



منظمة الأغذية
والزراعة
للأمم المتحدة

联合国
粮食及
农业组织

Food
and
Agriculture
Organization
of
the
United
Nations

Organisation
des
Nations
Unies
pour
l'alimentation
et
l'agriculture

Продовольственная и
сельскохозяйственная
организация
Объединенных
Наций

Organización
de las
Naciones
Unidas
para la
Agricultura
y la
Alimentación

PROGRAMME COMMITTEE

Hundred and Second Session

Rome, 27 – 31 July 2009

Progress Report on the Towards a More Effective Response to Desert Locusts and Their Impacts on Food Security, Livelihoods and Poverty - Multilateral Evaluation of the 2003-05 Desert Locust Campaign¹

1. The progress report below makes reference to paragraph numbers of the Report of the Ninety-seventh Session of the Programme Committee².

¶35. A progress report on the implementation of the recommendations of this evaluation should be presented to the Programme Committee meeting in May 2009.

2. As the next following scheduled meeting of the Desert Locust Control Committee (DLCC) was held in March 2009, it was agreed that the progress report would be presented at the July 2009 Programme Committee meeting.

¶28. ... particularly appreciated that FAO was now taking a livelihoods approach to its work in Desert Locusts. ... the Organization needed to prioritise more clearly in its locust activities and ... needed to maintain a high priority within the Organization's technical programmes, ... there was not an alternative supplier to FAO.

a) *Identifying vulnerable communities [recommendations 10 and 29]*

3. By combining data and maps that show localities of food insecurity with real-time locust population and migration data, FAO could play a key role in humanitarian, livelihood "safety-net" initiatives at national and local levels in order to address the potential effects of locusts on the most vulnerable communities.

4. There are a number of sources of these maps or locality data: Integrated Livelihood Assessments (TCE³ and ILO⁴), Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and

¹ cf. docs. PC 96/4 c); PC 96/4 c) Sup. 1; PC 97/4 d)

² CL 132/11

Agriculture (GIEWS) surveys, Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping System (FIVIMS) (ESA⁵), Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase classification (IPC) (ESA), USAID-funded Famine Early Warning Systems Network (USAID FEWS NET), and WFP Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (WFP-VAM). Data from these sources has been used to assess the possible impact of Desert Locust outbreaks, which occurred from late 2006 to mid 2007 on vulnerable communities.

5. As a result of early warning and prevention efforts, swift assistance – amounting to a total of USD 5,131 000 - was obtained as follows: through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) (USD 2.4 million for Yemen); through the Government of Japan (USD 1.9 million for Yemen, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan); and through FAO's Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) (USD 433 000 for Ethiopia and USD 398 000 for Eritrea). This contributed to preventing an upsurge and avoiding major crop damage in 2008. The same approach was applied in soliciting emergency support in 2008, for simultaneous Red Locust outbreaks in Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique, which resulted in the allocation of TCP for Tanzania and Malawi (one regional project for both countries for a total of USD477 000) and for Mozambique (one national TCP for a total of USD 494 425) for survey and control activities. In 2009, additional support was required to effectively face a worsening Red locust situation in Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique, therefore the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) approved, through the regional CERF, assistance worth almost USD 1,900,000 for red locust survey and control operations.

¶29. It was recalled that the evaluation had been of both FAO's response to the Desert Locust upsurge and that of affected countries and donors. It urged FAO to take a lead with all partners in ensuring follow-up to the evaluation and considered that the Desert Locust Control Committee would be important in this.

6. The achievements and progress made in the implementation of the Multilateral Evaluation recommendations were presented at the 39th Session of the DLCC in March 2009. The DLCC expressed its appreciation of the efforts FAO had made to follow up on the recommendations and noted with satisfaction that it was important to distinguish clearly between various levels of emergency from pre-crisis situations to real humanitarian emergencies.

¶30. ... urged donors to give ... recommendations the same consideration at the policy level as ... in FAO. Locust emergencies were transboundary, and a regional approach needed to be promoted, capacities built and formal arrangements developed to facilitate countries working together.

¶31. ... noted that ...CERF could now be accessed for locusts ...to develop a window which was not tied to requests from individual countries, in view of the transboundary nature of these threats.

b) Rapid access to external finance [recommendations 1, 3, 4, 9, 10, 23c, 24 and 25b]

7. Several recommendations, including 1, 3, 4, 9, 10, 23c, 24 and 25b, called for broader, deeper and earlier engagement and use of humanitarian relief mechanisms under the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). These operate through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the Flash or Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and, more recently, the CERF.

8. The first CERF grant to FAO for locust control was approved for a Migratory Locust outbreak in Timor Leste in April 2007. Two months later, Yemen faced its worst Desert Locust situation in decades with potentially dramatic consequences for rural communities. The

³ Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division (TCE)

⁴ International Labour Organization (ILO)

⁵ Agricultural Development Economics Division (ESA):

Government of Yemen requested emergency assistance to control the outbreak on 8 June 2007. Three days later, a project proposal of USD 2,432,110 was submitted to CERF in New York. The proposal was approved on 21 June by the CERF Secretariat. This was the fastest reaction to an onset of a Desert Locust emergency ever recorded. Based on the Yemen experience, the CERF Secretariat acknowledged FAO's recommendation that fast-moving and dynamic transboundary threats such as locusts require more flexible and regional funding within a broader emergency response system and provided, for the first time since its inauguration, regional emergency assistance to the Red Locust outbreak in Central and Southern Africa in April 2009. This was another significant breakthrough in respect of future locust emergencies.

¶32. ... more innovation in Desert Locust control was required, including a wider use of bio-pesticides. ... FAO to study and report on Desert Locust as food and/or feed, as affected by the use of synthetic pesticides.

c) Biopesticides, environmental and health safety [recommendations 13, 14, 15, 18, 19 and 31]

9. Environmental concerns, pesticide management issues and research addressed by the Evaluation in recommendations 13, 14, 15, 18 19 and 31 are entirely shared by FAO. It is widely acknowledged that locusts, including Desert Locust, are used by the poorest, most food insecure families: "... whereas the rich were appalled lest the locusts ate the grass needed by their cattle, the poor who had no cattle rejoiced because they could themselves eat the locusts."⁶

10. It is FAO's policy to reduce the use of chemical pesticides to its lowest possible limits by improved monitoring (from better satellite data interpretation and positioning), control and discourage its application on wetlands, close to water bodies, natural reserve parks, agricultural or populated areas. FAO for the first time made operational use of biopesticides in Timor Leste against the Migratory Locust in 2007 with good success. In Yemen in late 2007 local beekeepers forced a temporary moratorium on control operations. In anticipation of future resistance FAO provided Yemen with bio-pesticides for use in ecologically sensitive areas. Particularly in Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique many of the Red Locust outbreak areas are located in wetlands and national reserve parks with significant wetland species extremely vulnerable to chemical pesticides. FAO took serious consideration to the use of biopesticides under the CERF project in these areas in the 2008-09 campaign.

11. Countries became more interested in environmental issues and more systematically monitor environment and the health of their operators. The specialist teams, called QUEST (Quality, Environmental Protection, and Safety of Treatments), have been widely accepted. Following the Desert Locust campaigns of 2003-05, many of the affected countries were left with large stocks of unused pesticides. FAO has been working in collaboration with the countries and the African Stockpiles Programme to improve pesticide storage and computerized stock management systems to prevent the creation of new obsolete pesticide stocks that would require expensive disposal.

¶33. ... recognised the central importance of capacity building, both formal and practical education... training in locust surveillance and control, livelihoods perspective as well as environmental and health issues.

d) Building and maintaining capacity [recommendations 13, 14, 21e, 21f and 23a]

12. FAO is convinced that long-term investment in capacity-building is the only means to achieve better and more sustainable locust control strategies and practices and increased effectiveness to minimise hazardous effects on the environment with better economic impact using the train-the-trainers approach. This is being addressed within the EMPRES Desert Locust programme by supporting short- and mid-term training programmes to cover the training needs of all different target groups also at the lowest level. This approach is understood as a continuous

⁶ *The African Poor*, 1987, J. Iliffe, page 78

process giving the chance for further improvement to cope with new technical developments and concepts. The Desert Locust Information Service (DLIS) at FAO headquarters proposed (in 2009) its technical selection for an additional (P2) officer.

¶34. ... there had been considerable operational difficulties in the Desert Locust Campaign. analyse the nature of the operational constraints and the risks associated with any procedural changes.. . . .

e) FAO Operational Efficiency [recommendations 5, 6, 7, 8, 17 and 28]

13. In June 2007 the Council initiated a process evaluation to analyse FAO's managerial, administrative and operational constraints in its emergency operations. The preliminary findings indicated many areas in which FAO could streamline its operations specifically with regards to flexible funding mechanism for large multi-country programmes and the establishment of framework agreements for procuring repetitive inputs.

14. The Crisis Management Centre for the Food Chain (CMC-FC) approved by the FAO Director-General in March 2008 addresses risks to the human food chain in their assessment, management and communication in a comprehensive, systematic, inter-disciplinary, institution-wide collaborative approach. Locust management falls within the functional network of the CMC-FC Plant Pests.

15. Contingency plans for Desert Locust emergencies are being developed according to principles of preparedness. Relevant rosters have been put in place in collaboration with TCE and are regularly updated as a quick reference of important stakeholders in locust affected countries and various resources needed in emergencies. Advance tenders were requested by AFS⁷ from suppliers of standard equipment and aerial spray companies, and are being updated regularly so that orders can be launched more quickly. All these instruments helped significantly to reduce the delivery time of supplies from more than six months to less than one month in the 2009 campaigns.

¶34.It should also examine the potential for increased partnership with other organizations, in particular WFP.

f) Enhanced Inter-agency Cooperation [recommendations 2, 26]

16. Recommendation 26 posed two stark options: FAO either develops more effective Desert Locust procedures, or opportunities for outsourcing should be pursued. FAO does both. Remote sensing imagery, all aerial operations, development and maintenance of mission-critical software and databases are already outsourced, and new partnerships with WFP on logistics have been established.

17. With the outbreaks of Desert Locusts in the Central Region 2006-07, new demands for rapid supply of pesticides came from Yemen. FAO was able to liaise speedily between governments to negotiate the rapid transfer of pesticides donated by Mauritania to Yemen. As a result of prior discussions between FAO and the WFP logistics department, an efficient partnership was put in place. The triangulation reduced the standing stock of pesticides in Mauritania, saved the cost of pesticide procurement and Yemen received the required products faster than would have otherwise been possible. In a similar operation to respond to Red Locust outbreaks in Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique, some pesticides were shipped by WFP to the affected countries from remaining stocks in Mali in October 2008 and again in May 2009. This rapid transfer avoided delaying operations for more than six months whilst the pesticide was manufactured. The Organization fulfilled a unique role as inter-governmental agency by using information and systems to which only FAO has access and by liaising between governments.

18. The 2009 Evaluation of FAO's operational capacity in emergencies and rehabilitation will review the timeliness of delivery of equipment to save livelihoods, specifically in fast moving and

⁷ Administrative Services Division

transboundary emergencies, and consider closer partnerships particularly with WFP. Since FAO is authorized to use United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD) networks in Brindisi, Accra, Dubai, Subang and Panama City, this access to the WFP network would open up new opportunities to respond more rapidly to fast developing bio-threats such as the Desert Locust. WFP hubs could also be used for pre-positioning standard equipment (not pesticide) routinely needed to quickly reinforce national control capacities and would allow more timely and targeted delivery when and where the actual needs arise and could also provide intermediate storage and targeted distribution of pesticides to avoid later stock piles of obsolete pesticides in the countries. Subregional locust control organizations (DLCO-EA and IRLCO) are increasingly important partners especially when locust operations must be carried out in politically or ecologically sensitive locations.