The Project Document (Prodoc)
1. Both the Programme's justification and rationale are sound. However, it must be underlined that considerable constraints of an institutional and cultural nature, militate against the development of the aquaculture sub-sector in the region. In most countries, both, the national policies and the institutional framework reflect little or no priority attached to the sub-sector. Ultimately, aquaculture is an exotic concept in the region.
2. The immediate and long-term objectives are relevant to the development process in the region and address the pervasive need of increasing rural incomes and food security. However, their definition require greater operational precision and emphasis on the production of practical results.
3. There is no consistency in the selection of target groups, or immediate and ultimate beneficiaries of Programme outputs. The specific needs of the various beneficiaries are not clearly defined and the mechanisms by which they can be expected to be reached are not adequately spelled out. However, statements on target groups reveal a focus on a wider community of small-holders including women and youth.
4. There is no commensurate linkage between inputs and activities. The limited availability of inputs, particularly senior staff, relative to a large number of activities (27) within 7 broad and incoherent target areas, is disproportionate. This was aggravated by the regional nature of activities to be executed, of which a substantial number required additional effort for scheduling and duration.
5. Those outputs of the activities for which the Prodoc had identified the scheduling and duration were described with clarity. But, regrettably, for a large number of activities (41%) whose scheduling and duration were to be determined, the description of outputs were, per force, unclear and imprecise. In this light, it was difficult to link logically outputs, derived from activities to be determined, with the fulfilment of immediate objectives. The overall programme logic suffered from weak linkages among inputs, activities, outputs and objectives.
6. In the Plan of Operations, the description of planned Programme activities was logical. But to the extent that the scheduling and the duration of a large number of activities were to be determined,the realism of the work plan diminished considerably. The absence of precise figures concerning the future execution of major activities had, necessarily, a negative impact on budget control/monitoring and manpower use.
7. The job description of each staff member had remained too general for the requirements of a work plan. Specifically, since the Programme was of an innovative and interdisciplinary nature, it was vital to define tasks in terms of each discipline and as an interdisciplinary effort. This was essential not only to avoid overlapping but also to focus clearly on desired outputs with practical applications.
8. The potential contribution of the social sciences to the Programme requirements seemed not have been analyzed in detail. The term “socio-economist” encompasses a large set of social science branches. In reality, the term needs definition according to the needs and problems on site.
9. For a regional programme, with such variety of innovative activities and cutting across not only disciplines but also institutions, the internal management structure was inappropriate. It was ineffective for the core staff, stationed in Harare, to conduct tests on innovative rural techniques, in collaboration with national organizations, through periodic visits on a regional basis. This was compounded by the limited size of senior staff and the absence of the subproject's ownership by the governments concerned--so the final responsibility for outputs belonged to the Programme.
10. Within the framework of partners in the implementation of programmes, it is not realistic to share decision-making authority without assuming shared responsibility of sustainability of results so produced. In this light, SADC must be persuaded to participate with its own resources in the Programme so as to also share implementation responsibilities, and thus, improve the conditions for sustainability.
Assessment of Implementation
Budget and Expenditures
11. The financial information reveals a pattern of uncertain donor funding. This made planning for more than one year virtually impossible. In consequence, input delivery was neither effective nor of high quality. Unfortunately, this financial uncertainty was compounded by management efforts, from 1988 to 1992, to focus on the promotion of the Programme in the region, without necessarily facilitating implementation of activities--and to that extent transparent and rational management was compromised. Owing to that, budgets were nearly always overspent, with consequent delays in planned activities. Sub-project expenditures were difficult to track down. It was only in 1994 that a detailed budget management system became operational.
Activities and Outputs
12. The constraints of funding, which in turn affected staff recruitment and continuity, compounded by counterpart scarcity and regional institutional weaknesses, led to a shortfall in the execution of activities. The effectiveness of reaching intended objectives also suffered as a result. Thus, a pattern of nearly haphazard shifts of activities from year to year emerges from the data (Annex 11). This led, per force, to many unfinished outputs and/or outputs of short duration. Nonetheless, the staff produced a substantial amount of technical publications, of uneven quality, as shown in Annex 3. The extension material published in English/Portuguese as well as Nyanja and Shona, respectively, is practical, clear and relevant.
13. Specifically, out of 7 target areas, only 3 have produced outputs: women in aquaculture, information service, and aquaculture and farming systems. In all these areas, the outputs were precisely described and adequate for the fulfilment of immediate and development objectives. Seemingly, outputs fell short of expectations stemming from the shift in programme rationale from the “preparatory” to the current phases.
14. In the “Preparatory Phase”, ALCOM's rationale was the development of a methodology to introduce and sustain fish farming in small-scale farm households, where a range of crops is cultivated and whose annual labour could smoothly integrate fish culture. Despite the recommendations of the 1988 SIDA-FAO Evaluation Mission to avoid a “high profile” approach, in the current phase (1990–1994), ALCOM's activities drifted away from those original concepts. After relocation of the headquarters and expert staff to Harare, only some scattered APOs remained in the field. ALCOM became centralized, from which HQ experts travel around the SADC region attempting to test innovative techniques in rural areas which require continuous monitoring. In addition, ALCOM expanded to most fields of inland water-related activities, either to please new donors (the human nutrition experience, the women and youth experience), or to satisfy members of the Steering Committee (mariculture, national fish marketing, intensification and commercialization). Although those fields are important for national development, they are beyond ALCOM's capabilities, unrelated to its central objectives and peripheral to the capabilities and capacity of its staff.
15. Nonetheless, the Programme has had significant results, especially with its extension methodology development and application in Eastern Zambia. Recently Zambia has been identified as the country with the highest poverty rate in Africa. It shows the Programme's potential to contribute to food security in the region. There are good prospects for replicating this in Mozambique and Tanzania. In essence, the ALCOM Programme has developed a practical extension methodology for use in Eastern Zambia; it has successfully trained extension agents, and it has successfully raised the awareness of aquaculture among small-scale farmers. Analytically, the Programme's strong achievements during 7 years of activity are:
16. Unfortunately, the immediate objectives and target populations of ALCOM were never precisely defined; in consequence, it is premature to assess impacts. The impact from current results will become clearly visible only after many years. The extension methodology developed in Eastern Zambia works well there. It can be known only much later if it can be effectively transferred and adapted for application in Mozambique, Tanzania and other countries.
17. Concerning small water bodies (SWB), the Prodoc's assumption was that SWB have yielded encouraging economic results through stocking and controlled harvesting under the regime of private farms. It is expected that similar results can be achieved, through similar methods, if SWB are brought under the full control of small rural communities. The principal constraint is that very little is known about SWB.
18. The development of the SWB methodology did not follow the basic approach which gave ALCOM its successes in the development of the fish farming methodology. Currently, activities are unnecessarily diversified. There are good prospects, however, for the development of methodologies for community-based managed fisheries enhancement. The early results from the Zimbabwe work are heartening in particular with respect to the effective application of Rapid Rural Appraisal to obtain community consensus on management procedures (see Annex 9). However, these promising results need consolidation.
The required bio-technical data should be collected and processed at the earliest possible time in order to sustain the momentum of current developments in the selected dams.
Government Support
19. Current arrangements are not conducive to sustainability. There are no financial or personnel inputs from SADC to ALCOM, and sustainability cannot be attained without sharing responsibility for the results so produced. Likewise, ALCOM implements field sub-projects directly with the relevant departments or ministries. Although this modality provides flexibility in implementation, it is not conducive to sustainability because the final responsibility for results so produced do not belong to the local institution but to ALCOM's.
20. The only exception to the above conditions appears to be Zambia, where ALCOM has been present since 1987 and the professional staff was posted in the field, so the aquaculture-agriculture integration has taken root (see Annex 8). Extension, fisheries and agriculture departments and administrative councils are continuing ALCOM-initiated actions without much external aid. But the national resources are very limited. Unfortunately, those successes were not replicated after 1990/1991. Trials for fish farming extension started only recently in Mozambique and Tanzania. The potential for fish farming in the Manica region of Mozambique appears considearable as outlined in Annex 6.
Programme Management
21. Although Programme implementation reporting was adequate, the use of personnel showed little effectiveness. As already mentioned, relative to the large number of activities( 27) within 7 broad and incoherent target areas, the number of senior personnel (3) was insufficient. Possibly due to this fact, an unusually large number of APO's were recruited indiscriminately. Irrespective of the uneven performance of APO's, their donors cut down their commitments during execution--disrupting again timeliness, quantity and quality of outputs. Future use of APOs will require better planning and supervision.
Technical and Operational Backstopping
22. In the case of a multidonor programme, like ALCOM, the relationship between donor, recipient countries and executing agency becomes complex. Each donor has its own priorities and expectations. It became clear that in the ALCOM Programme there was very little information flow between the donors themselves or between the donors, recipients and the executing agency concerning expectations. In this connection, of all participants, the SIDA field offices appeared to be barely aware of the Programme's existence. Again, the need to address this inconsistency of goals was already highlighted by the 1988 FAO-SIDA Evaluation Mission.
23. The effective operational and administrative support of FAO Representations to the Programme greatly facilitated the logistics of implementation. This could not have been accomplished by any other means. The provision of a TCP during the period of the financial crisis undoubtedly saved ALCOM from premature termination. The Executing Agency has in a large sense fulfilled its commitments. Backstopping was effective.
24. The Executing Agency should have been more involved in the correction of ALCOM activities. Although the proposed change from many target areas to well-defined action programmes (1992-review) was a first correction, implementation in the field was slow to respond. In fact, a Programme of the present scope could have benefitted immensely from a mid-term evaluation.
25. Donors, recipients and Programme management met regularly through the Steering Committee. With the exception of the 7th meeting, where SC exercised its responsibilities by discussing possible ways in which the Programme should proceed, most of the meetings did not seem to correct any actions. On the contrary, they seemed to be opportunities to place requests. Management could not take the pressure of these requests, for the reasons indicated earlier, and to that extent Programme resources were distracted.
(i) To the Attention of Donors:
1. The development of community-based management methodologies and extension procedures to introduce fish culture systems into prevalent farming systems are long term objectives which can only be successful if financed continuosly for long periods. Donors should assure continuity of the project activities in periods of at least 5 years.
2. Since development projects geared to the adaptation of production techniques are complex because replicable and practical results must be produced, fielding preparation/appraisal missions can avoid misguided improvisations. The final design is an important management tool. The cost of these missions rarely exceeds 3% of total project costs. The potential losses, however, far exceed that figure.
3. If supervision missions cannot be launched on a yearly basis, a mid-term evaluation is definitely a requirement to ensure the achievement of anticipated objectives.
4. In projects where two or more donors are involved, regular donor meetings with recipient countries should be held to ensure that project activities conform to the policies and expectations of all donors and recipients.
5. Given that there is considerable complementarity in approach and objectives between ALCOM and the SIDA-funded Farming Systems Program (FSP), SIDA should carefully consider ways to integrate the common functions of these programmes within the existing institutional frameworks. ALCOM is promoting small-scale fish culture extension and fishing in communities, whereas the FSP is basically implementing a similar programme for other farm products. In both cases the target group is the small-holder. A consolidation of common functions at the administrative and information levels would make better use of donor funds and increase the integration of aquaculture with agricultural practices. ALCOM's best successes were achieved in regions were fish was considered as another crop, and as such was readily integrated into small-scale farming. However, careful attention would have to be paid to the institutional arrangements, and the Programme would benefit from increased inputs from SADC.
(ii) To the Attention of SADC:
6. To ensure the maintenance of ALCOM's regional activities, it is highly desirable that SADC explore sources of finance so that a professional staff and other support can be assumed by SADC to the Programme. The communication-dissemination function, including the management of the regional database and library, would be SADC's most desirable activity because of its regional and strategic nature.
7. It would thus, be beneficial, if SADC investigates with its new member, the Republic of South Africa, ways and means for an effective participation of the RSA in the development of the region. Indeed, ALCOM's proposal for Phase III could be submitted to the general consideration of the RSA, and in particular the financing of the communication-dissemination function could be examined.
(iii) To The Participating Countries:
8. To ensure the sustainability of the Programme activities by participating countries, it is essential to increase their ownership of pilot projects in such a way that each country is responsible for the results produced. From the technical standpoint, the effective use of the participatory approach can ensure that the target population, the national and project teams jointly diagnose the prevalent agricultural conditions, rank the community's felt needs, and design activities to meet those needs (see Annex 12). Ultimately, however, the increase in ownership should be reflected in budgetary allocation. The financial conditions of each country in the region vary significantly, however. So each country's specific commitment will have to be reviewed case by case with the purpose of ensuring that the country is responsible for the results produced.
(iv) To Executing Agency:
9. In concurrence with donors yearly supervision missions should be fielded. These missions should review management and disbursement issues but above all, progress in the actual activities. If launching yearly supervision missions is cumbersome in terms of arrangements and the like, then a mid-term evaluation mission is essential. FAO procedures for mid-term evaluation are adequate. This will provide an opportunity to rectify management procedures, if needed, and ensure future sustainability of activities.
10. Future use of APOs will require more planning and supervision. Specifically, when APOs took over a well defined task, they performed well, showed initiative and required little or no supervision. So future tasks for APOs need to be clearly defined in content and time frame. Supervision requirements cannot be overestimated, however. APOs normally arrive in the field with plenty of academic information, but their adaptation to the realities of the rural environment needs supervision.
(v) ALCOM's Future
11. The Programme's outstanding success in Zambia, a country ravaged by rural poverty, clearly shows its potential contribution to improve both, rural incomes and food security. Likewise, the possibilities to replicate the Zambian model in Mozambique and Tanzania are very promising. It should be underlined that experience has shown that only those development efforts where the beneficiary through his own labour, and with limited or no capital, improves food security conditions for his family unit and possibly also, obtains increased income, are the most adequate to eradicate rural poverty. These are the characteristics of ALCOM's efforts in Zambia (see Annex 8).
12. However, from current experience, it is evident that the Programme should focus exclusively on fish culture integration to farming systems and the development of community-based management of small water bodies. The “high profile” potential of aquaculture should be left to the private sector to exploit.
13. Accordingly, an outline of a proposed programme design for phase III, including definition of objectives, beneficiaries and principal activities, is found in Annex 12. Hereunder, the basic features will be explained. From the experiences of the current Programme, the fielding of a preparation/appraisal mission appears useful. The activities are complex and the executing capabilities of participating countries must be evaluated in order to choose executing modalities proposed. The participatory approach is used to ensure that the target population and project team jointly design and conduct the project. The country must take over increased ownership, control and direction of a pilot project so it is responsible for the sustainability of the results produced. As stated above, the kind of commitment needed from each country can only be assessed on a case by case analysis, given the varied conditions of the countries in the region.
14. The Programme is composed of a core management and two projects. The projects are field oriented and project teams will be out-posted for the duration of activities.
| Project 1: | Integrated small-scale aquaculture with small-holder farming. |
| Project 2: | Enhancement of fish production in community-based (managed) small water bodies. |
Core Management: Aimed at ensuring coordination, Programme management and information dissemination in the region.
Core Management. The core staff, located in Harare, is composed of a Programme manager, an information expert (national) and a librarian (national). The programme manager will ensure coordination between national/regional authorities, implementing agencies (when applicable) and project teams. This post will phase off once the execution of projects is completed because post-project activities will be carried out by national collaborating institutions. However, the information expert and librarian will continue after phase off. This is why it would be highly desirable if SADC finds the funds to assume these two posts from the beginning.
Project 1 The project team comprises a Sr. Aquaculturalist, an Extension/Training
Expert and an Ag.Eco/Farm Management Expert. Several scenarios are available in
terms of the number of pilot projects and executing modality.
*Initially 3 pilot projects are anticipated in Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia,
respectively. This is probably the optimum number. But according to resource
availability it could be increased to 4 or decreased to 2.
The scenarios on executing modalities depend on the country's executing capacity and
availability of implementing agencies. *Option A calls for intensive participation of the
project team during a period of 4 years with progressive phasing off to ensure active
participation of national counterparts.
*Option B can be used when there is considerable national commitment and an available
implementing agency. So the project team will phase off after Year 2. This allows the
project team to commence another pilot project under the same option. From Year 2
to project completion the implementing agency will progressively phase off so that by
Year 4 the national counterparts will run the project.
At the end of the project, under both options, the national collaborating agency, chosen
because of its capability to absorb and disseminate project outputs among the ultimate
beneficiaries, will continue activities.
Project 2. The project team comprises a Sr. Inland Fisheries Expert, an Extension/Training Expert and national expert on rural institutions/tenure regimes. Because the small water bodies conditions of Zimbabwe appear representative of the region, the project will be carried out there. The thrust should be on consolidating the efforts executed in Zimbabwe with the purpose of developing methodologies for community-based management of fisheries enhancement and strategies for reservoir stocking. Actual interdisciplinary analysis, focused on the potential of tenure regimes to absorb proposed management procedures, and precise coordination will be vital. Since the Rapid Rural Appraisal includes grass-roots participation, the participation of target groups and collaborating national organizations is ensured.
