



COUNCIL

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Global food security challenges and drivers

Executive summary

This document covers Agenda Item 5, Global food security challenges and drivers, including Subitems 5.1, The situation in Gaza related to food security and related matters under the mandate of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and 5.2., The impact of the war in Ukraine on global food security and related matters under the mandate of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

Building on the documents prepared for previous Council sessions, this document provides an updated assessment of the global food security situation and examines the intensity of its main drivers, including conflicts, extreme weather events and economic setbacks. It also discusses additional challenges and threats to global food security, such as macroeconomic risks, commodity price levels and volatility, fertilizer and energy prices, logistical disruptions and trade policies. The document features specific sections on the food security situation in Gaza and on the impacts of the war in Ukraine, highlighting FAO's interventions in these two crisis contexts. The last section outlines FAO's technical support mechanisms and tools aimed at addressing global food security challenges.

Suggested action by the Council

The Council is invited to note the information presented in the document and provide guidance as deemed appropriate.

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I. Introduction

1. This document builds on Council documents CL 172/5, CL 174/4, CL 175/4 and CL 176/4, and provides an update on the global food security situation based on the latest available data and assessments. In addition to examining the key drivers, challenges and emerging threats to global food security, the document provides an update on the situation in Gaza and the impacts of the war in Ukraine on food security at global and national levels and presents the interventions of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in these two crisis settings. The last section of the document outlines FAO's technical support mechanisms and tools aimed at addressing global food security challenges.

II. Global food security challenges and drivers

A. Food insecurity situation

2. The 2024 edition of *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (SOFI)* revealed persistently high levels of chronic hunger, with the world still off track to meeting Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) Target 2.1 by 2030.
3. After rising sharply from 2019 to 2021, the proportion of the world population facing hunger persisted at virtually the same level for three consecutive years, with the latest estimates indicating a global prevalence of undernourishment (PoU - SDG Indicator 2.1.1) of 9.1 percent in 2023. In terms of population, between 713 and 757 million people were estimated to be undernourished in 2023. Considering the mid-range estimate (733 million), about 152 million more people may have faced hunger in 2023 compared to 2019.
4. Africa is the region with the largest percentage of chronically hungry people – 20.4 percent, compared with 8.1 percent in Asia, 6.2 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 7.3 percent in Oceania. However, Asia is still home to the largest number with 384.5 million, or more than half of all those facing hunger in the world.
5. While the PoU in Africa rose from 19.3 percent in 2021 to 20.4 percent in 2023 (an increase equivalent to nearly 29 million people), it fell in Latin America and the Caribbean in the same period, from 6.9 percent to 6.2 percent – a decrease equivalent to 4.3 million people in two years, driven mainly by improvements in South America. However, there was a notable disparity in progress at the subregional level. From 2022 to 2023, hunger increased in Western Asia, the Caribbean and in most regions of Africa. It is noteworthy that in all regions, the PoU is still above pre-COVID-19 pandemic levels.
6. Updated projections indicate that 582 million people will be chronically undernourished in 2030. This is about 130 million more undernourished people than in a scenario that reflected the world economy before the COVID-19 pandemic. By 2030, 53 percent of the global population facing hunger will be concentrated in Africa.
7. Going beyond hunger, the global prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity (SDG Indicator 2.1.2) also remains far above pre-pandemic levels, with little change in four years, after the sharp increase from 2019 to 2020 during the pandemic. In 2023, an estimated 28.9 percent of the global population – 2.33 billion people – were moderately or severely food insecure. These estimates include 10.7 percent of the population – or more than 864 million people – who were severely food insecure, namely, they had run out of food at times during the year and, at worst, gone an entire day or more without eating. The prevalence of severe food insecurity at the global level rose from 9.1 percent in 2019 to 10.6 percent in 2020 and has remained stubbornly unchanged.
8. The prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in Africa reached 58.0 percent and was nearly double the global average in 2023, whereas, in Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and Oceania, it is closer to the global estimate – 28.2, 24.8 and 26.8 percent, respectively. In the same year, the prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity was 31.9 percent in rural areas compared with 29.9 percent in peri-urban areas and 25.5 percent in urban areas. The prevalence of food insecurity has remained consistently higher among women than among men, globally and in all

regions, since data first became available in 2015, although the gender gap has narrowed in most regions in the last two years.

9. The number of people unable to afford a healthy diet in the world fell back to pre-pandemic levels in 2022 (2.83 billion people), fuelled by an economic recovery from the pandemic that has, nevertheless, been uneven across regions and country income groups. The number of people unable to afford a healthy diet dropped below pre-pandemic levels in Asia, Northern America and Europe, while increasing substantially in Africa, where the number rose to 924.8 million in 2022, up by 24.6 million from 2021 and by 73.4 million from 2019.

10. An updated assessment of chronic food insecurity in the world will be available in July 2025, with the launch of the 2025 edition of the SOFI report.

B. Acute food insecurity

11. According to the 2024 edition of the Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC), around 281.6 million people, or 21.5 percent of the analysed population, faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 59 countries/territories affected by food crises in 2023.¹

12. The share of analysed population that faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 was marginally lower than in 2022, when it was 22.7 percent. However, the number of affected people increased by 24 million since 2022, marking the fifth consecutive year of rising numbers. This year-on-year increase is mainly explained by increased country coverage, as well as deteriorations in some countries/territories outweighing improvements in others.

13. However, for four consecutive years, the prevalence of acute food insecurity has remained stubbornly high, ranging between 21 and 23 percent, despite record levels of humanitarian funding. Thirty-six countries/territories have featured in the GRFC reports for the past eight years, highlighting the difficulty of exiting acute food insecurity conditions once they become acute. Nineteen of them are categorized as both protracted and major food crises.

14. According to the mid-year update of the GRFC,² released in September 2024, the number of people facing or projected to face Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) more than doubled from 705 000 in five countries/territories in 2023 to 1.9 million in four countries/territories. This is the highest in the GRFC reporting. The increase is driven by conflicts in the Gaza Strip (1.1 million) and the Sudan (755 300); South Sudan (79 000) and Mali (2 600) are the other affected countries. In this phase of acute food insecurity, people face an extreme lack of food and exhaustion of coping capacities leading to starvation, acute malnutrition and death.

15. The FAO and World Food Programme (WFP) Hunger Hotspots report, covering a total of 22 countries/territories, warns that acute food insecurity is expected to worsen across 16 hunger hotspots over the outlook period from November 2024 to May 2025. Haiti, Mali, Palestine, South Sudan and Sudan remain hotspots at the highest concern level. These are countries/territories with Famine or Risk of Famine, or with populations already in the Catastrophe Phase, needing the most urgent attention. Chad, Lebanon, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen are classified as hotspots of very high concern, where large numbers of people are facing or are projected to face critical levels of acute food insecurity. Additionally, Kenya, Lesotho, Namibia and Niger have been added to the hunger hotspots list, while Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Malawi, Somalia, Zambia and Zimbabwe remain designated as hunger hotspots.

¹ FSIN and Global Network Against Food Crises. 2024. *GRFC 2024*. Rome. www.fsinplatform.org/grfc2024 “High levels of acute food insecurity” refers to populations in Crisis or worse (Phase 3 or above) according to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)/Cadre Harmonisé (CH) classification or moderate and severe acute food insecurity categories in World Food Programme’s Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security, and Humanitarian Needs Overview/Humanitarian Response Plans food security People in Need number as an approximation of IPC/CH Phase 3 or above. These are the populations who face high levels of acute food insecurity and need urgent assistance.

² [Global Report on Food Crises 2024 Mid-Year Update | Food Security Information Network \(FSIN\) \(fsinplatform.org\)](http://www.fsinplatform.org)

16. Fighting in the Sudan has further intensified in 2024, spreading to areas that were previously less impacted by the conflict. This has led to a significant increase in internal displacement and cross-border movements. More than 11 million people in the Sudan – 30 percent of the country’s population – were displaced between the outbreak of violence in April 2023 and the end of December 2024, making the Sudan the world’s largest displacement crisis. Of these, 3.2 million people sought refuge in neighbouring countries. Additionally, conflict continues to severely disrupt agricultural activities and food supply chains, escalating food insecurity and humanitarian needs, which are further compounded by the deep economic crisis and extreme humanitarian access constraints. Inflation remains extremely high at close to 190 percent, while the price of the local food basket more than doubled from 2023 to 2024. This is partly due to a 46 percent decrease in cereal production in 2023 compared to 2022, mainly driven by the impact of the ongoing conflict on agricultural operations. Border crossing closures, bureaucratic hurdles and limited resources have also hampered humanitarian aid efforts, affecting the distribution of essential supplies and support to vulnerable communities.

17. Famine (IPC Phase 5), first reported in Zamzam camp near North Darfur’s El Fasher town in July 2024, was confirmed in five areas in December 2024, while projected in ten areas from December 2024 to May 2025, with 17 more areas identified at risk of Famine. The latest IPC analysis reveals that acute food insecurity is more severe than previously forecasted, with 24.6 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) from December 2024 to May 2025, during the post-harvest period, affecting more than half of the analysed population. This includes 8.1 million people in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and at least 637 000 people in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe).³ Food security conditions are anticipated to deteriorate further in the coming months, as food stocks run out ahead of the lean season, which is anticipated to begin earlier than usual.

C. Drivers of global food insecurity

18. Since 2017, the SOFI report has identified conflict, climate variability and extremes, and economic slowdowns and downturns as the major drivers of the recent trends in hunger and food insecurity that are making it very challenging for the world to be on track towards the Zero Hunger goal (SDG 2). Furthermore, the negative impact of these major drivers on the chronic food insecurity situation is exacerbated by underlying structural factors like high cost of nutritious foods, low level of agricultural productivity, and high and persistent inequality.

19. In the last ten years, the frequency and intensity of these major drivers have increased, undermining food security around the world. These major drivers are also occurring concurrently more often and in combination with the underlying factors, resulting in increasing numbers of hungry and food-insecure people. The impact on low- and middle-income countries is of particular concern, as these countries already bear the greatest burden of the world’s undernourished population.

20. Alarming, the majority of low- and middle-income countries are affected by at least one of the major drivers and, where there are multiple drivers occurring, the compounding impacts lead to the highest increases in hunger and chronic food insecurity. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024 shows that, in the period 2013-2022, 88 out of 119 low- and middle-income countries with data available were affected by at least one of the major drivers and, among them, 39 countries were affected by more than one driver.

21. Most of the undernourished people live in countries affected by multiple major drivers. In addition, 18 out of 19 countries in major protracted food crises were affected by at least one major driver between 2013 and 2022, and 13 of them were affected by multiple major drivers. Between 2019 and 2023, increases in the prevalence of undernourishment in these countries were three times higher than in the rest of low- and middle-income countries.

22. These factors not only drive chronic hunger but are also behind the intensification of acute food insecurity. According to the latest edition of the GRFC report, in 2023, **conflict/insecurity** was the major driver in 20 of the 59 countries/territories in food crisis, where almost 135 million people

³ The Government of Sudan has not endorsed this analysis.

were estimated to be in high levels of acute food insecurity. The impact of conflict on acute food insecurity has intensified since 2022, when 117 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 19 countries/territories where conflict/insecurity was the main driver.

23. In the meantime, **climatic shocks** were the main drivers in 18 countries, where almost 72 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity. This represents an increase from 2022, when 56.8 million acutely food insecure people in 12 countries were estimated to need urgent humanitarian assistance.

24. Weather extremes and increased climate variability are exacerbating acute food insecurity in many regions. La Niña emerged in December 2024 and is expected to prevail until April 2025, with significant impacts on rainfall patterns and temperatures. While La Niña may enhance agricultural prospects in some areas, due to above-average rainfall amounts, it also increases the risk of flooding in parts of Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Conversely, La Niña is likely to bring drier-than-average conditions to southern and southwestern Ethiopia, northern Kenya and southwestern South Sudan. In Afghanistan and Yemen, forecasts indicate below-average rainfall, further jeopardizing agricultural output in already vulnerable areas. Given the uncertainties, continuous monitoring of weather forecasts and their impacts on agricultural production and livelihoods is essential.

25. **Economic shocks** were the primary driver in 21 countries, where 75.2 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity, down from 83.9 million people in 27 countries in 2022, although still more than double the numbers in 2019 before COVID-19 instigated major rises in domestic food prices.

26. The FAO-WFP Hunger Hotspots report reveals that conflict will continue to be a major driver of acute food insecurity in hotspot countries, such as the Sudan where the conflict is likely to expand, driving mass displacement and resulting in persisting famine levels and an increase in the number of people in catastrophic conditions. A likely intensification of the conflict will further aggravate the regional humanitarian crisis, resulting in increased cross-border movements to neighbouring countries, primarily the Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya and South Sudan.

27. In West Africa and the Sahel, violence perpetrated by non-state armed groups and rising insecurity continue to escalate. Countries and areas affected include northern and eastern Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (North and South Kivu) and northern Nigeria. In Southern Africa, persisting conflict in the north of Mozambique is expected to increase acute food insecurity. Fighting in Myanmar is likely to deepen the economic crisis. Escalating violence in Haiti is also pushing displaced populations back into starvation, with pockets of the population already experiencing catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity.

28. Beyond conflict, global economic disparities and high debt levels in many developing countries/territories are undermining governments' capacity to shield their populations from poverty and climate shocks. Additionally, currency depreciation and food import restrictions could result in rising food prices in vulnerable countries already grappling with climate shocks and political instability.

D. Additional challenges and threats to global food security

Macroeconomic risks

29. The International Monetary Fund, in its January 2025 edition of the World Economic Outlook, projected that global growth would remain steady at 3.3 percent in 2025 and 2026, staying below the pre-pandemic historical average (2000-2019) of 3.7 percent. Growth in advanced economies is projected to rise slightly from 1.7 percent in 2024 to 1.9 percent in 2025, before easing to 1.8 percent in 2026. Meanwhile, growth in emerging markets and developing economies is projected to reach 4.2 percent in 2025 and 4.3 percent in 2026.

30. As the report highlights, the overall outlook masks divergent paths across economies and a fragile global growth profile.

31. With regard to inflation, the report highlights that, while global disinflation continues, progress is stalling in some countries and inflation remains persistent in a few countries. Labour markets are gradually cooling and, with an expected decline in energy prices, global headline inflation is projected to reach 4.2 percent in 2025 and drop to 3.5 percent in 2026. However, the report warns that various risks – including economic policy shifts, geopolitical tensions and an upside in global economic activity – could affect the outlook for inflation in different directions.

32. Another important element in economic conditions is public debt. High debt levels and interest rates can strain public budgets, limiting governments' ability to increase essential public expenditures, particularly during crises. The UN Trade and Development, in its 2024 report *A world of debt – A growing burden to global prosperity*,⁴ highlighted that global public debt surged to USD 97 trillion in 2023, an increase of USD 5.6 trillion from 2022. Public debt in developing countries is rising at twice the rate of that in developed countries, accounting for 30 percent of the global debt in 2023, up substantially from 16 percent in 2010. The report also revealed that interest payments by developing countries are not only increasing rapidly but are outpacing growth in critical public expenditures. Alarming, an estimated 3.3 billion people live in countries that spend more on interest payments than on education or health.

33. The report also highlights that, while public debt is rising across all developing regions, Africa is the only region where it is growing faster than the gross domestic product (GDP). Consequently, 46 percent of the developing countries with a public debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 60 percent are in Africa, a significant increase from 25 percent in 2013.

34. A recent report indicates that the world's poorest countries are facing a growing debt crisis, with debt service payments reaching record levels. According to the United Nations Development Programme, in 2025,⁵ 56 developing nations spent over 10 percent of their revenues on interest payments, with 17 countries exceeding 20 percent, increasing the risk of default. The World Bank⁶ reports that total external debt for low- and middle-income countries hit USD 8.8 trillion, straining their economies.

International food commodity prices

35. Since May 2020, the international prices of most agricultural commodities have steadily risen, with many reaching record highs in the first half of 2022. The FAO Food Price Index (FFPI) hit an all-time high in March 2022, averaging 160.2 points (in nominal terms), a 34 percent increase from the year before. International prices of cereals, vegetable oils, meat and dairy products also peaked in the first half of 2022.

36. International food commodity prices began declining in mid-2022, a trend that continued uninterrupted until February 2024. Since March 2024, prices have experienced smaller but steady monthly increases. In January 2025, the FFPI averaged 124.9 points, down 1.6 percent from its December level. Declines in the price indices for sugar, vegetable oils and meat outweighed increases in those for cereals and dairy products. While the overall index was 6.2 percent higher than a year earlier, it remained 22.0 percent below its peak in March 2022.

37. While overall adjustments in the FFPI remained relatively moderate since early 2024, price trends across commodity groups have varied. In January 2025, the price indices for vegetable oil, dairy products and sugar were up 24.9 percent, 20.4 percent and 18.5 percent, respectively, compared to January 2024. Meanwhile, increases in the meat and cereal price indices were more modest, at 8.1 percent and 6.9 percent, respectively.

38. Despite the gradual increase in the FFPI in 2024, global food commodity markets have stayed relatively stable. However, they remain vulnerable to risks and uncertainties. Key concerns include

⁴ <https://unctad.org/publication/world-of-debt>

⁵ Retrieved from: <https://www.undp.org/press-releases/ballooning-debt-service-payments-poorest-countries-reach-alarming-levels-undp-warns>

⁶ Retrieved from: <https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/opendata/international-debt-report-2024--low--and-middle-income-countries>

adverse weather conditions, pests and diseases, conflicts and wars that can disrupt production and trade, sudden changes in trade policy that heighten uncertainty and price volatility, and broader economic setbacks. Economic conditions also play an important role in shaping global food markets and affecting food security.

39. Over the past year, international prices of cocoa, coffee and tea have risen significantly, largely due to supply constraints caused by adverse weather conditions and trade disruptions. These three commodities share common characteristics: they are all products of perennial trees; and their production is relatively concentrated in a few countries.

Fertilizer and energy prices

40. Developments in the energy markets highlight the complex interplay of supply, demand and geopolitical factors. In early February 2025, natural gas futures rose to EUR 58/MwH on account of cold weather in parts of the Northern Hemisphere and a decline in wind turbine output in the North Sea. In addition, concerns over gas storage persist, with levels at around 35 percent of storage capacity, down from 40-45 percent in February 2024.

41. In January 2025, crude oil prices ranged between USD 72 and USD 77 per barrel, up from the range of USD 68-72 per barrel in November and December 2024. This increase was primarily driven by short-term supply risks and a seasonal rise in heating demand. However, uncertainty surrounding crude oil prices persists, with significant implications for economic activities, including agricultural production and the movement of goods.

42. Energy prices directly affect agricultural production by raising inputs costs and indirectly as a key input in nitrogen fertilizer production. Following the surge in energy and natural gas prices before and immediately after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in late February 2022, world prices of urea, ammonium nitrates and other nitrogenous fertilizers soared well above their multi-year averages.

43. In January 2025, fertilizer prices, represented by a basket of nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium price series, averaged USD 354 per tonne, up 5 percent from December 2024. The sharpest increase was in nitrogen fertilizer prices, driven by a strong agricultural demand from India, reduced urea production in Egypt, and seasonal demand peaks in the United States of America and Europe ahead of spring applications. Phosphate markets remained relatively stable, with limited supply concerns, as the Russian Federation prioritized domestic deliveries for farmers. Potash prices, meanwhile, experienced a significant increase, influenced by production curtailments of 1 million tonnes in Belarus and 300 000 tonnes in the Russian Federation.

44. Although fertilizer affordability has generally declined so far in 2025 compared to 2023 and 2024, application rates in key consuming and importing countries have remained robust. However, concerns persist over the consequences of potential trade barriers and logistical bottlenecks.

Logistical disruptions

45. Logistical disruptions can have a direct impact on agricultural trade, with over 80 percent of global grain and oilseed trade conducted via maritime routes. Shipping restrictions and disruptions can lead to longer cargo travel distances, higher trade costs and increased greenhouse gas emissions.

46. Although attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea have declined, the number of vessel passages has not yet returned to pre-December 2023 levels, when the attacks began. The Red Sea route is a crucial corridor for grain and oilseed exports from the European Union (EU), Russian Federation and Ukraine to Asia and East Africa. Similarly, rice and other commodities flow westwards from Asia, while fertilizer shipments – such as potash from the Russian Federation to Asia – also rely on the Red Sea passage. In response to threats, several shipping companies have rerouted vessels via the Cape of Good Hope. Estimates suggest rerouting bulk grain shipments from Europe to Asia adds 10 to 15 days to the travel time and about USD 10 per tonne to the freight costs.

47. While no major disruptions to inland waterways are being reported, erratic weather patterns could pose challenges to transportation and logistics and increase insurance costs, particularly in major agricultural exporting countries.

Trade policy environment

48. Trade distortions and restrictions can pose significant obstacles to achieving global food security. Targets under SDG 2 emphasize the need to correct and prevent trade restrictions and distortions in global agricultural markets and to implement measures to ensure the proper functioning of food commodity markets.

49. Measures, such as export restrictions, tariffs, subsidies and market price support, can impact the availability, diversity and affordability of food, particularly in low-income, food-deficit countries. These policies can limit access to essential agricultural products, drive up food prices and worsen food insecurity for vulnerable populations. During periods of multiple crises – such as pandemics, conflicts or climate-related shocks affecting several regions simultaneously – trade restrictions can further aggravate the situation by disrupting trade flows and supply chains. The threat of sudden unilateral changes in trade policies, potentially prompting responses from trading partners, is likely to deteriorate the overall trading environment.

50. Achieving SDG 2 will require enhanced global cooperation to promote food security, nutrition and sustainable agrifood systems. It will also depend on progress in implementing trade policies that support transparent, fair and open markets, minimize distortions and foster partnership between nations to ensure that agrifood systems are efficient, inclusive, equitable and capable of meeting the needs of the world's growing population.

III. The situation in Gaza related to food security and related matters under the mandate of FAO

A. Food security situation in Gaza

51. The escalation of conflict and hostilities in the Gaza Strip since early October 2023 has triggered a humanitarian crisis of vast proportions, with catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity. The conflict has nearly destroyed livelihoods and agrifood systems, severely restricting access to essential goods and humanitarian aid, resulting in unprecedented levels of needs.⁷

52. The latest IPC report indicated that between September and October 2024, the whole territory was classified in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). About 1.84 million people across the Gaza Strip were experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or above, including nearly 664 000 people, in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and 133 000 people facing catastrophic food insecurity (IPC Phase 5). Acute Malnutrition (AMN) was at serious levels (IPC AMN Phase 3), ten times higher than before the escalation of the hostilities. Despite the ceasefire, the situation in the Gaza Strip remains catastrophic, with 1.9 million people displaced facing acute shortages of water, food and shelter amid harsh winter conditions. The IPC Famine Review Committee (FRC) issued an alert on 8 November 2024, warning about an imminent and substantial likelihood of famine occurring in areas within northern Gaza as the worst-case scenario the FRC had warned about is already unfolding.

53. Food consumption has deteriorated significantly in the last 15 months, with many households skipping meals or resorting to extreme coping strategies, such as scavenging or consuming inedible items. Malnutrition rates, especially among children and pregnant or lactating mothers, have soared due to poor diets and limited access to clean water and healthcare. An estimated 90 percent of them face severe food poverty, consuming two or fewer food groups per day, mostly low-nutritional value foods like bread and pulses. Alarmingly, over half of pregnant women in Gaza suffer from anaemia.

54. By the end of 2024, food access had reached critical levels. According to WFP's recent market monitor, prices of both food and non-food commodities started to decline following the ceasefire but remain significantly higher than pre-October 2023 levels, due to the unstable availability

⁷ FAO and WFP. (Forthcoming). *Monitoring food security in food crisis countries with conflict situations – A joint FAO/WFP update for the members of the United Nations Security Council, Issue no. 14, March 2025.* Rome.

of commodities and the lack of a fully functioning commercial sector.⁸ While some prices decreased between December 2024 and January 2025, many remain as much as 1 200 percent higher than the pre-crisis levels.⁹

55. The scale of destruction in Gaza is staggering. As of 31 December 2024, 3 047 infrastructures and 1 531 wells (67.7 percent) were damaged.^{10,11} Additionally, 75 percent of cropland was damaged by December 2024, up from 42.6 percent in February and 57.3 percent in May.¹² Among crops, 79.5 percent of orchards and trees, 64.3 percent of vegetables and 73.1 percent of field crops were damaged, with Khan Younis having the largest area of damaged cropland.¹³ Assessments also indicate that 56.5 percent of the greenhouses in the Gaza Strip were damaged.¹⁴

56. Damage to, and destruction of, infrastructure continues to constrain humanitarian access. By December 2024, 68 percent of the road network had been damaged or destroyed. Significant damage to telecommunications infrastructure will continue to hinder aid delivery, and restoring connectivity will require extensive repairs. Unexploded ordnance across the Gaza Strip presents an additional severe risk to local populations and humanitarians' work.

57. As of 8 January 2025, 61 percent of surveyed herders were displaced. Most herders feed their animals primarily with grass (81.4 percent), supplemented by leftover bread (64 percent) and market fodder (15.5 percent). Livestock survival rates have been severely impacted, with only 40 percent of sheep and 18 percent of goats remaining, underscoring the urgent need for support for both animals and their caretakers.¹⁵

58. The fishing sector has nearly collapsed, halting alternative sources for aquatic food production. The Port of Gaza City and most fishing boats north of Wadi Gaza have been severely damaged, with the majority of fishing boats destroyed. From October 2023 to April 2024, Gaza's average daily fish catch plummeted to just 7.3 percent of 2022 levels, resulting in a USD 17.5 million production loss.¹⁶

59. The conflict has resulted in the loss of about 507 000 jobs in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including 201 000 in Gaza, leading to a daily income loss of USD 25.5 million.¹⁷ Gaza's agricultural sector has incurred devastating losses of about USD 629 million, severely impacting

⁸ WFP.2025. Market Monitor – Palestine; <https://www.wfp.org/publications/202324-wfp-palestine-monthly-market-dashboard>

⁹ OCHA. 2025. Humanitarian Situation Update #261 | Gaza Strip

<https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-261-gaza-strip>

¹⁰ FAO. 2025. Damage to agricultural infrastructure due to the conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 31 December 2024. <https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/2208d866-8a58-4c1d-8122-0a8610cfb80a/content>

¹¹ FAO. 2025. Damage to agricultural wells due to the conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 31 December 2024.

<https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/ce158334-ea46-4bc3-b452-148082159b8e/content>

¹² FAO. 2025. Damage to cropland due to the conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 31st of December 2024

<https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/293d5e69-a56f-4caf-91e7-bd70bc8fef0d/content>

¹³ FAO. 2025. Damage to cropland due to the conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 31st of December 2024

<https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/293d5e69-a56f-4caf-91e7-bd70bc8fef0d/content>.

¹⁴ FAO.2025. Damage to greenhouses due to the conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 31st of December 2024.

<https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/28739b1a-b02d-4855-876a-745c48c3468a/content>

¹⁵ FAO. 2025. Herders Needs and FAO's Response in the Gaza Strip as of 8 January 2025.

<https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/8e099a01-5579-4757-b12f-939390df9e77/content>

¹⁶ FAO.2024. Reviving Gaza's fishing sector hinges on restoring peace and safe access to the sea.

<https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/reviving-gaza-s-fishing-sector-hinges-on-restoring-peace-and-safe-access-to-the-sea/en>

¹⁷ International Labour Organization (ILO) and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. 2024. *Impact of the war in Gaza on the labour market and livelihoods in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Bulletin No. 3*. Beirut, Regional Office for Arab States, ILO. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_918919.pdf

livelihoods, exacerbating food insecurity and destabilizing the economy.¹⁸ The economic toll of the conflict is severe on all farmers, with households engaged in mixed farming system – combining crop cultivation and livestock production – which were disproportionately affected.¹⁹

60. Women bear the heaviest burden of wartime challenges. As of the latest data from UN Women, 12 000 women have been widowed, with many now serving as the principal providers for their households. Their hardships are amplified by limited economic means, with 95 percent unable to meet the basic needs.²⁰ Displacement, violence and resource shortages add psychological stress and disrupt women-led agribusinesses.²¹

61. Since the ceasefire, more than 500 000 people have returned to Northern Gaza after Israeli forces withdrew from key roads;²² however, the journey is fraught with protection risks, especially for women, children and the elderly who are making dangerous journeys on foot. In these situations, women and girls are especially vulnerable to health issues.²³ According to a recent UN Women snapshot published in January 2025, the collapse of primary and specialized healthcare centres has compounded difficulties for over 162 000 women at risk of or living with non-communicable diseases. Meanwhile, 690 000 women and girls lack access to menstrual hygiene, threatening their lives and well-being.²⁴

62. In February 2025, the *Gaza and West Bank Interim Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment*²⁵ – February 2025 was published as a collaborative effort by the World Bank, the European Union and the United Nations.²⁶ The main findings indicate that USD 53.2 billion is needed for recovery and reconstruction over the next decade, with Gaza sustaining most of the impact. This overall figure reflects total estimated physical infrastructure damage of around USD 29.9 billion and economic and social losses around USD 19.1 billion. The Assessment found that housing requires the largest share of recovery needs, with an estimated USD 15.2 billion, accounting for around 30 percent of total recovery needs. The health sector (USD 6.9 billion), commerce and industry (USD 6.9 billion), and agrifood systems (USD 4.2 billion), also require a large share of recovery needs due to their extensive damage and socioeconomic importance. The education sector requires USD 3.8 billion for recovery and reconstruction.

63. The situation in Gaza represents a profound violation of the right to food, which encompasses not only access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food, but also the means to produce or procure it with dignity. The extensive destruction of agricultural land, water infrastructure and food production systems – combined with soaring food prices, displacement and the near-collapse of livelihoods – has

¹⁸ EU, the World Bank, and the UN. 2024. *Gaza Strip Interim Damage Assessment - Summary Note – March 29, 2024*. Washington, D.C. <https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/gaza-strip-interim-damage-assessment-summary-note-march-29-2024-#:~:text=WASHINGTON%2C%20April%20%2C%202024%20%2D%2D,support%20of%20the%20European%20Union>.

¹⁹ FAO. Forthcoming. *The impact of the three months of 2023/2024 war in Gaza on the agricultural production and income of farming households*. Rome.

²⁰ FAO. 2024. *Understanding the Gender-related Impact of the Crisis in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank for an Inclusive Response – Briefing note on the Occupied Palestinian Territory*. Rome.

<https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/54943775-b4ba-4d74-beb5-936bc61db658/content>

²¹ FAO. 2024. *Understanding the Gender-related Impact of the Crisis in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank for an Inclusive Response – Briefing note on the Occupied Palestinian Territory*. Rome.

<https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/54943775-b4ba-4d74-beb5-936bc61db658/content>

²² <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/02/1159796>

²³ UNFPA. 2025. *Situation Report Humanitarian Crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territories*, covering period 1 to 31 January 2025. New York. <https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdf/Situation%20Report%20%23%2014%20-%20January%202025%20-%20Palestine.pdf>

²⁴ UN Women. 2025. Gender snapshot for Gaza Strip as of 31 January 2025

[Gaza-RDNA-final-med.pdf](#)

²⁶ International Labour Organization (ILO) and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. 2024. *Impact of the war in Gaza on the labour market and livelihoods in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Bulletin No. 3*. Beirut, Regional Office for Arab States, ILO. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_918919.pdf

rendered the population unable to secure even the most basic sustenance. The staggering levels of food poverty, malnutrition and anaemia, particularly among children and pregnant women, signal a catastrophic failure of the agrifood systems to meet fundamental human needs. The right to food is not merely about preventing starvation; it demands proactive measures to rebuild local agrifood systems, ensure non-discriminatory access and uphold human dignity amid crisis and conflict.

B. Escalating risks and global impacts

64. Tensions in the Red Sea and broader geopolitical tensions could have significant economic consequences at both regional and global scale. As noted earlier in this document, ongoing tensions in the Red Sea have compromised the security of global supply chains, forcing a rerouting of maritime traffic away from the Suez Canal – one of the world’s key trade chokepoints and a vital source of foreign exchange for Egypt – toward longer alternative routes to mitigate the risk of attacks. These disruptions have not only increased transportation costs and transit times but have also revealed the vulnerability of global trade to future climate and conflict-related shocks, potentially driving food prices even higher in the long run.

C. FAO’s interventions in Gaza

65. FAO has been working across the Gaza Strip to help people rapidly produce highly nutritious foods, to complement food assistance and facilitate access to quality food, even in circumstances of rapidly changing access to aid. Animal feed provision continues. As of 16 February 2025, FAO has successfully delivered approximately 1 000 tonnes of barley fodder to approximately 4 800 beneficiaries and distributed veterinary kits to nearly 2 400 herders. Out of FAO’s target of approximately 2 250 small ruminant owners, 2 040 beneficiaries have received 510 tonnes of fodder concentrate. Around 460 donkey owners received around 68 tonnes of barley fodder and are providing services to the municipalities and the shelters. Two poultry owners in Deir al-Balah, among the very few still operating in the Strip, received 3.1 tonnes of barley fodder to prevent further poultry losses.

66. Since the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas took effect on 19 January 2025, the conditions for access of humanitarian aid have improved. Increases in daily aid shipments through the Erez and Zikim crossings in the north and Kerem Shalom in the south have expanded the delivery of lifesaving assistance and services across the Gaza Strip, including to previously inaccessible areas. However, damage and destruction of infrastructure continue to hinder humanitarian operations.

67. It is crucial to keep livestock alive and healthy, thus ensuring access to protein and milk for families, and particularly for children who are often malnourished or at risk of malnourishment. A recent United Nations Satellite Centre (UNOSAT) and FAO cropland damage joint assessment, based on satellite imagery collected in December 2024, revealed that 75 percent of cropland in the Gaza Strip (11 293 ha out of 15 053 ha) was damaged or destroyed because of razing, heavy vehicle activity, bombing, shelling and other conflict-related dynamics. The governorate of Khan Younis had the largest cropland damage (2 879 ha, 68.4 percent), while North Gaza and Gaza exhibit the highest damage in percentage terms (84.1 and 80.4 percent, respectively).

68. This is the fifth geospatial assessment conducted by FAO in collaboration with UNOSAT and Palestinian institutions, including the Ministry of Agriculture and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, to evaluate damage to the agricultural sector in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The assessment found that 56.5 percent of greenhouses were damaged, with destruction reaching as high as 99.9 percent in Gaza and 92.9 percent in North Gaza.

69. FAO also conducted assessments of Gaza’s fishing assets – including boats, aquaculture farms and Gaza City’s port – revealing that 72 percent of the assets have been damaged, resulting in losses estimated at about USD 84 million. The destruction of two major aquaculture farms and a hatchery has completely halted production, further worsening food insecurity.

70. FAO conducted several rounds of rapid assessments (in March, mid-April-early-May, July-August and December 2024) among the owners of small ruminants in Gaza to estimate livestock mortality. Based on the results of these quick interviews, almost all cattle have died. Milk production has significantly decreased, with only minimal small-scale household activities ongoing. Furthermore,

it is estimated that around 40 percent of sheep (about 235 000 heads) and 34 percent of goats (about 1 000 heads) remain alive. Dramatic losses are reported in poultry, with only 4.3 percent (about 130 000 heads) alive. Commercial production has largely ceased, with most operations now limited to household-level production for self-consumption. The remaining layer farms in the Middle Area are unable to operate due to electricity and food shortages, severely limiting egg production, which remains scarce and expensive.

IV. The impact of the war in Ukraine on global food security and related matters under the mandate of FAO

A. Global impacts of the war in Ukraine

71. The outbreak of the war in Ukraine in late February 2022 caused immediate disruptions to world agrifood markets and trade, affecting logistics and transport routes and raising concerns about potential global impacts, given the importance of both the Russian Federation and Ukraine for global agrifood markets. Both countries are major agricultural producers and important exporters of staple foods to many countries highly dependent on food imports to meet the needs of their populations, including many least developed and low-income, food-deficit countries.

72. Documents prepared for previous Council sessions highlighted the main risks stemming from the war in Ukraine, including trade and logistical risks, production disruptions, excessive food price volatility and energy concerns. While these risks were mostly pronounced in 2022, they have gradually diminished as the global economy adapted to new market conditions.

73. As of February 2025, despite the termination of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023, Ukraine continues to export food commodities to global markets via the Black Sea ports.

74. While global grain and oilseed markets are currently relatively stable, any disruption to Ukraine's agricultural exports, whether due to war-induced production shortfall or infrastructure damages, could impact global availability and price levels of food commodities. Although, it is important to mention that a major consequence of the war in Ukraine in terms of the market structure of global exports of wheat and oilseed is an increase in market concentration.

B. Situation in Ukraine

75. The war continues to disrupt the country's agrifood sector and drive high levels of acute food insecurity, particularly in the conflict areas. Damage and destruction of critical infrastructure and land-mine contamination of farmland have constrained agricultural activity and the transportation of crops to both local markets and export destinations. High production and logistical costs have eroded livelihoods, reducing farmers' incomes and the revenues of millions of rural Ukrainians.

76. Ukraine's wheat production from the areas under government control is estimated at 22.4 million tonnes in 2025, 13 percent below the past five-year average and 30 percent lower than in 2021 (accounting for the entire area). Market disruptions caused by the conflict have severely constrained farmers' access to inputs, limiting wheat yield potential despite generally favourable weather conditions. For similar reasons, maize production is forecast at 25 million tonnes, nearly 25 percent below the five-year average and 40 percent lower than in 2021.

77. FAO, in collaboration with its partners, is conducting comprehensive assessments to evaluate the war's impact on the food security and livelihoods of Ukrainian households. These assessments are prioritizing rural households, particularly those in frontline areas, to better understand how the conflict has affected their production capacity and livelihoods. The findings will be critical in guiding humanitarian response and recovery efforts.

C. Situation in neighbouring countries

78. Since the start of the war, Ukraine's limited capacity to export through the Black Sea ports has led to a redirection of export trade flows through neighbouring EU countries, either for transit purposes or as final destinations. In May 2022, the EU introduced the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes to allow Ukraine to export grains and other foodstuffs and import needed goods, including agricultural

inputs. While they have facilitated the export of Ukrainian food and agricultural products, the Lanes created tensions between Ukraine and its EU neighbouring countries (Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) because of concerns about the potential impacts on local markets and farmers.

79. By mid-2023, the opening of new routes facilitated Ukraine's exports. In particular, the humanitarian corridor allowed exports via the Black Sea ports and outperformed the Black Sea Grain Initiative. As a result, Ukraine has re-gained its pre-war export volumes, with 80 percent of its agricultural exports now moving through the Black Sea. This shift to Black Sea routes has reduced reliance on the Danube and land connections and eased the tensions between Ukraine and its EU neighbouring countries. Virtually no exports of wheat and maize from Ukraine to neighbouring countries have occurred since September 2023. Competition with local farmers in the Eastern part of the EU is mainly limited to access to infrastructure and transportation services.

80. In April 2024, the European Commission extended trade measures by suspending all duties and quotas on Ukrainian products for another year but introduced a safeguard mechanism. In December 2024, Ukraine introduced voluntary export restrictions to prevent triggering the European Union's safeguard mechanism under the bloc's Autonomous Trade Measures.

D. FAO's interventions in Ukraine

81. Under its Emergency and Early Recovery Response Plan (EERRP) for 2025-2026, FAO requires USD 150 million and plans to reach over half a million people. FAO will continue supporting the efforts of the Government of Ukraine to mitigate the negative effects of the war, especially among rural communities located in frontline oblasts. This two-year plan integrates a multipronged and inclusive strategy aiming to ensure the timely, effective and efficient delivery of agricultural assistance to safeguard food security and nutrition, while reducing protection risks, preventing dependency and paving the way for more resilient communities through the integration of small farmers into key value chains.

82. The EERRP is comprised of three thematic pillars. The first is a one-year Emergency Response pillar with primarily the objective of rapidly mobilizing support to restore and sustain livelihoods of the most vulnerable rural households and small farmers affected by the war. This will be achieved through the provision of inputs to safeguard food production and food security.

83. The second pillar will be revolving around activities to support rehabilitation of agricultural land contaminated by unexploded ordnance/explosive remnants of war. The third pillar is composed of multi-year early recovery activities aimed at supporting both rural households and small-scale farmers with higher productive capacity which struggle to regularly access the market with fair prices, particularly in the oblasts recurrently affected by war-related events.

84. With special emphasis on rural households settled farther away from the frontline, the Early Recovery pillar aims to provide relevant information, inputs and technical support to strengthen their productive and business-oriented capacities and increase their production and access to markets in a more organized manner. Overall, both rural households and small farmers will be supported with an inclusive value chain approach that tackles the lack of basic infrastructure, technical matters, social aspects and financial literacy, actively linking them up with possible commercial opportunities, ensuring the equal engagements and benefits for women and men. Along those value chains, main gaps related to production, harvest, post-harvest, processing and marketing will be identified and supported in a more tailored manner, considering the geographical areas and natural resources availability and accessibility.

85. All three pillars will be strengthened through continuous technical analyses and assessments. FAO will continue delivering valuable insights to stakeholders. These efforts will guide the design of targeted interventions, identify opportunities to address emerging needs and support early recovery initiatives effectively. Concurrently, FAO will continue supporting the Government to develop policies and programmes that aim at supporting a greener and more sustainable recovery path, as well as at ensuring a smooth transition of Ukrainian agrifood systems to enhance environmental, food safety and trading standards.

86. FAO is developing a recovery and long-term development strategy aligned with key national sectoral strategies in agriculture, environment, climate shocks and weather extremes, and economic growth. The goal is to transform national and local agrifood systems into a driver of sustainable development, while accelerating recovery in areas severely impacted by the ongoing war. Through technical assistance and investment projects, FAO aims to support national, local and community-based organizations in designing policies, programmes and initiatives that facilitate a smooth transition from emergency response to long-term development. This includes scaling long-term support for smallholder farmers, particularly in rural areas, access to knowledge and financial services, market integration, sustainable natural resource management, animal health, green energy, rehabilitation of war-affected areas, and climate change adaptation and mitigation.

87. Agriculture and environmental considerations are central to harness potential opportunities to improve the efficiency and inclusiveness of agrifood systems in Ukraine. This presents a significant opportunity for Ukrainian farmers to embrace diversification, adopt more efficient and sustainable production methods and improve natural resource management. FAO is playing a crucial role in ensuring smallholder farmers are included in this transition and have access to tools that enable them to seize these opportunities – all essential for achieving the SDGs.

V. FAO's global response through technical support mechanisms and tools

A. Major FAO's global assessments

Global Assessments on Food Security and Nutrition

88. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World is an annual report published by FAO, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the United Nations Children's Fund, WFP and the World Health Organization, aimed at monitoring and analysing the world's progress towards ending hunger, achieving food security and improving nutrition. It also provides in-depth analysis on key challenges for achieving these goals in the context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World tracks progress towards SDG 2 (Zero Hunger) by analysing factors like undernourishment, food access and malnutrition rates, while also examining the impact of conflicts, climate change and economic crises on agrifood systems. It provides critical insights for policymakers, highlighting challenges and recommending strategies to strengthen food security, improve nutrition and build more resilient agrifood systems worldwide.

89. The OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook is an annual report jointly produced by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and FAO, providing a ten-year projection of global agricultural production, consumption, trade and prices. It analyses trends in major commodities such as grains, livestock, dairy and biofuels, considering factors like climate change, economic growth, trade policies and technological advancements. The report also assesses food security challenges and sustainability issues, offering insights for policymakers and stakeholders to ensure resilient and efficient agrifood systems. It serves as a key resource for understanding future agricultural markets and guiding policy decisions.

90. FAOSTAT is a comprehensive online database managed by FAO providing free access to global agricultural statistics. It contains data on food production, trade, prices, consumption, land use, emissions and food security across more than 245 countries and territories. FAOSTAT enables policymakers, researchers and analysts to track trends, compare national and regional agricultural performance, and make data-driven decisions. The platform is regularly updated and supports sustainable development by offering insights into global agrifood systems, climate impact and economic factors affecting agriculture.

Market monitoring and assessment for food commodities and fertilizers

91. Market monitoring and assessment of food commodities are central to FAO's global efforts in the fight against food insecurity and malnutrition. FAO's work in this area plays a crucial role in enhancing market transparency and supporting informed policy decisions. By systematically tracking global agricultural markets, including supply, demand, trade and price trends, FAO provides reliable, up-to-date information that helps governments and other stakeholders navigate market dynamics. This

transparency reduces uncertainty, promotes efficient resource allocation and enables decision makers to design evidence-based policies that enhance food security and market stability.

92. FAO regularly publishes key reports on global food markets and prices. These include the monthly FAO Food Price Index and the Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Bulletin; the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) Market Monitor, published ten times a year providing an overview of major market developments for wheat, maize, rice and soybeans; the biannual Food Outlook report, offering a comprehensive assessment of food commodity markets; and the triannual Crop Prospects and Food Situation report, providing an analysis of the food situation and food security conditions by geographic region. Additionally, following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, FAO has produced a series of briefs and information notes assessing the impacts on global agrifood markets and food security and proposing policy actions to mitigate the risks.

93. In addition to monitoring food commodity markets, FAO is placing greater emphasis on tracking and assessing fertilizer markets, recognizing their critical role in sustaining agricultural productivity and ensuring stable food supplies. Fertilizer availability and affordability are closely linked to energy markets, global trade flows and geopolitical developments. Disruptions in supply chains – such as those caused by trade restrictions or rising production costs due to higher energy prices – can have widespread consequences, including lower crop yields, elevated food prices and heightened food security risks, particularly in low-income and food import-dependent countries. The AMIS Market Monitor also contains a prominent section on fertilizer markets.

Assessment of overall resilience of countries' food security and nutrition to shocks and stresses

94. Shocks such as weather extremes, damage to infrastructure, war, conflicts and pandemics frequently disrupt the operations within agrifood systems. The theme of the 2021 edition of The State of Food and Agriculture flagship report was “Making agrifood systems more resilient to shocks and stresses”. In this regard, to measure countries' absorptive capacity to shocks, FAO developed a country-level indicator – the dietary sourcing flexibility index – to measure the diversity of food supply in terms of sourcing channels and food commodities²⁷. A high value indicates multiple possible sourcing pathways and thus a high capacity to absorb shocks and ensure food availability to consumers.

95. The dietary sourcing flexibility index is composed of three different elements that contribute to food supply diversity: domestic production diversity across commodities and export partners, import diversity across commodities and import partners, and food stocks. The indicator is available for 171 countries and territories and is in the process of being included in FAOSTAT as a data series starting in 2010. The indicator shows that countries diversify their sources of food in different ways. It highlights the role of a mix of domestic production and diversified international trade in enhancing absorptive capacity in the face of domestic and external disruptions. However, in low-income countries with limited imports available, consumption diversity can be similarly attained through the diversity of foods produced domestically. On the other hand, for countries with a narrow agricultural base, where climate or lack of land or water limits diversification, supply diversity often relies on importing from a broad range of trading partners.

Assessment of chokepoints and disruptions to trade

96. Agrifood trade relies on the smooth and efficient operation of supply chain infrastructure, including ports, inland transport corridors and border crossings. However, disruptions caused by conflicts, geopolitical tensions, trade restrictions, extreme weather events and logistical bottlenecks can obstruct the movement of food products and agricultural inputs. Identifying and addressing these chokepoints is essential for enabling timely actions and safeguarding food security.

97. Through the Agricultural Market Information System, FAO's work on trade disruptions involves collecting and analysing data on chokepoints, shipping delays and freight costs, identifying and assessing associated risks, providing timely data and analysis, and supporting coordinated policy

²⁷ <https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/1e61f82a-618c-467a-a37f-545580094a1d/content>

responses to minimize disruptions. By strengthening trade-related risk assessments and fostering international cooperation, FAO helps build more resilient food supply chains and ensure that food reaches the people who are most in need, particularly in vulnerable, low-income, food-deficit countries.

B. Major FAO's tools for food security and nutrition monitoring

The Agricultural Market Information System and the Food Price Monitoring and Analysis Tool

98. FAO maintains a range of market monitoring and assessment tools to enhance global market transparency, strengthen early warning systems, and mitigate the impact of crises on food security and nutrition; these tools include the [Agricultural Market Information System](#) and the [Food Price Monitoring and Analysis Tool](#).

99. The Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) was launched by the Group of 20 (G20) Agriculture Ministers in June 2011 as part of the Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture. The initiative came in response to sharp price spikes and swings in international prices of basic food commodities, which revealed significant weaknesses in market information systems and the coordination of policy actions. Weaknesses included the lack of timely, reliable data and information on crop production, utilization, stocks and export availability.

100. The Agricultural Market Information System²⁸ was tasked with the responsibility to enhance market transparency and promote policy response coordination in times of heightened market uncertainty. This dual objective led to the creation of two groups: i) the Global Food Market Information Group, composed of technical experts from AMIS participant members to assemble relevant market and policy information; and ii) the Rapid Response Forum, composed of senior representatives of AMIS participant members to facilitate policy discussions in times of market uncertainty with the objective of enhancing policy coordination. Both groups are supported by an inter-agency Secretariat composed of ten international organizations and hosted by FAO in the Markets and Trade Division (EST).

101. The Agricultural Market Information System focuses on four key food commodities – wheat, rice, maize and soybeans. To ensure broad market representation, G20 Members and Spain (as a permanent G20 observer) invited seven additional countries to participate in AMIS: Egypt, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Philippines, Thailand, Ukraine and Viet Nam. The Agricultural Market Information System's outputs include the Market Monitor, which provides market updates and assessments, a comprehensive market database and a policy database.

102. The Food Price Monitoring and Analysis Tool is an advanced platform for the dissemination and analysis of food price information. First launched in March 2009 as part of FAO's response to the global food price crisis, the tool has undergone several iterations, incorporating enhanced analytical features and leveraging the latest technologies. The latest version, FPMA Tool Version 4, was released in mid-2022, further strengthening its capacity to monitor and analyse food price trends globally.

103. The Food Price Monitoring and Analysis Tool features a user-friendly interface that enables users to track current and historical prices, analyse basic statistics and compare trends across markets, commodities and seasons. Furthermore, the tool includes a function for calculating SDG Indicator 2.c.1, which measures the occurrence of "price anomalies" for a given food commodity over a specific period. This indicator is a key metric for assessing progress towards SDG Target 2.c., which aims to ensure the proper functioning of food commodity markets and limit extreme food price volatility.

104. The Food Price Monitoring and Analysis Tool is accessible to countries and regional organizations and can be integrated with existing food price data collection systems, allowing for customization to meet specific needs. Since 2023, the tool also features an optional component for primary price data collection via a mobile app. This functionality enables real-time data gathering,

²⁸ [AMIS Agricultural Market Information System](#)

which can be validated and transferred to the analysis and dissemination platform, enhancing the accuracy and efficiency of food price monitoring.

Resilience Toolbox

105. The concept of resilience has gathered momentum in fostering the response mechanisms of international agencies. By reducing the damage of a shock or preventing a disaster, investments in resilience building are generally cost-effective strategies with a high return on investment. However, effective resilience-enhancing interventions and ad hoc responses require strong contextualization and must be embedded within multi-year strategies aligned with the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus.

106. FAO's Resilience Toolbox is an applied resource to support country and context-specific selection of (sets of) interventions, that are integral to resilience programming. By leveraging scientific evidence, existing knowledge and practice, its primary goal is to expand and enhance the portfolio of locally relevant solutions and foster synergies among them. These interventions will be targeted to different contexts and hazards, aligning with the HDP nexus. In doing so, the toolbox aims to strengthen resilience across diverse target populations, while also promoting local peace and minimizing risks wherever feasible.

Modelling frameworks

Aglink-Cosimo modelling system

107. The Aglink-Cosimo modelling system is a recursive-dynamic, partial equilibrium model used to produce ten-year projections and simulate annual market balances and price developments for main agricultural commodities. It incorporates country and regional modules, covering the whole world. Jointly managed by OECD and FAO, the model generates consistent baseline projections and policy scenario analysis. It plays a key role in FAO's market outlook reports, primarily the OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook report, offering insights that inform national and international policy decisions and contributing to food security globally.

108. The OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook combines the commodity, policy and country expertise of both organizations, along with inputs from collaborating Member Nations, to deliver an annual assessment of national, regional and global agricultural market prospects for the coming decade. To account for the risks and uncertainties surrounding the baseline projections, the report explores various alternative scenarios and conducts stochastic analysis to illustrate how market outcomes may change from the deterministic baseline projections.

MIRAGRODEP

109. The MIRAGRODEP model is a state-of-the-art, multicountry, multisectoral, recursive-dynamic, computable general equilibrium model, integrated with detailed household surveys. It constructs dynamic baselines that account for demographic, economic, climatic and technological changes at country level, while also capturing international interactions through trade in goods and services, and financial flows. These baselines are used in foresight exercises, or to conduct policy reform assessments, or policy optimization at both national and international levels, providing household-level outcomes in terms of income, poverty, food consumption and food security. Since 2020, the MIRAGRODEP model has been utilized in the prevalence of undernourishment for the SOFI flagship publications, as well as for policy scenario analysis in the SOFI and the State of Agricultural Commodity Markets. The model is also employed by other organizations, such as the International Food Policy Research Institute, part of the CGIAR. Analyses based on the MIRAGRODEP model have been published in numerous peer-reviewed journals.

110. The MIRAGRODEP model has been used to simulate the impacts of major shocks or disruptions, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic and its effects on food security, as well as in the context of short-term policy disruptions (e.g. export or import bans). Since 2023, in support of the AMIS Secretariat and to mobilize AMIS data for analytical purposes, the Agrifood Economics and Policy Division (ESA) has been adapting the model to consider short-term disruptions on agricultural markets and food security in four categories: i) Agronomic: yields in response to weather shocks; ii)

Economic: energy and fertilizer prices; iii) Policy: export and import restrictions, shifts in biofuel mandates, or other demand shocks; and iv) Macroeconomic: exchange rates, or logistics-related issues such as maritime shipment costs and bottlenecks (e.g. disruptions in the Panama Canal). Additionally, due to increasing uncertainties, efforts are currently underway to provide a more stochastic approach to the prevalence of undernourishment projections included in the SOFI report.

FAO-led Financing for Shock-Driven Food Crisis Facility (under development)

111. The Financing for Shock-Driven Food Crisis (FSFC) Facility was designed under the Italian G7 Presidency in 2024 and is led by FAO, in collaboration with WFP and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). It aims to bridge the increasing gap between required funding for food crises and early actions needed to prevent them. By focusing on anticipatory financing, the FSFC enables a faster response using scientific triggers and pre-established action plans. The facility seeks to shift from costly emergency funding to a cost-effective, proactive approach by leveraging insurance companies and blended financing to mitigate extreme shocks and crises before they escalate into severe food insecurity.

112. To enhance its effectiveness, the FSFC integrates early warning systems with real-time data and advanced forecasting, ensuring funds are quickly disbursed when risks are detected. Covering 12 major risks, including climatic events, pandemics, locust outbreaks, economic shocks and political instability, the facility mobilizes public and private resources to finance Anticipatory Action and Rapid Response programmes. It also provides financial coverage for previously uninsurable shocks and complements existing frameworks like OCHA's Central Emergency Response Fund, addressing gaps in hazard and geographic coverage. The FAO Situation Room, housed at FAO headquarters, will offer real-time monitoring of food insecurity risks, facilitating early detection and response.

113. The Financing for Shock-Driven Food Crisis Facility was officially endorsed by G7 Leaders in June 2024 and further supported by G7 Development Ministers in October 2024. Moving into early 2025, the facility will convene funders, impact investors, and key Members and stakeholders to finalize its governance, fund structure and implementation plan. The FAO Situation Room will provide an open and transparent platform for Members, displaying data to support decision-making and rapid action. The Financing for Shock-Driven Food Crisis Facility represents a sustainable, commercially driven initiative designed to protect vulnerable populations and enhance global food security and nutrition efforts.