25. The above points illustrate the varying characteristics of policy measures aimed at restoring different aspects of livestock production, in terms of their costs, spill-overs and distributional impact. Particular governments win be faced by additional constraints on the choices to be made between possible policies. These constraints are imposed by limited resources, poor marketing and administrative infrastructures (leading to weak control by government of trade flows within the country and to foreign markets), weak institutional development at the level of producer organisations and political constraints imposed by the need to act in the interests of certain groups.
26. Resource constraints. Almost all policies require the direct allocation of funds for their implementation and many of the policy measures listed in Table 1 are costly in administrative and material resources. By contrast, inaction makes no immediate demand on the government budget, though its longer term cost may be much greater in terms of foregone output, incomes and foreign exchange earnings. One resource likely to be in particularly short supply is foreign exchange. Thus, policy measures which rely on using exportable commodities (such as agro-industrial by-products, like cotton seed or groundnut cake) or on importing goods (such as meat or grain) should be looked at with particular care. Foreign exchange limitations are relaxed where finance is available through grants-in-aid from external donors.
27. Marketing and administrative structures. Several of the policy options outlined in Table 1 involve government intervention through control of prices or imposition of taxes and subsidies. Such intervention requires that there be an administrative structure through which the government can act effectively. In practice, few governments have the required degree of control over markets and livestock movements to carry out many of the policies shown in Table 1. Thus, for example, it is estimated that only a small proportion of livestock exports from Ethiopia and from the Sahelian states actually pass through official export channels. Most animals are taken across borders illegally, given long frontiers which are difficult to police effectively except at great cost. By contrast, Botswana meat export are channelled entirely through the Botswana Meat Commission, the official exporting body. This high degree of control is made possible by the high prices paid to producers by the BMC. On-the-hoof exports of stock to neighbouring states are of negligible importance. Control over domestic slaughterings is less complete as many of these take place in rural areas. Prospects for policies aimed at re-directing livestock flow between export and domestic markets are far greater for a country like Botswana, where movement of animals within the country is also tightly controlled in order to comply with the quarantine requirements for imports by the European Community. Other countries have set up parastatal bodies intended to give governments a greater degree of control over livestock marketing, though these have usually driven a larger share of market activity into the uncontrolled sector. Thus, Stryker (1974) reckons that attempts to intervene in the Malian livestock market, over the period 1960-68, were largely nullified by the ability of merchants to displace their activity to other locations. Similarly, the short-term ban on the export of various categories of stock from many Sahelian states after the drought of the early 1970s led to a dramatic fall in controlled livestock exports but probably led to a substantial increase in illegal exports of stock.
28. Institutional development at the producer level. The structure of the livestock sector differs between countries. In the case of Botswana, 15% of the cattle are held by large commercial farmers and 85% by smaller herd-owners in the communal areas. In Ethiopia, the traditional farming sector accounts for about 70% of the nation's cattle population, most of the rest being held in rangeland areas while State Farms are of significance in certain areas. In most Sahelian states, livestock are in the hands of both pastoralists and farmers, although an increasing proportion of animals are thought to be held by non-traditional producers (traders, civil servants, teachers, etc.) who invest in cattle as one asset within a wider portfolio of investments. Different patterns of ownership imply differing herd management objectives and supply responses to changing market conditions. The structure of production, mean herd size and form taken by producer organizations affect both the options open to government to intervene successfully in this sector and the extent to which producers can themselves lobby governments in support of their own interests. A network of herder co-operatives, for example, provides a framework within which credit and other inputs can channelled to herd-owners. In their absence, active intervention in the livestock sector becomes much more administratively costly as systems for the allocation and distribution of resources must be established.
29. Political constraints. All governments depend on particular groups for their support, whether it be the army, middle classes or commodity producers of critical importance to the economy. Almost all policy measures are likely to affect the distribution of welfare within society, whether this be by changes in relative prices or by changes in employment and income prospects for certain groups. On the whole, the power of the urban professional class has tended to ensure that priority be given to the level of food prices in urban markets. For this reason, most governments would be reluctant to adopt policies leading to domestic shortages of key commodities such as grains and meat.
