 2009, <http://www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=145>

⁵ See UNDG-World Bank, *Joint Guidance Note on Integrated Recovery Planning using Post Conflict Needs Assessments and Transitional Results Frameworks*, September 2007, p. 22.

1.2 The concept of “transition” in FAO work

FAO defines *transition* as a process of linking immediate objectives (meeting the immediate needs of the disaster/shock-affected population through emergency operations) to medium and long-term development objectives.⁶

Transitional actions pursue both types of objectives simultaneously according to a “*twin-track approach*”. *Transition* starts immediately after a shock (a natural disaster or a man-made event) and not “after the crisis is over”, although shocks may persist in *protracted crises*. *Transition* has taken place when *vulnerability* to future external shocks or crises is reduced by reducing susceptibility to suffer consequences from negative events.

A successful *transition* in FAO emergency operations occurs when one of these elements are met⁷:

- (i) enhanced national ownership of the activities promoted, including through support to national strategies and policies in the sector;
- (ii) inclusive planning has been launched, including locating that planning within existing or nascent national institutions;
- (iii) disaster risk reduction has been integrated in the emergency operation, focusing on building household, community and institutional resilience;
- (iv) capacity development aimed at reducing future risks and vulnerabilities to disasters has been promoted;
- (v) market forces have been activated to achieve humanitarian and development outcomes, including through market-based interventions; and
- (vi) gender equality has been promoted.

Transition in FAO activities starts as early as the beginning of its initial response after the shock, with emphasis on early recovery, and emphasis on planning and implementing rehabilitation and development, through a process that includes recovery, reconciliation and peace consolidation.

Early recovery is defined as a multidimensional process of recovery that begins in a humanitarian setting and is guided by development principles. It aims to generate self-sustaining, nationally-owned, resilient processes for post-crisis recovery and includes the restoration of basic services, livelihoods, shelter, governance, security and the rule of law, environment and social dimensions, including the reintegration of displaced populations.⁸

Recovery is often used as interchangeable term with *transition*, implying a shift from humanitarian response to medium- and long-term processes that are nationally led.

Rehabilitation is generally referred to activities that support the restoration of production, market systems and household livelihood strategies in the aftermath or a disaster or crisis as well as during *protracted crises*. *Reconstruction* can be part of *rehabilitation* efforts, and usually is referred to physical structures or infrastructures that have been deteriorated during or as a consequence of the external shock.

⁶ See FAO, *Transition: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development*, 2011, note on *Strategic objective 1, Organizational result 3: Countries and partners have improved transition and linkages between emergency, rehabilitation and development*, p. 1. See also FAO in Emergencies GUIDANCE NOTE: *Transitional Programming*, 2013, p.3.

⁷ FAO in Emergencies GUIDANCE NOTE: *Transitional Programming*, cit., p.5.

⁸ Early Recovery Cluster Guidance Note, 2008.

In FAO, *transition* is interpreted in light of the 2013 *Reviewed Strategic Framework*⁹ and its strategic objectives (SOs), especially SO5 (*Increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises*), and its links with the other four SOs.¹⁰

For FAO, *resilience* is the ability of individuals and communities to *prevent disasters and crises* and *anticipate, absorb, accommodate or recover* from them in a timely, efficient and sustainable manner.¹¹ The enhancement of resilience cannot be pursued only through short-term replacement of lost assets, but requires protection, restoration, improvement and diversification of livelihoods, asset building and capacity to manage future threats and crises that may impact agriculture, food and nutrition and related areas.

Although the *relief-development continuum model* may still apply in sudden natural disasters, if food and livelihoods security is unexpectedly disrupted and countries face short-term exhaustion in their capacities, FAO prefers to refer to *transition* as a non-linear process, as seen in multidimensional, complex and protracted crises. The most suitable approach for FAO is the “*contiguuum model*”, in which short-, medium- and long-term measures are simultaneous and integrated in the “*twin-track approach*”.

In this approach, *transition* is not necessarily represented by a distinguished time period or a phase, which follows relief before the development stage (which is what one would expect in the *continuum model*) but rather it is a way to interpret FAO’s role in promoting development in crisis or post-crisis situations, where both immediate urgent needs and long-term capacity building needs are simultaneously addressed. Focusing on *transition* at an early stage of an emergency situation means to focus on those development elements that may facilitate recovery and rehabilitation in the medium- and long-term while immediate needs are still present and a high priority. This notion will be further clarified in the context of specific evaluations here reviewed.

1.3 *On post-conflict protracted crises in fragile states*

Most country situations reviewed in this report belong to *complex emergencies with protracted crises in fragile states*, although also post-hazard situations are considered as well in non-complex emergencies, especially those defined as “level 3 emergencies”.¹²

A *complex emergency* is defined by the IASC as “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agencies and/or the ongoing UN country programme”.¹³

⁹ FAO document C 2013/7.

¹⁰ Anne XII to C 2013/3 on *Strategic Objective Action Plans*.

¹¹ FAO, *The State of Food Insecurity in the World, 2012*

¹² According to the FAO’s Declaration and Response Protocol for Level 3 Emergencies (7 May 2013), “**Level 3**” **emergency response** level is defined (in line with what indicated by IASC) as the situation in which the capacity of the country, sub-regional and regional offices are overwhelmed, thus requiring full FAO corporate support. (see Humanitarian System-Wide Emergency Activation: definition and procedures” IASC, 2012). “**Level 2**” is the situation in which the disaster or crisis occurs in more than one country and requires regional-level coordination of response efforts, and the capacity of one or more FAO country offices is to be supported by the respective regional office. “**Level 1**” of emergency response is the one in which the national capacity of an FAO country office is considered sufficient to support the host country, providing the required support to the affected population.

¹³ 10th session of IASC, December 1994.

A *fragile state* refers to a region or state that has weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society. Fragile states are more vulnerable to internal or external shocks such as economic crises or natural disasters.

Situations under review may also consist of *protracted crisis* in countries with ongoing conflicts, or *protracted crisis* in post-conflict situations.

Referring to a definition provided in an ODI publication, *The State of Food Insecurity of 2010*¹⁴ defines **protracted crisis** as “*those environments in which a significant proportion of the population is acutely vulnerable to death, disease and disruption of livelihoods over a prolonged period of time. The governance of these environments is usually very weak, with the state having a limited capacity to respond to, and mitigate, the threats to the population, or provide adequate levels of protection.*”

Complex emergency are often combined with post-hazard situations with long-term recurrence of natural calamities. Although these cases do not exhaust the post-crisis situations analyzed by the “core evaluation”, special attention will be paid to them.

There are cases of *complex emergencies*, where militarized conflict is not a significant factor (e.g. Ethiopia and Uganda), although insecurity issues are still present but are mostly related to conflicts prevailing in neighbouring countries, although internal tensions are also relevant. RDC is an example of a country with a mixture of a post-conflict situation in a few regions and ongoing conflicts in certain specific areas (e.g. North Kivu), so that features of both types of situations apply. Among man-made shocks that add to the complexity of these situations, the impacts of shocks such as the world-wide increase of food prices that took place a few years ago and the 2008 world financial and economic crisis should be added.

Basic principles that the international community applies to support *countries in protracted crises* follow the orientations expressed with reference to humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and what OECD defines as principles for “*engagement in fragile states*” respectively.

¹⁴ See FAO-WFP, *The State of Food Insecurity in the World – Addressing food insecurity in protracted crises*, 2010. The *core evaluation* will also refer to the Report of the *High-Level Expert Forum on Addressing Food Insecurity in Protracted Crises* of September 2012, organized by FAO, IFAD and WFP, under the auspices of the CFS, which suggests a set of principles and proposes a set of initiatives, including initial elements for an “Agenda for Action” for CFS consideration.

2 Relevant evaluations for the meta analysis

2.1 Typology of relevant evaluations

This meta-analysis will review recent evaluations that only indirectly regard *transition*, assuming that they meet at least one of the following criteria:

- They focus on emergency and/or rehabilitation activities of FAO;
- They regard FAO's response (global, regional or country specific) to natural hazards;
- They focus on areas of FAO's work crucial to support *transition*;
- They concern cross-sector issues relevant for *transition*;
- They concern countries affected by severe crises in the last 10-15 years;
- They cover FAO modalities relevant for programming FAO's work in *transition* situations.

2.2 Evaluations reviewed for the meta-analysis

The specific evaluations here reviewed are listed below. The *core evaluation* will also consider information from *Country Programming Frameworks (CPFs)*– or *National Medium-Term Priority Frameworks (NMPTFs)* – as this may provide overall frameworks within which *transition* takes place.

<i>Selected list of evaluations reviewed for the meta-analysis on FAO's work in transition situations</i>			
<p>a) <u>On FAO emergency and/or rehabilitation activities</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2010 - Evaluation of FAO's operational capacity in emergencies 2011- Evaluation of FAO's work through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) 2013 - Evaluation of FAO's role and work in Disaster Risk Reduction in Asia and in Latin America and the Caribbean 		<p>b) <u>On response to specific natural hazards</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Real Time Evaluation of the FAO Emergency and Rehabilitation Operations in Response to the Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami Evaluation of the FAO Response to the Pakistan Earthquake First/Second Real Time Evaluation of FAO's work on the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza An Independent Evaluation of FAO's Response to the July 2010 Floods in Pakistan 	
<p>c) <u>On key technical areas of the FAO's relevant for increased long-term resilience</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluation of FAO's Role and Work in Nutrition Strategic Evaluation of FAO's Work on Tenure, Rights and Access to Land and Other Natural Resources Strategic Evaluation of FAO's role and work in Forestry FAO's Role and Work in Food and Agriculture Policy Evaluation of FAO's role and work related to water Evaluation of FAO's Role in Investment for Food and Nutrition Security, Agriculture and Rural Development Impact Evaluation on FAO's support to the Implementation of the Code of Conduct in Sri Lanka 		<p>d) <u>On specific cross-sector issues relevant for transition</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluation of FAO's role and work related to Gender and Development Evaluation of Capacity Development in Africa (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe) 	
<p>e) <u>On relevant FAO modalities and procedures</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strategic Evaluation of FAO Country Programming 		<p>f) <u>On effectiveness of FAO programme in specific situations</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> FAO's Effectiveness at Country Level: Synthesis of Country Evaluations: Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Cambodia and Honduras 	
<p>g) <u>Country evaluations of FAO activities</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Afghanistan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DRC Ethiopia Sierra Leone 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Somalia Sudan Sri Lanka 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tajikistan Zimbabwe

2.3 Analytical approach

This meta-analysis will review the selected evaluations asking a number of questions, inspired by the evaluation questions suggested in the *terms of reference* of the “core evaluation”. These questions may be summarized in the following main ones:

1: Context and relevance

- *To what extent and in what way are FAO programmes in crisis and post-crisis situations aware of the overall context of the countries in which they are implemented, and reflect the fundamental drivers behind conditions of conflict and instability that prevail in those situations?*
- *Do these programmes assume implicitly a Theory of Change that is compatible with the dynamics of the society in which FAO operates?*
- *Has FAO been able to prioritize its transitional activities taking into account the dynamics of the society and factors that challenge peace and stability?*
- *To what extent do these FAO programmes tackle leverage points in the local communities and the society as a whole, by addressing key issues that facilitate transition from instability to development?*
- *What should FAO try to do and should try to avoid in order to mitigate any negative impact and maximize the positive impact in the crisis-to-development transition?*

2: Impact on development and livelihoods

- *To what extent is good development work carried out in a crisis as well as in post-crisis situation, aiming at greater resilience and development in the broader system, particularly as these relate to agricultural livelihoods and production?*
- *What is FAO's role in this, if any?*
- *What results has FAO achieved in this role and what kind of impact has it produced?*
- *What impact did FAO's transitional activities have on reestablishing Government services?*

3: Vulnerable population and targeting

- *To what extent have the needs of disadvantaged people/groups/communities been prioritized in a crisis or post-crisis situations in the aggregate?*
- *To what extent are gender equity and inclusiveness of most vulnerable groups integrated in the transition process?*
- *Has FAO effectively contributed (or not contributed) to generate any benefits in support of these most vulnerable groups?*

4: Management and good practices for transition

- *Have the new management approaches pursued by FAO – e.g. decentralization of emergency and rehabilitation operations to country level; a more integrated (twin-track) programming approach in dealing with post-crisis situations; and the establishment of the Protocol for Level 3 Emergencies – contributed to a more contextually relevant and more effective response from FAO to the need to facilitate transition from crisis to development?*
- *Have these management approaches facilitated the timeliness of FAO's transition creating better conditions for it to happen?*
- *Have the quality of FAO's interventions been affected? Has FAO provide adequate technical support to them? Has FAO been able to maintain a competitive position in its interventions, making good use of its comparative advantages?*

- *Are FAO programming practices -- as regards intervention design, M&E mechanisms, targeting techniques, consultation and participation, funding –adequate to the task?*

3 Country evaluations

3.1 Context and relevance

Evaluations reviewed converge on a general conclusion: FAO approaches to post-crisis situations analyzed are in general relevant to promote *transition* to rehabilitation and development, although they are conceived mostly as response to immediate needs and the notion of *transition* is seldom mentioned. This general relevance, however, is subject to many constraints and qualifications.

Areas where evidence of activities relevant for transition are found

- Capacity building initiatives, especially in central government (but inadequate elsewhere);
- Strategic planning for agriculture (e.g. Afghanistan, Sudan);
- Public information systems food security and natural resource management (e.g. FSNAU and SWALIM in Somalia, INFOSEC in RDC, SIFSIA in Sudan), linked to a DRR approach;
- Shift from asset replacement to asset building. Asset replacement may still continue, but main concern for asset building is channeled through a wide variety of initiatives for the development of agriculture, livestock, and fisheries. Examples of relevant activities are:
 - Farmers' Field School system (FFS) (particularly successful in RDC, Sierra Leone and Sudan);
 - High quality seed in the main staple and a diversified series of crops;
 - Partnerships to improve dairy productivity (Afghanistan, Sri Lanka);
 - Transition in livestock, with focus on livestock health and production (Tajikistan and Sri Lanka), development of veterinary services, DRR measures;
 - Irrigation restoration (e.g. in Afghanistan); and
 - Water tanks rehabilitation (e.g. Sri Lanka, in dry zones).
- Relevant side effects of humanitarian emergency operations for the transition process. Preservation of livelihoods through emergency relief is the first step of *transition*. Post-conflict resettlement is complemented with enhanced crop production, land preparation, fisheries and aquaculture, water use, repairing or development of irrigation. Good examples of how emergency operations can positive affect *transition* are found in input replacement programmes (especially if they do establish constructive links with local markets) and initiatives such as Cash-for-Work (CFW). (see separate box)
- Advocacy work on food security and coordinated action with other UN agencies, linked with other food security projects and DRR measures.

Even if relevant interventions are carried out in the above areas, most evaluations here reviewed show that there are key areas of the economic and social functioning of these countries that have been neglected or may have come too late in the picture of FAO country programming. This makes the *transition* incomplete, due to the missed opportunities. The neglected areas vary from one country to another, with some overlapping that may confirm some common features among a few countries, which will be further reviewed in Chapter 5.

How transition starts in emergency operations: two examples

➤ **Input replacement and transition**

Replacement inputs (mostly seed, livestock and tools) may have a dominant role in short term operations. It is however useful to see whether *transition* is somehow introduced when emergency operations focus only on asset replacement. If interventions allow the productive system to recover, so that during the next productive cycle normal activities are re-established, the asset replacement is more than a pure “emergency relief” operation, but a way to activate *early recovery*.

Moreover, the way in which input replacement is undertaken may have a major influence on the *transition* process. For instance, decision on whether to procure those inputs by making use of local supply or purchasing them in the international markets may depend on several factors: quality of local supply as compared with quality of inputs obtainable in other markets; availability of local supply.

However, the distorting effect of free distribution of imported inputs on local markets may have long-term consequences on the growth of local productive capabilities.

On the other hand, limited local supply of inputs (a major reason to procure those inputs abroad) cannot be assumed but needs to be verified. Where local purchase was appropriate and possible (e.g. in Somalia), multiplier benefits for the local communities have been significant.

However, the reactivation of a productive cycle may generate a self-sustaining growth process, and generate a positive impact on *transition*, even if free inputs are procured in other markets and may have initially distorted conditions of local supply.

➤ **Cash-for-Work and transition**

The introduction of cash-for-work (CFW) initiatives in some countries (e.g. Somalia and Zimbabwe) has proved to be of major importance in supporting vulnerable communities in extreme critical situations. In the case of Somalia, CFW has allowed meeting basic household needs in parts of central and southern regions, otherwise unreachable by central government because of intensive conflicts, while population’s access to food was severely limited by Al Shabaan, which favoured only interventions related to long-term productivity. In this case, *transition* occurred in the reverse by shifting from asset rehabilitation to cash distribution.

This switch from a long-term development approach to a shorter term modality does not necessarily entail the interruption of the *transition* process. In principle, the CFW formula allows FAO to support development activities such as construction building or canal rehabilitation, often neglected in emergency relief, while providing humanitarian assistance in worst-affected areas. CFW establishes a link between two types of intervention: a humanitarian assistance intervention with a longer development initiative. Evidence from the field may prove however that this link is sometimes very weak, if the rehabilitation efforts (the “work” component of CFW) cannot be implemented immediately because of the precarious situations prevailing in the country, while the “cash” component can be more easily carried out generating instant relief to the most vulnerable groups. That would immediately enhance their livelihoods. However, these short-term difficulties do not change the fact that CFW in FAO is still conceived mainly as a clear application of the *twin-track approach*, and is not a mere “cash transfer” programme unrelated to rehabilitation efforts.

If seen from the point of view of the extent to which FAO has been able to show full awareness of the overall context in which transition efforts are undertaken, these omissions seem to suggest that there are a few grey areas, not fully tackled by FAO in those crisis and post-crisis situations, which may require further efforts, for transition to be fully functioning at its full potentials.

The following list shows a few significant examples, as identified by the country evaluations, of relevant areas that have not been sufficiently explored for the possible contribution to accelerate *transition* from crisis to rehabilitation and development.

A few missed opportunities in countries with ongoing conflicts

- **Food Security.** A common conclusion is that although food insecurity is probably one of the key problems of these countries, FAO's effects have been biased towards food availability, neglecting access to food and the right-to-food.
- **Nutrition.** Major gaps are found in the nutrition area and may not be an explicit goal for FAO or the Government in the country. Although FAO generates in several countries and world-wide a lot of information and analysis on nutrition, most evaluation show that this information is not necessarily translated into follow-up interventions that may benefit communities mostly affected by malnutrition or undernourishment.
- **Rain-fed agriculture.** Support to irrigated agriculture has prevailed (e.g. in Afghanistan and Somalia), and this is justified by better prospects for productivity gains and security constraints. However this has often occurred at the expense of rain-fed agriculture, neglecting that most vulnerable farming households depend on it and this applies not only to agro-pastoralists but also to small-scale resident farmers.
- **Crop production.** A few country evaluations show that relevant support may have failed to reconcile approaches promoted by the Government in favour of mechanization with the support to sustainable agricultural practices and conservation agriculture (e.g. Sudan).
- **Production of high quality seeds.** Successful initiatives in this sector are found in some cases (e.g. Afghanistan) but this is an area that has not been sufficiently exploited in Somalia, although it has potentials that may generate major benefits for agricultural productivity and market expansion. Several evaluations single out seed certification as key area, since it counts of FAO's technical support that may assist in formulating regulations and laws for the sector, but some complaints that this potential is not fully exploited.
- **Livestock.** In several countries that benefitted of support in this sector, evaluations conclude that no sufficient attention was given to livestock asset management.
- **Fisheries.** Although Somalia has significant possibilities in fisheries due its long coastline, the country evaluation underlines that the fisheries programme has not been expanded adequately. Similar conclusions apply to countries with different levels of potentials (e.g. Sudan). This is not the case in Sri Lanka, where FAO focused, *inter alia*, on fisheries.
- **Natural resource management and land tenure.** Several evaluations remark that attention to natural resource management and land tenure, particularly relevant in those countries, has not been adequate, and funding has been modest. Land tenure, an area not frequently addressed in the country evaluations reviewed, may have special relevance in some of these countries (see the country evaluation for Tajikistan), but is also an area of great sensitivity, and is at the root of local conflicts. Unfortunately, several evaluations are quite silent on this issue.
- **Forestry** is an area that has been often neglected with sporadic interventions. This seems a frequent conclusion of several evaluations. The introduction of Community Forestry principles, mentioned in a few evaluation reports, has often produced limited impacts (e.g. in Afghanistan and DRC). In Sudan, interventions in forestry lack of a planning framework and have not been able to generate significant results for lack of support to policies against deforestation. This is an area where participatory approaches may produce important results.
- **Conflict and climate change** are two key underlying causes of food insecurity that several evaluations find that are not sufficiently analyzed in their full implications, especially in designing FAO interventions.
- **Inter-sector linkages.** A common conclusion reached by a number of evaluations was that stronger linkages should be established between interventions in the livestock and agriculture sectors, especially around improved animal nutrition and fodder production, exploiting benefits from synergies between these two sectors and introducing innovative approaches that generate multiplied effects in the longer run.
- **Decentralization of governmental structures and services.** Most evaluations that address this aspect conclude that FAO often fails to reconcile ongoing transfers of governmental responsibilities to non-central level of government, because of FAO's highly centralized structures even at the country level, which limit strategic engagement of FAO staff operating at state (sub-national), provincial, district and community level, affecting its responsiveness and effectiveness.

3.2 *Effectiveness and twin-track approach*

The use of the traditional evaluation criterion of “effectiveness” applied to *transition* work may not work very easily. If effectiveness is a “*measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives*”, one could assume that evaluations here reviewed may have assessed the extent to which *transition*, conceived as the “objective”, was attained by making use of appropriate approaches. However, in very few countries the evaluation reports indicate that the notion of *transition* is considered as an objective, and even in those cases, there are no attempts of measuring through those evaluations the capacity of FAO to achieve that objective.

A few evaluations suggest the reduction of the proportion of emergency projects in favour of the rehabilitation and development ones as a possible objective. However, this could hardly be considered as a measure of the effectiveness of the transition process, depending more on the changes in the funding conditions and the possible reduction of emergency resources in post-crisis situations. The country evaluations here reported often limit their attention to the notion of effectiveness when it applies to the FAO’s individual operations, assessing the extent to which objectives pursued are attained, but this has little to do with effectiveness of the *transition* process.

Instead of focusing on these methodological dimensions of the meta-analysis, it is appropriate to go back to the fundamental questions identified in section c. of Chapter 2, and wonder whether the evaluations here reviewed show that the countries concerned have made any progress in addressing key issues that facilitate *transition* from crisis to development, therefore demonstrating effectiveness in FAO’s attempts to promote *transition*. Has FAO been able to introduce through its interventions key elements that generate greater resilience and development that enhance agricultural livelihoods and production?

Food security and “transition”

A few evaluations observe that with food insecurity still persistent in countries in protracted crises, even though recovery is in progress, an effective transition may take place only through a systematic response to the overall demand for better food security conditions and social protection at a scale that allows for improved agricultural production and better living conditions for social groups that participate in it, both as producers and final consumers, reaching sustainable levels and diversity of livelihoods.

Only an overall assessment of the food security conditions of the country vis-à-vis the needs of the most affected population on the one hand and availability of food in the markets (either locally produced or imported at market conditions) on the other, may give a measure that timely and effective transition from asset replacement to asset building is in place. Unfortunately, none of the evaluations here reviewed could provide a firm positive conclusion on this, nor could they outline the best approach to define this problem. Efforts are thus required to recognize signs that this transformation is taking place, verifying whether new capacities have been built, new conditions have been established, behaviours have been modified, social mobility promoted, ensuring diversification of livelihoods and establishing social protection networks.

All evaluations here reviewed confirm that FAO has significantly contributed to food production and asset replacement following civil conflicts and natural disasters. FAO usually measures its achievements in those activities only in terms of outputs and immediate targets of those interventions. The achievement of their outcomes or overall goals is seldom assessed. In some cases (e.g. Ethiopia and Sri Lanka), country evaluations express doubts whether good results in terms of immediate outputs have the same meaning if compared with long-term enhancement of livelihoods.

Application of the ‘twin-track approach’

A possible way to get closer to a satisfactory reply to the questions above indicated is by verifying whether the country evaluations here reviewed show the extent to which the ‘*twin-track approach*’ has been systematically applied by FAO through its interventions in crisis and post-crisis situations, since this may be a key factor to enhance effectiveness of FAO’s work in transition. For this to be verified, it would be enough to show that development “ingredient” have been effectively employed as lead factors to make use of emergency interventions to broaden the horizons of the interventions towards the achievement of longer-term development objectives.

Unfortunately, evaluations here reviewed do not provide a consistent evidence that the *twin-track approach* has been applied in all countries, although significant examples are shown in several countries where strong links between development and emergency work are emphasized. In some countries, however, the conclusion stressed in the evaluation reports is the absolute lack of interaction between emergency and development operations.

Lessons learnt on ‘twin-track approach’

- a. Several country evaluations recommend the need to pursue with determination the *twin-track approach*, achieving humanitarian assistance goals while pursuing protection, promotion and rebuilding of livelihoods and food security in a long-term perspective. Otherwise, *transition* will not happen.
- b. Most evaluations show that the *twin-track approach* in a post-crisis emergencies introduces recovery and rehabilitation of livelihoods, as vehicles to achieve longer-term development.
- c. Insertion of actions such as canal rehabilitation, extension services, training, improved storage facilities and pest control in post-hazard operations is a way to apply a *twin-track approach* to *transition*.
- d. Improved fodder production, better veterinary services for emergency treatment and livestock vaccination, and use of CFW to rehabilitate infrastructures (e.g. water catchments) in livestock emergency operations is a way to apply the *twin-track approach*, associating immediate benefits from restocking with longer-term development benefits, although short-term remedies may not always produce immediate results in extreme situations (in several cases of CFWs initiatives in Somalia).
- e. A few evaluations show that the *twin-track approach* may be applied also through the establishment of information systems on food security and natural resource management when those systems are used to support both short-term emergency responses and longer-term strategic planning

The case of Somalia is probably the most significant among the country evaluations here reviewed in stressing its commitment to a twin-track approach. The 2011-2015 FAO Strategy for Somalia explicitly states: “*Protecting, promoting and rebuilding livelihoods and achieving food security for the Somalia people should be initiated in parallel with humanitarian responses*”, calling for a closer linkage at the early stages between humanitarian responses and longer-term development interventions.

Canal rehabilitation was often linked to improved seed development in Somalia. Improved storage facilities and pest control were associated with overall plans to increase food availability. Parts of the emergency initiatives were connected to outcomes of development projects since their conception. This was facilitated by the fact that, in the case of Somalia, seed distribution relied on locally produced seed.

The twin-track approach was fully applied in Somalia also in the livestock sector when FAO pursued at the same time: (1) improved fodder production and distribution; (2) emergency

treatment and livestock vaccination; (3) increasing numbers of livestock of vulnerable small-scale herders through redistribution/restocking; and (4) CFW to rehabilitate and construct productive infrastructure (e.g. water catchments).

In Sudan, FAO contribution to strengthening animal health system, through increasing coverage of vaccination and animal health services, has generated significant effects in the livestock area, whereas fishers have gained skills in net and boat making and fish processing. While interventions have been more effective in the area of veterinary area and animal area, FAO's interventions have been less effective in animal production and processing, and in general in promoting the fisheries sector. The effectiveness of the link between short-term horizon and longer-term interventions in information systems varies on food security and natural resource management varies from country to country, in some cases giving preference to the former, in other cases to the latter, instead of reaching a systematic integration of the two dimensions within the transition process. This is usually due to some technical faults or missing components within the information systems created. For instance, lack of trend analysis has prevented the fuller use of these systems for longer-term planning in Somalia. In Sudan, FAO has not been able to be very pro-active in promoting the Right-to-Food through the food security system that it supported (SIFSIA). The inclusion of “*sites sentinelles*” (*monitoring sites*) in DRC that periodically feed the INFOSEC (information system on food security) is an important step to satisfy the strong demand for information in this area.

A few country evaluations also highlight situations where *transition* is not making progress as expected. Recurrent crises in Ethiopia have raised some doubts about the justification of a “short-term approach” so far preferred in addressing economic and social problems in that country (see the box in this page).

Recurrent crises or permanent emergency? The case of Ethiopia

A 2011 country evaluation on FAO's programmes in Ethiopia¹⁵ stresses the need to link relief, recovery and development in a country that for decades has been labeled as the “basket case” for international support to food security. While the Government is determined to say that “those days are over: Ethiopia is now on the road to becoming a middle income country; famine is behind us”, the country still remains food insecure and will be like that in the foreseeable future, under the threat of recurrent droughts and floods, even though progress is being made in the national agricultural system.

However, that country evaluation questions the justification of continuing certain emergency interventions in Ethiopia, apparently with no exit strategy. Free distribution of seeds has been challenged. Some target populations are now in condition of acquiring seeds, instead of relying, season after season, on free distribution, which in certain locations may not be fully justified.

Consensus is emerging from all parties concerned to move away from repeated multiple emergency interventions in order to promote alternative longer-term strategies to build resilience, taking into account the prospects for agriculture production and trade. Major obstacle to this transition is that funding is available only for short-term emergency use and not for long-term development initiatives. Furthermore, the lack of a comprehensive development strategy within FAO in the country (the NMTPF was considered inadequate and at the time the CPF had not been formulated yet), shows a full disconnect between FAO development initiatives in Ethiopia and emergency operations, with very limited oversight of, and concern for, the transition process by the FAO and resource partners. Short-term operations are mostly monitored to verify whether they can deliver specific outputs (provision of physical assets) instead of evaluating the achievement of outcomes such as capacity development and enhanced livelihoods, identifying relevant lessons learnt.

¹⁵ 2011, *Independent Evaluation of the Programmes and Cooperation of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations in Ethiopia*, OED, Evaluation Report, January 2011, page 80.

3.3 *Impact, livelihoods and vulnerable populations: targeting and “transition”*

Impact of FAO’s work on *transition* is its long-term effects through the establishment or reestablishment of enhanced and diversified livelihoods among affected populations, which can be achieved thanks to improved capacities and higher resilience to future threats. This meta-analysis has reviewed the selected country evaluations to verify the extent to which FAO’s efforts in crisis and post-crisis situations are actually producing visible impacts through these long-term dimensions of development, higher resilience, higher levels of production, higher levels and diversified forms of livelihoods in the rural environment, especially in activities linked to agriculture, livestock and fisheries.

Success of FAO’s relevant contributions to an effective *transition* process is judged through their positive impact. Impact will be here assessed particularly in light of the possible effect that FAO’s work in crisis or post-crisis situations may generate in responding to the needs of disadvantaged people/ groups/ communities, prioritizing support to these vulnerable groups, encouraging various forms of social protection and promoting an inclusive approach to development, which also implies greater attention to equity (including gender equity and gender mainstreaming) while promoting rehabilitation and recovery processes.

The evaluations here reviewed show encouraging results in several areas but these results are seldom expressed as impact on livelihoods, capacity development or environment. Most findings mention positive results only if projects have been actually implemented, or results are exclusively referred to timely delivery of project outputs (quantities of goods and services delivered and numbers of beneficiaries), often neglecting or giving only marginal attention to outcomes and broader impacts.

Impact analysis is sometimes replaced by collection of information on good practices, where innovations and indications of positive impact are noted. For emergency operations, monitoring is often limited to quantity of feeds and seeds distributed, with no rigorous beneficiary analysis and assessments of impact on livelihoods of the most vulnerable groups.

However, a number of country evaluations also included impact studies that have been conducted as part or in parallel to the evaluation exercise on specific issues, in the attempt of filling the gap of information on impact of FAO’s activities. When these studies were available, more information was available on long-term effects of FAO’s work.

The overall impression that one gets from reviewing selected evaluations is that both transitional interventions and emergency operations have had a positive impact on livelihoods while pursuing enhanced resilience through improved infrastructure and productive facilities, restocked livestock households, increased asset protection and better functioning local markets for inputs, food produce and veterinary services, although information on distribution of benefits is uneven and sometimes not optimal.

Most evaluation reviewed observe that FAO’s work has not played a major role in terms of environmental protection. Its support to environmental initiatives has often been limited. Community forestry initiatives have been signaled as promising in principle but their impact (e.g. in Afghanistan, DCR and Sudan) has so far been limited for the modesty of those interventions. In Sudan, in spite of a long history of cooperation in forestry, no framework for FAO’s intervention in this sector is in place, and FAO’s involvement in forestry is still extremely low, while Sudan continues to lose its forest cover. On a positive note, participatory forest

management has been successful in southern Ethiopia, contributing to rehabilitation of last remaining forests in the country.

Several evaluations show that, through interventions aimed at improving agricultural productivity, including seed production initiatives, FAO has been able to achieve a significant impact on the livelihoods of farming communities, especially if FAO's support has been conceived in a broader context, establishing efficient market opportunities, which would benefit from a price stabilizing system based on locally produced staples, improving trade opportunities both for exports and imports, introducing market reforms and better trade regulations, enhancing land tenure, and developing various forms of micro-credit. Similarly, the positive experience of the FFS support in several countries reviewed in terms of impact on farmers' livelihoods, is another example that benefits accrued in one area can potentially be extended to other sectors such as livestock production and aquaculture.

Significant impact on livelihoods of farmers in several countries was produced through sustainable seed production programmes (e.g. in Afghanistan and Sierra Leone) that increased the number of farming households benefitting from improved certified seeds. Seed multiplication brings normality back to farming communities after years of crisis, involving hundreds of farmers who produce seeds as partners and as contract growers, reestablishing a viable national seed system and contributing to food security (as food availability). If emergency still prevails, these interventions coexist with free input distribution, implementing the *twin-track* approach.

In countries where fisheries has great potentials, country evaluations here reviewed show that FAO's initiatives in this sector have had so far modest impacts. Even in Sri Lanka, where FAO helped develop a fisheries strategy in 2006 and has undertaken major efforts through CCRF initiatives, no major follow-up to that strategic approach has been observed, and little influence from CCRF was exerted on fishing practices or sustainable management of fisheries resources. With the exception of some regional initiatives and an intervention in agriculture in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka, FAO has paid so far little attention to improving the livelihoods of poorer coastal fishers in Sri Lanka and other economically disadvantaged groups, including women, in its regular programming.

Different approaches to targeting: a time-consuming and valuable tool

Reviewing the country evaluations here selected, and in particular a few impact studies undertaken within those exercises, confirms that *targeting* is time-consuming. Therefore it has a cost.

In different countries and different project scenarios, a variety of criteria have been used, reflecting different approaches to *targeting*, which often reflect a variety of constraints met on the ground.

A frequently met trade-off was the following: do *targeting* criteria maximize aggregate production or do they aim at improving household food security for the most vulnerable? This choice seems to have a major consequence in shaping the *transition* process.

A third option is the ***blanket approach***, often mentioned in a few country evaluations, which avoids *explicitly targeting* by deciding "on purpose" to have the broadest distribution of benefits with no restrictions. This method may be easier to apply, since it does not require special preparation and it is used when rapidity of execution is crucial. However, it usually entails neglect for the neediest, and that may contradict the principles and main objectives of FAO. Several evaluations underline that vague or broad *targeting* may also favour "better connected" elites at the community level.

Inadequate targeting or no targeting (*blanket approach*) may be due to the need for urgent action or may be just the result of an explicit decision to avoid any discrimination, due to local conditions: e.g. high conflict

sensitivity if any targeting system is adopted; political opportunity of making use of local traditions in identifying beneficiaries instead of more accurate measures of most vulnerable groups, in order to enhance acceptability of external interventions; interference of local authorities in determining benefit distribution; unfeasibility of alternative targeting methods. In some cases, it was indicated however that inadequate targeting was simply due to a faulty design or inadequate attention to targeting by the project formulator.

Most findings of the evaluations here reviewed confirm that even when project performance is excellent, and outputs and targets are met, it is difficult to find sufficient evidence that intended outcomes are actually achieved, both for attribution problems but also or even more for lack of a programming framework that would show consistency between project outputs and higher-level objectives in terms of improved livelihoods, food and nutrition security, and poverty alleviation.

Evaluations reviewed confirm that, unfortunately, *targeting* has seldom been satisfactorily carried out when designing and implementing transitional activities. Therefore, the question on whether FAO's work in *transition* has actually produced the desired impact on the most vulnerable groups would remain partly unanswered. Furthermore, in spite of FAO's interventions to support food and nutrition at the country level in post-crisis countries, country evaluations indicate that most of them have failed to take up important policy and advocacy issues for a more decisive impact on poverty reduction.

Targeting in Farmer's Field Schools in Sierra Leone

In the case of the FFS initiatives in Sierra Leone, it was possible to undertake impact studies that proved the successful increase of food production and food security within local communities among those who benefitted of the FFS interventions (36,000 farmers). Impact on the resilience of this target group was also seen through the adoption of improved agricultural practices by FFS farmers through better line planting, appropriate spacing, bed preparation, timely planting, composting (manure), crop rotation and crop protection techniques, introduction of new seed varieties and planting of new crops. That turned into higher food production, although limited benefits were found in other potential areas (e.g. communication skills and enhanced self-reliance).

These studies also provided some information on a comparison between FFS farmers and other vulnerable groups that had not been participating in the FFS initiatives. This also showed that the FFS system had adopted a targeting system that benefitted in first place farmers that had already access to bigger arable lots of land of better quality, therefore were in an initial stage of relative advantage compared with other farmers.

Consequently, benefits of the FFS interventions were not concentrated on the most vulnerable population but on those that were more likely to generate higher productivity gains, causing frictions between farmers that were members of the FFS system and those that were non-members.

The targeting issue was therefore useful to verify whether the positive impact of the FFS system could be expanded to a broader spectrum of potential beneficiaries, so as to include most affected and vulnerable populations.

Impact studies also showed that, while FFS farmers increased production and incomes more than non-FFS farmers, thanks to the improved agricultural methods, FFS farms may have met more problems in marketing their output, probably as an undesired effect of the unprecedented growth in production that FFS farmers managed to achieve. This means that enhancing livelihoods of farmers cannot be limited to improved productivity but support is required also to commercialization and post-harvest activities.

In other projects undertaken in Sierra Leone (e.g. Telefood), no in-depth assessment of potential target population was undertaken as part of the project appraisal process and the final selection of beneficiaries was in some cases inappropriate. In addition, given the poor results of some of those initiatives, when projects failed, intended beneficiaries were sometimes left with nothing, if they did not have resources to re-start the enterprise again.

Who are the actual beneficiary of FAO's *transition* efforts? Whose resilience are transitional activities enhancing? Evaluations show that targeted groups in post-crisis situations vary from

country to country, comprising returned refugees, displaced persons, ex-combatants, affected farmers and herders who have lost assets because of external shocks, fishermen affected by tsunami and similar events. These potential beneficiaries may even include nationals of bordering countries, who may be sharing damages from the same emergencies, and may be targeted by sub-regional interventions.

As integral part of project design, targeting is typical function of project preparation. Findings from past evaluations show that beneficiaries of *transition* interventions are often designated in the project documentation. *Targeting* may also be the result of a detailed ***vulnerability analysis*** aiming at defining “best targets”. Some evaluations underline that, in ideal circumstances, this assessment should have been undertaken in consultation with the target population, agreeing on distribution of benefits according to vulnerability, although several complained that this consultation was far from thorough or effective. Evidence from the evaluations reviewed confirm that *targeting* is complex exercise. For crop interventions, farmers differ, have farms of different sizes, their land are either irrigated or rain-fed they are either sedentary farmers or agro-pastoralists, they focus on subsistence agriculture or are part of the commercial agricultural sector. Livestock activities entail difficult decisions regarding pastoral groups as compared with sedentary farming populations. Similar distinctions apply to the fisheries sector and forest dwellers. Evaluation findings confirm that *targeting* may affect significantly the quality of the impact from FAO’s interventions in crisis and post-crisis situations. Various country evaluations highlight the trade-off between different approaches to targeting, which may apply to different circumstances:

- Do selection criteria that identify farmers entitled to receive assistance in the form of seed inputs (or other inputs) require that farmers show title to the land that they cultivate (example from Sri Lanka), or also landless farmers are included?
- Do herders entitled to receive support in terms of livestock replacement or shelter repairing, need to show that they have, at least in part, those resources required to build shelters?
- In order to receive a water pump, is a farmer required to pay a contribution to its cost (e.g. 50% of its price)?
- Are there any safety nets or similar measures to protect the weaker or poorer targeted populations or groups, if a biased approach to targeting is adopted?

A call for targeting guidelines in emergency operations

The 2011 evaluation of FAO’s work funded with CERF resources for short-term emergency operations¹⁶ recognized the need for more general targeting guidelines within FAO, to be focused on the entire process of access to assets and their distribution among vulnerable groups, which may also enhance the responsibilities of capable NGOs and local communities that should be involved in undertaking, in a transparent manner, the selection of broad groups of deserving households at the field level, minimizing tensions and maximizing the perception of an equitable approach within the community. That would save time in terms of planning and coordination.

¹⁶ See 2011 Evaluation of FAO’s work through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), para.25.

3.4 Targeting gender

Women are among the most vulnerable groups in emergency situations, especially in conflicts and social upheavals. Traditional roles of “women” in societies still affected by widespread poverty are further stretched beyond any limits in crisis situations, to meet new domestic, social and economic needs of the family and the community. Pre-existing conditions of inequality and social exclusion precludes them from having access to many forms of assistance or sometimes even aid distribution. Even when legislation gives equal access to land to women and men (e.g. the Land Law in Tajikistan), institutional resistance and interference of local authorities can make it difficult to apply this principle.¹⁷

The 2011 evaluation of FAO’s work on gender¹⁸ observes that a gender perspective has not been effectively integrated into too many of FAO’s projects, even though in some circumstances ECU may have played a dynamic role as gender champion at the country level in crisis situations. It also highlights that, although they are target of a number of initiatives to improve their food security and incomes, there is little evidence that these interventions are sustainable and that gains accrued would benefit them.

Do FAO initiatives for rehabilitation and development leave behind women and, in general, any other vulnerable groups to any significant extent or are they more threatened by future emergencies? The country evaluations reviewed confirm that FAO has not played a sufficiently strong role in promoting gender equity through its transitional work. Social and gender analysis is rarely done before projects are started. Few projects were informed by a gender perspective at the formulation phase.

In this context, the 2012 evaluation of FAO’s work in land tenure, rights and access (TRA) highlights that the approach to TRA adopted by FAO shows that TRA has introduced “gender-sensitive” policies and programmes, giving ample space to social inclusiveness in matters of access to land and natural resources, although more improvements in governance are required.

In some of the country evaluations here reviewed, it was not possible to find an exhaustive analysis of gender equity aspects in the context of the *transition* work, although some elements are provided in the context of specific projects. In other evaluations, the conclusion reached is that the performance of the FAO country programme is often extremely weak in the domain of gender equity and gender mainstreaming, with poor accountability records.

In Somalia, interventions in the livestock sector show that livestock ownership does appear to be sex disaggregated in Somaliland and south-central Somalia, but not in Puntland. Participation of female-headed households in FAO initiatives was still small, with no evidence that female farmers had been consulted. In most cases, gender is not concretely factored into project design or implementation in several FAO interventions. Women are often excluded from participating in CFW initiatives, especially if they had no male relative to advocate on their behalf. The food and nutrition security information system FSNAU has been revising its methodologies for data

¹⁷ While over three quarters of members of Collective and State farms in Tajikistan in the Soviet era were women, only very few women have now access to land after separation, and even when farms are registered under the name of women, they are actually managed by their husbands and fathers. FAO’s work has focused on land reform in that country, mainly emphasizing the need for increasing public awareness, supporting a Land Reform Working Group and providing legal information to Legal Assistance Centres, in the attempt of refocusing on gender issues. However, these attempts have produced mixed results, especially in arable lands where the prevailing crop is cotton (which is the main national crop).

¹⁸ 2011 *Evaluation of FAO’s role and work related to Gender and Development*, June 2011

collection, to analyze changing roles of gender in livelihood activities, coping strategies, access to services, and capture their differential needs. However, progress is still very slow. The country evaluation on Somalia reaches strong conclusions on FAO's responsibilities in not having been able to support Government authorities in formulating agricultural and livestock policies that are gender sensitive and inclusive.

In the case of Sierra Leone, the country evaluation could not avoid noticing that the ultimate users of certified machine-processed rice seeds are mostly male producers, although in the case of other crops (cassava, groundnut, maize, cowpeas), women may represent the majority of producers. Women are also involved in processing and marketing of cassava. Therefore the cassava multiplication scheme was found to be a better channel to promote female income generating activities. In a limited number of emergency rehabilitation projects, vegetable seeds were specifically distributed to target women, but interventions failed to accompany that distribution with fertilizer and agrochemicals, without which yields could not reach their potential, limiting severely the benefits that women could receive from that support.

Participation of female-headed households in FAO initiatives is still small, with little or no evidence that female farmers have been consulted. The capacity of FAO's work to reach out targeting women in agriculture, fisheries and forestry is generally disappointing. In most cases, gender is not concretely factored into project design or implementation in several FAO interventions. Women are often excluded from participating in CFW initiatives, especially if they have no male relative to advocate on their behalf.

In some countries (e.g. Tajikistan) FAO has made special efforts to include women as beneficiaries, putting the primary focus of attention on women and female headed households. However, effectiveness of these attempts is not yet demonstrated with facts.

In the case of Sri Lanka, although women represent half the adult population and female-headed households in the north following the conflict, the capacity of FAO's work to reach out targeting women in agriculture, fisheries and forestry was disappointing. Little consultation with women was associated to design interventions (e.g. in poultry raising and home gardening), with only sporadic training provided.

In DRC, FAO managed to target women in a specific project (DIMITRA), an information project jointly promoted with the *National Committee for the Woman and Development (CONAFED)*, that aims at enhancing capacities of rural women, and other initiatives such as the *Project on Support to the Development of Urban and Per-urban Horticulture (HUP)* and the *Programme on Support to Community Development (PADC)*, where gender-based data have been used to target interventions. However, in general, FAO failed to target women in its projects in DRC.

In Ethiopia, the country evaluation reaches the conclusion that gender has not been systematically reflected in the project/programme cycle management process. Project documents do not show gender disaggregated data nor any gender analysis has been used in project design. Consequently the gender perspective is not adequately reflected in the initiatives undertaken in that country.

The lack of a systematic consideration of gender in preparing transitional activities explains a lot of missed opportunities, also considering the availability of women to participate in several promising activities. The FFS initiatives in Sierra Leone found that women participating in FFS were more likely than men in getting involved in experimenting new varieties or fertilizer use or

crop rotation, but they were often significantly excluded from group savings schemes and access to loans. FAO has made special efforts to include women as beneficiaries in some countries, focusing attention on women and female headed households. However, effectiveness of these attempts is not yet demonstrated with facts.

3.5 *Impact on capacity development*

Capacity development does not receive always a prominent role in country evaluations here examined, being limited to a short section of the evaluation reports. The 2010 evaluation of FAO's activities on capacity development in Africa¹⁹ recalls that FAO's performance in capacity development in Africa has been mixed. Success stories are found mainly in areas such as plant protection, statistics, information systems on food and nutrition security and natural resource management, policy planning, and increasingly in transboundary animal diseases, building a critical mass of skills, institutional memory and experience in policies, norms, values and structures to support FAO's work in those areas. Projects to enhance preparedness for and control of new and emerging diseases (PPR, HPAI) have been a driver for capacity building in the veterinary field in several countries where this sector was a central focus of the attention.

Capacity development activities have encouraged participatory planning, appropriate consideration of enabling environment, but several interventions were considered unsustainable, focused on immediate results and outputs. While interventions on the FFS approach have been in general well appreciated, FAO has could not document FFS principles for wider application (except in Sierra Leone).

Capacity building within the Central Statistics Authority in Ethiopia is considered a success story, since it has contributed significantly to future improvement of agricultural statistics. A positive impact of the capacity of the Government to respond to threats to zoonotic diseases with increased preparedness was mentioned as a side effect of the FAO's engagement in the avian influenza in several countries (Ethiopia included).

In a country like DRC, FAO's efforts to enhance national capacity has proved to have some impact on the chronic institutional weakness in this country, with positive results in restructuring the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Livestock, and strengthening statistical services. However, FAO has not been able so far to support capacity building at provincial level, where weakness of support services are particularly evident.

¹⁹ 2010 *Evaluation of FAO's Activities on Capacity Development in Africa*, March 2010

Capacity development on information systems

A success story in capacity development was mentioned in the country evaluation for Somalia for the establishment of an information system on natural resource management (SWALIM). In spite of the very low skills base and lack of resources within the ministries where SWALIM operated, significant results were achieved thanks to an incentive system that avoided problems of competition from more remunerative offers for personnel trained by FAO, retaining a great number of them within SWALIM. Trained staff are expected to train their colleagues, generating a multiplier effect. There are other examples in this domain, however, (e.g. in Tajikistan and Sierra Leone) where FAO has difficulties in ensuring that trained personnel remain in the Government's structures, especially at the provincial and district level, leaving limited capacity in the hands of the Government to maintain food security information system, data gathering and analysis, statistic and early warning systems, which continue to rely on external support. In general, the country evaluation on Sierra Leone concludes that a major constraint to the enhancement of capacity development impacts from FAO interventions is the difficulty to retain qualified personnel, within government institutions, since competition from more remunerative occupations is a major cause of a constant loss in capacity in the institutions and structures that benefit from FAO's support.

Most evaluations reviewed observe that in rehabilitation initiatives linked to emergency, time horizon is too short to allow growth of capacity and impact is necessarily limited. Capacity development in transitional activities is too often limited to short-term technical training, not sufficient to ensure sustainability. Capacity building attached to the distribution of hand tools has been mentioned as relevant, if connected with local procurement and so capacity development efforts within rehabilitation projects in the livestock sector and fisheries, which may have produced significant results. Involvement of the private sector however is still limited.

Several evaluations confirm that, in general, FAO has not moved from capacity development efforts focused on policy development (which address central governments) to support to policy implementation through the enhancement of capacities at the decentralized level within the countries, up to the district level.

Lack of an overall framework for capacity development has often been claimed as key constraint to capacity development, which may be overcome if an overall FAO strategy is adopted in the country within the CPF, to be aligned with a broader UN-wide coherent approach to capacity development.

3.6 Technical support, management and efficiency in transition processes

Efficiency with which FAO responds to emergencies after major external shocks is not the topic of this evaluation but how efficiently FAO facilitates *transition* from emergency relief. It includes the entire spectrum of management conditions in place to support the promotion of rehabilitation and development in crisis and post-crisis situations, while emergency relief may still be provided. While the country evaluations here reviewed provide useful findings that directly address efficiency with which FAO provides its support for emergency operations, the latter aspects more closely linked to the *transition* process is not openly explored. Nevertheless, there are remarks and findings of those evaluations that contribute to a better understanding of the way in which FAO provides its technical support to *transition* process, and adopt management approaches, especially through its peripheral structures and through

decentralization of responsibilities, that may facilitate a more integrated (twin-track) programming approach in dealing with crisis and post-crisis situations, ensuring a timely transition from purely urgent post-crisis interventions to capacity development initiatives that a more lasting impact on the affected communities.

Quality of technical support

- **Quality of support to emergency operations.** Evaluation reports show that FAO contributed to better coordination of those operations and reduction of duplication, but results were mixed.
- **A good example: seed production.** Interventions mentioned in the evaluations are often effective and catalytic for rehabilitation and recovery, with adequate technical backstopping. Quality of seeds distributed has often been high (e.g. RDC, Pakistan). However, asset replacement entailed distribution of poor quality seed in Sierra Leone (rice seeds) and distribution was often late. Several evaluations (e.g. Ethiopia, Tajikistan) stress that this activity overlooked a broader approach & side effects.
- **Another good example: Farmers' Field Schools (FFS).** Good quality was found in FFS as implemented in several countries (e.g. Sierra Leone and RDC). Multiplying impact through NGOs that adopted same FFS methodology possible.
- **Quality of policy assistance.** Strongest in some countries but not in others. Policy support to food and nutrition security was stronger in Afghanistan and DRC but less effective in Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe.
- **Quality of rehabilitation interventions in irrigation schemes has been appreciated.** Improved access to irrigation water was achieved where focus was on medium and long term (e.g. Afghanistan and Sri Lanka).
- **Quality of interventions in livestock sector.** National capacity to use genetic potential of local dairy cattle was enhanced in Sri Lanka, with roundup and return of stray cattle in post-conflict. In Ethiopia, livestock emergency operations were too small and did not favour "transition".
- **Quality of design work.** Quality of project design ensured thorough analysis and survey work prior to project formulation in some cases. Unfortunately, lack of rigorous analysis was frequent.
- **Inadequate monitoring of emergency operations.** beyond delivery controls is frequent.
- **Quality of consultation process** affects effectiveness of programmes. Mix results were noted: good was Government's involvement in formulating legal, regulatory and planning frameworks; and weak at community level, also for limited access to insecure areas and design flaws (modalities for consultation not specified), marginalizing vulnerable voices.
- **Cases of poor quality support** compromised quality of FAO's work and achievement of objectives.
- **Uneven use of FAO normative products** to support and guide *transition* work.
- **Influence of time-horizon in determining quality of technical support.** Short duration of projects has limited their effectiveness, determining results inferior to those achievable with a longer-term approach.

A first question, therefore, may be related to the quality of FAO's interventions, which is closely related to the adequacy of technical support. Only through a good use of FAO's comparative advantages, linked to its skills and wealth of knowledge that has accumulated in years of experience in programmes in the most challenging circumstances, one can expect that FAO be in conditions to provide an efficient response to a demand for a smooth transition from relief to development, making use of its competitive position vis-à-vis other development actors in these countries. A relevant concept for the efficient management of the *transition* process is its "timeliness", i.e. whether FAO's response to the needs for *transition* from relief to development have been timely planned and implemented or, alternatively, rehabilitation efforts have been introduced when local conditions did not allow affected population to take full advantages of the long-term components of the interventions (e.g. when CFW interventions do not manage to activate the "work" component due, for instance, to security constraints) or, to the contrary, these longer-term components have not been introduced in a timely matter, causing unjustified time lags and prolonging the state of emergency beyond what was considered reasonable, delaying recovery, and causing further deterioration of the economic and social status of the community or the country.

No clear-cut answers to these questions can be found in country evaluations reviewed, although they often refer to the need to promote more efforts for rehabilitation and long-term development. No special attention is paid in these evaluations on the longer-term components of the emergency activities other than through some unsystematic observations.

In most cases, these evaluations mention the inadequate integration between short-term emergency operations and long-term development (e.g. Ethiopia and Sudan), but relief interventions is not perceived as a contribution of the enhancement of long-term food security. The reviewed evaluation sometimes observe that food security initiatives are characterized by excessive geographical dispersion, with limited longer-term impact. These two levels of operations (emergency relief and rehabilitation/development) are seen mostly as completely separate, so that design of more developmental and sustainable approaches cannot rely on lessons learnt from relief operations.

Most evaluations conclude that, since FAO projects are often conceived in isolation, it is not easy to verify whether asset replacement initiatives are coordinated with those aimed at asset growth. A high number of short-term projects are formulated to respond to emergencies, instead of preparing comprehensive strategies that deal with emergencies in coordinated and harmonized way harmonized with a broader longer-term perspective.

In protracted crisis situations, evaluation reviewed show that *transition* does not necessarily follow emergency as a time sequence in a linear process but takes place simultaneously. Acceleration of economic recovery and social development may start while emergencies are still on. *Transition* is then better referred as promotion of rehabilitation and recovery initiatives for better social, economic and political conditions.

What these evaluations do not show, however, is the extent to which this promotion of rehabilitation and development in crisis and post-crisis situation takes places in a smooth and efficient way. Findings show that FAO always starts launching rehabilitation projects since the earliest stages of the emergencies, and these initiatives are intensified when signs of appeasement appear, or where relative security is guaranteed. Several country evaluation confirm that FAO's commitment to promote early recovery is actually being promoted everywhere, as part of the Organization's own mandate, and it is integrated in the nature of many emergency interventions, which insert rehabilitation elements at an early stage of the process.

Although "asset building" starts as early as "asset replacement" in most FAO emergency operations, it is not easy to verify whether "asset building" is timely enough in making progress. The only conclusion that could be reached is that *transition* is underway but nothing can be said about the pace of that *transition*, and its efficiency, and whether that pace is sufficient to make up for the food insecurity in the country.

Efficiency and good management in the *transition* process are closely related to the availability of adequate support from FAO country office (or FAO Representation) and necessarily also from the **FAO country representative (FAOR)**. Both are frequently and extensively addressed in the country evaluations reviewed. Some of the remarks raised in these evaluations on this theme may be relevant for this meta-analysis.

Good management of the *transition* process relies on work, leadership and strategic vision of the FAOR; his/her willingness to make priority choices and innovate to promote *transition* from crisis to recover and development; his/her ability to build a strong management team and attract

good staff; excellent communication skills and capacity for good relationship-building with donors, national entities and other UN agencies; his/her openness and transparency about FAO work; good knowledge of FAO comparative advantages and potentials; mastering of its strategies, modalities and procedures; familiarity with its normative work, its global information services and the vast store of material and knowledge available within the Organization and its possible applications at the country level.

One major risk associate to the role of the FAOR is that he or she may accumulate such as great number of functions that the situation may emergency where he or she suffer from an excessive workload, which may limit the incapacity of the FAOR to perform his/her responsibilities to their full extent, affecting the efficiency of the *transition* process.

When there is no full-fledged office in a post-crisis country (e.g. Tajikistan) or the country office suffers for a prolonged vacancy for its resident representative, technical and management support as well as FAO's involvement in resource mobilization, jointly with other UN organizations, is necessarily limited.

All evaluations reviewed pay a special attention to the efficiency of FAO country offices, although that analysis cannot be easily referred to the fundamental question relevant for this evaluation, i.e. whether FAO management arrangements affect in any possible way its ability to support *transition*. Decentralization of FAO management within the country to the local level (state, sub-region) represents a major topic related to the efficiency with which FAO handles *transition*, since it is both a challenge and an opportunity, allowing for a better connection with provincial institutions and authorities.

Decentralization to the country and regional levels of responsibilities related to emergency operations and rehabilitation activities that used to be concentrated in TCE and their integration under the same umbrella at the country office is relevant for the *core evaluation*. The question is whether these new arrangements result in a more integrated and efficient programming approach. Unfortunately, country evaluations here reviewed could not find any sufficient answers to this, first for the time covered by those evaluations.

The issue of decentralization has been occasionally addressed in those evaluations in assessing the *efficiency* of FAO's response in *transition* situations. This theme has also been addressed by a 2010 evaluation of FAO's operational capacity in emergency work,²⁰ although the angle from which it tackles the subject does not apply any longer to the administrative arrangements currently in place within FAO. However, some of the considerations raised in 2010 are still relevant and justify the following questions:

- (a) Would the *transition* from relief to rehabilitation and development be conducted in a more efficient, effective and integrated manner with new responsibilities for emergency operations assigned to the sub-regional and regional offices and the FAO country representative (FAOR), including the designation of the FAOR as the budget holder?
- (b) Does the FAO country office have the tools, necessary competencies and capacity to oversee the planning, coordination and implementation of the *transition* process in an adequate and efficient manner? Who else needs to be involved in the *transition* process to make it effective and how should he/she interact with the FAOR?

²⁰ See sections 3.2 and 3.3 of that evaluation report

These questions, however, do not find any answers in the country evaluations here reviewed.

3.7 *Designing activities for “transition”*

Good management and efficiency is connected with the adoption of appropriate programming procedures, good practices, tools, including appropriate design, monitoring and evaluation, procurement and so on. Design has a major impact on the quality of the *transition* process. In a few evaluations reviewed (e.g. Sierra Leone), it was even openly recognized that the design and results of emergency and development individual projects had not been analyzed in any special way, while other evaluations mentioned design faults as a major problem. Influence of design modalities on how *transition* is programmed is an important topic. Several evaluations were very critical on this point (e.g. Sri Lanka). Faults in the current practice of designing projects have been frequently mentioned in crisis and post-crisis situations (see next box).

Major flaws in designing projects in post-crisis countries

- Absence of beneficiary participation in identifying needs and designing appropriate responses;
- Limited stakeholder analysis;
- A tendency to be output- and target-driven rather than results-driven;
- Inflexibility – little scope for changing, adapting and innovating at field level once central authorities had set targets and determined packages of assistance;
- Little experimentation with alternative modalities, such as cash transfers, in recovery projects;
- Insufficient risk assessments and mitigation measures (e.g. market development, post-harvest storage and value addition);
- No gender analysis and no budget to work on gender equality;
- Little social analysis or social mobilization;
- Inadequate analysis of the capacities of implementing partners;
- Little analysis of FAO’s comparative advantages or use of its normative products (e.g. Emergencies Handbook, Socio-economic and Gender Analysis (SEAGA), Seeds in Emergencies, FAO’s role and effectiveness in emergencies, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, and so on);
- Weak criteria for selecting beneficiaries and project sites;
- Weak understanding and application of RBM;
- Insufficient attention to monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and inadequate budgets for these tasks;
- Insufficient attention to sustainability, including resilient livelihoods, disaster risk reduction, ongoing operation and maintenance of equipment/supplies, marketing of products/goods, and shared responsibility and accountability for results; and
- Little application of lessons from similar programming over the years

Source: Evaluation of FAO Cooperation in Sri Lanka 2006-2012, OED, 22 October 2012.

Connected with this problem is the frequent disregard for the “outcome and impact monitoring” of both emergency operations and rehabilitation/development activities, frequently mentioned as inadequate or missing in the country that was evaluated. This aspect is closely related to the programming modalities foreseen for the individual projects when transitional component are included. FAO has precise guidelines on programming and design of projects. However the way they are applied in connection with rehabilitation and recovery process in countries in *protracted*

crises may require further reflections, since they affect the quality of FAO technical support to *transition*, given the traditional tendency of focusing only on fast delivery of inputs in the emergency phase.

3.8 *Fragmentation vs. coherent strategic approach towards “transition”*

In spite of the relevance of activities mentioned in this chapter that confirms that *transition* from relief to rehabilitation and development is a reality, the great majority of country evaluations here reviewed observes that the achievement of the objective of overcoming the state of emergency to undertake a long-term process of sustained development meets a major obstacle: absence of an overall FAO strategy within the country. In countries such as Afghanistan, Ethiopia, DRC, Somalia and Sudan, the 2010 evaluation of FAO’s operational capacity in emergencies recommends the development of “*a sound conceptual framework that effectively link the processes of development, emergency response, recovery and resilience building*”²¹, calling for a new direction (e.g. a Road Map for Ethiopia, which should establish funding requirements, investment priorities and strategic vision).

Even in countries where an NMTPF or a CPF was adopted, there are no proofs that a coherent strategy for *transition* is operationalized. NMPTF was often considered inadequate. In the few cases where a CPF was already formulated at the time of the country evaluation (e.g. Afghanistan and Zimbabwe), full harmonization between emergency and rehabilitation has not yet been achieved. Lacking a coherent national framework, several country evaluations observe that the prevailing fragmented approach to programming in the emergency phase affects the way relief operations are followed up. In general, no coherent systematic approach to facilitate rehabilitation efforts has been adopted. Fragmented approach is also combined with an overly centralized management structure. Final result is that FAO activities, however relevant individually considered, become less relevant if seen as a whole, for the absence of a systematic approach to pursue resilience building in the country. The country evaluation on Sudan comments that relevance of individual activities is not sufficient to provide adequate support to overall peacebuilding efforts, and this conclusion can be easily applied to other post-conflict or in-conflict situations. Prolonged periods to fill up the vacant positions of FAOR were often quoted in individual evaluation reports as one of the concomitant causes that limit the capacity of FAO to pursue a strategic approach in a country.

In some cases, such as Ethiopia and Sri Lanka, activities relevant for the *transition* process are still largely confined to short-term relief and rehabilitation efforts, partly because conditioned by short-term emergency funding, with only a peripheral attention to long-term poverty reduction initiatives (e.g. fisheries initiatives in Sri Lanka). Most evaluations call for a longer sustainable development of approach, including organizational or institutional capacity development, as a means to overcome the short-term approach so far adopted, looking for a broader picture of long-term capacity development.

²¹ 2010 *The Evaluation of FAO’s Operational Capacity in Emergencies*, March 2010, document PC 103/7 – FC 132/10, submitted to the 103rd session of the Programme Committee and the 142nd session of the Finance, page 82

3.9 *Funding and partnerships*

Progress in the *transition* process is strongly conditioned by *access to resource mobilization*, increasingly done at the country level, where agriculture may not necessarily be the highest priority of several key resource partners. National and international resources directed to agriculture often remain below expectations. Resources are more abundant at the pick of the emergency crisis than in the recovery phase. The reviewed country evaluation make frequent reference to this biased structure of funding sources for FAO activities, and mentions the difficulties of finding adequate resources to support rehabilitation and development initiatives after the generous funding for emergency operations is exhausted.

The analysis contained in the country evaluations is often limited to a mere review of the evolution of the composition of FAO project portfolios at the country level, noticing a possible reduction of budgets for emergency projects (focused on asset replacement) that are substituted by budgets for rehabilitation projects (focused on asset building). This type of analysis, however, is not accurate, since several activities that are *transitional*, to the extent that they contains significant rehabilitation and recovery components, are funded with typical emergency resources.

Donors (except Canada and Netherlands) use different funding windows or mechanisms for short- and long-term purposes. In general, donors tend to privilege emergency funding, as national constituencies prefer supporting allocations of their tax-revenues to humanitarian assistance rather than longer-term development cooperation purposes.

Although emergency funding does not cover longer-term commitments and requires rapid exit strategies, the rigid separation between the two types of funding and the preference of donors for short duration emergency projects make the situation more difficult for funding long-term initiatives. For this reason, all evaluations reviewed confirm that a lot of rehabilitation initiatives are often funded with emergency resources, “forced” within short time limits in order to take advantage of abundant finances for emergencies. However, those initiatives do not belong to the emergency response but are *transitional* activities.

This is a major constraint in the effectiveness and efficiency of FAO initiatives in support to *transition* processes. Nothing guarantees that when emergency operations are over, funding of comparable amounts is going to be available from longer-term funding windows to support *transitional* activities, since the two funding windows are often not harmonized with each other (e.g. European Union). Furthermore, emergency funding is of short-term duration, while commitments for *transition* should have a broader and longer-term horizons to allow the country or the community to grow the necessary capacities, skills and processes.

Therefore any measure of progress in the *transition* process based on the mere analysis of composition of FAO project portfolios in each country is not accurate, since funding from emergency windows also covers both operations that belong to *transition*.

Reviewed evaluations suggest that effectiveness of the *transition* process may be linked to constraints to availability of funding.

Partly linked with funding and resource mobilization issues, there are other aspects that emerge through the review of the selected evaluations, related to the access to *coordinated approaches to promoting post-crisis transition with other UN organizations*, also through possible joint initiatives, use of pool funding mechanisms, which may enhance effectiveness of *transition*.

Although there are many options available in this domain, however, the evaluations here reviewed suggest that FAO often limits these coordinated approaches to joint advocacy efforts, instead of promoting joint country-level operations targeted to vulnerable groups and does not fully explore the potential for joint funding of initiatives geared towards accelerated *transition*.

Coordination arrangements with other UN organizations are mostly channeled through FAO's involvement in the UNCT. In the comments contained in several evaluation reports reviewed, FAO does not always appear to be the strongest partner in UNCT. This has also some implications for FAO's dialogue with external development partners, which should be strengthened if resource mobilization to support *transition* processes is going to be intensified.

In this context, several evaluations here reviewed underline the fact FAO, as co-lead of the cluster for agriculture and food security in the country, FAO has opportunities to promote *transition* thanks to its convening responsibilities, promoting joint needs assessments, sharing technical guidelines, supporting training and capacity development among humanitarian partners, mapping sector partners' work, and encouraging joint engagement in policy issues.

Joint resource mobilization efforts does not find special treatment in the evaluations reviewed, although partnerships with others are mentioned and the evaluations reviewed highlight elements that may contribute, through enhance partnerships, to enhanced effectiveness of *transition* work. Records from country experience are however mixed. Obstacles to country-based partnerships include lack of support from headquarters.

Good examples of several collaborative partnerships that support the application of the *twin-track approach* are found in each country evaluation. In Somalia, for example, it is possible to single out the following:

- (1) Partnership with UNICEF and WFP in formulating and implementing a joint resilience strategy;
- (2) Joint collaboration between FSNAU and FEWSNET in early warning;
- (3) Strategic partnerships in the livestock sector such as the Somali Ecosystem Rinderpest Eradication Project (SERECU), managed by the African Union's Inter-African Bureau of Animal Resources (AU-IBAR), and the the Somali Animal Health Services Project (SAHSP);
- (4) Strategic partnership with IGAD and its regional platform for drought resilience and sustainability, together with the *Global Alliance for Action for Drought Resilience and Growth*;
- (5) Strategic partnerships with government authorities, especially in Somaliland and Puntland in the agriculture and livestock sectors, although progress is still slow with the ministries in Mogadishu.

In post-conflict situations new partnerships with community-based organizations (CBOs) and NGOs in areas where conflicts were more intensive are crucial but also difficult to establish. A few evaluations show that in some cases FAO has limited engagement with NGOs and CBOs, such as farmer organizations compared with other UN agencies, partly because of restrictions imposed by central/provincial/district authorities (e.g. in Somali). However, the country evaluation on Somalia reflects on the example of other UN agencies that have been able to establish broader connections with NGOs and CBOs in spite of being subject to the same restriction as FAO, and arrive at the conclusion that more efforts are required by FAO representation to undertake the necessary step to ensure a broader selection of partnerships and

promote greater interaction with the civil society in promoting increase support to the most vulnerable groups.

FAO's partnership with the Government is in general positive in the evaluations reviewed, especially when it comes to the ministry (or ministries) for agriculture and irrigation, but with other line ministries or agencies results are mixed. In the case of Afghanistan, FAO has excellent partnerships with the ministry of agriculture and the ministry of energy and water, but practically irrelevant collaboration with other relevant ministries or institutions (e.g. rural development, national authority for environmental protection, women's affairs, and several other governmental agencies).

FAO partnered with the Government, international NGOs and national NGOs for the post-tsunami recovery projects in Sri Lanka and these partnerships appear to have fostered reasonably effective programming, contributing to a timely response to populations during that emergency. However, in the same country, post-conflict partnerships with government line departments in the east and north, however strong, had their limitations.

3.10 On sustainability

Success of the *transition* process needs to pass the test of sustainability of transitional initiatives. Is FAO able to replace short-term emergency operations with rehabilitation of agricultural, livestock, fisheries and forestry activities in view of introducing lasting solutions to development problems? In a few evaluations, the observation was made that support to *transition* process requires a long-term approach and vision, while short-term funding often makes sustainability constraints almost impossible to address, if expressed in purely financial terms. Some evaluations maintain that long-term solutions may still require long-term financial support.

Economic sustainability and long-term sustainability

A sustainability test is not simple. If interpreted only as the capacity of new initiatives to generate economic results in the short term that matters, so that they may become immediately remunerative and self-sustained, reducing dependence on external assistance, sustainability may be a difficult concept to be applied to a long-term horizon like *transition*, especially in light of the short-term nature of the prevailing funding so far available.

Nevertheless, a few evaluations show success stories of economic sustainability in promoting some initiatives. Support to seed producing companies (e.g. in Somalia) now operate independently and rely on market mechanisms in some cases. Newly established veterinary services are supported through market of services provided by private veterinarians, which may be contracted by the Government for disease surveillances and vaccination.

In several cases, however, economic sustainability is still be a distant goal. There are several other factors that constrain sustainability of results. E.g., provision of productive inputs need to be linked to market opportunities. Rural financing must be available, and so technical services and marketing options, collaborative partnerships with the civil society and the private sector.

Sustainability is enhanced if FAO initiatives are supported by capacity development efforts, which include dissemination of technical knowledge and training as components of rehabilitation projects. National and local institutions, as well as farmers, herders and fishers may continue to use the knowledge and equipment that FAO provides, providing further training to their own

staff and social groups as a self-sustained process. Frequent turnover in both FAO and Government staff introduces discontinuity in efforts for capacity development and policy advice, making transition unsustainable.

Introduction of revolving funds or credit system in a few projects made replication of innovations possible with self-sustaining financing processes, putting the basis for exit strategies. The country evaluation for Ethiopia mentions the use of tools such as a revolving credit system, for instance in the support to the national food security programme, assistance to the Central Statistical Authority of Ethiopia and a few fruit tree projects. By creating physical and financial assets both at community and households level, FAO has contributed to the replication of certain interventions.

The country evaluation on Sri Lanka shows a few good examples of sustainability in FAO's initiatives linked to emergency response. In the case of the seed intervention, FAO's support to improve the quality of seeds for farmers was associated with other activities, such as clearing large tracts of abandoned land for cultivation. While additional seed supplies will be required to support Sri Lankans awaiting resettlement following the conflict, conditions have been created to reduce the burden for such a provision for future seasons, thanks to the enhanced agricultural productivity.

At the same time, little attention was paid to resilient livelihoods and disaster risk reduction in FAO's recovery programming in the north and east of Sri Lanka, failing to build long-term sustainability measures into fisheries projects following the 2004 tsunami, although it was evident that coastal population will continue to be vulnerable to future natural disasters of that type. Similarly, little attention was paid to climate change, although Sri Lanka is bound to suffer a negative impacts from climate dynamics as regards its agriculture, forestry and fisheries.

In the case of DRC, although the 2008 country evaluation observes that sustainability of results in FAO programmes is uneven, there is evidence that ownership is building up for activities such as those in the crop sector or support to the FFS system, with national institutions increasingly willing to carry on some initiatives beyond the limits of the initial support from FAO. On the other hand, however, the Government shows very low interest in some activities (e.g. statistical services), assigning to them a low priority when it comes to allocate financial resources to them, which makes sustainability a matter of major concern. Unfortunately this applies to several other FAO initiatives in that country (agricultural research, forestry), which are important for the long term transition to development.

An effective development practice for sustainability is to prepare exit strategies, but they were not discussed in the evaluations reviewed in the context of the *transition* process. There is little evidence of exit strategies in FAO's projects, except for emergency initiatives, where they are defined only in terms of completion of operations in an appropriate cost/ time framework reaching expected targets.

Sustainability and institutional dimensions

Sustainability of the *transition* process requires participation of target communities in project planning and design, even though FAO's performance on this is far from optimal, as confirmed in several evaluation reports here reviewed. There are a few examples of rehabilitation projects where transparent community participation was ensured, and farmers' organizations and

community leaders were involved with major roles. More often, this was not the case, and this oversight likely undermined sustainability of the *transition* process.

Sustainability also requires that social conditions and constraints related to the institutional environment (laws, regulations, governance, social conflicts, equity, participatory development, democracy, justice system and traditional values) are verified. A sustainability test in this broader sense is one of the challenges that the *core evaluation* of FAO's work in transition needs to explore.

A more holistic approach is to be adopted, taking into account constraints that condition local communities and influence vulnerability of different groups in rural villages. So far, limited attention has been given on social sustainability of FAO interventions.

To the extent that national Government takes full responsibility for some of the transitional activities, sustainability enhanced. Transfer of responsibilities to the Government or other national entities is crucial but needs to be balanced with efficiency and effectiveness in providing support to livelihoods, which may still require external support. Given the high turnover of qualified staff in the governmental services, sustainability can be addressed only in realistic timeframes that assume adequate capacity development, achieving sustainability in decades rather than years.

Importance of markets

Links between market constraints and economic sustainability of the emergency rehabilitation initiatives were often addressed in the evaluations reviewed, e.g. within seed production projects, looking into the impact of seed multiplication on market mechanisms. A few evaluations (e.g. Ethiopia) stress the inadequate attention paid to market access of outputs produced through emergency operations, complaining for the missed consideration of market opportunities, linkages with value chains and private sector actors. Effective *transition* requires sustainable production and marketing of inputs and output commodities (both crops and livestock) through a sound understanding of current and emerging rural value chains, through the involvement of the private sector and other relevant organizations (e.g. cooperatives, producers' associations), also looking into opportunities for commercial partnerships.

However, past evaluations do not provide a systematic analysis of the relationship between transition and market mechanisms, calling for further exploration of this theme in a comprehensive approach.

FAO's work on transition cannot ignore its impact on food and nutrition security and poverty reduction through repercussions of its interventions on food and inputs availability in the agricultural markets, taking into account their great volatility as a consequence of several factors, including emergency and external aid interferences, and unstable policy environment. These instability factors have major bearing on the dynamics on the conditions of the most vulnerable social groups that cannot be overlooked, since speculative movements in the markets affect immediately those vulnerable groups, modifying the circumstances that will grant for an effective and smooth *transition*.

FAO's work in post-crisis phases cannot be confined to asset replacement and rehabilitation or reconstruction activities, without considering this broader picture of the evolution of markets for agricultural products. This means the inclusion of consideration for potentials to be explored for value additions, livelihoods diversification, new investment, involvement of the private sector,

jointly with an intensification and revision of extension services, growing attention to post-harvest and marketing approaches, since all these factors may have major implications for the resilience of most vulnerable populations.

4 Thematic evaluations

In addition to examples from selected country evaluations mentioned in Chapter 3, evidence of relevant activities that support the *transition* process is found in a few recent thematic evaluations that have been here reviewed.

4.1 Nutrition

Field-level operations undertaken in the **nutrition** sector,²² in spite of limitations of FAO's work in this domain, show that FAO's potential role in supporting the fight against malnourishment and under-nutrition in post-crisis countries cannot be denied, even though there are limitations in FAO's role in nutrition, especially at the country level.²³ Attempts to integrate nutrition in FAO programmes are perfectly in line with the purpose of supporting the *transition* process, responding to the demand for better conditions for the most disadvantaged people. They include:²⁴

- (i) Introduction of *Trials for Improved Practices (TIPs)* into household food security and community nutrition projects;
- (ii) Integration of nutrition education into FFS and Junior Farmer Field and Life Schools (JFFLS);
- (iii) Greater focus on urban horticulture (Food for the Cities projects); and
- (iv) Introduction of food and nutrition security for people living with HIV/AIDS.

However, as shown in the 2011 evaluation on nutrition, those attempts have often been of very small-scale and *ad hoc*, and are not framed within strategic priorities. Conclusion reached by the 2011 evaluation on nutrition is that, behind these limitations, there may be a faulty implicit assumption that increases in food production will automatically resolve nutrition concerns, ignoring the role of diversification in production to alleviate malnutrition and micronutrient deficiencies. Furthermore, the evaluation observes that nutrition interventions are conceived as short-time actions (12-24 months), linked to emergency, while behavioural changes take place only in the long-term to be sustainable, even though there excellent success stories at the country level, which unfortunately often suffer from low sustainability.

It is the view of that evaluation that key challenge is to *mainstreaming* nutrition into food security and agriculture *transitional* interventions, directly targeting women and social inclusion. Partnerships are an essential component of these efforts, not only with ministries of agriculture, since a multi-sector approach is required, with involvement of other UN partners and research

²² 2011 *Evaluation of FAO's role and work in nutrition*, final report, June 2011, page 56, quoting the 2010 State of Food Insecurity (SOFI) jointly prepared by FAO and WFP.

²³ *Ibidem*, para. xvi. FAO's indicator of under-nourishment is not sufficiently articulated to inform on hunger distribution within the country. Focus is on food energy deficiency and not on micronutrient deficiency. FAO's records to deliver statistics and analysis on nutrition are still limited. Even when FAO is active in protracted crisis situations to improve information (see FSNAU in Somalia), focus is on food availability and access and not on nutrition, preventing nutritional interventions to play their full role when crucial.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, para.xx.

organizations. At the community level, effective partnerships with NGOs and CSOs are crucial, looking beyond the current approach limited to contractual approaches with them as Implementing Partners (IPs).

4.2 *Food and agricultural policy*

Although the 2012 evaluation on FAO's work in food and agricultural policy²⁵ does not address the role of that work to support the *transition* process, its findings highlight the unique contribution that FAO provides in much of its global policy work on issues such as the food prices crisis, climate change (e.g. work on "*climate-smart agriculture*"), payment for environmental services and seed systems,²⁶ which are extremely relevant for the *transition* process. Technical departments too are engaged in up-stream research in their respective fields, promoting global instruments, such as voluntary guidelines and standard-setting in several areas relevant for long-term development of food and agriculture, which have sometimes been used at the country level to support activities that facilitate the *transition* to development, even though country evaluations find uneven evidence for the use of normative tools in country level work in countries in *protracted crisis*.

However, the same evaluation observes that the impact of policy work at the country level is very disappointing.²⁷ Although FAO is recognized as trusted partner for his unique access to the highest level of agriculture policy making and a neutral global knowledge broker in food and agriculture, country work has a limited focus on policy dimensions. Technical and emergency projects seldom addressed policy issues even though projects may have been used to build trust with governments, and subsequently steer important policy changes with far-reaching effects²⁸. Nevertheless, this evaluation also recalls – and country evaluations confirm – the significant role played by FAO emergency and humanitarian assistance and post-emergency support in addressing policy issues in a number of key cases: e.g. in the process of providing seeds and other productive resources; in strengthening capacities of governmental structures; in contributing to re-prioritization of policy work for DRR (conservation agriculture, incorporation of indigenous or other marginalized groups in land tenure, sustainable pest-management, and cross-border animal disease control); in several rehabilitation and reconstruction interventions; in reviewing and modernizing pre-crisis policy frameworks (e.g., fisheries policies in countries that suffered from the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami).

4.3 *Investment*

The link between investment and *transition* is central, as demonstrated by the role played by intensified investment when aimed at promoting strategies and policies in agriculture and food security that responded to the recent world economic crisis and the high food prices of 2009. *Transition* takes place only if supported by adequate investment. This is confirmed by the 2013

²⁵ 2012, *Evaluation of FAO's Role and Work in Food and Agriculture Policy*, Final Report, OED, January 2012.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, para. 139

²⁷ *Ibidem*, ES, para.ix.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, para.168.

evaluation on FAO's role in promoting investment for food and nutrition security, agriculture and rural development.²⁹

Investment activities supported by FAO are “critical to the ability of humankind to produce enough food to ensure our survival in the face of huge global challenges”.³⁰ Consequently, they should have a prominent role in FAO's agenda to support *transition* to development in countries that have been under the pressure of prolonged crises for years if not decades. The potential role of FAO as a partner of new collaborations in this domain with others, including the private sector, is highlighted by 2013 evaluation on investment. Unfortunately TCI's work has been in the last years inadequate compared with the intended objectives, even though recently progress has been made to intensify FAO's commitment to promote investment, increasing TCI's operational budget.³¹ Concluding, the role of FAO in this domain is very relevant for the promotion of the *transition* process, although its records are not so brilliant.

4.4 Water

Water plays a crucial role in the livelihoods of populations affected by major crises, and interventions that deal with it are crucial to alleviate their immediate needs and promote longer-term resilience to any future threats and crises, whether connected to natural hazards or conflicts. Water is a key resource for agriculture and rural development, food and nutrition security. However, the water sector is also complex, and “water” cuts across sectors and ministries, including agriculture, water resources, irrigation, energy, environment, forest, watershed management, health, municipalities and cuts across FAO activities in several units of the Organization.³² At the country level, FAO assists planners and managers in post-crisis situations, including on international transboundary issues, normative and operational work on modernization and management of irrigation systems, water productivity, water resources management, and groundwater management.

Given the broad and diversified role of water in FAO's activities at the country level, they play a significant role in promoting sustainable *transition* from relief to development, although involvement of FAO in these activities varies considerably from country to country: it has been very strong in countries such as Afghanistan, where major project of rehabilitation of irrigations schemes have been undertaken, and it has been quite limited in others (e.g. limited interventions in water-shed management in Tajikistan). Major constraints are availability of technical support

²⁹ 2013, *Evaluation of FAO's Role in Investment for Food and Nutrition Security, Agriculture and Rural Development*, OED, January 2013.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, para 12.

³¹ *Ibidem*, ES, para.10.

³² 2010, *Evaluation of FAO's Role and Work Related to Water*, OED (document PC 103/9, March 2010). It should be here recalled that The Independent External Evaluation of FAO (IEE) conducted between 2005 and 2007, commissioned a “Background working paper on Water Management and Irrigation”, which concluded that ‘FAO continues to have a lead role on water databases and is respected for its work on agricultural water management. If hunger, poverty and chronic malnutrition are to be overcome, especially in Africa, increased water control is a prerequisite for any green revolution and for continuing agricultural development in Asia and the Middle East. Many water networks exist but are often biased against agriculture. FAO is currently in a weak position. The competency mix and the wide dispersion of the few human resources remaining in the Organization would need to be addressed as an initial imperative for the Organization to exercise leadership in macropolicy issues at global and regional levels.’

and financial resources, since interventions may be capital-intensive, if significant construction work is included.

Relevant activities that FAO undertakes in water sector within its efforts to facilitate *transition* include:

- Support to water policies and strategies, formulation of legislations and legislative reforms, advice on transboundary management of water resources.
- Support to water users' associations, often embedded in field programmes (particularly sensitive in post-conflict or conflict-prone areas).
- Technical assistance on water in production systems (from rain water harvesting to on-farm water use, productivity and efficiency).
- Rehabilitation of smallholder irrigation schemes (often in emergency interventions)
- Rehabilitation and modernization of large-scale schemes (Iraq and Afghanistan)
- Normative work on water (e.g. on irrigation system, drainage, soil salinity, highly in demand. FAO food information system does not capture "water" as a resource, besides rainfall data)
- Water and food security;³³
- Water and livestock (mostly concerned with pollution);
- Fresh water management for fisheries and aquaculture
- Groundwater (work in this area has been limited, mostly due to resource constraints).
- Water and environmental issues (as it relates to forest and watershed management)
- Agriculture and Wetlands Interaction (mostly normative work);
- Water and food safety (where FAO has an excellent reputation);
- Water pollution and agriculture (unfortunately work in this area is very limited)
- Information and knowledge on water (AQUASTAT is FAO's flagship information system on water).

4.5 Forestry

One would expect forestry to be playing a major role in FAO's efforts for *transition*, especially since forests and trees – together with water, air and land – are important components of the global concern for environment and should be then an essential ingredient of solutions for long-term development, also in view of mitigating the impact of climate change and environmental degradation. This is an area where external crises have had a multiplier effect, either linked to natural calamities or conflicts and other social disturbances, often associated with greater demand for wood, and intensification of deforestation and forest degradation processes, including illegal forest clearance.

Therefore, in principle, FAO's work in forestry should have a particularly relevant role in the *transition* process, as there are several implications for sustainable livelihoods, food security,

³³ "Water and Food Security" is a series of 76 projects that have been pursuing the improvement of access to water resources for agriculture and food security among the rural poor. The 2010 evaluation observed that the programme showed positive results and impact, but only for a restricted number of beneficiaries, having major defects in failing to address sustainable land and water management. Furthermore, positive impacts may have been short-lived, especially in Africa, due to internal management issues and unrealistic timeframes.

climate change adaptation and mitigation, disaster risk management, biodiversity preservation, watershed management, and irrigation.

The 2012 evaluation on FAO's work on forestry³⁴, however, observes that, in spite of its technical competence on forestry, FAO is not perceived nowadays as the lead agency in shaping forest policies, although its work in supporting forest governance reform, national forest policy and programme development and support to capacity building is relevant.

FAO's role in the REDD programme, together with UNDP and UNEP, is well recognized for its unique technical contribution. FAO provides timely and extensive information on the state of forest resources and forest products statistics and is one of few organizations that still addresses a wide array of biophysical, technical and socio-economic aspects of sustainable forest management and conducts a wide variety of activities in this area.

However, the resources that FAO devotes to this area are too small to have any significant impact. Many cross-sector activities relating to watershed management, agroforestry and urban/peri-urban forestry, with potential impact on countries in protracted crisis (e.g. Afghanistan) are not considered effective in addressing the magnitude of existing needs. FAO programmes often do not create the critical mass that is needed to generate a significant impact making them vehicles for *transition*. The only exception is within the REDD initiative, which deals with the relationship between forest and climate protection, which has received significant support from resource partners.

4.6 Tenure, rights and access to land (TRA)

One area that has a unique role to play in post-crisis situations, especially in post-conflict countries is the work of FAO in tenure, rights and access (TRA) to land. It may be less known than other functions played by FAO but it is not less relevant for the *transition* process. A specific evaluation on this subject carried out in 2012³⁵ underlines the strong linkages that exist between land tenure and water rights with work on tenure of other natural resources, such as forestry, livestock and fisheries, expanding the scope of the possible role of FAO in this domain. The relevance of TRA activities for the *transition* process cannot be underestimated, even though progress in this area is conditioned by progress in other areas in order to achieve sustainable food security and poverty reduction.

Several countries in post-crisis situation, particularly those in *protracted crises*, face the challenge of strong competition for natural resources, with increasing demographic pressure, climate change, land degradation and the clearing of more land for cultivation. Reforms, laws and practices are often incomplete or underway, and governance problems limit a sustainable and socially equitable administration of those resources. The 2012 evaluation recognizes the strong role that FAO potentially may play in this domain, although there are major challenges to overcome, particularly if social tensions persist and lack of governance is widespread. These challenges are enlarged when countries are affected by conflicts and natural disasters, interacting with the effects of climate change. Challenges are still extremely relevant in the post-crisis situations.

³⁴ 2012, *Strategic Evaluation of FAO's Role and Work in Forestry*, OED, Final Report, June 2012.

³⁵ 2012, *Strategic Evaluation of FAO's work on tenure, rights, and access to land and other natural resources*, OED, Final Evaluation Report, January 2012.

The 2012 evaluation on FAO's work in TRA highlights that the approach to TRA adopted by FAO shows a level of "conflict sensitivity" not found in any of other activities promoted by the Organization in post-crisis countries. As indicated in section d of Chapter 3, TRA has also introduced "gender-sensitive" policies and programmes in the countries where FAO has operated in this domain, in the framework of initiative aimed at increasing social inclusiveness. Geographical distribution of TRA projects is demand driven, and focused in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Central America, and to a lesser extent in sub-Saharan Africa. For countries in conflict or post conflict situations, FAO's work in TRA is particularly relevant. However, the field programme on TRA did not reach adequate sustainability and impact for its outputs.

Limitations to FAO's role in this area at the country level is mostly due to lack of resources and lack of interest by the host Government, given the fact that TRA projects are demand-driven. However, it the conclusion of the 2012 evaluation that post-emergency support for TRA deserves a special attention. Given the increasing importance of TRA issues in post-crisis situations, FAO's work in TRA may become an important component of the emergency and rehabilitation programmes and the *transition* process. It is the conclusion of the 2012 evaluation that this may require a significant change in the capacity and sensitivity of FAO staff at all levels on TRA issues.

4.7 Fisheries

The promotion of fisheries as a means to promote long-term development is often mentioned in the country evaluations here reviewed as a promising way to achieve improvement and diversification of livelihoods, including through aquaculture. Records from country evaluations for countries in protracted crisis are not thoroughly satisfactory, in spite of good signs from Somalia and Sri Lanka. Too often the potentials were not fully exploited. However, their relevance cannot be denied.

Impact of emergencies on the fisheries sector have also been considered, especially in the context of post-hazard crises, like the 2004 tsunami, which interested a great number of countries where FAO operates. The relevance of emergency and post-emergency operations launched after the 26 December 2004 massive earthquake that triggered a series of tsunami across the Indian Ocean, is to be found in the size of the impact of that event: damages to the coastal communities and infrastructures, death of approximately 300,000, affecting millions of other people.

FAO's response to the 2004 tsunami has been the object of a specific real-time evaluation at the regional level, which also examine role of the emergency response in the fisheries sector. More on this will be said in other sections of this Chapter. In June 2012 the OED published also an evaluation on FAO's support to the implementation of the *Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF)*,³⁶ which covers a specific impact study on Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka was one of the major recipient of the post-tsunami emergency assistance.

Although these studies do not address the *transition* questions directly, they do raise issues that are relevant for this meta-analysis. There is no doubt that support to fisheries is a relevant component of a response to the demand for *transition* in countries affected by natural calamities

³⁶ CCRF was adopted by FAO in 1995 following the conclusions of the 1992 *United Nations Conference for Environment and Development*.

like tsunami or typhoons. The impact study on Sri Lanka³⁷ however raises some issues on the type of support that has been provided to that sector, considering that Sri Lanka is the country that, on a *per capita* basis, has received the largest support from FAO in the fisheries and aquaculture domain.

One of the findings of the 2012 impact study on CCRF in Sri Lanka states: “*Too often over the last ten years FAO’s fisheries projects and technical assistance have focused on addressing primary fisheries issues such as the delivery of basic fishing inputs (e.g., engines, nets, bicycles, fish boxes, fish landing centres, more fish boxes, life jackets and hand held GPS) and training. FAO’s fisheries projects and technical assistance have focused much less on seeking to resolve secondary and tertiary issues related to the implementation of responsible fisheries and sustainable fisheries management*”.³⁸

It is true that the emergency interventions launched by FAO in Sri Lanka focused on asset replacement as an emergency operation. However, the 2012 impact study on CCRF reaches also one conclusion to be considered with some concern as regards the *transition* process: “*FAO’s recent portfolio of fisheries projects and technical assistance to MFARD lacks a sense of purpose beyond meeting immediate needs; in short, it lacks vision.*”³⁹ Given the condition of shock in which the country found itself after the tsunami, it is difficult to assess whether the conclusion reached by the 2012 evaluation on CCRF was fully justified, since FAO actually concentrated its action on asset replacement or not. Did the evaluation take into account the side effect of the return to productive activity that the emergency operations allowed? Or was it mostly concerned with the efficiency and effectiveness with which that emergency project was implemented? It is not possible to verify all this, also because that evaluation was focused on the application of the CCRF. As far as relevance of the intervention area, however, the conclusion to be reached is necessarily.

5 Lesson learnt from past evaluations

5.1 The approach to FAO’s transition work in the emergency operations

Emergency operations have a short-term horizon but in FAO have also a longer-term dimension, since FAO is not a purely relief agency. *Transition* is somehow intrinsic in FAO’s emergency work. FAO interventions in humanitarian assistance can be grouped in two broad *modus operandi*:⁴⁰

- i. Pre-crisis interventions, which attempt to control the scale of future threats that may affect both productive assets and human health.
- ii. Post-crisis interventions. Examples are free distributions of farming inputs (seed, fertilizer, tools, livestock and livestock feed) that intend to mitigate impacts of external shocks on livelihoods.

³⁷ 2012 *Field Survey Report for the Impact Evaluation on FAO’s support to the Implementation of the Code of Conduct in Sri Lanka*, April 2012, which is Annex 12 of the *Evaluation of FAO’s support to the implementation of the CCRF*, June 2012.

³⁸ 2012 *Field Survey Report for the Impact Evaluation ... in Sri Lanka* cit. para.129.

³⁹ *Ibidem*

⁴⁰ 2011 *Evaluation of FAO’s work through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)*, February 2011, doc. PC106/4, submitted to FAO Programme Committee of 21-25 March 2011, para.26.

Focusing on preparedness and long-term development: the case of HPAI

The experience with the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) is a good case study in which emergency operations can be harmonized with long-term dimensions of preparedness and long-term development. HPAI was first identified in December 2003 in Asia and widely spread through Asia, Europe and Africa since then. FAO responded within weeks, by implementing small regional and national projects, and in collaboration with OIE and WHO, developed strategies to control the system. The Global HPAI Programme became a major programme for FAO and was the object of two real time evaluations (RTE), respectively in 2007 and 2010.

The first RTE in 2007 observed that the H5N1 virus had continued to re-infect cleared countries and spread to new ones, calling for efforts to expand the approach, going beyond veterinary measures. A key recommendation was that FAO shift emphasis to longer term issues, moving from early mainly “fire-fighting” emergency mode to longer-term development and economic perspective. The management structure of the HPAI response was reviewed, incorporating non-animal health aspects. The new structure includes:

- (1) Early warning;
- (2) Emergency response;
- (3) Provision of veterinary expertise (CVO function); and
- (4) Non-emergency activities in support of diseases control.

The latter activities include:

- Non-veterinary approaches for long-term disease containment, control and eradication;
- Post emergency support for rehabilitation of livelihoods; and
- Longer term development issues related to control of epizootics.

This is a “perfect” implementation of the *twin-track* approach in a specific case. The second RTE evaluated FAO’s contribution to national preparedness and response programmes for HPAI, assessing the following components: a) policy development and programme coordination; b) disease surveillance mechanisms; c) disease diagnosis, differential diagnosis and infection characterization; d) disease control and eradication; e) epidemiological data synthesis, analysis, presentation and use; and f) disease prevention. This second RTE finds substantial progress made in the preparedness and response mechanisms directed at HPAI, and this has much to do with a change in the awareness of the importance of livestock enterprises to building national economies and to enhancing processes of pro-poor growth, and for this to be achieved broad multidisciplinary approaches are recommended. Recommendations of the second RTE include:

- formulation of new strategically-applicable support tools, including new guidelines and policy tools;
- better integration of the livestock (poultry) production, marketing livelihoods/ attributes and socio-economic aspects of the preparedness and response mechanisms with the veterinary aspects; and
- maximizing lessons learning from the countries where FAO has been active.

The *pre-crisis modus operandi* already contains elements of *transition*, even if funded with short-term emergency resources, since it intends to prevent future crises, beyond the short run as part of ***Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)***. DRR is defined in FAO as the series of interventions that support prevention, mitigation and preparedness to disasters.⁴¹ FAO’s work in DRR introduces tools and mechanisms, such as multiple information, monitoring and early warning systems.

FAO’s support to DRR may be of two different types:

- a. *emergency-related DRR initiatives*, which explicitly pursue DRR as main objective; and
- b. *implicit DRR activities*.

⁴¹ See 2013 *Evaluation of FAO’s role and work in Disaster Risk Reduction in Asia and in Latin America and the Caribbean*, July 2013, para. 9.

The latter include FAO core activities that contribute to the reduction of risks or exposure to risks increasing livelihoods and resilience. The ultimate goal of DRR is *transition* as defined in this report.⁴²

LESSON N. 1
OPERATIONS

A lesson from past evaluation on FAO's work in DRR

EMERGENCY

A recent evaluation of DRR's work in Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean shows that most explicit FAO's interventions known as DRR activities lack of a clear approach to reduce risks for target populations, are designed with no clear definition of overall national priorities, and have often been implemented without a preliminary assessment of the context, with no adequate targeting and vulnerability analysis.

Most interventions are confined to fragmented projects, have a short-term horizon, as funded with emergency resources. When linked to specific emergency situations, they ignore root causes of the risks and structural reasons for food insecurity, and do not provide adequate targeting.⁴³

DRR activities may not have exploited their full potentials to enhance resilience of livelihoods.

DRR should be mainstreamed through FAO's core development work in line with Strategic Objective 5 (SO 5) of FAO's *Renewed Strategic Framework*.⁴⁴ There is an enormous space for innovation in this domain, introducing new research-based agricultural interventions, high-level technical inputs, territorial planning approaches, environment management and updated forecasting mechanisms.

LESSON N. 2
OPERATIONS

EMERGENCY

*The 2013 evaluation just quoted shows that **Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)** activities, including the so-called implicit DRR interventions, can potentially contribute significantly to transition by establishing a better link to long-term approaches, improvement of agricultural systems, addressing conditions of most vulnerable over time through improved flexible measures⁴⁵*

FAO adopts an approach to post-crisis emergency that is different from other relief entities, since it aims at **protecting livelihoods** through asset replacement. Although "*protecting livelihoods*" is not the same as "*saving lives*", the two are linked as the former allows the latter.⁴⁶ For this reason, in addition to CERF resources, conceived only to support actions that generate immediate results, FAO makes use of other financial sources, as the FAO *Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities (SFERA)*, bilateral donor's contributions, and its regular budget resources, to allow for a longer time horizon.⁴⁷

⁴² Ibidem, Executive Summary, para. ES 43.

⁴³ Ibidem, Executive Summary, para.ES 10.

⁴⁴ Ibidem, Rec. 1.

⁴⁵ Ibidem, Executive Summary, para. ES38.

⁴⁶ See *2011 Evaluation of FAO's work through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)* cit. section 2.7.2 "*Results vs. CERF criteria*".

⁴⁷ CERF 's funding operations have a short duration, since they are limited to "life-saving" situations. Two-third of the CERF grant facility's provisions are for rapid-response and one –third for under-funded crises (see *2010 The Evaluation of FAO's Operational Capacity in Emergencies* cit. para. 23).

LESSON N. 3
OPERATIONS**From protecting livelihoods in the short term to transition****EMERGENCY**

While FAO's focus on the "protecting livelihoods" in post-crisis interventions⁴⁸ may be interpreted by CERF as a way to "save lives", the 2011 evaluation of FAO activities funded by CERF indicates that FAO's approach is also a way to support self-reliance and local food availability in affected communities through time-critical agricultural interventions, establishing the basis for a longer self-sustaining functioning of agriculture and livestock activities.

FAO's intent is to allow undernourished people to feed themselves also in the next productive cycle by pursuing at the same time protection of livelihoods and restoration of local food productive capacities.

This approach links improved livelihoods resulting from FAO post-crisis operations with improved productivity conditions in the next cropping cycle, turning FAO's emergency into the first step of the transition process, putting the premises to pass from asset replacement (lost or damaged assets) to rebuilding (or rehabilitating or creating) new assets, thanks to enhanced productive capacities.

As FAO emergency interventions produce broader impacts on the food and agricultural situation of affected communities and countries, they call for a broader planning that takes into account the livelihoods and socio-economic mechanisms of many more groups, within the overall picture of the agriculture and livestock sectors. As stated by an evaluation of FAO's operational capacities in emergencies completed in 2010 "FAO's emergency intervention is [with the exception of pests and diseases] immediate restoral of livelihoods, leading into recovery". For this reason, they require a longer-term vision than is done by humanitarian organizations for the UN Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP).⁴⁹

LESSON N. 4
OPERATIONS**On the longer-term impact of emergency operations****EMERGENCY**

Reviewed evaluations converge in maintaining that FAO should adopt a broader picture in designing short-term emergency interventions, looking at their side-effects and long-term repercussions within and across communities of vulnerable populations, moving from a post-crisis modus operandi to a transition modus operandi, with a strategic development planning approach.

FAO's exit strategy from its emergency operations is not the end of its role but the adoption of a transition strategy. In most cases, FAO is expected to continue (if financial resources allow) its support beyond the aftermaths of the immediate shock by starting a sustainable process of asset building in the pursuit of longer-term development. Short-term benefits may be volatile and if shocks are recurrent, increased resilience may not be sufficient to face newer or stronger crises of the same nature.

⁴⁸ See 2011 Evaluation of FAO's work through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) cit., para.38. The evaluation underlines the difference between interventions that deal only with "saving lives" (e.g. through food aid) and those that improve livelihoods mainly to explain work of FAO is considered of lesser priority by CERF after disaster, since it does not focus on "immediate life-saving work of relief agencies".

⁴⁹ 2010 The Evaluation of FAO's Operational Capacity in Emergencies, March 2010, document PC 103/7 – FC 132/10, submitted to the 103rd session of the Programme Committee and the 142nd session of the Finance .

LESSON N. 5
OPERATIONS**Transition as an exit strategy for FAO****EMERGENCY**

One lesson identified by reviewed evaluations is that FAO is challenged in its emergency operations for the sustainability of their benefits and that the solution to these challenges is to be found in planning and designing a transition strategy, geared towards the long-term enhancement of resilience, which complements asset replacement with support to asset building.

Funding procedures for emergency operations usually require that interventions only respond to self-evident urgencies and seldom allow use of financial resources for long-term planning.⁵⁰ FAO finds itself in this contradictory situation: on the one hand, it is interested in longer-term planning for emergency interventions as *exit strategy*, linking them to a sustainable *transition* process; and on the other hand, it cannot find adequate resources for longer-term planning in the available funding windows.

LESSON N. 6
OPERATIONS**EMERGENCY****Preliminary conclusions on transition dimension of emergency operations**

Evidence brought up by the reviewed evaluations shows that attention to longer-term repercussions of emergency operations makes FAO uniquely placed to facilitate transition processes in geographical areas severely affected by short-term shocks, when emergencies directly affect agriculture, livestock, fisheries, natural resource management and food security. If appropriate long-term planning is adopted, FAO can make use of short-term support from CERF and SFERA as ‘entry point’ or temporary “head-start” immediately after the shocks to promote transition that builds on that first response to promote more sustainable longer-term development solutions. This is FAO’s “exit strategy”.

Evaluations reviewed in this meta-analysis agree on concluding that FAO needs to adopt a more strategic approach to programming for emergency operations so that *transition* to recovery and development is incorporated since short-term intervention are first designed.⁵¹ The use of the CPF may allow for a better integration of emergency with *transition* as part of the medium and long term programming of FAO activities in a country, calling for a unified approach to planning for emergency operations and non-emergency FAO operations at the country level.⁵²

The prevailing practice of planning emergency operations through separate projects has however been one of the major difficulty in adopting such a strategic approach. This has caused not only inefficiency in the short-term response in terms of timeliness and appropriateness of the response, but is possibly one of the main reasons for the inadequate *transition* from emergency to recovery and development.

⁵⁰ Ibidem, paras. 15-16.

⁵¹ Ibidem, para. 47, Rec. 2.3

⁵² 2010, *Strategic Evaluation of FAO Country Programming (with special attention to implementation of the National Medium Term Priority Framework (NMPF) planning tool)*, Final Report, 12 July 2010, page 37 and Rec. 13.

5.2 *Transition in post-hazard crises*

A series of lessons have been learnt from post-hazards situations. Although evaluations (see list in Chapter 2) concern mainly emergency dimensions, lessons relevant for *transition* process can be drawn.

<u>LESSON N. 1</u>	<u>POST-</u>
<u>HAZARD CRISES</u>	
<u>Constraints to transition in the design of post-hazard emergency programmes</u>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ <i>Project documents are derived from previous emergency documents, with no needs assessments</i> ➤ <i>Regional projects do not benefit from feedback from field offices and national Governments</i> ➤ <i>Emergency response is not integrated with ongoing FAO development activities</i> ➤ <i>Special attention is to be paid on planning or articulating a strategy for the transition phase</i> 	

<u>LESSON N. 2</u>	<u>POST-</u>
<u>HAZARD CRISES</u>	
<u>Implications of management of post-hazard emergency programmes on transition</u>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ <i>Monitoring of post-hazard crises is essential to learn lessons for “transition”</i> ➤ <i>Only through monitoring, benefits for target population can be extended through recovery</i> ➤ <i>Excessive centralization of decision-making in post-hazard crisis management may accelerate after-shock operations but hinders programming of “transition” being detached from local reality and longer term needs</i> ➤ <i>Flexible and efficient management in post-hazard crises are conditions for an effective “transition”.</i> 	

<u>LESSON N. 3</u>	<u>POST-</u>
<u>HAZARD CRISES</u>	
<u>Sector coordination and interaction with strategic and operational partners in the transition process</u>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ <i>FAO’s role in sector coordination in hazard emergencies may contribute to a more coordinated approach to rehabilitation and reconstruction.</i> ➤ <i>Partnerships established in post-hazard crises with organizations, resource partners, NGOs and other UN agencies and IFIs can be the foundations for involving them in the transition process.</i> 	

<u>LESSON N. 4</u>	<u>POST-</u>
<u>HAZARD CRISES</u>	
<u>Targeting in post-hazard crisis: its implications for the transition process</u>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ <i>“Targeting” in post-hazard emergency may affect planning of “transition” phase</i> ➤ <i>There is a key trade-off in “targeting” in transition: to focus on the most affected by the crisis (vulnerable populations) or to focus on those that can better contribute to rapid economic recovery. No trickling-down can be assumed. Therefore there is no simple solution to this trade-off. Both requirements are needed for an effective sustainable “transition”</i> ➤ <i>A “blanket approach” (no targeting) is sometimes adopted to avoid conflicts at local level but this criterion has a price in terms of social equity and justice, not necessarily sustainable in the long run</i> ➤ <i>Inefficient targeting occurs when unintended beneficiaries (“well connected”) take advantage of targeting criteria to extract more benefits from emergency relief than entitled ones. “Transition” should correct unintended distribution of benefits occurred during the emergency phase</i> ➤ <i>Programming for “transition” requires awareness of who is going to benefit from the transition</i> 	

activities in a transparent manner, calling for open consultation and participation

- Targeting is an essential component of a participatory approach to programming of transitional operations

LESSON N. 5

POST-

HAZARD CRISES

Specific measures to plan post-hazard interventions and promote the transition process

- Systematic introduction of a long-term perspective in planning taking into account broader development and economic context.
- Management functions for FAO's immediate response should systematically include expertise that allow for a longer-term planning:
 - (i) emergency response management;
 - (ii) promotion of DRR components;
 - (iii) technical support to services with longer-term impact;
 - (iv) early introduction of longer-term strategic planning.
- In the design of emergency and early recovery response to post-hazard crisis, FAO should always develop a series of long-term project concept notes as part of FAO's proposals.
- The post-hazard interventions may be conceived as structured in two harmonized and simultaneous components (relief and rehabilitation) with different but coordinated projects and purposes, as a way to apply the systematic adoption of twin-track approach.
- FAO's response to post-hazard situation should always include support to strategy development, to be formulated as a contribution to Government's policy planning, drafting recovery strategies.
- The participation of TCI in designing reconstruction strategies and ultimately formulating investment programmes should be included, especially if the natural calamity occurs in middle-income countries, where resource mobilization for long-term development may not be supported through ODA channels.

5.3 What past evaluations do not say

This meta-analysis of a select number of past evaluations provides important elements of information for the *core evaluation* on FAO's work in *transition* situations. Those findings however do not cover all relevant aspects for a thorough assessment of the extent to which FAO has been playing an active role in effective *transition* from relief to rehabilitation and development. Those evaluations identify useful lessons– summarized in the previous sections – that give some light on the theme of this *core evaluation*. However, there are a few key *omissions* neglected in those evaluations that should be the object of careful consideration in the work of the evaluation team. These are the *omissions* that this meta-analysis has identified:

- a) **Limited focus on the *twin-track* approach.** The concept of “*transition*” is seldom used. The notion of *twin-track* response from FAO is often not even mentioned and in general ignored. The two dimensions of the *twin-track*, i.e. immediate response and longer-time rehabilitation, are addressed separately and not in their interaction, except for lack of integration, with no further analysis.
- b) **Not enough attention on national ownership and leadership in the *transition* process.** No special attention on analysis of how national Governments are progressing in taking over responsibilities from FAO in the transition process. There is some reference to government struggling in performing its basic functions. The impact of FAO's work in re-establishing

Government services in post-war situations is sometimes mentioned, mentioning support provided to policy development in agriculture and food security, or establishing national information systems. No specific analysis is included on dialogue with national partners on how to progress in rehabilitation and reconstruction.

- c) **Disregard for the timeliness of the transition process.** Lack of integration between relief and rehabilitation is often mentioned, and so timeliness of FAO's response to emergencies. However, no attention is paid to timeliness of the transition process. Except for a reference in the country evaluation for Ethiopia about the non-justification of a free distribution programme (see box above), and a brief reference to analogous problem in Sierra Leone, synchronization of the mix of relief and rehabilitation is not addressed.
- d) **Inadequate attention on impact of FAO's work on resilience to future threats and crises.** There are no attempts to estimate systematically the possible impact of FAO's work on resilience of communities or countries to future threats or crises. Risk analysis of future threats is missing.
- e) **Focus on technical nature of FAO's work is at the expense of attention on food security and nutrition, right-to-food, livelihoods and poverty analysis.** Several country evaluations disregard these aspects or address is shortly, while more attention is given to traditional aspects of agriculture, livestock and fisheries sectors in the country. This neglect may have been caused by the nature of the terms of reference for each evaluation, and composition of the evaluation teams. However, one would expect a better analysis of these dimensions. The 2011 evaluation on nutrition criticizes this omission within FAO. This aspect is seldom addressed properly in the country evaluations and it is ignored in the other thematic evaluations. (see also point f) below)
- f) **Disregard for impact of FAO's work on most vulnerable groups.** Distribution of benefits of transitional activities among beneficiaries, which is a basic information in all project document, should be carefully addressed. The extent to which FAO's interventions are conceived as a means to enhance resilience of the "*most vulnerable groups*" should be a key dimension of the *transition* (see question 2 of the terms of evaluation). However, findings of the evaluations here reviewed seldom make an articulate reference to it, or this impact is described in very generic terms. *Targeting* was never a core theme for the evaluations. Sometimes, *targeting* was described as generically satisfactory with no deep analysis. However, when impact studies were included, more information on *targeting* was available. Since results obtained from those impact studies were sometimes disappointing, as targets had been missed, or unexpected results had been achieved (e.g. use of *blanket approach* instead of intended *targeting*), this could be a theme to be further explored, especially linked to the problem of "conflict sensitivity" raised here in point j) below.
- g) **Relations between gender and transition.** In spite of synthetic consideration for the impact of FAO's activities on women, relationship between gender (equity, mainstreaming) and *transition* is not adequately addressed. How to intensify resilience of women to threats and crisis in post-crisis transitions? There is sometimes reference to lack of gender focus in FAO initiatives but no much analysis. Relationships of women with other groups are generally ignored, and so is the way in which women have been evolving during the *transition* process, both in terms of food and nutrition security and in their participation in productive activities in the early recovery and rehabilitation initiatives. No analyses of the way women or any other *vulnerable groups* were affected during the conflict and post-conflict phases are

included. The promotion of *gender equity* and *gender mainstreaming* in the rehabilitation is only synthetically referred.

- h) **Disregard for impact of FAO's work on environment in countries in post-conflict situations.** Disregard of FAO country programme for the environmental issues may be frequent, but it is not analyzed in its complexity and importance as a way to contribute to *transition*. FAO's involvement in some of the environmentally-sensitive sectors is mentioned (water-shed management, irrigation, forestry, fisheries) but, with few exceptions (e.g. fisheries in the country evaluation for Sri Lanka), the relevance of environmental factors in these post-conflict country is significantly neglected. There is no risk analysis of consequences of past natural hazards in post-conflict countries.
- i) **DRR and *transition*.** While several country evaluations make reference to FAO's involvement in national information system and early warning, and a few of them (e.g. the one on Somalia, with reference the FSNAU) have provided an assessment of the effectiveness of those mechanisms as DRR mechanisms, relationship between DRR initiatives and *transition* is never addressed, except for excessively short-term dimension of the approach adopted with some of these mechanisms.
- j) **Disregard for "conflict sensitivity analysis" in design of transitional activities.** Most country evaluations reviewed do not contain much information, if any, on conflict sensitivity when they report on food security. Interaction among groups previously involved in, or affected by, armed conflict are ignored or marginal. Resilience is often seen only in terms of capacity to face the negative consequences of possible natural hazards, which may affect food security, but is never referred to possible tensions and conflicts within communities or countries. In some evaluations, some current tensions are just ignored and not mentioned (e.g. Tajikistan). It was not possible to verify whether the design of FAO operations during both the emergency and rehabilitation was *conflict sensitive*, even if it may be included in individual project documentation. Links between food & nutrition security, on the one hand, and conflict sensitivity, on the other, are seldom emphasized.
- k) **Disregard for FAO's potential contribution to peace-building and stability.** FAO is seldom perceived as potential contributor to peacebuilding and political/social stability, especially alleviating hardship of victims of conflicts, addressing needs of different conflicting target groups after recognizing their diversity of interests, contributing to participatory community development and institution-building in rural development programmes and sustainable management of natural resources. This is ignored in the evaluations reviewed. Development causes of conflicts are also ignored, probably considering this out of FAO's scope or mandate. Links of FAO's work with the socio-economic roots of past conflicts are usually ignored.
- l) **Relation between *transition* and decentralization processes within FAO.** This theme is occasionally mentioned, but most evaluations cover a review period before the recent changes for decentralization of responsibilities for managing emergency/rehabilitation work at regional and country level were introduced. This is an area where more updated information is required.
- m) **Resource mobilization for *transition*.** Changing structure of funding from emergency to post-emergency situation at the country level is often mentioned with reference to a donor driven situation for resource mobilization with a dualistic mechanism that does not allow for flexibility. However this theme requires further analysis if this evaluation is expected to

provide any recommendations. Although resource mobilization is not in the immediate scope of the *core evaluation*, some attention needs to be paid to it, at least taking stock of the options available.

- n) **Use of normative work to promote effective *transition*.** A few evaluations made reference to the minimal use of normative and guidance tools for some of the rehabilitation initiatives. Others ignore this theme. It is necessary to test the role of normative work in *transition* and further explore its potential use.

6 Suggestions for a *Theory of Change* applied to FAO's transition work

It was not possible to perceive a consistent approach to a *theory of change* (TOC) for the *transition* process in reviewing the selected evaluations for this meta-analysis. The term of reference (TOR) of the *core evaluation* anticipated this problem, recognizing the absence of a stated aim for FAO's transition work. The TOR also adopted an interim measure as main goal of transition, defined as “*reducing the dependency of the population on international relief and encouraging self-reliance and productivity while safeguarding and improving the food security of the affected population*”, and built up a provisional TOC where it was assumed that FAO may contribute to that goal through support, in different measures, for capacity development at individual, organizational and enabling environment levels.

That TOC assumed in the TOR includes a series of logical/causal links associated to the achievement of that goal, which assume the use of a number of tools or mechanisms, namely:

- conflict analysis
- needs and capacity assessments
- strategic planning
- development assistance
- exit strategies
- forging of partnerships
- resource mobilization for country recovery plans
- adequate FAO's support to all the above.

In the same TOR, the TOC identified a series of blocks of actions that pursue the overall goal:

- Interventions (project/programme) that meet the immediate needs of the affected population and are in support of national strategy and policy in the sector;
- Emergency/rehabilitation interventions that are couched in existing and planned institutions;
- Programmes and interventions that have a clear exit strategy;
- Building resilience and reducing risk; and
- National ownership.

After reviewing the evaluations summarized in this meta-analysis, the elements of this TOC appear to be still valid, although new elements may be added to complete the overall picture.

By analyzing a variety of country situations here reviewed, which belong all to the group of *protracted crises*, a number of different notions of *transition* seem to emerge from those country

evaluations. To some extent all of them are valid in their own merit. Four different notions have been here singled out:

- (1) Traditionally *transition* is seen as a mere change from a situation where project portfolio is made up only of emergency relief to a portfolio made up of longer term initiatives that build capacity for a self-sustaining and sustainable process of agricultural growth and improvement of food security. This notion views *transition* as a linear replacement of humanitarian assistance with rehabilitation and development initiatives, conceiving *transition* as a continuum.
- (2) For countries that used to be part of Soviet Union (e.g. Tajikistan), *transition* is the transformation from a centrally planned economy dominated by state-owned farms, completely focused on the public sector, into an economic system based on market mechanisms. In that case, “land tenure” becomes particularly relevant, although this theme is relevant also in other countries, since it is the source of internal tensions (e.g. Cambodia and in general South East Asia). This notion of *transition* stresses the role of the private sector, in contrast with older “state-centred” approaches, and gives ample space to the role of private investment in agriculture and related sectors. This notion is also relevant when agrarian reforms that affect farm ownership are in place, and development of entrepreneurship and market mechanisms are crucial. Also with this notion, *transition* is a linear process, although its application is far from simplified.
- (3) A third notion of *transition* is from prevailing chronic poverty and stagnation to a better future of sustainable development. It is a notion that does not make any reference to external shocks and emergencies, but it is frequent in case of countries in *protracted crisis*, where the origin of the crisis is lost in time, while widespread poverty is still a dominant concern (e.g. Sierra Leone). In this notion, the starting block of the TOC is the status of widespread impoverishment of the population, from which the country intends to exit. It is difficult to find a country here considered to which this notion of *transition* does not apply, even though emergencies have disappeared from the designing board, and so their recurrence. This notion is far from being a linear process, since relationships between poverty and development belongs to a complicated non-linear process of intertwined interactions and counteractions of different factors. Unfortunately, this notion of *transition* ignores the notion of external shock or crisis.
- (4) Finally, a fourth notion of *transition*, applicable to all countries with ongoing conflicts but also to countries where the risk of recurrent violence is just around the corner (e.g. DRC, Liberia, Cambodia) is the non-linear process of a fragile country in protracted crisis where a collapsed state or very weak government institutions call for a complex change towards state-building, stabilization and development.

If all these four notions, in a way or another, apply to the reality of *protracted crisis* situations in which FAO operates, it is possible to conceive them overlapping with each other and be integrated with the notion of *transition* suggested in the TOR or the simple definition suggested in this report in Chapter 1. In practice, the consultation work and the country visits will further enrich the wealth of knowledge about the *transition* process, so that instead of using hypothetical notions, the evaluation team will agree on a definition that reflects the findings of the evaluation work.

For the time being, the TOC is still a purely methodological exercise. However, this meta-analysis has allowed the identifications of a number of relevant factors that affect the *transition*. Therefore, an attempt has been made to make some progress in defining the TOC.

In what follows, it is assumed that this *core evaluation* agrees on an overall goal for the *transition* process, which has been suggested in the TOR or any similar comprehensive multidimensional goal that takes into account the complex reality illustrated in this report. However, it should be mentioned here that in reality every country will have its own TOC, specific for its own unique reality, and will define its own overall goal. After the country visit this overall goal will be revisited, in order to reflect the findings of the evaluation.

On the basis of this initial assumption about the overall goal, the TOC methodology here suggested assumes that it is possible to undertake a “**backward mapping**” of causal relationships that can be traced back starting from the ultimate goal, linking it with a series of changes or transformations (the “preconditions” of the TOC methodology) that will facilitate the *transition*.

These changes have not been defined yet. However, this meta-analysis allows the identification of “areas” in which these changes will occur. These areas have been called here “blocks of outcome areas”.

These “blocks of outcome areas” have been identified on the basis of the most relevant areas of FAO interventions singled out in Chapter 4, section a, integrated with possible omitted areas, which were also identified in that same section, taking into account the list of issues not sufficiently addressed in the past evaluations listed in Chapter 5, section b. Therefore they may look as shown in the following table.

<i>ELEMENTS OF A “THEORY OF CHANGE” ON TRANSITION</i>	
OUTCOME AREAS	<i>Thematic Emphases, Tools, Mechanisms, Actions</i>
1. Livelihoods of vulnerable population	<i>Includes food security as access to food, food security as malnourishment and under-nourishment: food and nutrition analysis; right-to-food; macro-nutrients and micro-nutrients; poverty analysis and livelihoods analysis; vulnerability analysis safety nets; unemployment and underemployment; gender equity and gender mainstreaming; social inclusiveness; CFW; promotion of food security initiatives, both advocacy and pilot interventions with vulnerable groups, targeting of emergency and rehabilitation interventions; access to assets and distribution of wealth and income, targeting and conflict sensitivity</i>
2. Productive systems	<i>Includes food security as availability of food: promotion of agricultural production, including quality seed production; promotion of livestock, fisheries and forestry products; value chain, food processing activities and post-harvest activities; market functioning; rural credit; trade mechanisms; productive investment</i>
3. Environmental dimensions of crises	<i>Natural resource management, climate change, droughts, floods, tsunamis, typhoons, pest controls, transboundary animal diseases, desertification, deforestation, soil degradation, carbon sequestration, urbanization & environment, water pollution, CCRF, conflicts and environment</i>
4. Infrastructures & institutions	<i>Physical infrastructures: irrigation and dams, rural roads, transportation sector, storage facilities, coastal structures and infrastructures for fisheries; Institutions: custom structures and institutions, research labs for food safety certifications, labs for animal disease control and vaccination, seed certification centres</i>
5. Strategies, policies and plans	<i>Design of strategies, policies and plans; governance of government institutions; decentralization of public functions; legislative reforms; information systems & statistics; performance of public institutions in charge of food security; national advocacy campaigns; sectoral plans for agriculture, fisheries, livestock, forestry, irrigation, etc.; use of FAO normative tools at policy level</i>
6. DRR and future threats	<i>DRR institutions and mechanisms; early warnings and prediction mechanisms; preparedness for crises; institutional mechanisms for mitigating effects from future shocks; national policies on DRR; resilience to future threats; interaction with networks</i>
7. Capacity development (CD)	<i>National ownership of the transition process; CD at central and decentralized level, government-level, farm- herder- fisher-level; FFS; training at all levels; institution-building; support to CD strategy (or strategies) with Government and UN system; FAO and water users associations and farmers associations and cooperatives</i>
8. Peacebuilding and post conflict arrangements	<i>Conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity analysis, appeasement process, political governance and rule of law, land tenure and water rights, power sharing, CBOs and national debate on democracy and participation in development process, public vs. private influences in power sharing, potential contribution of FAO to peacebuilding and political/social stability, FAO’s programmes with victims of conflicts, interaction of FAO with CBOs and local NGOs and FAO’s contribution to participatory community development; FAO and water users associations and farmers associations and cooperatives</i>
9. FAO programming mechanism	<i>Planning for the twin-track approach and harmonization between emergency and timeliness of transitional activities; CPF; planning for emergencies; design and implementation of projects; procurements processes; monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, FAO’s involvement in coordination mechanisms, including UNDAFs, CAPs, Strategic Frameworks; incidence of decentralization processes within FAO, FAO’s access to resource mobilization for transition</i>

For each block, a number of thematic emphases, relevant tools and mechanisms, and possible actions have been identified simply as examples and have been listed in the table that follows. They have been inspired by the content of the meta-analysis conducted in previous sections.

Although these blocks have been listed in a table, relationships among them are far from linear. The best way to illustrate those relationships, in fact, would probably be a complex stellar system (a different graphic presentation would be appropriate), with causality links that go in any

possible direction, while the central focus of this stellar system is played by the overall goal of the *transition* process, to which all the “stars” contribute or do not contribute, depending on whether they support the *transition* process or not.

Next step (not done here in this report) would be to identify initiatives that will generate “preconditions” (i.e. changes) capable of producing “outcomes” that will eventually generating the required *transition*.

No attempt has been here made to identify “outcomes” or “causal links”. The “blocks” represent a first attempt to outline the ground on which these elements will be further defined. The grouping of “blocks” is provisional and can be modified any time.

The TOC is expected to reflect a complex non-linear socio-economic process, built on a broader information base than was possible through the evaluations here reviewed, which will identify relations between FAO interventions with a large number of other factors that are at the basis of what is being analyzed as *transition* process.

Annex 5: Expert Panel Input to the Final Report

EVALUATION OF FAO'S WORK IN POST-CRISIS TRANSITION

5 August 2014

This input on the evaluation report final recommendations is the result of the Expert Panel members' review of the draft final evaluation report, as well as extensive dialogue with each other and the evaluation team in Rome, 28-30 July 2014. Panel members have submitted their individual comments on the evaluation draft as a whole; these are the Expert Panel reflections on the draft recommendations, based on the aggregate of the evaluation evidence and analysis.

Brian Ganson, Chair

On behalf of the Expert Panel

Since FAO's core work is intimately tied to land and livelihoods, as well as to questions about how broadly and fairly the benefits from agricultural development are distributed, FAO is never far removed from the root causes of poverty and vulnerability in difficult transition environments. FAO's own experience – as illustrated in the current evaluation report and the evidence on which it relies – amply demonstrates that FAO and its work are part and parcel of these contexts. The Expert Panel concludes from its review and discussion of the report that that the evaluation and its recommendations must more consequentially address the need for FAO work in transition settings to go well beyond supporting technical solutions for the material aspects of vulnerability to confront and help shape in constructive ways difficult socio-political realities.

The Expert Panel recognizes that this is a delicate and demanding task. The experience of FAO, consistent with broader experience and the literature, underlines that transition settings, among them many fragile states and protracted crises, pose significant challenges: social, political, and economic, as well as technical and environmental. They are the most difficult contexts in which FAO as well as other relief and development actors work. They do not lend themselves to simplistic or boiler plate solutions.

Yet the Panel notes that, if FAO is to achieve its mission, it is imperative that FAO be capable of helping the poor and vulnerable in these places transition from crisis, hunger and risk of hunger to food security and sustainable livelihoods. It must do so both directly through its projects and programs, and indirectly through its normative and leadership role within particular transition environments and the broader international community. It is also critical that FAO not do harm through unintended consequences of its actions.

The Expert Panel notes the strong evidence that FAO is more successful when the full range of its operations related to a transition context – including those in-country and those at regional and headquarters levels – are aligned around this challenge. In such cases FAO demonstrates certain attributes that allows it to understand, navigate and ultimately help shape transitions for the poor and most vulnerable. Conversely, FAO is less successful and more likely to do unintentional harm when its operations in a transition context, particularly in fragile states and protracted crises, lack these attributes. The Panel believes these attributes, as well as the challenges to demonstrating them in all of FAO's transition work, merit deeper exploration.

Similarly, the Panel believes from its review and discussion that the report must more frankly acknowledge that FAO has not achieved either dependable or consistent levels of performance across the many countries to which transition is relevant, including fragile state and protracted crisis

contexts. The expert panel also believes there is more room to question whether current frameworks, strategies and institutional reforms are sufficient to close the gap in addressing hunger and food insecurity in the timeframes with which FAO and its partners can be comfortable. The Panel at the same time recognizes that there are examples of strong performance and good practice in some transition settings from which FAO can draw valuable learning, which can also usefully be explored in greater depth.

The following Expert Panel reflections highlight the Panel's conclusion that the evaluation and its recommendations should more directly confront the need, arising from the evidence and analysis, to address organizational roles and capabilities more consequentially and systematically in difficult transition settings, both in the field and at regional and headquarters levels.

1. The evaluation recommendations should better emphasize the need for FAO to exert leadership, internally and externally, that achieves a sustained and relentless focus on the transition of poor and vulnerable populations from crisis, hunger and risk of hunger to food security and sustainable livelihoods in difficult environments.

While FAO has in the past period legitimately attended to its organizational improvements, it appears from the evidence and analysis timely for the primary meaning of transition to shift within FAO from a funding and program paradigm to one of sustained and relentless focus on the transition of poor and vulnerable populations from crisis, hunger and risk of hunger to food security and sustainable livelihoods. The Expert Panel believes the recommendations should similarly demonstrate a shift in emphasis from institutional arrangements to impact, as well as realization of FAO's aspiration to be accountable to affected populations.

The Expert Panel notes that the full imperatives of transition environments are not clear in relevant FAO normative frameworks. The evidence shows that technical solutions implemented to address the material aspects of vulnerability will not achieve their intended ultimate impacts if FAO and others do not address the political economy of poverty and vulnerability. The Panel believes the evaluation and its recommendations should address for difficult transition environments, particularly fragile states and protracted crises, how FAO's normative frameworks, including those of "resilience" and "transition," can better embrace changes in power and institutional relationships that are root causes of poverty and vulnerability in these places.

The Expert Panel concludes that greater emphasis needs to be given to the imperative for FAO leadership through enhanced corporate governance and accountability structures to ensure that all FAO activities that relate to a particular transition environment – across all FAO strategic objectives and all FAO core functions, and at local and international levels – are directed towards the achievement of positive outcomes for the poor and most vulnerable in that place, both short and long term. The evaluation and its recommendations can better explore how information gathering and analysis, normative contribution, analysis, evidence-based policy development, convening and coordination across diverse stakeholders, advocacy and resource mobilization all can contribute to FAO's transition work.

The Expert Panel also concludes that that report can usefully explore in greater depth how FAO can make full use of its authority and legitimacy embedded in its dual mandate as a UN humanitarian and development organization to confront and help shape in positive directions difficult socio-political realities. This should include how FAO can better engage all food security stakeholders around issues including power relationships, social organization, the

quality of governance and the nature and role of institutions in a society, frequently at the heart of the vulnerability of the rural poor and food insecurity as it is more broadly experienced.

2. *The recommendations should better address how FAO can ensure the seamless integration of contextual analysis, strategy development, targeting, and intervention design, planning, implementation and monitoring for each transition environment.*

The evidence and analysis underline that transition environments are highly dynamic, and typically information poor. They are also different one from another. Thus it is unsurprising that the evidence and analysis also highlight that, to be effective, FAO must operate on the basis of nuanced and continually updated contextual analysis that uncovers the often disguised forces that nurture and sustain crises. The Expert Panel believes that the point can be more strongly made that central to this must be strong political economy analysis, both at country and specific sector levels. It must include for each transition setting synthesizing from internal and external sources of sound information and actionable insight about poor and vulnerable populations; it may frequently require the development of better information and insight than is currently available. The Panel concludes that the recommendations should explore more thoroughly why such rigorous and thorough analysis of the root causes of crisis, poverty and vulnerability, and the impact on livelihoods of social, political, economic and conflict dynamics are not at the heart of FAO operations in every transition environment, and how this can be remedied.

The Panel concludes that the evaluation and its recommendations can usefully explore how such analysis can be pursued in partnership with all food security stakeholders. Since the evidence suggests that FAO may not access such knowledge and insight easily, this could improve the quality of FAO's own information and analysis by forging alliances with those who do. The evidence also suggests that this may provide a platform for inclusion, shared vision, shared analysis and consensus-building on problems and solutions, mobilization of resources inside and outside of FAO, as well as greater coherence and coordination among stakeholders who may be insufficiently focused on the transition needs of poor and vulnerable populations. It may help orient the actions of all actors through a sound understanding of the socio-political and economic relations that drive vulnerability. It may provide a mechanism for ensuring that intended program strategies and approaches as well as evaluation of their impacts and outcomes are validated with affected populations.

The Expert Panel also concludes that there is much room to explore how this analysis can be better used to ensure that the generally accepted measures of program effectiveness are evident and real in FAO Country Planning Frameworks (CPFs) in transition settings. The evidence seems clear that many elements are absent from many (if not most) CPFs, including prioritization of vulnerable populations, context appropriateness, coherence, and coordination; locally-grounded theories of change for the transition of poor and vulnerable populations from crisis, hunger and risk of hunger to food security and sustainable livelihoods, amenable to monitoring and evaluation; and gender analysis as well as conflict sensitivity and do no harm analysis at the program and project levels. The evaluation and its recommendations can better explain these gaps and explore the implications for all FAO strategic objects and core functions – including articulation of anticipated support from FAO regions and headquarters – in improving strategies for transition environments.

The Expert Panel also concludes that the evaluation and its recommendations should address how monitoring and evaluation of FAO's own interventions should be adapted to the imperatives of difficult transition environments. Broad experience underlines that M&E must be attentive to anticipated as well as unanticipated results and outcomes in complex contexts. It

must be ongoing, assuming that strategies and approaches will need to be adapted in dynamic environments. It must also remain attentive to the social, political and conflict dynamics that can frustrate well intended work in complex socio-political contexts. The evaluation can also usefully explore how FAO can cycle back into its contextual analysis the collective impact of developments, positive and negative, of its own and others' actions as they affect the transition of poor and vulnerable populations from crisis, hunger and risk of hunger to food security and sustainable livelihoods.

3. *The recommendations should better address how FAO can ensure dependable organizational performance across all its operations in difficult transition settings.*

The Expert Panel notes that an individual FAO operation must be able to deliver dependable performance despite the difficult and shifting social, political, economic and conflict dynamics characteristic of transition environments, in particular fragile states and persistent crises. FAO as a whole must deliver consistently high performance across a large number of difficult environments. The Panel concludes the evaluation and its recommendations must better identify and highlight the core organizational capabilities for these challenging contexts, noting that the evidence indicates that these will include those related to analysis, planning, decision-making, program implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and advocacy and coordination explored above.

The Expert Panel notes that it may be beyond the available evidence and analysis to fully define the necessary and sufficient organizational capabilities, the full range of normative requirements, governance and accountability measures, and capability building required to achieve them (including human resource development as well as organizational systems and processes), and the best method for these to be systematically implemented. Yet the evaluation and its recommendations must to be actionable include more attention to the path needed for FAO to ensure that its organizational development efforts are broad enough, deep enough and fast enough to meet the transition needs of crisis-affected populations.

The evidence and analysis suggest that distinct aspects of leadership – particularly for FAORs, but also at different levels of the organization – may need to be emphasized, and therefore merit greater consideration in the report. In summary, it appears to the Panel that leaders must integrate short and long term thinking. They must combine rigor with flexibility in program design and implementation. They must be honest brokers and trusted conveners of diverse stakeholders on issues affecting poor and vulnerable populations facing hunger or vulnerability in crisis contexts. The Panel concludes that the evaluation and its recommendations can usefully explore in more depth how individual leaders and FAO as a whole can develop the capacity to balance relationship-building with advocacy on behalf of poor and vulnerable populations, as well as navigate FAO's role as a partner to government with its role as an implementer of universal humanitarian and development norms and standards, particularly in environments where these may be in tension. The Panel concludes that the high degree of individual and institutional political savvy required to navigate difficult transition contexts, why it may be absent, and how it can be achieved should be explored in the evaluation.

Finally, the Expert Panel concludes that the tensions inherent between decentralization and the development of new capabilities need to be better acknowledged in the evaluation and recommendations. Worth exploring may be how constant global exchanges as well as more centralized expert resources may help ensure dependable and consistent levels of performance across the many countries to which transition is relevant, particularly as FAO as a technical organization increasingly confronts the need to help shape contentious issues of political

economy that are root causes of poverty and vulnerability. The Panel notes that the evidence suggests that “integration” should be pursued to its logical conclusion as quickly as possible, but “decentralization” as it relates to the capacities needed to affect fundamental changes in complex socio-political dynamics may need to be addressed with some caution, particularly in the short term.

The Expert Panel concludes by acknowledging that not all of the most complex transition environments within which FAO works are violent or at risk of violence. But all face substantial and disruptive socio-political and socio-economic conflicts, with land and livelihoods often at the core. The Panel reflections for strengthening the evaluation and its recommendations in the aggregate recognize that within difficult transition contexts, in particular fragile states and protracted crises, FAO to be effective must embrace the imperative to help shape a new social and political consensus on the political economy at the heart of the vulnerability of the rural poor and food insecurity as it is more broadly experienced. In the Panel’s view this goes well beyond “resilience” and “transition” as they are currently defined or broadly understood within the organization. The Panel concludes that the evaluation and recommendations must more consequentially address how FAO’s leadership role in individual transition settings as well as internationally, its information and analysis, its programming, and its core organizational capabilities can align to confront and help shape in positive directions difficult and contentious socio-political realities.

Annex 6: Profiles of Evaluation Team Members

Massimo D'Angelo – Team Leader

Extensive experience with the United Nations. Worked with UN Secretariat since 1984 until 2006 (was seconded to UNDP as Senior Field Economist between 1988 and 1991). Dealt with inter-agency affairs and prepared evaluations on effectiveness of UN development cooperation since 1994. Has been Chief of the Development Cooperation Policy Branch, UN DESA, since 2001. Dealt with UN funding mechanism, coordination mechanisms. Since March 2006, consultant with FAO and UN Secretariat. With FAO, analyzed relations with UN reforms for FAO conference and undertook studies on partnership strategies respectively with UNDP, UN system, and Organization-wide Strategy on Partnerships. Special advisor for FAO in Vietnam in 2007-2008 for the “One UN” pilot exercise. Special advisor for FAO in Cambodia (in 2009) for the formulation of the National Medium-Term Priority Framework (NMTPF), in Iran (2010) for a revision of a draft NMTPF and formulation of a Country Programming Framework (CPF) for Iran, and in Afghanistan (2011-2012) for the formulation of the CPF for that country. Assisted FAO headquarters in 2010 and 2011 for the revision of the NMTPF, providing initial draft of revised guidelines for the CPF formulation and related toolkit. Undertook evaluations on aid mechanisms.

Birgit Kundermann

As a senior consultant, Birgit Kundermann has more than 20 years of extensive experience in the agriculture, food security and rural development sectors in Africa and Asia, partly in long term assignments with mainly GIZ (1991 – 1999) and since then as an independent short term consultant. Her consultancy experience includes the coordination of a number of complex evaluations of both transitional and development interventions on behalf of bilateral development agencies as well as for NGOs. She has worked intensively on the interaction between disaster, conflict and biodiversity with studies and publications in this area. In addition, Birgit has acquired a profound working experience on reintegration aspects in post-conflict settings and in analyzing conflict and gender issues in various circumstances. Moreover, she is a specialist for results based monitoring systems and evaluation with a wide range of methodological experience for evaluations and impact studies. Birgit holds a Master's Degree in Agricultural Engineering and Crop Production from Justus-Liebig University in Germany.

Balachandran Gowthaman

A senior professional with 15 years experience in Development and Humanitarian programme design, implementation, evaluation and policy advocacy. Possesses senior level operational management and representational experience in highly complex emergencies including in conflict and natural disaster situations. Hands on development and institutional strengthening experience working on community mobilization and capacity building at the grass roots, regional and national levels. Expertise in rights-based programming and gender mainstreaming. Has a strong academic background in development economics, business administration and law. Possesses expertise in poverty and social analysis and conflict sensitive programming. Excellent analytic and writing skills. Very fluent in English, Tamil and Sinhala. Conversant with UN structures, covenants and guidelines and experienced in coordinating and working with multiple actors including Government, Military, UN, NGOs & civil society groups. Politically astute and very familiar with the context and challenges

facing transition in fragile societies. Gowthaman has a Masters of Public Administration in International Development from Harvard.

Pernille Nagel Sørensen

Senior consultant with more than 20 years of specialization in food/ nutrition security and livelihoods systems (agricultural and pastoralist areas) in Africa and Asia. Since 2006, she has worked as an independent consultant primarily with evaluation and monitoring. e.g. contribution and impact evaluation and Results-Oriented- Monitoring (ROM) for clients such as FAO, WFP, EC, ECHO, NORAD, Danida, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and NGOs. Pernille has conducted evaluations in various contexts (post-crisis/transitional countries, natural disaster, fragile and conflict-affected states, protracted crisis); the work for instance focused on IDPs (Uganda, Sierra Leone, South Sudan), social protection (e.g. Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia), cash/voucher interventions (e.g. rehabilitation of rural infrastructure in Bangladesh and voucher for agricultural inputs in Uganda). Prior to her job as consultant, Pernille served as food security advisor for a Danish NGO, DanChurchAid (2004-2006). During the period 1997-2004 and 2007-2008, she coordinated/conducted applied research in relation to integrated relief-development food security programme in North Wollo, Ethiopia. Pernille holds a PhD in Anthropology from University of Copenhagen, the dissertation focused on maize trade in Uganda.

Daniel Shallon – Evaluation Manager

An evaluator and evaluation manager with over 15 years of evaluation experience, mainly in IFAD and FAO. A rural sociologist by training, prior to evaluation Daniel Shallon spent many years working in rural development, particularly in the areas of gender and empowerment of rural women, community forestry and decentralized management of natural resources, participatory methods, and field programme monitoring and evaluation. Since 2000, he has been an evaluation manager in the FAO Office of Evaluation, and has had leadership and management responsibilities for many corporate evaluations. Among others, these have included the evaluations of FAO's emergency work in Latin America, FAO's Kosovo programme, the Livelihood Support Programme, and thematic evaluations of FAO's global role in livestock production and policy, commodities and trade, statistics, food security information systems, investment, policy, and crop production. Daniel has his degree in Rural Sociology from Cornell University in the U.S., and conducted graduate work in sociology at Beijing University in China.

Savina Tessitore

A social scientist by background, she has worked in various capacities for FAO-UN, private consultancy companies, research institutes, NGOs and local administrations. Her fields of expertise and research interests are mainly food security, social protection and cash transfers, vulnerability reduction and its relationship with agency, power and rights, pastoralism, rural development, disaster risk management. M.A. Development Studies.

Genny Bonomi

Genny Bonomi has been working with the FAO Office of Evaluation since 2010. As an Evaluation Analyst, Genny has supported the preparation of Country Evaluations for Zimbabwe, the evaluation of FAO's response to the floods in Pakistan and the evaluation of

the EC/FAO programme on linking information and decision-making to improve food security. She has participated in the Somalia Country Evaluation and in the Evaluation of FAO's Regional and Sub-Regional Offices for Asia and the Pacific. Previously, she has worked for the Secretariat of the Development Assistance Committee at the OECD in the Peer Review and Evaluation Division. Genny holds a Ph.D in Economics.

Annex 7 - Profiles of Advisory Panel Members

Brian Ganson

Brian Ganson holds appointments as Senior Researcher, Africa Centre for Dispute Settlement, University of Stellenbosch Business School; Research Associate, Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, The Graduate Institute Geneva; and Senior Fellow, Council on Emerging Market Enterprises, The Fletcher School at Tufts University. His research focuses on the intersection of conflict and development. He also consults to companies, governments, international organizations, and civil society on socio-political risk management, conflict prevention and collaboration, and third party roles in post-conflict and other complex environments. Recent publications include *Business in Fragile Environments: Capabilities for Conflict Prevention in the Negotiation & Conflict Management Research Journal*, and the book, *Management in Complex Environments: Questions for Leaders*.

Lilianne Fun

Lilianne leads ODI/HPG's growing engagement on humanitarian action in Asia, including with ASEAN, Myanmar, China, and Indonesia. Her areas of specialisation include humanitarian crisis, conflict and sectarian violence in Myanmar's transition, regional organisations and humanitarian action in Asia, and "non-traditional" humanitarian actors such as emerging donors and the private sector.

Prior to joining ODI Lilianne had served as Housing, Land and Property Coordinator for the IASC Cluster System in Haiti, as Advisor to the ASEAN Special Envoy on Post-Nargis Recovery in Myanmar, as member of the advisory team of the Governor of Aceh on sustainable development following the Aceh peace agreement of 2005, and as Senior Policy Coordinator for Oxfam International in Aceh and Nias. She has also supported and advised Acehnese humanitarian, human rights and refugee organisations since 1999. Lilianne holds a Master of Arts in Anthropology from Columbia University.

Simon Levine

Simon Levine is a Research Fellow at the Humanitarian Policy Group at ODI, London, worrying mostly about livelihoods and food security, protracted crises, LRRD and resilience. He worked for different NGOs for many years usually working on development programmes in contexts of conflict and protracted crisis such as Mozambique, Cambodia and Burundi. He then spent nine years living in Uganda, working across Eastern and Central Africa and the Horn of Africa specialising in livelihoods, vulnerability analysis and early response. In Uganda he also developed a passion for land rights, on which he worked extensively. Since returning to England in 2010 to work at ODI, he thinks a lot about the frequent mis-match between how humanitarian agencies construct the world in which they work and the world in which people affected by crises actually live.

Margie Buchanan Smith

Margie Buchanan-Smith has been working in the humanitarian aid sector for over 25 years, as an evaluator, a policy researcher and adviser, a humanitarian programme manager and as a trainer and coach. She has co-authored a recent guide on 'Evaluating Humanitarian Action' for ALNAP and facilitates annual training courses on evaluation. She has particular expertise on the Horn of Africa, especially Sudan, in food security and livelihoods. She is a Senior

Research Associate with the Overseas Development Institute, London, and is a Visiting Fellow at the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University. M.Sc. Agricultural Economics.

Herbert M'cleod

Herbert M'cleod is a Sierra Leonean development consultant, who, until recently was an adviser at the President's office in Sierra Leone. In that position, he was at the centre of policy reforms in the growth sectors, particularly the Extractives industry. From 2008 to 2014 he led Sierra Leone's Mineral Negotiations team.

His prior career spanned 35 years of development work in fragile countries for the United Nations Development Program. Among the various senior level positions, he was the UN Resident Coordinator at the DRC, Cameroon, and Eritrea, and was also Director of Operations Policy at the UNDP for several years.

He was a member of the World Economic Forum, Global Action Council on Fragile States and Conflict Prevention from 2012 – 2014. As a consultant he has provided advisory services to several African governments in the area of development policy and is currently assisting the UNDP to operationalize its support for the implementation of the African Mining Vision. He is on the Board of Trustees of The Shift Project, an independent, non-profit center for business and human rights practice that supports governments and businesses to apply the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. He is currently a member of the Irish Aid Expert Advisory Group, and the Sierra Leone Country Director of the International Growth Centre.