The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2025

Understanding the implications of food price inflation requires a comprehensive view of how rising prices affect different aspects of food security and nutrition. Building on the analytical framework used in previous editions of The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World, four key dimensions are considered:

• availability (the physical presence of safe and nutrient-dense food);
• access (people’s physical and economic capacity to obtain it);
• utilization (individuals’ ability to absorb and benefit from the nutrients consumed); and
• stability (the consistency of these conditions over time, especially in the face of shocks or cyclical pressures).

Recent global shocks (discussed in Section 3.2) have significantly disrupted global food availability, access, utilization and stability. These events have constrained exports from major food-producing countries, disrupted access to essential inputs like fertilizers and energy, and impaired critical trade routes. This in turn has compromised the availability of food, especially in net food-importing developing countries. Beyond supply constraints, rising food prices have eroded households’ economic access to food. Reduced purchasing power could originate from loss of income, occurring frequently in time of economic crisis or slowdown, or due to sharp increases in consumer prices: both will reduce real income with similar effects on consumers, but with significantly different causes, and therefore solutions. While, in theory, rising wages could offset the effects of food price inflation, evidence presented in Section 3.3.1 suggests that incomes have not kept pace with food price increases in the short term, reducing households’ capacity to access food. Furthermore, as food prices increase, households may reduce their diet diversity (usually relying on cheaper foods) and change their intrahousehold allocation patterns to the detriment of women (see Section 3.3.2). Thus, food price inflation may have negative effects on households’ capacity to maintain adequate food utilization. Thus, high levels of food price inflation can affect food consumption and food security through two mechanisms. The first is an income effect, where higher prices erode households' real incomes restricting their overall food consumption. The second is a substitution effect, where households might readjust their consumption patterns towards relatively cheaper food items (potentially less nutrient-dense and of lower quality). The extent and duration of this income price misalignment varies across countries, but it has weakened the overall stability of food security for many vulnerable populations.

Food price inflation is associated with higher food insecurity and worse nutritional outcomes. Section 3.3.2 examines the relationship between rising food prices and food insecurity, using estimates based on the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES) and finds a clear association between higher inflation and increased food insecurity. Section 3.3.3 explores whether food price inflation is also linked to a deterioration in nutritional outcomes, particularly among children under five, by analysing key nutrition indicators while controlling for confounding factors such as access to clean water, sanitation and public health services. As illustrated in the conceptual framework (Figure 3.6), nutritional status depends not only on food consumption but also on broader health and environmental factors, including feeding practices, food preparation, immunization and healthcare access. Despite the complexity of this relationship, the analysis finds that higher food price inflation is associated with a greater prevalence of acute malnutrition in children.

FIGURE 3.6 Food security and nutrition dimensions and determinants

SOURCE: FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP & WHO. 2024. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024 – Financing to end hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition in all its forms. Rome. https://doi.org/10.4060/cd1254en

3.3.1 Inflation deteriorates real income

Inflation erodes household purchasing power, making it harder for families to afford essential goods and services. While real incomes are ultimately tied to workers’ productivity, wages and prices often adjust at different speeds in the short term, particularly as economies absorb external shocks and disruptions. This temporary misalignment can create significant hardships for households, even when long-term economic fundamentals remain stable. A growing body of evidence shows that even short-lived economic shocks, such as macroeconomic crises, food scarcity or extreme weather events, can have long-lasting effects when they occur during critical periods of human development, including in utero and in early childhood.^107–110 These adverse effects on long-term health outcomes underscore the importance of timely and targeted policy responses to mitigate the consequences of inflation, especially for vulnerable population groups.

The recent surge in global inflation (2021 to 2023) has had substantial adverse effects on living conditions. Global real wages^s decreased by 0.9 percent in 2022 as inflationary pressures intensified^104, 111 – consistent with evidence that large-scale economic shocks can lead to surges in inflation and a consequent decline in real wages. Countries such as Myanmar and Sri Lanka have recently experienced severe socioeconomic crises. In Sri Lanka, during the major macroeconomic crisis of 2022, poverty rates doubled from 13 percent (2021) to 26 percent (2022). Similarly, in Myanmar, the economic contraction following the 2021 military coup resulted in increases in poverty rates of 19 percent and 32 percent in urban and rural areas, respectively.¹¹²

Previous inflationary episodes offer important lessons on recovery patterns. During the food crises of 2007 to 2008 and 2011 to 2012, in Ethiopia, real food wages – i.e. wages adjusted for food price inflation – fell by 22 percent, worsening food insecurity and economic vulnerability. As the economy stabilized, however, wage growth outpaced inflation, leading to a 60 percent increase in real food wages between 2013 and 2018.¹¹² A similar pattern is emerging today, with real wages beginning to recover after a sharp decline in 2022. Global real wages rose by 1.8 percent in 2023 and 2.7 percent in 2024.¹¹¹

The global wage fallout and recovery process has been highly uneven, with some countries experiencing parallel movements in earnings and food prices, which have helped maintain relatively stable earnings in real terms. Figure 3.7 illustrates trends in monthly employee earnings, based on ILO data, alongside food price inflation across selected countries. In Mongolia (Figure 3.7C), earnings and food prices have largely moved in tandem, helping stabilize food-adjusted wages despite short-term fluctuations.¹¹³ A similar pattern is observed in Mexico (Figure 3.7B), where earnings and food price trends have generally aligned.

FIGURE 3.7 The global fallout and recovery process of average employee monthly earnings has been highly uneven, as shown in the cases of Egypt, Mexico, Mongolia and Peru

NOTES: The indices are based on 2019Q1=100 (except for Mongolia, where 2019Q2=100). Quarterly consumer price indices (CPIs) are estimated as geometric means of the monthly data. These data only include information about wage earners. Thus, they do not reflect the situation of farmers in rural areas. Data are missing for the first quarter of 2021 in Peru due to a break in the series. * Wage index and food CPI data are available through the fourth quarter of 2023.
SOURCES: Data for nominal monthly earnings of employees are based on ILO. 2025. ILOSTAT: Statistics on wages. [Accessed on 10 March 2025]. https://ilostat.ilo.org/topics/wages. Licence: CC-BY-4.0; data for the food consumer price index are based on FAO. 2025. FAOSTAT: Consumer Price Indices. [Accessed on 18 June 2025]. https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/CP. Licence: CC-BY-4.0.

https://doi.org/10.4060/cd6008en-fig3.7

Many countries, however, are experiencing sustained declines in real earnings, making it more challenging for households to meet basic food needs. In Egypt (Figure 3.7A), the heavy reliance on wheat imports from the Russian Federation and Ukraine, compounded by a severe shortage of foreign currency, has caused food prices to increase significantly faster than earnings since mid-2022.^114, 115 In Peru, food prices surged markedly from early 2020 to late 2023. By late 2023, workers’ earnings had increased by only 6.6 percent, while food prices had risen by 34.5 percent relative to their pre-COVID-19 pandemic (2020Q1) levels (Figure 3.7D).¹¹⁶ Overall, the evidence underscores the fact that the recent inflationary period has placed households’ food budgets under heavy strain in some countries.

Conflict-affected countries have faced particularly acute challenges, as sustained declines in real wages have made it increasingly difficult for households to meet basic food needs. While ILO’s dataset provides valuable insights into employees’ monthly earnings, its scope is limited, often excluding self-employed workers, those in smaller firms, the informal economy and rural areas. To address this gap, Box 3.4 draws on complementary data from the World Food Programme (WFP), tracking unskilled labour wages and staple food prices in local markets across Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen between 2020 and 2024. These data offer a more nuanced view of vulnerable workers in conflict-affected countries. All three countries experienced significant declines in real food wages (i.e. wages adjusted by food price inflation) over this period, with recovery trajectories proving uneven. In large part due to persistent conflict and instability, unskilled wages have yet to return to early 2020 levels.

BOX 3.4Real food wage analysis in selected conflict-affected countries

In conflict-affected countries, real food wage dynamics present a critical picture of food affordability and purchasing power amid high inflation and disrupted economies. Prolonged conflict, economic instability and global crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, have severely affected food prices and nominal wages, widening the gap between income and essential expenditures. As wages often fail to keep pace with rapidly increasing food prices, households experience diminished purchasing power, aggravating poverty and food insecurity.

The real food wage analysis uses nominal wages as a proxy for income, adjusted for food price inflation using a staple food price index. The index tracks the price of the primary staple food (wheat flour) in each country, normalized to the first observation in the time series. Real food wages are calculated by deflating nominal wages with this index, converted into 2021 purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars for cross-country comparability. The analysis covers data from January 2020 to December 2024. Data were sourced from market-level observations in conflict-affected countries, aggregated to national averages.

In Iraq (Figure A, Panel A), real food wages have been slow to recover from the shock induced by the pandemic and subsequent economic turmoil. The implementation of a currency devaluation at the end of 2020 led to a sharp increase in food prices, while global spikes in food and energy prices following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine further exacerbated the situation. Though nominal wages saw slight, steady increases, they remained insufficient to counterbalance the escalating cost of staples. By the end of 2024, real food wages in Iraq were still significantly lower than their pre-pandemic levels, reflecting the ongoing struggle of households to maintain purchasing power in the face of persistent challenges.

Figure A In conflict-affected countries the gap between food prices and wages was not closed by 2024

NOTES: Data for Panel C refer to the southern part of Yemen administered by the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen. The staple food price index tracks the price of the primary staple food (wheat flour) in each country, normalized to the first observation in the time series. Real food wages are calculated by deflating nominal wages with this index, converted into 2021 purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars for cross-country comparability. * Wage and staple food price data are available through December 2024.
SOURCE: Authors’ (WFP) own elaboration based on unpublished WFP data.

https://doi.org/10.4060/cd6008en-figB3.4A

In the Syrian Arab Republic (Figure A, Panel B), prolonged conflict and economic distress have been compounded by global crises, leading to significant surges in food prices while wages have lagged behind. Between 2020 and 2024, the Syrian economy suffered from food and fuel shortages, economic sanctions, and currency depreciation. These factors, combined with the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine, resulted in steep increases in staple food prices, especially in 2021 and 2022. Although wages began to adjust upwards starting in 2023, real food wages remained substantially below the January 2020 baseline. With the collapse of the Baathist-led government at the end of 2024, the outlook for economic stabilization and recovery remains uncertain.

In Yemen (Figure A, Panel C), enduring conflict has left the economy fragile, with food prices persistently high throughout the analysis period. The dual shocks of the pandemic and the war in Ukraine further aggravated food price inflation in the country. A six-month truce in 2023 brought a brief period of price stability. It also brought a moderate increase in nominal wages, but the rate of increase was notably slower than the escalation in food prices observed in 2021 and 2022. By the end of 2024, despite some recovery in purchasing power, real food wages were still significantly lower than in January 2020, highlighting the prolonged impact of economic disruptions and conflict on household purchasing power.

As households experience temporary or more prolonged declines in their real incomes, they employ various strategies to cope with shocks. These include distress sales of assets, including productive capital; increased reliance on remittances from migrants; diversification of income sources; and reductions in spending on other important items, such as preventive health care or children’s education.^{117, 118} Notably, households may also adjust their food consumption. This can involve shifting to cheaper, less nutrient-dense food items,¹¹⁹ reducing the diversity and frequency of meals,¹²⁰ or prioritizing food for certain members – often reducing the quantity of food women and children consume – to ensure that other household members have sufficient food intake.^121, 122

Evidence highlights the widespread nature of these strategies also across previous inflationary periods. In Kenya and Uganda, a rapid assessment during the pandemic found that at least 40 percent of respondents altered their diets by consuming a narrower variety of foods, skipping meals, or reducing portion sizes.¹²³ In Nairobi’s slums, 69 percent of households reported eating fewer meals per day.¹²⁴ In rural North Central Nigeria, 95.8 percent of households reported relying on fewer preferred foods, while 83.5 percent reduced meal portions.¹²⁵ Similarly, in northern Ghana, 69 to 97 percent of households reduced meal quantity or frequency during hunger periods.¹²⁶ In Palestine, a WFP assessment found that amid sharp food price increases – 15 percent in the food CPI and 70 percent for wheat flour – half of all households reduced their food consumption, primarily by cutting down on meat and dairy consumption (89 percent), but also by reducing overall quantity (76 percent).¹²⁰

3.3.2 Inflation deteriorates food security

Food price increases can potentially affect households’ food security.^t Between 2014 and 2024, countries at different income levels experienced varying degrees of food insecurity, with notable increases coinciding with periods of food price spikes.^u This section explores how trends in annual food prices from 2014 to 2024 relate to average food insecurity levels across countries grouped by income (Figure 3.8).

FIGURE 3.8 Low- and LOWER-MIDDLE-INCOME countries experienced high levels of moderate or severe food insecurity and food price inflation

NOTES: FAO’s Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES) survey data are from 2014 to 2024. Food consumer price index (food CPI) data are estimated as the geometric mean of monthly food CPIs in each year. In each panel, the left axis shows the variation in the food CPI (normalized to 2015=100). The right axis shows the yearly evolution of the prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity. Due to pronounced differences in the rates of food insecurity across income groups, the right axis has different ranges for each group. However, all axes have been scaled to reflect a 14-percentage point range. An alternative presentation of the evaluation of the prevalence of food insecurity could include an index of the number of people experiencing food insecurity (normalized to 2015=100). This analysis yields qualitatively similar results.
SOURCE: Nakasone, E. & Ignaciuk, A. (forthcoming). A global assessment of food price dynamics and food insecurity – Background paper for The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2025. FAO Agricultural Development Economics Working Paper 25-09. Rome, FAO.

https://doi.org/10.4060/cd6008en-fig3.8

Low-income countries experiencing the highest rates of food price inflation (Figure 3.8A) also face large increases in the prevalence of food insecurity. This relationship has been particularly pronounced since the beginning of the current period of inflation, as food prices have risen sharply since 2020, coinciding with an accelerated increase in the prevalence of food insecurity. Between 2019 and 2024, the prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity increased by 6.7 percentage points, and the prevalence of severe food insecurity by 3.5 percentage points. From a policy perspective, this trend is especially concerning as the majority of households in LICs are those most vulnerable to shocks including sharp spikes in food prices.

Lower-middle-income countries (Figure 3.8B) also experienced substantial increases in food insecurity. Although food price inflation in this group averaged 7 percent annually from 2019 to 2024 – less than the 11 percent seen in LICs – the prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity rose by 5.6 percentage points, and of severe food insecurity by 1.6 percentage points. This sharp rise likely reflects the impact of conflict in several countries in this group^v (such as Lebanon and Myanmar), alongside broader economic pressures. Large populations in other countries affected by conflict (such as Nigeria and Pakistan) also contribute to the group’s overall rates, highlighting the complex and interlinked drivers of food insecurity across contexts.

In contrast, food insecurity remained relatively unchanged in UMICs and HICs (Figure 3.8C and Figure 3.8D). The prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity rose by 0.9 percentage points in HICs and declined by 1.2 percentage points in UMICs. This could be related to several factors. For example, these countries (especially HICs) have experienced lower inflation rates (Figure 3.2), and household’s purchase capacity to afford their dietary needs has thus not been as eroded as in other regions. Additionally, higher-income countries tend to have lower levels of inequality.¹³⁰ The analysis below suggests that food insecurity in less unequal countries is not as responsive to increased food price inflation when compared to countries with high levels of inequality. Furthermore, wealthier countries tend to have stronger social protection networks and greater resources to aid their populations in times of distress. In particular, elevated levels of aid – such as the relief programmes implemented during the pandemic – likely helped cushion the impact of inflation on food security.^w For instance, several HICs expanded their social protection programmes and implemented additional subsidies for food and energy to curb the impacts of food price inflation on their population’s living conditions (see Section 4.1).

An increase in food prices is associated with a rise in food insecurity. Figure 3.9 illustrates the relationship between food insecurity and food prices^x between 2014 and 2024 with a scatterplot of the prevalence of food insecurity for each country–year combination in the FIES dataset alongside the average food CPI^y individuals faced. It shows a positive but non-linear association between food insecurity and food prices. For most observations in the data, higher food prices are correlated with larger rates of food insecurity. However, it appears that when countries are already burdened by high food prices, additional price increases are not associated with higher food insecurity.

FIGURE 3.9 Relationship between food insecurity and food prices, 2014–2024

NOTES: This analysis uses survey data from a representative random sample of approximately 1 000 individuals across 143 countries, collected annually between 2014 and 2024, to estimate global food insecurity through FAO's Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES). On average, each country contributes seven rounds of FIES surveys. The FIES questionnaire gathers self-reported data on individuals’ experiences with limited access to food due to financial constraints in the 12 months prior to the survey. Probabilities of moderate or severe food insecurity are estimated based on these responses. The FIES data are then matched with the average food consumer price index (CPI) for each reference period (i.e. the 12 months preceding the survey). Based on these surveys, the prevalence of food insecurity (moderate or severe in Panel A and severe in Panel B) in each country–year is estimated. These graphs present the relationship between (FIES_it – FIES_i) on the vertical axis and (FoodCPI_it – FoodCPI_i) on the horizontal axis. FIES_it and FoodCPI_it are the prevalence of food insecurity and food CPI during year t in country i, respectively. FIES_i and FoodCPI_i are the average prevalence of food insecurity and average food CPI in country i over the sample period, respectively. The figure measures how countries’ deviations in their food prices (relative to their average food prices) are associated with changes in food insecurity (relative to their average levels of food insecurity). The line represents the linear relationship between both variables, weighted by each country’s population. The size of each dot in the graph represents each country’s population. The red line is the regression line based on a flexible fractional polynomial estimation (with regression error terms clustered at the country level). The red shaded area around the regression line is the 95 percent confidence interval of the estimate.
SOURCE: Nakasone, E. & Ignaciuk, A. (forthcoming). A global assessment of food price dynamics and food insecurity – Background paper for The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2025. FAO Agricultural Development Economics Working Paper 25-09. Rome, FAO.

Several factors can influence the relationship between food prices and food insecurity, including country-specific characteristics and shocks. These differences can affect a country’s or household’s exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity to economic or environmental hazards. High food prices act as shocks, and households in more vulnerable countries are typically more prone to reduced food access.¹³⁷ Countries with stronger institutions and governance structures are generally better positioned to mitigate the impact of sharp food price increases on food security. Additionally, external shocks, such as economic downturns or climate extremes, can further exacerbate the link between food prices and food insecurity.^{136, 138, 139} For instance, GDP contractions from macroeconomic shocks can create inflationary pressures while simultaneously limiting household access to food.^z, 136

Food price inflation is associated with higher food insecurity. A 10 percent increase in food prices is associated with a 3.5 percent rise in moderate or severe food insecurity and a 1.8 percent increase in severe food insecurity (Figure 3.10), holding all other factors constant. In 2020, at the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, the global per capita GDP dropped by 3.8 percent,¹⁴² reflecting the dramatic impact of the pandemic. This large economic contraction was associated with a considerable surge in food insecurity. The share of the global population that experienced moderate or severe food insecurity jumped from 25 to 28.8 percent between 2019 and 2020, with the share of those experiencing severe food insecurity increasing from 9.1 to 10.5 percent (see Chapter 2). As the global economy experienced a significant rebound (GDP per capita increased by 5.6 percent in 2021) and some milder growth in subsequent years (GDP per capita grew by 2.5 and 2.3 percent in 2022 and 2023, respectively), food insecurity was expected to return to pre-pandemic levels. However, this recovery has been modest and sluggish: by 2024, the prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity was 28 percent (3 percentage points above the 2019 level). While the world has experienced several important shocks – such as the war in Ukraine, natural disasters, and livestock diseases, as discussed in Section 3.2 – the results in this section suggest that food price inflation may have slowed down the recovery process.

FIGURE 3.10 Highly unequal countries, women and rural populations are more vulnerable to increases in moderate or severe food insecurity associated with food price inflation

NOTES: The figure shows the percentage change in food insecurity associated with a 10 percent increase in the food consumer price index. A more formal econometric model is estimated using the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES) microdata to capture the relationship between food price inflation and food insecurity. Given the apparent non-linear relationship observed in Figure 3.9, a quadratic approach is employed to account for the positive yet diminishing effects of food price inflation on food insecurity. The model controls for several potentially confounding factors. First, country-fixed effects are included to account for time-invariant country characteristics, such as whether a country is landlocked, its natural resource endowments and the long-term strength of its institutions. This statistical model assesses whether changes in food price inflation are associated with changes in food insecurity within countries over time. Second, time-fixed effects are incorporated to control for global shocks in any given year, along with region-specific linear trends to adjust for pre-existing regional patterns in food price inflation and food security. Third, individual-level controls, including respondents’ socioeconomic characteristics from the FIES surveys (e.g. age, sex, education level, household size, rural/urban location and national income quintile) are included. Lastly, the model incorporates country-wide variables to account for shocks that may simultaneously affect food prices and food security, such as per capita GDP and the occurrence of natural disasters (e.g. floods, droughts, pest infestations, earthquakes, tornadoes). FAO’s Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES) survey data are from 2014 to 2024. For food consumer price index (CPI) data, the basic econometric model is the following: Y_icrt = β₁FCPI_crt + β₂FCPI²_crt + δX_icrt + θW_crt + (γ_r × Time Trend)+α_c + λ_t + ε_icrt, where Y_icrt is the probability of food insecurity of individual i of country c in region r during year t and FCPI_crt is the food consumer price index. The regression controls for the respondent’s characteristics X_icrt (age, age squared, sex, indicator variables for level of education, number of adults in the respondent’s household, number of children in the respondent’s household, rural/urban location and the national income quintile to which the individual belongs), macroeconomic variables W_crt (GDP per capita and natural disasters), region-specific time trends γ_r, country-fixed effects α_c and year-fixed effects λ_t. The error term ε_icrt is clustered at the country level. In this setting, the percentage change in food insecurity associated with a 10 percent increase in food CPI is estimated as: Δ% = 0.1/FIES (β₁ + 2β₂FCPI) × FCPI. The Δ% is bootstrapped with 500 replications to estimate standard errors and 95 percent confidence intervals for this estimate.
SOURCE: Nakasone, E. & Ignaciuk, A. (forthcoming). A global assessment of food price dynamics and food insecurity – Background paper for The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2025. FAO Agricultural Development Economics Working Paper 25-09. Rome, FAO.

https://doi.org/10.4060/cd6008en-fig3.10

The impact of inflation varies across different countries and groups. In particular, food price inflation is more strongly associated with food insecurity in countries with higher levels of income inequality compared to those with lower inequality^aa (Figure 3.10). In more unequal countries, where vulnerable populations are larger and social protection mechanisms are weaker, even modest food price increases can have disproportionately harmful effects on food security. These findings underscore the importance of addressing inequality as a critical factor influencing global food security trends.^136, 144

Food insecurity of women is disproportionately affected by food price inflation, reflecting persistent gender disparities (Figure 3.10). Women’s traditional caregiving roles, limited access to productive resources, lower-paying jobs and reduced opportunities to utilize public services constrain their ability to cope with rising food prices.¹⁴⁵ This finding aligns with broader evidence showing that women frequently act as “shock absorbers” in times of crisis, often reducing their own food intake to prioritize that of other household members.^121, 146 For instance, during the pandemic, rapid assessments found that women were more likely to skip meals or reduce meal sizes compared to males,¹⁴⁷ underscoring their heightened vulnerability to food price inflation. A comparison of food insecurity among men and women based on the FIES – presented in Section 2.1 – shows a considerable widening of the gender gap during the period from 2020 to 2021, in the wake of the pandemic.

Rural populations face heightened vulnerability to food price inflation due to structural and economic constraints. Figure 3.10 shows a stronger association between food prices and food insecurity in rural areas compared to urban ones. While in theory, higher food prices could benefit rural households if they are net sellers, empirical evidence shows that most rural households are net food buyers.^15–21 This limits their ability to gain from rising prices.^ab Moreover, rural households typically devote a larger share of their income to food, leaving them with limited flexibility to adjust non-food expenditures.^ac Therefore, they have fewer opportunities to cut down non-food non-essential expenses, making them more vulnerable to food price increases.

3.3.3 Inflation can affect nutritional outcomes

Rising food prices can restrict access to diverse diets for vulnerable groups, particularly children. For infants and young children during the complementary feeding period, animal source foods, legumes, nuts and seeds, and fruits and vegetables are crucial for optimal growth and development. Yet, these foods are frequently missing from young children’s diets.¹⁵³  Complementary feeding practices for children aged 6 to 23 months increasingly emphasize the inclusion of nutrient-dense foods, while discouraging heavy reliance on starchy staples that provide energy but few essential micronutrients.¹⁵⁴ Food price inflation plays a significant role in shaping the diets of children, particularly in terms of achieving minimum dietary diversity (see Section 2.3). When vegetables and other nutrient-rich options are more expensive, families, especially those with limited resources, may opt for cheaper, ultra-processed alternatives that mostly lack essential vitamins and minerals to prepare meals for their young children. This cost barrier can lead to diets that fall short in quality and to malnutrition including stunting and wasting.¹⁵⁵

Wasting, a key indicator of acute malnutrition, reflects the proportion of children under five years of age with low weight relative to their height.^ad It is partly driven by short-term nutritional deficiencies, making it a useful measure for tracking the immediate impact of shocks on child nutrition. Among chronic indicators, stunting captures the long-term effects of inadequate nutrition, while wasting^ae responds more quickly to economic or environmental crises. For instance, the prevalence of wasting tends to rise during negative income shocks,¹⁵⁷ such as those seen during the pandemic. The 2021 edition of this report¹³⁹ estimated that, under a moderate scenario, an additional 11.2 million children under five in low- and middle-income countries would be affected by wasting between 2020 and 2022 – including 6.9 million in 2020 alone. Under a pessimistic scenario, this figure could have risen to 16.3 million.

Wasted children are significantly more vulnerable to other health shocks and are at increased risk of mortality. Severe wasting, often triggered by inadequate access to nutrient-dense foods, weakens the digestive system’s ability to absorb nutrients and impairs the immune system’s capacity to combat even common illnesses. A severely wasted child is up to 11 times more likely to die from a common illness, such as pneumonia, compared to a well-nourished child.¹⁵⁸ Moreover, experiencing wasting during the first years of life not only heightens the risk of mortality but also increases the likelihood of stunting and long-term health challenges.^af, 167

Previous spikes in global food prices have had detrimental effects on child nutrition, particularly by increasing rates of wasting among vulnerable populations. For instance, during the 2007 to 2008 global food crisis, there was an increase in the prevalence of wasting among Mozambican children.¹⁶⁸ Consistently, a rise in the proportion of wasted children was observed in India, with the impacts being particularly severe among low- and middle-income families.¹⁶⁹

Food price inflation episodes are linked to rising wasting. Analysis data from 44 LICs and MICs finds that a 5 percent increase in real food prices raises the likelihood of wasting by 9 percent and severe wasting by 14 percent among children under five years of age.¹⁵⁵ These findings highlight the heightened vulnerability of young children to food price shocks, especially in contexts where food insecurity is already prevalent.

Recent food price inflation may have increased the risk of child wasting. Based on data from about 150 countries worldwide between 1983 and 2023, the analysis in this section suggests that a 10 percent rise in food prices is associated with a 2.7 to 4.3 percent increase in wasting prevalence and a 4.8 to 6.1 percent increase in severe wasting among children under five years of age (Table 3.1). As noted in Section 3.3, nutritional outcomes are shaped not only by food access but also by access to health services. To account for this, additional regressions in Table 3.1 control for basic health indicators – such as access to water and sanitation, and per capita public health spending. The results remain robust with these additional controls. Full regression results are shown in Table 3.1, and further details of the econometric model are provided in Nakasone and Ignaciuk (forthcoming).¹⁴⁴

TABLE 3.1Association between food prices and wasting, 1985–2023

NOTES: Food consumer price index (CPI) is calculated based on FAOSTAT data from 2000 onwards, where average food CPIs in each country and year are calculated. Prior to 2000, food CPI is based on yearly food price inflation from the World Bank. The data for the prevalence of wasting comes from WHO’s Child Malnutrition Database. This dataset compiles wasting indicators collected across several survey rounds in each country. The regressions include all survey-based observations in WHO’s Child Malnutrition Database between 1983 and 2023. The fieldwork months of each survey are identified, and the average food CPI in each period is calculated. The basic econometric model is the following: Y_crt = βFCPI_crt + θAvgLagCPI_crt + δX_crt + (γ_r × Time Trend) + α_c + λ_t + ε_crt, where Y_crt is the prevalence of wasting (or severe wasting) in country c of region r during period t, and FCPI_crt is the food consumer price index over this period. AvgLagCPI_crt is the geometric average of food CPI in the three years prior to period t, γ_r are region-specific time trends, and α_c and λ_t are country- and year-fixed effects, respectively. All regressions control for lagged food CPI, region-specific trends, and country- and year-fixed effects. Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 additionally include a vector of time-varying controls X_crt. In columns 2 and 5, X_crt includes “macro” controls for per capita GDP and an indicator variable for severe disasters in the country. Columns 3 and 6 additionally control for proxies of health services (the percentage of the population with access to basic water, the percentage of the population with access to basic sanitation and per capita public expenditure in health). All regressions have been weighted by the number of children under five years of age in each country and year. The percentage change in the prevalence of wasting (or severe wasting) associated with a 10 percent increase in food CPI is estimated as: Δ% = (β × 0.1 × FCPI)/Y. This estimate is bootstrapped with 500 replications to calculate standard errors, which are clustered at the country level. Asterisks indicate statistical significance levels: * p-value<0.1, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01.
SOURCE: Nakasone, E. & Ignaciuk, A. (forthcoming). A global assessment of food price dynamics and food insecurity – Background paper for The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2025. FAO Agricultural Development Economics Working Paper 25-09. Rome, FAO.

These findings underscore a pressing policy concern: the recent surge in global inflation may have worsened acute malnutrition, placing millions of children at heightened risk of severe health outcomes. At its peak, year-on-year global food prices rose by 13.6 percent between January 2022 and January 2023 (Figure 3.1). During this period, food price inflation reached 25.2 percent and 11.8 percent in low- and lower-middle-income countries, respectively (Figure 3.2), with 65 percent of LICs and 61 percent of LMICs, home to more than 1.5 billion people, facing food price inflation rates of 10 percent or more. These regions also report higher levels of child wasting. By 2024, the prevalence of wasting was 6.4 and 9.5 percent in LICs and LMICs, respectively (see Annex 1A). The results presented here highlight the widespread and serious risks food price inflation poses to these particularly vulnerable populations.