12.6
Conclusion
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Below are listed the main
conclusions which can be derived from the examination of
empirical evidence in this chapter.
- In situations involving
conservation problems, villagers are usually reluctant to
participate in local CPR management efforts if they do
not receive immediate and adequate compensation for the
sacrifices entailed, whether these sacrifices take the
form of restraint in using the resource or of investment
in resource-preserving infrastructure. External provision
of appropriate economic incentives is therefore required.
The transfers in favour of resource users willing to
enter into a management scheme must not be so large as to
make them opportunistically dependent on external assist
ance. Yet, when resource users are hard-pressed by
survival constraints and rehabilitation of the CPR
entails a long gestation period, subsidies must be
sufficient to allow them to build up the resource to the
level where it can be optimally conserved over an
indefinite time-horizon. On the other hand, when the
resource to be conserved has alternative, highly valued
uses that generate negative externalities, it is
important that subsidies cover the opportunity costs of
land and labour. The agents responsible for destructive
practices are not necessarily subsistenceconstrained
users who are eager to draw as much income as they can
from the CPR, but may also be rich users who find it
optimal to follow a shut-down path of resource
exploitation because they have available to them better
alternative economic opportunities.
- As expected from the
theoretical insights provided in Chapters 4 and 5,
collective action is more successful with small user
groups. When the characteristics of the resource are such
that co-operation must occur on a scale that involves
large groups, the advantages of small groups formally
demonstrated by the theory of non-cooperative repeated
games need not be lost. Indeed, small units operating at
a decentralized level can often be fitted into more
complex cooperative structures that arc endowed with
rules and explicitly designed enforcement mechanisms.
- Co-operation is enhanced
when small groups live close to well-delineated CPRs and
when they are able to lay down access and management
rules in their own way. It is especially important that
rules are kept as simple as possible (so as to be easily
understandable and enforceable) and that they are
perceived as fair by the people concerned. The latter
requirement may imply that there is a relatively
egalitarian access to local CPRs even when inequality in
private landholdings and political power prevails within
the village society. Its fulfilment may actually result
from the fact that the social structure is articulated
around patronclient relationships. If the village elite
behave as natural leaders, they may then determine the
success of collective action in these egalitarian zones
of the village resource domain.
- Large groups may sometimes
succeed in carrying out CPR-management schemes. This
tends to arise when a large group is made more like a
small group because members share common norms possibly
enforced by a well-recognized authority, or because they
are confronted by a common challenge arising from
without.
- Homogeneous groups are often
more conducive to collective action than heterogeneous
groups. This is especially true when heterogeneity has
its source in cultural differences and in varying
interests in the CPR among the users. Yet, as has been
shown in Chapter 5, there is no systematic relationship
between group homogeneity and success in collective
action. As a matter of fact, when heterogeneity
originates in differential endowments of the users,
cooperation may possibly be enhanced by the heterogeneous
structure of the group. The latter result tends to occur
when economic inequality does not prevent uniformity of
interest in a collective agreement and when the
privileged users can assume a leadership role and provide
the authority structure required for proper enforcement
of regulatory rules. As we know from Chapter 5, if these
users have a high interest in a CPR and its management
involves coordination problems, it is highly likely that
they will take the initiative of collective action. By
contrast, the worst case presents itself when the elite
hold a strategic position in the CPRs that enables them
to dispense with a corporate organization and with the
labour contributions of the rest of the resource users.
- External sanction systems
are often needed to mate up for several deficiencies of
decentralized punishment mechanisms, whether the latter
are embodied in strategies of conditional co-operation or
involve payoff transfers among agents. In order to be
effective, these systems must be escalating, flexible,
and tolerant; moreover, monitors must have the right
incentives to do their work seriously and he accountable
to the group. Crucial decisions must be taken publicly
and there is a critical role for well-accepted mediators
to settle conflicts and serve as role models and
norm-reactivators.
- Past experience of
successful collective action is an important 'social
capital' for a village society since it becomes
encapsulated in a convention of co-operation that
provides a focal point from which it ma! spread by
analog!. Rural communities with the best prospects for
cooperation are probably those which were lucky enough to
meet relative!! easy collective challenges at some point
in their history and could therefore build the trust
required for confronting more complex situations. Those
with the worst prospects, by contrast, are the
communities which did not benefit from such a happy
coincidence of historical events and became suddenly
confronted with hard challenges without an! preparation
for collective enterprises. In the latter societies,
collective action ma!- nevertheless be possible even
though it cannot be rooted in a long tradition of
co-operation. Yet, success will then crucially depend on
external assistance and it is important that the external
agency uses a gradual approach starting with concrete,
relatively easy-to-solve problems at the most
decentralized Ievel, preferably under conditions where
social relations are not too distant or antagonistic.
- Good leaders are essential
to perform several critical functions: to help people
become aware of the real challenges confronting them; to
convince them that the!- can ultimately benefit from
concerted action; to show to others the good example; to
mobilize a sufficient number of them for enterprises
requiring co-ordinated efforts; and to ensure
impartiality and fairness in the designing and enforcing
of' rules and sanction mechanisms. Traditional authority
and leadership patterns offer considerable advantages as
long as the! carry social prestige and Iegitimacy.
However, customer! leaders do not necessarily possess all
the required qualities for effective leadership in
present-da!- management schemes. Collective action is
probably most satisfactory when it is led by relatively
young, literate persons who have been exposed to the
outside world and who can find some we! of collaborating
with traditional structures of' authorit!- and
leadership.