Monitoring food security in Palestine and the Sudan

A joint FAO/WFP update for the members of the United Nations Security Council

February 2024

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Introduction

This is the thirteenth update of the Monitoring food security in food crisis countries and territories with conflict situations, jointly produced by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) to inform members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on critical food crises driven by conflict and insecurity.

FAO and WFP have been producing these reports since June 2016 to inform UNSC members on acute food insecurity situations, livelihood disruptions and the need for humanitarian assistance in countries and territories affected by conflict and insecurity, where humanitarian access to populations is often challenging. This is a special edition, focusing on Palestine (particularly the Gaza Strip) and the Sudan, prepared in the framework of the informal briefing to be held in February 2024.

On 24 May 2018, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2417 on the link between armed conflict and food insecurity. This was a response to growing hunger and the threat of famine that armed conflict posed to millions of people. Today, ample evidence shows UNSC Resolution 2417 and its call to break the vicious cycle of conflict and hunger is even more relevant. Conflict continues to create and amplify acute food insecurity globally and was among the main drivers of eight of the world’s ten largest food crises in 2023.1

Resolution 2417 notably calls upon all states to uphold international humanitarian law (IHL) in conflict and ensure accountability for egregious crimes. The Resolution also reaffirms that states bear the primary responsibility to protect the population throughout their whole territory.4

In the Gaza Strip and the Sudan, conflict has pushed people to the highest levels of acute food insecurity. People in these contexts require the most urgent attention and support to avoid any risk of famine. The Gaza Strip and the Sudan are currently two out of five Hunger Hotspot countries of highest concern globally.2

In the Gaza Strip, 378 000 people were estimated to be experiencing Catastrophe, Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Phase 53 – the most severe phase of acute food insecurity, marked by starvation, critical levels of acute malnutrition, and high levels of excess mortality.4 Experts warned in December 2023 of a risk of famine that would increase daily if hostilities and restrictions on humanitarian access persisted or worsened.5 By 7 February 2024, the entire population in the Gaza Strip is projected to be in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above), the highest percentage of people experiencing such acute food insecurity that the IPC has ever classified for any given area or country.6

In the Sudan, almost half of the population (20.3 million people) were experiencing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) acute food insecurity between July and September 2023, only three months into the conflict.7 This is a staggering deterioration in food security, in terms of scale and severity of hunger compared to the same period in 2022.8 During the harvest season, 17.7 million people are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity, the highest number ever projected during Sudan’s harvesting season.9 If the security situation worsens so that the movement of commodities, including humanitarian assistance, from Chad into West and Central Darfur is restricted, some acutely food-insecure people in these two states will likely deteriorate further into Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).10

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Projections may be conservative because the conflict may become more intense and spread to more areas than previously assumed.¹¹

UNSC Resolution 2417 condemns both the starving of civilians as a method of warfare and the unlawful denial of humanitarian access to civilian populations in need of urgent food, nutrition, and livelihood assistance. The Resolution calls on parties to conflicts to grant humanitarian access and provides the UNSC with options for responding to situations in which access is denied. It also reminds all parties to armed conflict to comply with their obligations under IHL regarding the protection of civilians, highlighting that armed conflict, violations of international law and related food insecurity can also be drivers of displacement.

Resolution 2417 stresses that “…objects necessary for food production and distribution, such as farms, markets, water systems, mills, food processing and storage sites” must not be attacked and that “…objects that are indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, crops, livestock, agricultural assets…and irrigation works”,¹² must not be destroyed, targeted, or rendered useless.

This report explores some of the impacts of armed conflict on food security from the perspective of protecting civilians and objects indispensable for their survival that represent essential components of food systems, as well as the challenges of securing safe, timely and unimpeded humanitarian access, both of which are addressed by Resolution 2417.

By exploring conflict-induced food insecurity in the Gaza Strip and the Sudan, this report seeks to contribute to the monitoring of the implementation of Resolution 2417 and provides recommendations that the UNSC may consider to prevent further deteriorations in food security.

For each of the countries and territories of concern, three distinct conflict-related impacts that can affect people’s food security, as referenced in Resolution 2417, are examined:

1. Impact of conflict on civilians

Conflict directly impacts food security by forcibly displacing people from land, livestock grazing areas, and fishing grounds,¹³ cutting off their access to livelihoods and income opportunities.

Heavy bombardment, intense fighting and evacuation orders have resulted in unprecedented civilian casualties and the forced displacement of around 75 percent of the population in the Gaza Strip.¹⁴ In the Sudan, intense urban warfare and systematic and indiscriminate attacks are driving high numbers of civilian casualties and forced displacement. With over 9 million people internally displaced¹⁵, the Sudan is now the largest conflict-induced internal displacement crisis globally.¹⁶

Resolution 2417 calls on all parties to armed conflicts to protect civilians, in compliance with their obligations under IHL, by conducting hostilities according to the principles of humanity, distinction and proportionality. The forced displacement of civilians is generally prohibited during conflict, except where necessary for civilian safety or in cases of military necessity.

2. Impact of conflict on food systems

Hostilities and violence directly damage or destroy food systems, or indirectly cripple them when essential supplies – like electricity, fuel, and water – are limited. This leads to increased food prices and decreased household purchasing power.

In the Gaza Strip, civilian infrastructure, and objects essential for the production, processing, and distribution of food – such as farmland, markets, water infrastructure, and electricity systems – have
been severely damaged or destroyed by military operations or crippled by the Israeli blockade. Agriculture across all sectors has been dealt a severe blow.

In the Sudan, damage, looting and the destruction of critical infrastructure—such as food factories and markets—has halted economic activities in some of the main areas, while livestock production has been disrupted and the 2024 harvest season is expected to be below average.\(^{17}\)

Resolution 2417 strongly condemns depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival\(^{18}\) and calls on all parties to armed conflicts to comply with their obligations under IHL. The Resolution reminds parties that they are obligated to take constant care to spare civilian objects and refrain from attacking, destroying, removing, or rendering useless objects that are indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.

3. Impact on humanitarian access and humanitarian’s ability to work

Severely restricted humanitarian assistance is contributing to the risk of famine in the Gaza Strip. Humanitarian food assistance was already supporting more than two-thirds of the population before the recent escalation in the conflict,\(^{19}\) and humanitarian commodities remain the only supply of essential items since the import of commercial goods was banned.

In the Sudan, the vast majority of the over 6 million people experiencing critical levels of acute food insecurity are in areas where access is extremely limited owing to fighting and insecurity.\(^{20}\) In Geneina and Zalingei, in West and Central Darfur states, humanitarian assistance and commodities entering from Chad are preventing death and starvation.\(^{21}\)

Resolution 2417 strongly condemns the unlawful denial of humanitarian access and calls on parties to armed conflict to ensure safe and unimpeded access of humanitarian personnel to civilians in armed conflicts, in line with IHL.

This update is prepared under the framework of the Global Network Against Food Crises, as part of a range of analytical products including notably the *Global Report on Food Crises*. Founded by the European Union, FAO and WFP at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, the Global Network Against Food Crises is an alliance of humanitarian and development actors working together to prevent, prepare for, and respond to food crises and support the Sustainable Development Goal to End Hunger (SDG 2).

In collaboration with the Food Security Information Network, the Global Network Against Food Crises released the *Global Report on Food Crises 2023*, available at [www.fightfoodcrises.net](http://www.fightfoodcrises.net) and [www.fsinplatform.org](http://www.fsinplatform.org).

The Global Network Against Food Crises also supports the preparation of the report *Hunger Hotspots – FAO-WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity*. 
This analysis outlines how conflict and the conduct of hostilities since 7 October 2023 have contributed to pushing a large portion of the population to the brink of famine inside the Gaza Strip.\(^a\)

\(^a\) Cutoff date of analysis is 20 January 2024.
Overview of conflict impact on food security

The 7 October 2023 marked the beginning of the deadliest period in the history of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, with unprecedented levels of civilian fatalities, and massive levels of displacement and humanitarian needs.  

The conduct of hostilities in the Gaza Strip – including Israeli air, land and sea bombardment, ground operations, and an economic and humanitarian blockade – has driven over 90 percent of the population (corresponding to more than 2 million people) into Crisis or worse level of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) as of early December. Among these, 378 000 people were estimated to face an extreme deprivation of food and starvation, classified as a Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) level of food insecurity. This is the first time that the severity of food insecurity in Gaza has reached this alert level. The proportion of people experiencing these conditions was greater in Gaza and North Gaza governorates (25 percent), which have been affected by conflict for the longest period and are facing far more severe and prolonged access constraints for aid and essential services relative to the southern governorates.  

In parallel, over 939 000 people (40 percent of the population) were experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) level food insecurity. The deterioration is particularly severe when compared to pre-escalation figures.  

Food insecurity in the Gaza Strip is projected to further worsen in the months ahead, driven by the conflict. By 7 February 2024, the entire population of about 2.2 million people in the Gaza Strip is projected to be in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above). This is the highest share of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity that the IPC initiative has ever classified for any given area or country. Among these, about 50 percent of the population (1.17 million people) is projected to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and at least one in four households (more than 0.5 million people) in Catastrophic conditions (IPC Phase 5) – with that projection assessed as conservative. There is a risk of famine, which remains until May 2024. The risk will increase daily if intense hostilities and restrictions on humanitarian access persist or worsen.  

Food insecurity in the West Bank, while far less severe, is likely to worsen in the face of increased violence and severe access restrictions, which significantly affect the economic sector. According to the Flash Appeal from November 2023, 600 000 people were estimated to be vulnerable to acute food insecurity.  

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When famine/risk of famine is considered likely as a finding of any IPC process, the IPC Famine Review Committee, a body of independent experts, is convened to review the IPC findings. In this case, the IPC Famine Review Committee stressed that the IPC Phase 5 projections were conservative. Moreover, the IPC Famine Review Committee concluded that if the conflict continues and humanitarian access remains restricted, there is risk of famine until May 2024.
Impact of conflict on population movement

Unprecedented levels of conflict-induced displacement and civilian casualties have occurred, mostly in the Gaza Strip. Displacement has close links to acute hunger. People who are displaced lose access to livelihood assets and income-generating activities, becoming more at risk of food insecurity — particularly when humanitarian access is constrained. If displacement becomes long term, it contributes to the further compromising of local food production, including agricultural and other economic activities.

The return of most internally displaced people (IDPs) will be severely impeded by the widespread destruction of housing and civilian infrastructure across Gaza, with more than two-thirds of buildings in North Gaza governorate and Gaza governorate reportedly destroyed or damaged as of 5 January, and the likely range for the Gaza Strip as a whole standing at 45–56 percent. By early November, a United Nations Special Rapporteur warned about the systematic and widespread attacks on housing and civilian infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, indicating that this amounted to an international crime, “domicide”.

Civilian casualties

More than 1 250 Israelis and foreign nationals were killed in the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) groups’ multipronged armed attack on 7 October, while an estimated 6 200 others were injured and dozens more remain missing. In addition, around 250 Israeli and foreign nationals were abducted and taken into Gaza, with 136 people still believed to be held. Heavy fighting inside Israel until 10 October displaced around 130 000 Israelis. Since 7 October, Palestinian armed groups in

Figure 1. Gaza conflict and food insecurity: pathways of impact channels

Source: Authors’ own elaboration.

Note: These pathways, drawn from the analysis undertaken in this report and simplified, are not exhaustive and may interact and overlap through other mechanisms not considered here.
Gaza have launched at least 11,000 indiscriminately targeted rockets, including on Israeli civilian population centres such as Tel Aviv, reportedly resulting in additional fatalities.\footnote{36, 37}

Over nine weeks of heavy Israeli bombardment from land, air and sea across much of the Gaza Strip – one of the most densely populated areas in the world with 5,900 residents per square kilometre – and a ground operation since 27 October have resulted in at least 25,105 Palestinians killed with 62,681 others injured, according to the Ministry of Health in Gaza, as of 22 January 2024.\footnote{38, 39, 40} Since records started in 2008, the current crisis is resulting in by far the highest number of fatalities ever recorded in Gaza. The last most deadly conflict was 50 days of conflict in 2014, which resulted in 2,251 fatalities.\footnote{41}

The numbers of civilians killed and injured raise serious questions about compliance with the requirements of distinction, precaution in attack and proportionality, according to the United Nations Secretary-General.\footnote{42} Parties to conflicts are obligated under IHL to conduct hostilities according to the principles of humanity, distinction and proportionality. Humanity requires parties to protect civilians from unnecessary suffering and mandates that they be treated humanely at all times.\footnote{43}

**Large-scale forced displacement**

As of 31 January, around 1.7 million people – some 75 percent of the population of Gaza – were estimated to be internally displaced, as a result of heavy bombardments, intense fighting, widespread destruction and consecutive evacuation orders from the Government of Israel.\footnote{44} Of these, nearly 1.4 million IDPs are sheltering in extremely overcrowded United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) facilities across the Gaza Strip, while more than 1 million have sought refuge in Rafah governorate.\footnote{45}

The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) has progressively designated an expanding portion of the Gaza Strip for immediate evacuation. An initial notice on 14 October ordered more than 1 million people to leave northern Gaza within 24 hours, in advance of an imminent ground operation.\footnote{46} With subsequent orders, the areas designated for evacuation amount to around 30 percent of the Gaza Strip.\footnote{47}

The forced displacement of civilians is generally prohibited during conflict, except where necessary for civilian safety or in cases of imperative military necessity.\footnote{48} When one of the exceptions applies, evacuation orders ahead of attacks can be part of the precautions that parties to a conflict must take to avoid or minimize civilian harm. However, IHL also states that the party who ordered the evacuation must adequately provide for displaced civilians – such as ensuring they have food, hygienic conditions and shelter.\footnote{49} People who have been evacuated have the right to return to their homes once hostilities have ceased.\footnote{50}

The United Nations Secretary-General – as well as the UN Human Rights Office, the World Health Organization and the International Committee of the Red Cross – have stated that Israel’s evacuation orders have confined hundreds of thousands of people into small areas in southern Gaza without proper sanitation, access to sufficient food, water and health supplies, and where their safety is not guaranteed.\footnote{51, 52, 53} Displaced or evacuated civilians have also been affected by Israeli restrictions on food, water, electricity and medicine.\footnote{54} According to the United Nations Special Rapporteur, ordering the evacuation of more than 1 million people from northern Gaza into southern Gaza, knowing that it would have been impossible to provide adequate housing and humanitarian aid, while maintaining a blockade, cutting off water, food, fuel and medicine, and repeatedly attacking evacuation routes and

\footnote{There was a humanitarian pause to the hostilities from 24 November–1 December 2023.}
“safe zones”, were violations of IHL. The United Nations Secretary-General indicated that ordering and directing a massive displacement of civilians from northern and central Gaza, without ensuring shelter, food, water, medicine and safe passage, raised serious concerns over compliance with the applicable legal requirements. The IPC Famine Review Committee alerted that these conditions, combined with limited supply of water in a context with a health system incapable to respond, heightens the risk of further increases in excess mortality.

IHL requires parties to conflicts to respect and protect civilians wherever they are, and at all times, during the conduct of hostilities. International human rights law (IHRL) also continues to apply, providing additional protections for civilians.

Violence against civilians in the West Bank

Violence against Palestinians in the West Bank has intensified significantly since 7 October. Between 7 October 2023 and 15 January 2024, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports that 344 Palestinians, including 88 children, were killed in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Of these, 335 were killed by Israeli forces, eight by settlers, and one by either forces or settlers. Notably, there has also been a substantial uptick in “settler violence” by Israeli settlers. OCHA has recorded 386 settler attacks against Palestinians since 7 October, resulting in Palestinian casualties (36 incidents), damage to Palestinian-owned property (302 incidents), or both casualties and damage to property (48 incidents). This has contributed to the significant displacement of Palestinians. Since 7 October, over 1 000 Palestinians have been displaced, which corresponds to almost the same amount of people displaced over the other ten months of 2023.

Settler violence had already been steadily increasing prior to 2023, climbing 800 percent from 95 incidents in 2016 to 856 in 2022. Yet 2023 has been the deadliest year for Palestinians in the West Bank since OCHA began recording casualties in 2005. Settlement activity and related violence have been factors contributing to the undermining of livelihoods and food security among Palestinians.

Impact of the conflict on food systems

Parties to conflicts are obligated under IHL to conduct hostilities according to the principles of humanity, distinction and proportionality. Distinction requires parties to differentiate between civilians and combatants, and civilian objects (including those objects indispensable to civilians’ survival related to food security) and military objectives, and to only direct operations towards combatants and military objectives. In case of doubt, people should be presumed to be civilian, with the same presumption applying to civilian objects. Indiscriminate methods of warfare are prohibited. Proportionality prohibits attacks against military objectives that are reasonably expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury and/or damage to civilian objects that is in excess compared to the concrete, direct military advantage expected.

Civilian infrastructure, including that essential for the production, processing and distribution of food such as farmland, bakeries and water infrastructures, has been severely damaged, destroyed by military operations or crippled by the effects of the Israeli blockade, particularly by the lack of electricity and fuel in the Gaza Strip.

Since 9 October, the Government of Israel has strengthened Israel’s existing blockade on the Gaza Strip, including stopping or restricting the entry of food, electricity and fuel supplies, as well as commercial goods. Identified as a form of collective punishment by the United Nations Commission
of Inquiry, the impacts of the blockade have been severe and contribute directly to the dire food security situation. The entire food supply chain has been affected in different, compounding ways:

- Severe fuel shortages cripple the functioning of water infrastructure and desalination plants, the production and delivery of key food commodities, and the provision of electricity. Fuel shipments into Gaza, cut off completely from 7 October to 15 November, remain heavily restricted. Fuel supplies entering as of late December represent the bare minimum needed to prevent the collapse of critical services. As of 10 December 2023, cross-border pipelines were operating at less than 28 percent capacity, with the cross-border pipeline to the northern governorates remaining completely shut off.

- Electricity blackouts disrupt agricultural activities, fishing, food processing and distribution, and water infrastructure, all of which depend on electricity. The sole power plant in Gaza shut down after running out of fuel on 11 October, while electricity supplies from the Israeli authorities have been cut off since 12 October. The only electricity available in the Gaza Strip comes from solar panels and generators, for which there is little available fuel. The damage to infrastructure and the disruption of the irrigation system due to shortages of fuel and destruction of solar panels have led to a significant deterioration of the health and density of several crops, while the lack of electricity has also disrupted refrigeration, irrigation and incubation devices, severely impacting agricultural livelihoods.

- The commercial sector has been decimated due to the near complete lack of imports of essential items, including food, because of the restrictions. The lack of imports due to the conflict means that food stocks are rapidly depleted. Even before this escalation, Gaza was dependent on commercial imports for essential goods. Since early October, the availability of food and nutrition supplies has seriously diminished, as markets are reportedly empty except for those with food from limited humanitarian assistance. Markets for food and fuel had nearly collapsed by December, with only 20 percent of individuals in the northern governorates able to utilize markets as their primary source of food, while 40 percent are relying primarily on friends and family social networks. According to the IPC Famine Review Committee, a complete collapse of formal markets in the northern governorates and a further shrinking of markets in the southern governorates is expected if present conditions continue, with food-accessibility constraints particularly acute among IDPs in increasingly overcrowded facilities.

- Shortages of safe water persist. As of late December, the water supply was at only 7 percent of pre-October levels, with sources restricted to water trucking, one functional desalination plant, and one of the three main water supply lines, the latter of which was only restored on 30 December. Around 97 percent of the ground water in Gaza is reportedly unfit for human consumption, so many Palestinians depend on water supplied by Israel and on desalination plants in the Gaza Strip. As of early December, people in the northern governorates had an average of 1.8 litres per person, per day, and people in the southern governorates an average of 2 litres per person, per day – significantly less than the minimum recommended average of 15 litres per person, per day. In these circumstances, the extremely poor access to water, hygiene and sanitation services contributes to increasing the risks of waterborne diseases and epidemics.

Bakeries’ capacity to produce bread – a staple part of diets in Gaza – has been seriously hampered by direct damage, combined with lack of electricity, fuel, water and wheat. No bakeries were operational north of Wadi Gaza as of early January, while six had only just re-started operations in Rafah and nine in Deir al Balah after nearly two months of being shut down. Ongoing conflict forced those in Deir al Balah to swiftly shut down again. Furthermore, the five mills operating in the Gaza
Strip ceased operations in late November due to fuel shortages; in northern Gaza, the supply of wheat flour was stopped as of 8 November.\textsuperscript{91, 92, 93}

The agriculture sector in the Gaza Strip, already diminished before the escalation but still vital for the local economy,\textsuperscript{94} received a further blow under the combined effect of hostilities and the increased blockade. Agriculture across the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is an important sector, with 6.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).\textsuperscript{95} Before the current conflict, Gaza’s food production allowed self-sufficiency in most fruits and vegetables; the conflict has severely disrupted this.\textsuperscript{96} The IPC Famine Review Committee warned that in the most likely scenario, agricultural production will have collapsed in the northern governorates by May 2024, due to the displacement of farmers and breeders and the destruction of fields and other assets.\textsuperscript{97, 98} Preliminary satellite data analysis from December 2023 shows a significant decline in the health and density of crops, compared to the preceding six seasons spanning from 2017 to 2022. This is linked to conflict-related dynamics including razing of territory, heavy vehicle movement, bombing and shelling. In addition, arable land has been significantly damaged in North Gaza governorate, with around 39 percent affected. This damage increased from 17 percent to 27 percent, between imagery collected in November and December 2023.\textsuperscript{99}

According to the latest FAO geospatial assessment, as of 31 December 2023, the agricultural infrastructures with the highest levels of destruction were animal shelters (94), sheep farms (149), dairy farms (20), home barns (206) and broiler farms (172).\textsuperscript{100} A total of 21.6 percent of wells had been destroyed.\textsuperscript{101} Destruction of wells has been most significant in North Gaza and Gaza City governorates, at 184 (30 percent) and 178 (29.2 percent), respectively.\textsuperscript{102} A total 262 hectares (20.5 percent) of greenhouses had been destroyed, most severely in Gaza City (40 percent), North Gaza (35.5 percent) and Khan Younis (23.6 percent), with 101 hectares destroyed in the latter.\textsuperscript{103} Moreover, the harvest of olives and citrus fruits, which typically occurs around October–November and provides an important source of income for farming households,\textsuperscript{104} has been heavily impacted by the hostilities with 27.3 percent of orchards damaged across all of the Gaza Strip.\textsuperscript{105} By early December, commercial agricultural production had stopped in northern Gaza due to lack of electricity and water for irrigation, while urban agriculture was limited and heavily affected by ground operations.\textsuperscript{106} All of this compounds an already critical situation: since 2007, Israeli restrictions on the import of raw materials, and restricted access to arable land, have hindered growth of the agricultural sector. Restrictions on the sale of Gazan products into the West Bank contracted the economy by 4.4 percent, due to a large decline in the agricultural, forestry and fishing sectors since August 2022.\textsuperscript{107, 108}

Lack of access to fodder and damage from airstrikes have taken a toll on livestock owners, with many breeders reporting substantial losses among their animals.\textsuperscript{109} The IPC Famine Review Committee warns that by May 2024, in the most likely scenario, livestock in the northern governorates will likely have been slaughtered or died due to lack of water and fodder.\textsuperscript{110} Regarding livestock, the general mortality rate linked to airstrikes, displacement, starvation and premature slaughtering is believed to be high. By the end of January 2024, all broiler poultry are assumed to have been slaughtered or died. Approximately 25 percent of layers in Gaza may have survived, but their production cycle was completed within the first two weeks of December 2023, resulting in a scarcity of eggs. The mortality rate of calves is assumed to be between 50–65 percent, the expectation being that no more than 1 000 heads are still alive. Approximately 70 percent of beef cattle are estimated to be dead. Around 50 percent of small ruminants are still alive, corresponding to 30 000 heads.\textsuperscript{111}

Gaza’s sea fishing sector has come to a standstill, due to airstrikes on the port of Gaza City and Rafah, and the fear of being targeted while at sea. The aquaculture sector, which had recorded impressive growth in recent years,\textsuperscript{112} is also being affected by a lack of feed.\textsuperscript{113} Prior to 7 October, the fishery
sector was an important source of nutrition and income in Gaza, indirectly providing livelihoods for over 100,000 people. The IPC Famine Review Committee warns that in the most likely scenario, fishing is likely to remain impossible in northern governorates because of the destruction and damage to infrastructure and assets, and complete restrictions on access to the sea.

Overall, the economic access of people to food and other market commodities has shrunk as prices soar. For example, prices for the few remaining market commodities in the northern governorates has spiked, with a 45–50 percent increase in basic grain prices and a 500 percent increase in fuel; there has been a complete depletion of wheat flour, eggs and dairy products. Across the Gaza Strip, the Consumer Price Index has increased 32.5 percent since the conflict’s onset in October. Essential items are provided only through humanitarian assistance, which is also severely restricted.

Overall, the impact of hostilities and restrictions has severely weakened an already struggling economy in the Gaza Strip, with long-term socioeconomic implications including increasing poverty levels—which in turn will affect food security. Already in 2017, the United Nations had warned that Gaza was on a trajectory of de-development, due both to trade restrictions and the effects of different rounds of armed hostilities on the economy and essential infrastructure. By 2022, 53 percent of the population was living below the poverty line and 34 percent below the deep poverty line, marked by a 44 percent unemployment rate in the Gaza Strip in the second quarter of 2022. Now, early estimates indicate that poverty is expected to rise between 20 and 45 percent, depending on the duration of the conflict. GDP loss in 2023 could range between 4 and 12 percent, and between 4 and 9 percent in 2024, compared with pre-conflict estimates, depending on the duration of the conflict. In Gaza, the real GDP in 2022 was already 11.7 percent below its 2019 levels and close to its lowest levels since 1994.

Across the West Bank, the demolition and seizure of Palestinian-owned structures has accelerated since 7 October, according to OCHA data. An estimated 401 structures had been demolished as of 8 January, 59 of which were categorized as agricultural, 44 as livelihoods, 45 as water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), and 42 as infrastructural. This marked an acceleration from 121 structures in the equivalent time frame preceding 7 October. In parallel, the continuing expansion of Israeli settlements is impeding access by Palestinians to their land and resources.

IHL prohibits the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. It also includes, as a corollary, a prohibition against attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless objects indispensable to civilians’ survival; this includes those essential for food production, such as agricultural areas, water supplies and irrigation works. This list is not exhaustive. Furthermore, “starvation” is increasingly understood to mean not just killing by deprivation of food or water, but also a more general deprivation of essential commodities, such as clothing, bedding and shelter.

Impact on humanitarian access and humanitarians’ ability to work

Humanitarian assistance, including food and the fuel required to distribute it, has been heavily restricted inside the Gaza Strip since 7 October. This, alongside ongoing hostilities, has rendered impossible any meaningful humanitarian operations. This in turn has resulted in a completely inadequate level of assistance allowed into Gaza, disproportionate to the overwhelming needs of the population.
Severely restricted humanitarian assistance contributes to the risk of famine in the Gaza Strip. This is particularly the case given that food assistance was already supporting more than two-thirds of the population before October, and that humanitarian commodities remain the only supply of essential items since early October given the ban on commercial goods.134, 135

For three weeks after 7 October, Israel closed all border crossings into Gaza, meaning no humanitarian supplies could enter. On 21 October, Israel reopened the Rafah crossing at the Egyptian border, but only for an initial average of 20 trucks of humanitarian supplies per day; that is about 10 percent of normal traffic through all crossings in the months before the escalation.136, 137

The amount of supplies entering Gaza gradually increased until the humanitarian pause began on 24 November, with an average of 51 trucks per day. Fuel supplies remained completely cut off for six weeks until an initial shipment entered Gaza on 23 November.138 The 24–30 November humanitarian pause saw a significant increase in the entry of supplies, with a daily average of 170 trucks and 110 000 litres of fuel crossing into Gaza.139 During the pause, some humanitarian assistance reached northern Gaza after weeks of no access.140 Since 1 December, the number of crossings into Gaza has fluctuated, trending between 80–190 trucks, which has continued into the new year.141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146 The Karam Shalom border crossing was reopened on 17 December, but periodic closures, impeded routes and excessive delays have continued hindering movement of aid supplies into Gaza.147

In northern Gaza, where needs are estimated to be the highest and most severe, access denials by Israeli authorities for aid deliveries including food, medicines, water, livestock fodder and other life-saving supplies has increased since early January 2024, compared to previous months. Between 1 and 11 January, only 21 percent of planned aid deliveries to the north of Wadi Gaza went ahead.148

Ongoing insecurity severely constrains humanitarian organizations’ ability to deliver aid within the Gaza Strip, with the bombings giving rise to the highest number of United Nations employees killed in any conflict since the United Nations was founded.149 As of 3 January 2024, a total of 142 UNRWA staff had been killed.150

Ongoing hostilities have also led to telecommunications blackouts, a shortage of available and functioning vehicles, and the destruction of roads and other civilian infrastructure – impairing humanitarians’ ability to receive and distribute incoming supplies.151, 152 Humanitarian operations are particularly constrained in the Gaza and North Gaza governorates, where access to affected populations and distributions came to a near-total halt by 1 November, and more recently in Khan Younis, as military ground operations have expanded since the end of the truce on 30 November.153, 154 This has made humanitarian operations nearly impossible.

IHL requires parties to conflicts to protect all civilians, including humanitarian workers.155 To help protect civilians during conflict, IHL also prohibits parties from deliberately impeding humanitarian assistance or restricting the freedom of movement of humanitarian relief personnel.156 Parties to conflicts must allow and facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need, and the movement of humanitarian staff so that they can discharge their duties.158
Recommendations

Considering the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) commitments under Resolution 2417, as well as other relevant UNSC Resolutions, the UNSC may consider appropriate action on the following recommendations:

1. Restore safe and unhindered humanitarian access across the Gaza Strip to eliminate the risk of famine. To ensure sustained humanitarian access, the cessation of hostilities is essential.

2. Reopen all border crossings and facilitate improved access to operational and technical humanitarian organizations, particularly in the northern governorates where needs are most severe.

3. Restore functionality of basic services in the Gaza Strip to save lives, including cross-border pipelines and resumption of electricity distribution. Traffic of commercial goods should be resumed to meet the volume and diversity of commodities required. The domestic production of fresh, perishable nutritious food – which is difficult to supply either through aid or commercial imports – should be resumed.

4. Pressure parties to the conflict to adhere to their obligations under IHL, including avoiding the use of starvation as a weapon of war and refraining from depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival, including targeting, destroying or rendering useless foodstuffs, crops, livestock, agricultural assets, drinking water installations and irrigation works.

5. Call for, and provide support to, independent, impartial, full, prompt and effective investigation into alleged violations and abuses of IHL and IHRL by all parties to the conflict, as well as those providing support to such parties, pursuant to international standards. This includes considering the establishment of a new, dedicated United Nations Commission of Inquiry or continuing support to an existing one.

6. Support provision of additional funding to cover immediate, medium- and long-term needs. Dedicated funding will be required to rehabilitate agrifood systems as soon as is viable, including agriculture, livestock and fishing.
The Sudan

Acute food insecurity situation

Projected | July–September 2023
20.3 million people in IPC 3+ facing high levels of acute food insecurity and in need of urgent action

- CRISIS (IPC 3): 14.04 million
- EMERGENCY (IPC 4): 6.26 million

Projected | October 2023–February 2024
17.7 million people in IPC 3+ facing high levels of acute food insecurity and in need of urgent action

- CRISIS (IPC 3): 12.83 million
- EMERGENCY (IPC 4): 4.90 million

Map key – IPC acute food insecurity phase classification

- 1 – Minimal
- 2 – Stressed
- 3 – Crisis
- 4 – Emergency
- 5 – Famine
- At least 25 percent of households meet over 50 percent of caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance
- Not analysed

Sources:

Note: The final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. The second projection period (right map) corresponds to the pre-harvest and harvest phase from October 2023 to February 2024, which is expected to translate in a modest improvement compared to the peak lean season of July to September 2023.

This analysis provides an overview of how conflict and violence have contributed to critical food-insecurity levels in the Sudan, with a specific focus on the impact of conflict since April 2023.

* Cutoff date of analysis is 22 January 2024.
Overview of conflict impact on food security

Since April 2023, the armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Response Forces (RSF) has affected a large part of the country. It rapidly spread from Khartoum to the Darfur region and then to the Kordofan region, involving an increasing number of armed actors.

Within the first month of the conflict, clashes multiplied compared to previous years, in particular the use of airstrikes. Between September and December 2023, hostilities further intensified and became entrenched. The SAF and RSF increasingly relied on bombings to control strategic locations in Khartoum, in addition to RSF advances into Gezira and White Nile states in December – marking a significant shift of the conflict to the east. The RSF violence against civilians and communities, as well as fighting against/between rebel groups and militias, are often affiliated along tribal or ethnic lines, which sparks intercommunal violence. While clashes between the SAF and RSF have constituted over 70 percent of all violent events recorded since 15 April, intercommunal violence has been an increasing trend, especially in the Darfur and Kordofan regions.

The conflict has had a disproportionate impact on women and girls, along with non-Arab ethnic groups. The situation builds on the historical use of conflict-related sexual violence in the Sudan, particularly the use of rape as a weapon of war. Conflict and other organized violence remain the primary drivers of life-threatening food insecurity. The most acutely food-insecure populations are in states affected by high levels of conflict, including Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan and Khartoum – encompassing the tri-city area of Khartoum, Bahri and Omdurman. Of note, these are also the areas where many IDPs originate from. Acute food insecurity has significantly deteriorated, even exceeding earlier projections; there is a risk of Catastrophic conditions in West and Central Darfur during the lean season in early 2024.

Three months into the conflict, 20.3 million people – almost half of the population – were assessed to be facing acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above), including 6.3 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) between July and September 2023. This is a severe deterioration, both in terms of scale and severity, compared to the same period in 2022: a 74 percent increase in people in Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) and a 101 percent increase in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

Improvements in food security due to good harvests are less likely than previously estimated. More recent projections for the harvest period estimate that 17.7 million people will be facing high levels of acute food insecurity by February 2024. This is the highest number ever projected during the Sudan’s harvesting season, including 4.9 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). This is due to the severe impact of the conflict on agricultural production, combined with displacement, loss of life, destruction and damage to major infrastructure and livelihoods, disrupted trade flows, poor market functionality and severe price increases. Access to people in need is one of the greatest challenges facing humanitarian partners and stakeholders.

Highly food-insecure people in West and Central Darfur are of particular concern, estimated at over 1 million people. The current access situation is precarious, with only one cross-border route into Darfur operational. If the security situation worsens so that the movement of commodities, including humanitarian assistance, from Chad into West and Central Darfur is restricted, the most acutely food-insecure people in these two states will likely shift into Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) during the next lean season.
Overall, in December 2023, the IPC concluded that because the conflict may increase with greater intensity and spread to more areas than assumed for the analysis, acute food insecurity may be even more severe and of greater magnitude than current projections indicate; close monitoring of the situation and risk factors will therefore be required. 173

Figure 2. The Sudan conflict and food insecurity: pathways of impact channels

Source: Authors’ own elaboration.

Note: These pathways, drawn from the analysis undertaken in this report and simplified, are not exhaustive and may interact and overlap through other mechanisms not considered here.

Impact of conflict on civilians

The conflict has been characterized by a high degree of urban warfare, resulting in elevated levels of civilian casualties, massive displacement and significant damage and destruction to civilian property and infrastructure. 174, 175 Over two-thirds of the fighting between the SAF and RSF has taken place in cities of over 100 000 people, with fighting concentrated in the Khartoum tri-city metropolitan area and the Darfur region, primarily West, Central and South Darfur. 176

Civilian casualties

The real number of civilian casualties in this conflict is difficult to identify; most available data is considered a very conservative approximation. Between 7 May and 31 October, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS) documented the killing of at least 610 civilians, including children, mainly by air strikes. 177 According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), at least 4 000 people were killed between April and August 2023 in Darfur. 178 By January 2024, OCHA reports around 13 000 casualties. 179 Many civilians have been caught in the crossfire or directly targeted by both sides of the conflict, with multiple serious human rights violations including sexual violence. 180 In many cases, these actions have been racially, ethnically and/or politically motivated. 181, 182, 183, 184 The situation on the ground was summarized by the Special
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, who in an official release said: “The latest reports from the Darfur region depict a deeply disturbing picture of continued systematic and indiscriminate attacks against civilians, including along ethnic lines.” This pattern is no longer reportedly concentrated in Darfur, spreading to other parts of the country such as Kordofan. These serious violations are likely significantly under-reported. Systematic, ethnically motivated violence, including summary executions, have been reported, especially by the RSF in Darfur; these target non-Arab communities, particularly the Masalit. In addition, the RSF has occupied residential areas, forcing civilians from their homes, looting their property and, in many cases, killing those who resist.

IHL provides fundamental guarantees for civilians during armed conflicts. Parties to conflicts are obligated under IHL to conduct hostilities according to the principles of humanity, distinction and proportionality. Humanity requires parties to protect civilians from unnecessary suffering and mandates that they be treated humanely at all times (Oxford, 2013). Distinction requires parties to differentiate between civilians and combatants, and civilian objects and military objectives, and to only direct operations towards combatants and military objectives. In case of doubt, they should be presumed to be civilian, with the same presumption applying to civilian objects. Indiscriminate methods of warfare are prohibited. Proportionality prohibits attacks against military objectives that are reasonably expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury and/or damage to civilian objects that is in excess compared to the concrete, direct military advantage expected.

Large-scale forced displacement

With more than 9 million people estimated to be displaced by the conflict, the Sudan has witnessed the largest internal displacement crisis globally. It has also seen the largest children’s displacement crisis, representing about half of the people displaced. The conflict has caused a regional forced displacement crisis, with more than 1.5 million people, mostly refugees who were living inside Sudan, moving to neighbouring countries – primarily Chad, South Sudan and Egypt. The Sudan had been home to over 1 million refugees – the second-highest refugee population in Africa – primarily from South Sudan as well as smaller refugee populations from Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Central African Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic.

Internal displacement and cross-border movements have gone hand in hand with increasing and expanding hostilities, rapidly surging at the onset of the violence in April 2023 and continuing along a steady upward trend. For example, by end of April, just two weeks into the conflict, already almost 335 000 people were newly internally displaced and 64 000 had crossed into neighbouring countries. Since April 2023, conflict and/or insecurity are clearly identified as the main push factor for displacement. As of 31 December 2023, the Sudan hosted an estimated 9 052 822 IDPs, representing the largest internal displacement crisis worldwide.

Hostilities and insecurity have pushed people to move more than once to seek safety, often resulting in secondary and tertiary displacement. In a recent example, the RSF advances into Gezira state in December 2023, in an attempt to cut off SAF supply lines into the capital, resulted in an estimated displacement of more than 509 796 individuals, including 234 000 people who were already previously displaced from other parts of Sudan.

The forced displacement of civilians is generally prohibited during conflict, except where necessary for civilian safety or in cases of military necessity. IHL also states that the party who ordered the evacuation must adequately provide for displaced civilians, such as ensuring they have food, hygienic conditions, safety and shelter.
In addition to rapid and large-scale forced displacement, many Sudanese are likely to remain involuntarily immobile. This means they might lack the resources to move, as the price of travel has sharply increased; the fighting is too severe and movement would be dangerous; and/or because they are vulnerable or caring for vulnerable people. Both in Khartoum and other areas where fighting is concentrated, large populations of Sudanese remain trapped. This often-neglected group of people is usually among the most vulnerable in any conflict and humanitarian crisis, and is exposed to an increased risk of acute food insecurity.

Impact of conflict on food systems

The conflict has halted production in certain areas and destroyed human capital and state capacity. This led the economy to contract by 12 percent in 2023, with further shrinkage expected in 2024. For comparison, the economies of Yemen and the Syrian Arab Republic shrunk by about 50 percent over the past decade; the economic contraction in the Sudan is on pace to more than double that decline. The productive capacities of the Sudan have been heavily compromised, with damage, looting and the destruction of critical infrastructure, the financial sector, private property, food-manufacturing facilities and markets bringing production and economic activities to a halt in certain areas. In a context of continuous currency depreciation causing the prices of imported goods such as agricultural inputs to remain very high, a severe deterioration of people’s purchasing power is likely to happen, further hampering access to food.

Khartoum has been the site of heavy fighting, while severe violent clashes and heavy bombardments have also been reported in the greater Darfur and Kordofan regions. The hostilities have resulted in extensive damage to critical civilian infrastructure and facilities – including water – the collapse of banking and financial services, and frequent interruptions to electricity supply and telecommunication services. The conflict has resulted in the destruction of the industrial sector in Khartoum, where over 80 percent of factories were located. Remote sensing showed that economic activities in Khartoum decreased by between 33 and 42 percent in the first three weeks after the conflict started. In addition, widespread looting, and the destruction of food-processing factories, markets and food stores, have contributed to shortages of food and non-food items; this puts upward pressure on prices of essential commodities and further worsens food insecurity. Market systems have been highly disrupted across the Sudan. This has had severe repercussions, particularly for urban populations who rely heavily on markets to meet their food needs.

The direct and indirect impact of the conflict is likely to continue disrupting both crop and livestock production, with Khartoum state, Greater Darfur and parts of Greater Kordofan remaining the worst-affected areas. If state veterinary services are not supported, it is anticipated that there will be significant livestock losses. Additionally, inadequate consumption of animal-sourced food (such as milk) could drive an increase in malnutrition rates among children in vulnerable states. There is also an increased risk of transboundary animal diseases. This is due to a severe shortage of veterinary vaccines and drugs, inadequate veterinary services, lack of supplementary feed, overcrowding of livestock in limited pasturelands, water shortages, and irregular movement of livestock across state borders – all as a result of, or exacerbated by, the conflict.

Crop production for the summer 2023 agricultural season is expected to be below average. Farmers in conflict-affected areas were displaced and abandoned their agricultural fields or lost their assets, while access to agricultural financial resources shrunk as banking services were disrupted. The size of the main summer agricultural season’s planted area fell by 15 percent compared to the last five-year average. In addition, while financial access to agricultural inputs was already limited
prior to the conflict, it became prohibitive as of late-2023, contributing to losses of crop yield and production.\textsuperscript{221} In El Gedarif state, a major area for semi-mechanized production, reduction was at 25 percent by November 2023.\textsuperscript{222}

Harvests, currently under way,\textsuperscript{223} are projected as significantly below average in localized areas of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan, and severely reduced in West and Central Darfur states.\textsuperscript{224} National food availability will be affected as the greater Darfur, the Kordofans and Khartoum states together account for approximately 40 and over 80 percent of the total national production of sorghum and millet, respectively.\textsuperscript{225} A higher proportion of households will then rely more on markets and humanitarian assistance for their food consumption.\textsuperscript{226, 227} In December 2023, the eruption of hostilities in Gezira state jeopardized the cultivation of winter wheat – representing 40–50 percent of national production – and led to the destruction of key irrigation infrastructure. This is expected to further compound the country’s structural food trade deficit as before the conflict imports constituted 80–85 percent of the national consumption requirements for wheat. In January 2024, the expansion of the conflict into parts of Sennar, White Nile and South Kordofan states disrupted agricultural activities during the harvest of millet and sorghum, lowering further the already below-average forecast for national crop production.\textsuperscript{228}

With expectations of reduced harvest, prices of staple food are likely to remain atypically high in the harvest season and will likely rise further during the post-harvest period, with significant deviations from the norm. The price of staple grain could rise by 50–100 percent in the next months compared to last year.\textsuperscript{229} This will further aggravate the ongoing trend of soaring staple food prices, observed since the outbreak of the conflict.\textsuperscript{230} In 2023, food prices were 228 percent higher than the previous two years,\textsuperscript{231} with the average cost of the local food basket 88 percent higher compared to before the conflict.\textsuperscript{232}

Soaring food prices result from a combination of different effects of the conflict, interplaying and aggravating each other. Heightened political instability since 2019, and conflict since April 2023, have exerted upward pressure on prices.\textsuperscript{233}

- Severe disruptions to domestic trade flow and market functionality, particularly in the southwestern regions. Widespread destruction and disruption of crucial markets and transportation routes is leading to irregular deliveries, constrained quantities and varieties and thereby exerting additional pressure on food prices.\textsuperscript{234, 235, 236} Routes linking Greater Kordofan and Greater Darfur to central Sudan, continue to be largely inaccessible or disrupted, as do all routes between Darfur states. Routes linking Khartoum to the rest of the country remain disrupted, with periodic disruption along the only functional Dongola-Omdurman route.\textsuperscript{237}

- Due to market integration in the Sudan, price spikes have also been transmitted to areas where conflict has not been reported.\textsuperscript{238}

- Fuel shortages are increasing the price of transport vendors and wholesalers pay to deliver goods to the market due to high production and transportation costs. This is in turn transferred to the price of food sold in the market.\textsuperscript{239}

- Large-scale displacements create sudden surges in demand for food in areas where IDPs concentrate. This results in higher market prices at time when supply chains have already been challenged by access constraints and shortages, for example in the Darfurs.\textsuperscript{240}

Oil exports continue to flow steadily from Port Sudan, with oil infrastructure largely unaffected by the conflict. Nevertheless, fuel supply, an essential commodity for the functioning of various economic
sectors, is limited across the country. This affects agriculture and transportation, with ripple effects on availability and access to food across the entire country. The conflict has damaged the Khartoum and El Obeid refineries and other oil infrastructures, while key trade routes are disrupted. El Obeid, a critical intersection for east–west roads, is at risk of further disruption. 241

Basic service provision has been either intermittent or unavailable in areas experiencing conflict, especially Khartoum and Darfur. Water and electrical infrastructure damage in Khartoum has blocked access to these essential services. 242

Across all areas heavily affected by conflict and organized violence, civilians experiencing restrictions on movement – including due to sieges – are at an increased risk of high levels of acute food insecurity. 243 By September, for example, people were reportedly living in near-siege conditions in Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan state, as emergency food stocks had run out and roadblocks prevented attempts to bring in more relief and commercial supplies. 244 Sieges, including partial or complete encirclement of urban and other areas, or sections of them, remain likely in multiple locations. 245 The permeability of these sieges may vary widely, depending on the armed actor involved. Civilians immobilized by the use and threat of organized violence, including in combination with environmental and other barriers to movement – such as desert or water bodies – alongside continued disruption to agricultural and livestock production, market systems, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance, are at greatest risk of severe and extreme food insecurity. Some sections of the tri-city area are of particular concern, as well as several at-risk areas across Greater Darfur, particularly West and North Darfur. 246

IHL regulates the conduct of hostilities. Even when a particular tactic of warfare, such as sieges, is not expressly prohibited, parties to conflicts must use the tactic in accordance with the principles of humanity, distinction and proportionality. Parties must also align their actions with other IHL provisions. IHL prohibits the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. 247 It also includes, as a corollary, a prohibition against attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless those assets that are indispensable to civilians’ survival. This includes those essential for food production, such as agricultural areas, crops, water supplies and irrigation works. 248 This list is not exhaustive. 249 Furthermore, “starvation” is increasingly understood to mean not just killing by deprivation of food or water, but also a more general deprivation of essential commodities, such as clothing, bedding and shelter. 250

**Impact on humanitarian access and humanitarians’ ability to work**

Ten months of conflict have had a profound and far-reaching impact on humanitarian access and the ability of aid agencies to operate effectively. The Sudan is one of the most difficult humanitarian operational environments in the world today. 251 By July 2023, ACAPS had classified humanitarian access restrictions as “extreme”, as a result of the conflict. 252

Access is of critical concern, as more than 70 percent of the over 6 million people identified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) are in areas where access is extremely limited owing to fighting and insecurity. 253 The IPC analysis stated that if people who face critical levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 4) in Geneina and Zalingei in West and Central Darfur lose access to humanitarian assistance or commodities coming from Adre in Chad, they will likely shift into Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and will face death and starvation. 254

Access to people in need is one of the greatest challenges for humanitarians. The intricacies of conflict dynamics and multidimensional impacts pose considerable obstacles to life-saving assistance,
particularly for people trapped in conflict hotspots such as Khartoum, the Kordofans and the Darfur states. By September 2023, around 40 localities were still hard to reach, mostly in the North and West Darfur and Kordofan, in addition to Khartoum, while several others were still only partially accessible. For example, several humanitarian deliveries have had to be postponed or cancelled due to insecurity, hampering movement of humanitarian supplies to Darfur, Kordofan, Khartoum and White Nile states. Access is challenging, not only due to ongoing insecurity but also due to lack of commitment by parties to the conflict to provide safe passage. Reluctance and denials by parties to the conflict for crossline delivery of food items and essential medical supplies, especially in Khartoum, continue to be reported. As of February 2024, with the escalation of conflict in southeastern areas, the delivery of assistance from strategic storage areas as in Gezira state was suspended and access to hard-to-reach areas was further hampered by bureaucratic formalities.

Operating in the Sudan represents a high risk for humanitarians, with 20 aid workers killed in 2023. WFP lost three staff members in North Darfur at the start of the conflict in April. Humanitarian agencies have been targeted by different armed actors, including the SAF, RSF and armed groups and militias seeking monetary gains and access to vehicles and buildings. By November 2023, eight months into the conflict, around 997 incidents impacting aid operations had been recorded, the vast majority (72 percent) due to conflict or violence against humanitarian assets or personnel.

Looting of aid trucks, offices and warehouses curtail the capacity of humanitarian organizations. Humanitarian supplies and equipment have been looted on a large scale. By August 2023, at least 53 humanitarian warehouses had been looted and 87 offices ransacked. More than 40 000 tonnes of food assistance had been stolen and a logistics hub in south-central Sudan – one of largest on the African continent – had been overrun.

In all conflict-affected areas, extensive damage to critical infrastructure has led to internet and electricity blackouts, and fuel, water and food shortages, creating logistical challenges for humanitarian operations. Fuel shortages affect the movement of humanitarian staff and supplies, and the generation of power needed for operations including maintaining cold chain storage and the supply of water and food. Unstable internet and mobile networks are a key challenge, and securing customs clearances for the import of data connectivity and telecommunications equipment remained difficult during the reporting period.

Humanitarians' capacity to respond and to scale up is also affected by bureaucratic and administrative impediments. Rather than loosen regulations to facilitate the humanitarian response, pre-conflict bureaucratic systems have been maintained. Bureaucratic challenges and delays on the issuance of visas continue to affect the deployment of technical staff and constrain humanitarian personnel capacity within the Sudan. For example, by September 2023, there were already more than 200 pending visa requests. For humanitarians already inside the Sudan, their capacity to move is restricted by denials of travel permits – a requirement for in-country movements of staff and supplies. In addition, new administrative impediments, such as requirements for loading of humanitarian supplies and inspection of all trucks before unloading or distribution in Khartoum, have also been reported.

IHL requires parties to conflicts to protect all civilians, including humanitarian aid workers. To help protect civilians during conflict, IHL also recognizes that humanitarian organizations may provide assistance, and prohibits parties from deliberately impeding humanitarian assistance or restricting the freedom of movement of humanitarian relief personnel. Parties to conflicts must allow and facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need, and the movement of humanitarian staff, so that they can discharge their duties.
Recommendations

Considering the UNSC’s commitment under UNSC Resolution 2417, as well as other relevant UNSC resolutions, the UNSC may consider appropriate actions relating to the following recommendations:

1. Restore safe and unhindered humanitarian access across the Sudan to eliminate the risk of catastrophic food insecurity in West and Central Darfur. To ensure sustained humanitarian access, the cessation of hostilities is essential.

2. Facilitate improved access to operational and technical humanitarian organizations to ensure enhanced transparency about the humanitarian situation and ensure people in need are located and services provided.

3. Pressure parties to the conflict to adhere to their obligations under IHL, including avoiding the use of starvation as a weapon of war and refraining from depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival, including targeting, destroying or rendering useless foodstuffs, crops, livestock, agricultural assets, drinking water installations and irrigation works.

4. Support independent, impartial, full, prompt and effective investigation into alleged violations and abuses of IHRL and IHL by all parties to the conflict, as well as those providing support to such parties, pursuant to international standards. This includes by supporting the recently established United Nations Fact-finding Mission on the Sudan. Where appropriate, call on states to take action against those responsible in accordance with domestic and international law, with a view to reinforcing preventive measures, ensuring accountability and addressing the grievances of victims.

5. Support provision of additional funding to cover immediate, medium- and long-term needs. Dedicated funding will be required to rehabilitate agrifood systems as soon as is viable, including agriculture, livestock and fishing.
Methods and data sources

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)

The acute food insecurity estimates provided in this update are based on the IPC scales. These estimates indicate populations in need of urgent assistance to save lives, protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps and acute malnutrition, which are classified into the three most severe phases of acute food insecurity according to the IPC classification – Crisis (IPC Phase 3), Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).

When in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), people start facing increasing acute malnutrition due to lack of access to food, or they are only able to access food by selling off assets or through other harmful coping strategies. People in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) face high levels of acute malnutrition and excess mortality due to lack of food, or resort to emergency coping strategies to mitigate large food consumption gaps. People in Catastrophe/Famine (IPC Phase 5) do not have any means left to access food and are facing starvation and death.

Famines should be avoided at all costs. Although further deaths can and should be prevented by urgent action, it is evident that responding to famine situations will be, de facto, a late response because many will have died by the time a famine is declared. In the countries where IPC processes are in place, therefore, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is already to be taken as indicative of an extremely severe situation where urgent action is needed to save lives and livelihoods.

While the annual Global Report on Food Crises provides the highest number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) every year, this special report updates on the latest figures available for the Gaza Strip and the Sudan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Phase description and priority response objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 None/Minimal</td>
<td>Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income. Action required to build resilience and for disaster risk reduction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2 Stressed</td>
<td>Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies. Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Phase 3 Crisis   | Households either: *Have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or*  
                    *Are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies. URGENT ACTION required to protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps.* |
| Phase 4 Emergency| Households either: *Have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or*  
                    *Are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. URGENT ACTION required to save lives and livelihoods.* |
| Phase 5 Catastrophe/ Famine | Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality). URGENT ACTION required to revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods. |

A Famine classification requires evidence on food security, nutrition and mortality at or above IPC Phase 5 thresholds. If there is insufficient data for Famine classification but the available information indicates that famine is likely occurring or will occur, then the famine classification is called Famine Likely. It is important to note that Famine and Famine Likely are equally severe.

Food security terms

The following glossary provides the definitions of the food security terms used in the update. The terms and definitions in this glossary have been compiled from existing glossaries and other reference material available to the public.

The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is a common global scale for classifying the severity and magnitude of food insecurity and malnutrition. It is the result of a partnership of various organizations at global, regional and country levels dedicated to developing and maintaining the highest possible quality in food security and nutrition analysis. Increasingly, the IPC is the international standard for classifying food insecurity and malnutrition in the context of emergency assessments.

This report uses mainly the IPC acute food insecurity phase classification scale, which identifies populations and areas with food deprivation that threatens lives or livelihoods, regardless of the causes, context or duration, as well as the need for urgent action to decrease food gaps and protect lives and livelihoods.

IPC classification terms and definitions

Populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) are considered as facing high levels of acute food insecurity and requiring urgent action to save lives, protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps and acute malnutrition.

- **None/Minimal (IPC Phase 1)**
  
  People have stable access to food. Action is required to reduce people’s vulnerability to disasters/shocks and to build resilience, so they can stay food secure.

- **Stressed (IPC Phase 2)**
  
  People have erratic economic access to food and are vulnerable to disasters/shocks. Action is required to improve people’s stability of access to food and to reduce their vulnerability to disasters/shocks.

- **Crisis (IPC Phase 3)**
  
  People are malnourished due to inadequate access to food or they only have enough food by selling off their assets or through other harmful coping strategies. Urgent action is required to protect livelihoods and increase access to food to avoid a food emergency.

- **Emergency (IPC Phase 4)**
  
  People are malnourished due to lack of food or mitigate large food consumption gaps by selling off their assets or through other emergency coping strategies. Urgent action is needed to save lives. If nothing is done, people could face extreme hunger or death.

- **Catastrophe/Famine (IPC Phase 5)**
  
  People are malnourished due to lack of food and do not have any means left to access food. At area level, the population is in a situation of Famine (see definition below). Urgent action is needed to stop widespread starvation and death.
• Famine (IPC Phase 5)

Famine is the most severe phase of the IPC. It exists in areas where at least one in five households has or is most likely to experience an extreme deprivation of food. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical levels of acute malnutrition are or will likely be evident. Significant mortality, directly attributable to outright starvation or to the interaction of malnutrition and disease, is occurring or is likely to be occurring. The IPC only permits classification of Famine when all regular IPC protocols and special Famine protocols are met.

The special protocols are the following:
- The requirement of reliable evidence on three outcomes – food consumption or livelihood change, global acute malnutrition and crude death rate – all of which are either currently above or projected to be above Famine thresholds (> 20 percent of households with extreme food gaps, >30 percent of children acutely malnourished and crude death rate > 2/10 000/day).
- Undergoing a famine review process to validate the classification.
- Development of IPC Famine Alert adhering to pre-determined standards.

• Famine-likely (IPC Phase 5)

The IPC permits the classification of Famine-likely when all regular and special protocols are met, except for the existence of reliable evidence for the three outcomes. Areas can be classified as Famine-likely if minimally adequate evidence available indicates that Famine may be occurring or will occur. When an area is classified as Famine-likely, it should trigger prompt action by decision-makers to address the situation while calling for urgent efforts to collect more evidence.

• Risk of Famine

Risk of Famine refers to the reasonable probability of an area going into Famine in the projected period. While this is not perceived necessarily as the most likely scenario, it is a scenario that generally has a realistic chance of occurring. It complements the Famine and Famine-likely projections of the most likely scenario by providing insights of potential Famine if prospects evolve in a manner worse than anticipated.

More information on the IPC Famine classification is available at the following link: https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/resources/resources-details/en/c/1152968
Notes

https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/GRFC2023-MYU.pdf


4 IPC. 2024. IPC overview and classification system. In: IPC. Rome. [Cited 7 February 2024].  
https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/ipc-overview-and-classification-system/en


https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156504/?iso3=SDN

8 Between July and September 2023, 11.7 million were projected to experience Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above), including 3.1 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).  
https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156504/?iso3=SDN

https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156730/?iso3=SDN

https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156730/?iso3=SDN

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https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-110

https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/sudan


Objects indispensable to survival are non-exhaustively defined in article 54 of Additional Protocol I (applicable in international armed conflicts) and article 14 of Additional Protocol II (applicable in non-international armed conflicts) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 as “…foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.”


Note: IPC Special Briefs are produced by the IPC global initiative and do not necessarily reflect the views of stakeholders in Palestine.


The number of people in Crisis or worse food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) almost doubled over the last quarter of 2023, compared to mid-2022 when the number of acutely food-insecure people in Gaza was estimated at 1.2 million. Source: WFP and FAO. 2023. Hunger Hotspots. FAO–WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity: November 2023 to April 2024 Outlook. Rome. https://doi.org/10.4060/cc8419en

These estimates were based on data that were not directly comparable to IPC and other sources used in the Global Report on Food Crises 2023, see page 12: https://www.fsinplatform.org/global-report-food-crisis-2023.


Note: These estimates were based on data that were not directly comparable to IPC and other sources used in the Global Report on Food Crises, see GRFC 2023 p. 12 at: https://www.fsinplatform.org/global-report-food-crises-2023.


32 Disclaimer: The United Nations has so far not been able to produce independent, comprehensive and verified casualty figures; the current numbers have been provided by the Government Media Office in Gaza and the Israeli authorities and await further verification.


ICRC. 2024. Distinction. In: IHL Database. [Cited 22 January 2024]. https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/distinction


The fuel supplies levels ranged from 60 000 litres daily in mid-November to a daily average of 129 000–150 000 litres since 9 December. OCHA Flash Updates, op. cit.


111 Data estimated by FAO and Food Security Sector partners, based on ground verification as part of emergency fodder distribution in Gaza, January 2024.


162 **ACLED.** 2024. All incidents of battles, remote violence/explosions and violence against civilians between 15 April 2023 and January 2024. In: **ACLED Data Export Tool.** [Cited 22 January 2024]. https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool


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191 ICRC. 2024. Distinction. In: IHL Database. [Cited 22 January 2024].
https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/distinction

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https://www.unicef.org/sudan/sudan-crisis-childrens-crisis-

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201 Geneva Convention IV, Art. 49; Additional Protocol (II) to the Geneva Conventions, Art. 17. See also

202 Geneva Convention IV, Art. 49; Additional Protocol (II) to the Geneva Conventions, Art. 17. See also

[Cited 22 January 2024]. https://mixedmigration.org/articles/mixed-migration-consequences-sudan-conflict


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Switzerland. https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-nine-months-conflict-key-facts-and-figures-15-
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https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156730/?iso3=SDN
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