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# COUNCIL

## Hundred and Seventy-fifth Session

Rome, 10-14 June 2024

### Global food security challenges and its drivers

**The situation in Gaza related to food security and related matters under the mandate of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)**

**The impact of the war in Ukraine on global food security and related matters under the mandate of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)**

### Executive Summary

This document covers agenda items 4, 5 and 6.

Building on documents prepared for previous Council sessions, the present document provides an update on the global food security situation and reviews the intensity of the main drivers, including conflicts, extreme weather and economic setbacks. It also discusses additional challenges and threats posed to world food security, covering macroeconomic risks, international commodity prices and excessive volatility, fertilizer and energy prices, and trade disruptions. The document includes specific sections on the conflict in Gaza and on the war in Ukraine, discussing impacts on food security both locally and globally. The last section of the document presents FAO's response to the global food security challenges as well as the Organization's support and activities in Gaza and Ukraine.

### Suggested action by the Council

The Council is invited to note the information presented in the document and provide guidance as deemed appropriate.

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## I. Introduction

1. This document builds on Council documents CL 174/4 and CL 172/5 and provides an update on the global food security situation, based on the latest available information and assessments. In addition to discussing the drivers of world food security and additional challenges, the document assesses the situation in Gaza and the impacts of the war in Ukraine on global food security and related matters under the mandate of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and presents FAO's support in this regard.

## II. Global food security situation

### A. Chronic food insecurity

2. As highlighted in Council document CL 174/4, which presented the findings of the 2023 edition of *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World* (SOFI), hunger and food insecurity remain far above pre-COVID-19-pandemic levels and off-track to achieve Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 2. More specifically, hunger, measured by the prevalence of undernourishment (PoU) (SDG Indicator 2.1.1) affected around 9.2 percent of the world population in 2022. While it remained relatively unchanged from 2021, the figure represents a significant increase compared to 7.9 percent in 2019. In terms of numbers, it is estimated that between 691 and 783 million people in the world faced hunger in 2022. Considering the point estimate (about 735 million), 122 million more people faced hunger in 2022 than in 2019, before the global pandemic.

3. Focusing on specific regions, the SOFI report noted that while progress was made towards reducing hunger in most subregions in Asia and in Latin America, hunger was still on the rise in Western Asia, the Caribbean and all subregions of Africa. The proportion of the population facing hunger in Africa in 2022 was nearly 20 percent, much higher compared with other regions of the world, such as Asia, where the PoU was 8.5 percent, Latin America and the Caribbean with a PoU of 6.5 percent, and Oceania with a PoU of 7.0 percent.

4. It is projected that almost 600 million people would be chronically undernourished in 2030. This is about 119 million more than in a scenario in which neither COVID-19 nor the war in Ukraine had occurred, and around 23 million more than if the war in Ukraine had not happened.

5. Regarding the prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity (SDG Indicator 2.1.2), the report highlighted that about 29.6 percent of the global population, corresponding to 2.4 billion people, were moderately or severely food insecure in 2022. A comparison of food insecurity among rural, peri-urban, and urban populations reveals that global food insecurity, at both levels of severity, is lower in urban areas. Moreover, the analysis showed that food insecurity affects women more than men in every region of the world.

6. Updated estimates of global chronic hunger and food insecurity covering up to 2023 will be available in July 2024 with the release of the new SOFI report.

### B. Acute food insecurity

7. According to the 2024 edition of the *Global Report on Food Crises* (GRFC), published on 24 April 2024, around 281.6 million people, or 21.5 percent of the analysed population, faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 59 countries/territories affected by food crises in 2023.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Food Security Information Network (FSIN) and Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC). Global Report on Food Crises 2024. Rome. [www.fsinplatform.org/grfc2024](http://www.fsinplatform.org/grfc2024)  
“High levels of acute food insecurity” refers to populations in Crisis or worse (Phase 3 or above) according to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)/Cadre Harmonisé (CH) classification or moderate and severe acute food insecurity categories in World Food Programme's Consolidated Approach to Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI), and Humanitarian Needs Overviews (HNO)/Humanitarian Response Plans food security (HRP) People in Need (PiN) number as an approximation of IPC/CH Phase 3 or above. These are the populations who face high levels of acute food insecurity and need urgent assistance.

8. The share of analysed population that faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 was marginally lower than in 2022, when it was 22.7 percent. However, the number of affected people increased by 24 million since 2022, marking the fifth consecutive year of rising numbers. This year-on-year increase is mainly explained by increased country coverage as well as deteriorations in some countries/territories outweighing improvements in others.

9. However, for four consecutive years, the prevalence of acute food insecurity has remained stubbornly high, ranging between 21 and 23 percent, despite record levels of humanitarian funding. Thirty-six countries/territories have featured in the GRFC reports for the past eight years, highlighting the difficulty of exiting acute food insecurity conditions once they become acute. Nineteen of them are categorized as both protracted and major food crises.

10. The Sudan faced the biggest deterioration due to the devastating impacts of the conflict that erupted in April 2023, with 8.6 million more people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, bringing the total to 20.3 million people.

11. The escalation of the conflict and hostilities in the Gaza Strip since October 2023 has created the most severe food crisis in the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and GRFC history, with the entire population of 2.2 million people (100 percent of the population) assessed to be in high levels of acute food insecurity, including 26 percent in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) from December 2023 to February 2024. An IPC analysis published in March 2024 warned of a further devastating deterioration with famine imminent between March and May 2024. An IPC analysis conducted in March 2024 projected that Famine would occur between mid-March and May 2024 in Gaza and North Gaza governorates, with a risk of Famine in the rest of the Gaza Strip through July 2024. Half the population (over 1.1 million people) was projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), rising to 70 percent in the northern governorates.

12. Over 705 000 people in five countries faced Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) in 2023 – the highest number in GRFC reporting and almost double that of 2022 – including the Gaza Strip (577 000), South Sudan (43 000), Burkina Faso (42 700), Somalia (40 400) and Mali (2 500). In this phase of acute food insecurity, people face extreme lack of food and exhaustion of coping capacities leading to starvation, acute malnutrition, and death.

13. Over 36 million people in 39 countries experienced Emergency level of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 4) in 2023. More than a third of these people were in only two countries, Afghanistan and the Sudan.

### III. Drivers and challenges of food insecurity

#### A. Drivers of global food insecurity

14. Council document CL 174/4 discussed the major drivers behind the increasing trends of global food insecurity. Conflicts, climate variability and extremes, economic setbacks remain the main drivers external to the agrifood systems. Moreover, poverty and inequality are structural causes of food insecurity, while the unaffordability of healthy diets is a driver internal to agrifood systems. The drivers of food insecurity seem to be intensifying and occurring more frequently and are often mutually reinforcing.

15. These causes not only drive chronic hunger but are also behind the intensification of acute food insecurity. According to the latest edition of the GRFC report, in 2023, **conflict/insecurity** was the major driver in 20 of the 59 countries/territories in food crisis, where almost 135 million people were estimated to be in high levels of acute food insecurity. Indeed, the impact of conflict on acute food insecurity has intensified since 2022, when 117 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 19 countries/territories where conflict/insecurity was the main driver.

16. Meantime, **climate-related shocks** were the main driver in 18 countries, where almost 72 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity. This represents an increase from 2022, when 56.8 million acutely food-insecure people in 12 countries were estimated to need urgent humanitarian assistance. **Economic shocks** were the primary driver in 21 countries, where

75.2 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity, down from 83.9 million people in 27 countries in 2022, although still more than double the numbers in 2019 before COVID-19 instigated major rises in domestic food prices.

### ***B. Additional challenges and threats to global food security***

#### Macroeconomic risks

17. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) updated its World Economic Outlook in April 2024.<sup>2</sup> The report highlights that the global economy has been resilient despite significant interest rate hikes by central banks to restore price stability. Global recovery is predicted to be steady, nevertheless slow and with differences among regions. More specifically, the world economy is expected to continue growing at 3.2 percent in both 2024 and 2025, at the same pace as in 2023. Advanced economies are expected to grow by 1.7 percent in 2024 and 1.8 percent in 2025, compared to 1.6 percent in 2023, while emerging economies are projected to register a slowdown from 4.3 percent in 2023 to 4.2 percent in both 2024 and 2025. The IMF forecasts global economic growth five years from now at 3.1 percent, the lowest level in decades.

18. While the global debt-to-GDP (gross domestic product) ratio declined in 2023 for the third consecutive year, the rate of decline slowed compared to the previous years, as growth and inflation both decreased. This decline was largely driven by advanced economies, while emerging markets registered an increase of the ratio, which reached new highs in 2023. Geoeconomic fragmentation, geopolitical conflicts and rising trade protectionism may exacerbate debt vulnerability.

19. Policies that distort trade, such as export restrictions, have proven to be largely inefficient and can negatively affect the food security of trading partners. While only a limited number of countries used such measures during the COVID-19 pandemic, the impact of the war in Ukraine on food and agricultural markets and weather-induced concerns about production, led to the imposition of more export restrictions than during the 2007/08 global food price crisis.<sup>3</sup> In light of the deteriorating global food insecurity situation, it is essential that countries refrain from reverting to such measures that can exacerbate uncertainty and volatility in global markets and worsen food insecurity and malnutrition.

#### International food commodity prices and excessive price volatility

20. International food commodity prices reached a record high in March 2022, following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. Since then, they generally followed a declining trend, albeit with significant differences among commodities. Overall, 2023 was characterized by a general decline in international food commodity prices, except for rice and sugar. The declining trend was generally due to ample exportable supplies and a sluggish global import demand. International rice prices rose by 21 percent in 2023 due to concerns over the impact of El Niño on production and export restrictions as well as a persistent strong demand, while world sugar prices increased by 27 percent from 2022, due to concerns of tightening global supplies.

21. In March 2024, the FAO Food Price Index increased slightly from the previous month, after seven months of continuous declines; however, it remained down by almost 10 percent from its corresponding value a year ago and as much as 26.2 percent lower than the peak of March 2022. The price indices of all the commodity groups were down in March 2024 compared to a year ago, except the sugar price index which increased by 4.8 percent year-on-year.

22. World food commodity markets have continued with their relative calmness so far in 2024. However, they remain prone to risks and uncertainties. Among those are adverse weather conditions, conflicts and rising geopolitical tensions which can have repercussions on production and create disruptions to trade, sudden changes in trade policy which can increase uncertainty as well as price volatility. Overall economic conditions can also have impacts on global food markets and prices.

23. For instance, El Niño-related drought has caused widespread crop damage and wilting especially in white maize in Southern Africa, with 2024 harvests expected at below-average levels. As

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2024/04/16/world-economic-outlook-april-2024>

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.foodsecurityportal.org/tools/COVID-19-food-trade-policy-tracker>

a result, import requirements are forecast to increase steeply and supplies will likely have to be sourced from outside of the Southern African region. The number of acutely food insecure people is expected to escalate in 2024/25.

24. Of particular note is the rapid increase in the international prices of cocoa, coffee and oil due to supply constraints and a continuing strong global demand. The three commodities share common characteristics. They are all products of perennial trees, they have no substitutes, and their productions are relatively concentrated in a few countries.

#### Fertilizer and energy prices

25. Due to the higher prices of energy and natural gas before and immediately following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in late February 2022, world prices of urea, ammonium nitrates and other nitrogenous fertilizers reached levels that were four times higher than their multi-year averages. Urea prices, a key N-fertilizer, reached almost USD 1000/tonne in April 2022, nearly four times the average registered in 2020. While international prices retreated significantly since then, down to about USD 350/tonne in the first quarter of 2024, in many cases they still linger above their historical levels. Nevertheless, fertilizer access by farmers in many countries remains problematic, reflecting logistical and infrastructure challenges as well as unaffordability.

26. The developments in the energy markets highlight the interplay of supply, demand and geopolitical factors. As of April 2024, global natural gas markets remained well supplied amidst generally high inventories reflecting low winter demand in the Northern hemisphere. However, possible disruptions along the fertilizer supply chains could increase prices.

27. Crude oil prices were in the range of USD 83-90 per barrel as of the end of April. However, escalation of geopolitical tensions combined with the extension of OPEC+ output cuts through June 2024 could exert an upward pressure on prices, which can have significant implications for economic activities, including for agricultural production and trade.

#### Trade disruptions because of logistical disruptions

28. More than 80 percent of the world trade in grains and oilseeds is conducted through maritime routes. While, as of the month of April, global basic food commodity markets remained relatively calm, at least compared to the recent past, restrictions originating from low water levels in the Panama Canal and disruptions in the Red Sea are altering the trading landscape. Shipping restrictions and disruptions translate into extended cargo travel distances, escalating trade costs, including insurance costs, a surge in greenhouse gas emissions, and increased probability of piracy attacks along some parts of the diverted routes.

29. Low water levels, resulting from extreme drought and exacerbated by the El Niño event, capped the size and the number of vessels in the Panama Canal locks. Reductions were first introduced in July 2023, and in January 2024 reached nearly 40 percent of volumes compared to the year before, leading to extended waiting time and diversions. The situation has started to normalize since then, and it is estimated that up to 32 vessels will be passing the Panama Canal as of June 2024, compared to 35 to 38 vessels under normal conditions.

30. The Red Sea passage secures exports of grains and oilseeds from the European Union, the Russian Federation and Ukraine to Asia and East Africa. Similarly, rice and other commodities head westwards from Asia. Fertilizer trade, including potash from the Russian Federation to Asia, also transits through the Red Sea. In response to the thread of attacks, several shipping companies have rerouted their maritime traffic via the Cape of Good Hope. Reports estimate that rerouting bulk vessels, for grain deliveries from Europe to Asia would add 10-15 days to the journey time and around USD 10/tonne to the freight costs.

31. While the increases in shipping costs may be partly absorbed by exporters, they are also passed on to farmers. Lower producer prices could further impact production decisions in the upcoming planting seasons.

## IV. Conflict in Gaza and impacts on food security

### A. Food security situation in Gaza

32. The escalation of conflict and hostilities in the Gaza Strip since early October 2023 has resulted in a humanitarian crisis of vast proportions, with catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity, as documented by the IPC report published on 18 March 2024.

33. The blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip, along with the destruction of infrastructure related to food, health and water systems from the sustained bombardment and ground operations by Israeli military forces in recent months and the restrictions on the delivery of emergency assistance, have led to widespread food insecurity and food scarcity.

34. As of 20 January 2024, an estimated 1.7 million people or over 80 percent of the population were internally displaced (UNRWA, February 2024) due to continued operations, destruction of shelters, Israeli military evacuation orders, and the lack of access to food, basic services and humanitarian assistance. Many were displaced multiple times in search of safety.

35. According to the IPC report, more than 40 percent of all croplands have been damaged since 7 October, including 41 percent of irrigated land, 43 percent of orchards and 42 percent of rainfed land. Lack of access to land and destruction of crops are compounded by a lack of essential agriculture inputs (fuel, seeds, fertilizers, pesticides). About 70 percent of livestock has been lost, while fishing production is largely halted due to the damage of boats, lack of fuel and safe access.

36. Physical and economic access to food is severely impaired. Formal markets have collapsed, and informal markets dominate food and non-food item transactions. Prices of essential food items have surged (salt, flour, basic staples, potatoes). The flow of humanitarian assistance has been severely disrupted and unevenly distributed across regions and across vulnerable populations within regions.

37. As reported in the latest IPC report, 84 percent of households in the North, 57 percent in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis, and 56 percent in Rafah experienced very severe hunger. Nearly all households in the Gaza Strip have engaged in extreme coping strategies, including virtually all households skipping meals every day, and adults reducing their meals so that children can eat. In nearly 2/3 of households in the North and 1/3 in the South, people went entire days and nights without eating at least ten times in last 30 days.

38. Food consumption throughout the Gaza Strip is heavily concentrated on 1-2 food groups (oil, cereals and tubers). The intake of protein-rich foods like meat and dairy products, as well as fruits and vegetables, is negligible. Between one third and half of Gazan households report being aware of people who were compelled to consume wild or raw inedible food (animal feed, seeds for planting, carcasses) to cope with hunger. Due to restrictions on imports of cooking gas, three out of four households in Gaza resort to burning firewood, wood residue, and animal and human waste as fuel to cook food.

39. Prolonged and extreme food consumption gaps increase nutritional risks greatly, especially among vulnerable groups such as children, pregnant and breastfeeding women, and elderly persons. This has led to increased incidence of diarrhoea, acute respiratory infections and other infectious diseases, including Hepatitis A with high risk of spreading due to overcrowding and lack of access to proper water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH)<sup>4</sup> facilities. The Nutrition Vulnerability Study recently conducted by the Global Nutrition Cluster found that 81 percent of households lack safe and clean water, with average daily household access to water reportedly less than 1 litre per person per day (against a minimum standard of 15 litres per person).

40. The situation is equally dire with respect to basic sanitation. As of 21 February, 13 percent of all sewage and water facilities have been destroyed and over 56 percent have been either destroyed or damaged. Another 11 percent have possibly sustained damage. The contamination of soil,

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<sup>4</sup> Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), reference: [https://www.who.int/health-topics/water-sanitation-and-hygiene-wash#tab=tab\\_1](https://www.who.int/health-topics/water-sanitation-and-hygiene-wash#tab=tab_1)



underground water sources and crops due to the presence of residual remnants and chemicals from explosive ordnances compound the effects of insufficient food intake, overcrowding and collapsing public services to further increase the risk of deadly infectious disease outbreaks and excess mortality.

41. In view of the catastrophic food insecurity situation in the Gaza Strip and the critical importance of peace for food security, FAO supports the call for an immediate ceasefire to allow the provision of essential and urgent humanitarian aid at scale and alleviate human suffering.

### ***B. Escalating risks and global impacts***

42. As mentioned earlier, escalating tensions in the Red Sea area could carry broad economic consequences at regional and global scale. The Red Sea shipping disruptions, especially if combined with additional chokepoints elsewhere, could affect the functioning of global supply chains and food availability on world markets, which may lead to raising international prices.

43. Although so far relatively contained, ongoing geopolitical risks could put an upward pressure on energy prices. For instance, following the start of the war in Ukraine, some countries decided to diversify their energy sources by sourcing small, yet not negligible, amounts of natural gas from Egypt, transferred via Israel. Others rely on tankers carrying supercooled liquified natural gas (LNG) transiting through the Red Sea. Diverting LNG via Cape of Good Hope is more costly than non-cooled cargo, and in some cases might result in cancellation. Furthermore, countries in the region have been facing shipping disruptions, with live animals and perishable cargo being the most impacted. Broader disruptions in trade and increasing energy prices may have implications for global economic performance and stability.

## **V. The impact of the war in Ukraine on global food security and related matters**

### ***A. Global impacts of the war in Ukraine***

44. The outbreak of the war in Ukraine in late February 2022 caused immediate disruptions to world agrifood markets and trade, by impacting trade logistics and transport routes, stirring several scenarios regarding potential global impacts given the importance of both Ukraine and the Russian Federation for global agrifood markets. The two countries are major producers of agricultural commodities in the world and play leading supply roles in global markets of foodstuffs and fertilizers, where exportable supplies are often highly concentrated. They are net exporters of basic foods to many countries that are highly dependent on imported foodstuffs and fertilizers, including many least developed countries (LDCs) and low-income food-deficit countries (LIFDCs).

45. The war has posed multiple risks to food and agricultural markets and trade. These included trade and logistical risks, production risks, price risks and energy risks. The risks were mostly prominent in 2022 but have gradually and partially dissipated as the global economy adjusted and absorbed some of the impacts.

46. When the war broke out in February 2022, Ukraine and the Russian Federation were in the middle of the 2021/22 marketing season. As such, it had immediate impacts on the capacities of both countries to execute existing export contracts and conclude new deals for crops already harvested. This was particularly the case for Ukraine, where the war caused the cessation of all commercial shipping operations, the temporary suspension of activities by private grain and crushing operators, damages to inland transport, storage and processing facilities, and the introduction of licensing requirements or outright bans on exports of some commodities.

47. The loss of Ukraine's maritime shipping capacity, which handles nearly 90 percent of offshore sales, was particularly harmful in terms of effects on world markets and prices. Efforts to boost food exports using alternatives, such as rail and road transport, provided some relief, however, the export capacity was significantly constrained by infrastructural and logistical damages as well as limited railway, car availability and incompatible rail gauges at borders with neighbouring countries.

48. Another impact of the war was the surging of export restrictions on food and fertilizers imposed by third countries. The scale of restrictions had surpassed that experienced during the global food price crisis in 2007/08 and further contributed to increasing food and agricultural prices. Trade



restrictions following the war affected almost one fifth of total calories traded globally, which further aggravated the crisis. Export restrictions prevent the trade needed to bring essential food supplies and fertilizers to where they are most needed.

### ***B. Situation in Ukraine***

49. Since February 2022, the impact of the war and the subsequent disruptions caused to economic activities and production were particularly severe on Ukraine's agricultural sector, causing an estimated USD 10 billion in damages and USD 70 billion in losses (RDNA3, February 2024).

50. Grain storage facilities, irrigation systems, farms and agricultural machinery have either been lost, damaged, or destroyed, exacerbating issues with supply chains and export logistics (including lack of sea access in the early months of the war and then frequent delays in processing of vessels) and increasing production costs.

51. The damages and losses to Ukraine's agriculture sector have changed the nature and scale of the country's agricultural activities. The total planted area decreased in 2023, with 7 percent of Ukraine's total cropland – mostly along the frontlines – being abandoned. This now-fallow land is primarily located in the southern and eastern oblasts where the majority of Ukraine's two largest crops for export were harvested and produced: wheat and sunflower seed. This land would have been worth USD 2 billion in wheat and oilseed in 2023 (NASA Harvest, December 2023). Frontline oblasts (Kharkivska, Khersonska and Zaporizka) experienced the largest losses. The Vinnytska oblast in central Ukraine also experienced large losses without being directly affected by ground battles (RDNA3, February 2024). Continuation of the war could dramatically impact Ukraine's agricultural production outlook for the years to come, jeopardizing Ukraine's ability to cover domestic and export demand (UN, November 2023).

52. This is of particular concern for wheat, considering that while in the occupied oblasts farmers primarily sowed winter crops, mainly wheat, in the government-controlled areas they shifted towards sunflower seed and rapeseed that require fewer inputs and, thus, have lower production costs than wheat or other cereals (NASA Harvest, December 2023).

### ***C. Situation in neighbouring countries***

53. The European Union's "Solidarity Lanes" were introduced in May 2022 to allow Ukraine to export grains and other foodstuffs and import the goods that the country needs, including agricultural inputs. While they have facilitated the export of Ukrainian cereals and oilseeds, among other goods, challenges in the neighbouring countries (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania) are experienced.

54. Due to lack of sufficient storage infrastructure and onward transportation, some commodities remained in these countries rather than being re-exported, putting a downward pressure on domestic prices and sparking protests among farmers in 2023. This resulted in the imposition of temporary import bans, while maintaining the export routes. While some protests remain, as of April 2024, the bulk of exports uses the shipping corridor from Ukrainian Black Sea ports, reducing the pressure on neighbouring countries.

## **VI. FAO's Response and Support**

### ***A. FAO's response at the global level***

55. Considering the increasing risks and challenges globally, market transparency is essential in informing policy decisions and reducing market uncertainty. FAO, through its regular activities and regular reports and information notes, continued the provision of up-to-date and objective data and information on market developments and outlook, early warnings at country and regional levels, as well as estimates of the impact on global food insecurity.

56. Furthermore, policy dialogue and coordination at the global level is essential to avoid distorting policies, thus minimizing market and trade disruptions and ensuring the proper functioning of international markets and supply chains. The Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS), a G20 initiative with its inter-agency secretariat housed in FAO, has contributed to increasing market

transparency through its regular and timely market monitoring activities and products, while its Rapid Response Forum offered a unique platform for policy dialogue and coordination of responses among the G20 participant members.

57. Apart of being a leader in the provision of market intelligence services and global public goods to guide policy decisions, FAO is also at the forefront of the efforts to frame approaches for addressing the world food security crisis in a wide range of global governance mechanisms, including the Group of Twenty (G20), the Group of Seven (G7), the Global Food Security Cluster, the Global Forum for Food and Agriculture, and the Global Crisis Response Group on Food, Energy and Finance (GCRG) established by the UN Secretary-General in 2022 in response to the global crisis.

58. With regard to the G20 under the Brazilian Presidency in 2024, FAO has been fully supporting the establishment of the proposed Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty aimed at escalating and accelerating efforts to eradicate poverty and hunger (SDGs 1 and 2) while reducing inequalities (SDG 10), championing just transitions and contributing to the achievement of other SDGs. Concerning the G7 process under the Italian Presidency, FAO has been closely supporting the Food Security Group and its work on developing the Financing for Shock-Driven Food Crisis (FSFC) Facility. The FSFC is a global effort aimed at providing rapid-response financing in anticipation of severe food crises, designed with the explicit goal of preventing their escalation to save lives and donor resources. This will be achieved by leveraging risk capital and knowledge from global insurance markets and drawing upon experience within FAO and the humanitarian community in implementing anticipatory action measures.

59. Furthermore, FAO's activities go beyond the immediate response to the current global food insecurity crisis. FAO is focusing on providing technical assistance and policy support to Members in the urgently needed transformation of agrifood systems to be more efficient, inclusive, resilient and sustainable. This includes medium- and long-term efforts and actions, fully in line with the Organization's Strategic Framework 2022-31. FAO's support to Members covers the full spectrum of the Organization's disciplines, including fisheries and forestry.

60. A dedicated webpage with full information has been developed on [FAO response to global food security challenges](#), including the situations in Gaza and Ukraine as well as other ongoing crises.

### ***B. FAO's support and activities in Gaza***

61. Under the Occupied Palestinian Territory Flash Appeal, FAO is aiming to address the immediate needs of vulnerable farmers and livestock holders in Gaza Strip and the West Bank, with a total requested funding of USD 40 million to assist 70 660 people. FAO's immediate plan is to provide barley fodder, water tanks, animal shelter, veterinary kits, and other inputs to small ruminants, cattle, and poultry holders. Inputs are planned to be procured and transported to distribution points/ warehouses, subject to COGAT (The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories - Israel) approval of the entry of goods into Gaza.

62. FAO plans to distribute 1 500 tonnes of animal fodder to be delivered to livestock farmers in Gaza. The quantity is considered sufficient to produce milk adequate to provide for all children under 10 years of age in Gaza 20 percent of the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended minimum daily requirement in terms of caloric intake. At the same time, the animal feed will help prevent death by starvation of small ruminants. As of 8 May 2024, 382.5 tonnes of barley fodder entered Gaza. Fodder was distributed to at least 2 600 beneficiaries in Rafah receiving a 50kg sack each, sufficient to feed five sheep for five days, with almost 2 300 of those beneficiaries receiving two sacks under an additional round of distribution. The remaining 117.5 tonnes are planned to be delivered once the security situation allows.

63. FAO has conducted several geospatial assessments in collaboration with the United Nations Satellite Centre (UNOSAT), alongside Palestinian institutions (Ministry of Agriculture and Palestinian Central Bureau for Statistics), to evaluate agricultural sector damages in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These assessments will aim to provide a detailed analysis of how mobility restrictions and conflict escalation have impacted FAO beneficiaries, including both farmers and herders.

### ***C. FAO's support and activities in Ukraine***

64. Since 2022, FAO provided support to over 205 000 rural families and more than 12 000 small farmers, focusing on the most affected oblasts of Ukraine. Of these, around 82 850 rural families received vegetable seeds and seed potatoes, over 6 600 received winter wheat seeds, over 46 000 rural families received animal feed, 7 300 rural families received one-day-old chicks and feed for them, more than 54 600 families received cash assistance, and around 27 500 families received vouchers to repair livestock shelters, purchase agricultural production inputs or animal health kits.

65. More than 5 500 farmers received 2 tonnes of either spring barley, spring wheat, spring peas, soybeans, or winter wheat seeds each to sow 10 hectares of land. Over 4 600 farmers received either seeds of sunflower or maize to sow 25-30 hectares of land. Over 1 800 farmers received grain storage sleeves or modular storage units. Around 90 agrifood processors have received power generators to support energy supply needs in areas near the frontline, where power supply was disrupted. Over 40 small-scale producers from western Ukraine received matching grants to sustain production, improve efficiency and profitability, and ultimately strengthen national value and supply chains.

66. Restoration of mine/UXO contaminated arable land is a crucial element of Ukraine's economic recovery. FAO has partnered with the World Food Programme (WFP), the *Fondation Suisse de Déminage* (Swiss Foundation for Mine Action) and the Mine Advisory Group to contribute to the government's effort to reach its announced objectives: 305 000 hectares returned to economic use by the end of 2024.

67. FAO conducted several assessments to understand the impact of the war on agriculture and food security. From late 2022 to early 2024, FAO conducted a series of assessments aimed at examining the impact of the war on agricultural production and livelihoods, both at the household and producer levels. These assessments included sectoral analyses of damage and losses in the agricultural sector. In addition, FAO participated actively in various multi-partner analytical processes in the country, such as the Rapid Damage and Needs Assessments (RDNA), Post Disaster Needs Assessments (PDNA), and Humanitarian Impact Assessments (HIA).