Timber Shortage in Europe

Consumption in Europe
Import requirements
Export supplies
The lumber deficit
Methods of overcoming the shortages
Practical means of securing international co-operation
Outlook for the future

THE end of World War II brought in its train the fear of famine in Europe. That food would be short and distribution difficult had long been foreseen and the Allied forces, followed by UNRRA, were able to divert relief supplies into the more desperate corners of the continent and avert catastrophe. It was not until after this had happened that the countries of Europe were able to look around and take stock of the situation.

It soon became apparent that a general scarcity of wood supplies was going to become one of the principal factors delaying reconstruction. International trade and normal channels of distribution of timber had been disrupted but there was no efficient international machinery to stimulate a flow of forest products and to circumvent a crisis if one should arise. Such machinery has had to be evolved slowly. There were, indeed, precedents to work on and a growing tendency towards full international co-operation aided the adoption of regional rather than national perspectives in trying to solve the timber problem. Now there is an intention to pool resources in the interests of all countries and such a course must, when properly directed, ease the present strain in Europe.

Consumption in Europe

About 30 percent of the land area of Europe, including the territories of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, is covered with forest. This means that there is approximately one hectare of forest land to each inhabitant, yielding an average of one cubic meter of wood per head of population, which is regarded as adequate for the current requirements of industrialized nations.

Europe should, then, as an entity, be self-sufficient in wood. It has indeed been a regular net exporter of forest products. In the years immediately preceding the outbreak of World War II, the roundwood equivalent of net exports of pulp and paper was approximately 12 million cubic meters. There was, however, at the same time a lumber deficit, for this reason: Certain countries traditionally exported substantial amounts of softwood lumber to South Africa, South America, Australia? and other overseas territories ; over-all lumber production was inadequate to cover both these exports and requirements within Europe, so that the United States of America and Canada had to provide imports of about half a million standards per year to make up the balance. This state of affairs has existed since the beginning of the present century.

During the war there was, of course, practically no outlet for exports from Europe but once hostilities ceased, trade was quickly started again, owing to the great need for food, goods, and equipment which could be obtained in exchange for forest products.

It was to be expected that the end of the war would also release an enormous pent-up demand for timber for reconstruction and new work within Europe. There were few stockpiles to draw on. Coming on top of foreign trade requirements, such a demand would have meant heavy cutting of all accessible forest resources and abandonment of established principles of forest conservation; for Europe, this was unthinkable. There was, therefore, every prospect of a formidable gap between production and consumption requirements.

But current demand did not reach the proportions which might have been expected. (See Table 1.) In 1948 the United States of America expects to use 14 million standards of softwood lumber, or 25 percent more than in 1937, and Canada expects to consume 33 percent more than in that year. A similar upward trend might have been expected in Europe but the 1948 requirements of that continent and the Mediterranean area, excluding the U.S.S.R., are placed at 11.5 to 12 million standards? still almost 10 percent less than these regions consumed in 1937.

The reason for this is not primarily insufficent production. More cogent factors have limited demand, such as shortages of foreign currencies; lack of other construction materials, coal? manpower, and equipment; the general economic conditions of the continent; and the high price levels to which softwood lumber has risen all over the world. The present basic quotation for Scandinavian softwood lumber c.i.f. London is more than three times as high as in the summer of 1939, but several European countries find it difficult to sell lumber profitably even at these prices in view of mounting costs for labor, production, and transportation.

Consumption therefore has had to be restricted to essential requirements only and chiefly to housing needs. Most countries are compelled to exercise firm control over the use of lumber, by limiting, for instance, the amount permitted per dwelling unit and refusing lumber for all " nonessential " purposes. Such economizing is, of course, inherently undesirable if it should lead to a permanent reduction in requirements. It is unlikely, however? that this will happen. Under present circumstances, restrictions are inevitable, but it is hoped that, when timber becomes more abundant and controls can be removed, present economies will have taught useful lessons in efficient use of a valuable product.

Great efforts are also being made to scale down total requirements by securing a more complete utilization of all available timber and by eliminating waste in the conversion of the raw material to finished goods.

As economic conditions in Europe improve, demand will tend to approximate more nearly to real requirements. At the same time, a more stable economy should result in an increase in softwood lumber output which will to some extent offset expanding consumption needs.

Import requirements

Table 1 indicates how obstacles to buying and using softwood lumber served to diminish the gap between supply and demand in 1946. Europe could not, of course, meet even her essential requirements without inter-European trade and a flow of lumber from overseas. The extent of such import requirements, after taking into account domestic production, is shown by Table 2.

For 1947, the major lumber-importing countries, working together in the Timber Sub-Committee of the EECE, consented to diminish their demands to figures far below original estimates of immediate needs. In this way import requirements were reduced to only 2.73 million standards for Europe and the Mediterranean area, which was only 221,000 standards in excess of prospective supplies.

Such action is not, of course, compatible with the rapid reconstruction and rehabilitation of Europe. It is imperative that softwood lumber supplies should reach as soon as possible the full level of essential requirements and that gradually the controls and limitations on consumption should be removed so as to permit adequate use of this raw material by all nations.

TABLE 1. - CONSUMPTION AND OUTPUT OF SOFTWOOD LUMBER Including Lumber Equivalent of Sawlogs (Thousands of standards)

Country	1937		1946
	Consumption	Output	Consumption	Output
Mainly importing
United Kingdom	2,400	(115)*	11,200	89
Ireland	110	33	110	13
France	(900)*	674	843	2700
Belgium	275	(100)*	95	21
Luxembourg	-	1	9	4
Netherlands	640	35*	128	5
Denmark	300	40	168	55
Germany	(3,500)*	(3,000)*	31,194	31,461
Switzerland	230	170	304	230
Hungary	184	4	90	8
Spain	(200)*	(80)*	(174)*	(124)*
Italy	420	187	188	172
Greece	86	17	68	34
French North Africa	67	7	53	10
Egypt	98	-	32	-
Iraq	(14)	-	(13)	-
Palestine	(54)	-	(58)	-
Subtotal	9,478	4,463	4,727	2,926
Mainly exporting
Norway	290	290	340	320
Sweden	545	1,406	725	1,200
Finland	355	1,330	280	620
U.S.S.R.	(7,500)*	(8,750)*	(8,370)*	(8,000)*
Poland	428	770*	663*	320*
Czechoslovakia	393	555*	504	535
Austria	90	400*	193	300
Yugoslavia	(350)*	(600)*	(275)*	(325)*
Bulgaria	75	75	68	68
Rumania	360	535	154	225
Portugal	(300)*	(300)*	(285)*	(300)*
Subtotal	10,686	15,011	11,857	12,213
GRAND TOTAL	20,164	19,474	16,584	15,139

Figures in parentheses represent estimates made by or for the International Timber Conference.
* Both hardwood and softwood lumber.
¹ U. K. figures for 1946 refer to actual consumption during the year and do not represent figures of national requirements in that period.
² Includes French production in Germany.
³ Only French, Br. and U. S. zones of Germany.

TABLE 2. - SOFTWOOD IMPORT REQUIREMENTS OF EUROPE, Including Lumber Equivalent of Sawlogs (Thousands of standards)

Country	1937	1946	1947	1948
Europe Proper
United Kingdom	2,316	810	1,621	1,500 to 2,000
Ireland	73	13	60	80
France	226	165	455	450
Belgium	175	74	220	325
Luxembourg	1	3	5	7
Netherlands	598	124	330	445
Denmark	200	129	142	182
Switzerland	41	48	110	110
Hungary	192	9	80	90 to 100
Spain	2120	2 (50)	(50)	(50)
Italy	232	16	366	587
Greece	270	232	130	140
Norway	241	226	18	18
Poland	-	256	-	225
Germany	731	-	-	-
Total	5,015	1,755	3,587	4,209 to 4,719
Mediterranean and Near East
French North Africa	60	43	106	106
Egypt	98	32	96	100
Iraq	14	13	(15)	(15)
Palestine	54	58	(60)	(60)
Total	226	146	277	281
U.S.S.R.3	-	(400)	(150)	(100)
Other import requirements	50	40	30	300
GRAND TOTAL	5,291	2,341	4,044	4,890 to 5,400

Figures in parentheses are estimates made by or for the use of the Conference.
¹ Included with data for Belgium.
² Includes hardwood imports.
³ Imports as reparations.

Export supplies

It is still perhaps insufficiently realized that it was not so much exceptional demand that precipitated a timber crisis as an exceptional drop in available export supplies. The basic trouble is that the forests of Europe and wood imports from North America are no longer sufficient to meet European needs and the requirements of the countries of the Mediterranean area.

In general, the capacity of European forests to produce the large logs needed in lumber manufacture has declined rapidly. Then, the war further reduced the volume of lumber that could enter inter-European trade. The causes of this are partly temporary and partly permanent. Internal demand is rising very considerably, even in those countries which were only indirectly affected by the war, and surpluses therefore tend to be absorbed, but beyond this most of the exporting nations have been compelled to curtail their over-all lumber output . For Sweden is short of coal and must divert labor and materials to the production of fuelwood. Finland's forest area has been diminished by 12 percent and her forest industries by about 25 percent.

Even where output has not declined, other factors have contributed toward a decrease in exports. The U.S.S.R. must absorb most of its timber output for reconstruction and development within its own borders. The countries of Central Europe each have their own troubles. Rumania is short of food and is supplying large quantities of wood to the U.S.S.R. during the reconstruction period. Transport conditions in Yugoslavia are bad. Austria, too, is short of food and the presence of the Allied occupation troops has not eased conditions. Czechoslovakia has insufficient manpower and is short of equipment. Poland's forests suffered severely during the German occupation and imports are now required.

In partial compensation Germany, from being an importer before the war, has now become the largest exporting country in Europe but there is no certainty as to how long this state of affairs will last.

Since the end of the war, then, export supplies from European sources have dropped to less than one-half of their prewar level. At the same time it has proved impossible to obtain any substantial increases of lumber imports from North America and other overseas sources. This is demonstrated by Table 3.

TABLE 3. - SOFTWOOD LUMBER EXPORTS AVAILABLE FOR EUROPE Including Lumber Equivalent of Sawlogs (Thousands of standards)

Country	1937	1946	1947	1948
From European countries
Germany	-	267*	328*	(200)*
Sweden	903	457	400	400
Finland	1,045	359	410	(410)
U.S.S.R.	1,362	30	(75)	(90)
Czechoslovakia	176	43	98	66
Austria	310	107	64	64
Yugoslavia	222	50	(100)	(100)
Rumania	353	125	104	111
Other countries	385	50	50	50
Subtotal	4,756	1,488	1,629	1,491
From Overseas countries
Canada	509	530	550	550
United States	109	120	250	300
Chile	-	7	(10)	(15)
Brazil	-	60	70	90
Subtotal	618	717	880	955
GRAND TOTAL	5,374	2,205	2,509	2,446

* French, Br., and U. S. zones of Germany.
Figures in parentheses are FAO estimates.

The lumber deficit

When the International Timber Conference met in Czechoslovakia, it found that prospective export supplies of softwood lumber available for Europe in 1948 were likely to be 2.5 to 3 million standards (6.5 to 7.5 million metric tons) short of essential import requirements. It can be assumed that approximately half the total consumption of softwood lumber goes directly into housing construction and that two standards of softwood lumber are required per dwelling unit; the deficit was thus likely to compel European countries to postpone the building of some 600 to 700 thousand dwelling units and to curtail to a considerable degree other activities in which lumber constitutes an essential factor, such as construction of transport equipment, and packaging of food and other goods for export.

Against an estimated world production of softwood lumber of 40 million standards, the European deficit represents only some 6 percent. It appears relatively small even in proportion to Europe's actual lumber production of 16 million standards. It should be remembered, however, that the deficit affects primarily the importing countries of Western and Southern Europe, including the non-European countries bordering the Mediterranean. These countries had estimated their essential requirements for 1948 at 7.8 to 8.3 million standards and could only expect to secure two-thirds of their demands. For these countries, many of which have been severely ravaged by war and occupation, the lumber shortage creates a truly alarming situation.

Shortages are not confined to softwood lumber. A number of other commodities are affected to a lesser degree, such as mine timbers, railway sleepers (ties), hardwoods and pulpwood. Although these provide additional problems for early international consideration, any amelioration in the softwood lumber position will also ease the situation for these other forest products and therefore they do not assume the same prominence.

The lumber deficit of about 3 million standards anticipated for 1948 is in fact very real and it seems that a like and possibly growing figure must be expected for so long as supplies fail to reach a substantially higher volume than at present.

The Conference at Marianske Lazne therefore concluded that the lumber deficit was not a short-term emergency problem but had every appearance of becoming a permanent feature of the economy of Europe, claiming the fullest attention of competent international bodies and demanding appropriate action.

This statement must, however, be qualified in one important respect, namely, with regard to the special position of the U.S.S.R., which was not represented at the International Timber Conference. The U.S.S.R. has enormous reserves of forests. Its forest area represents more than four times the extent of the forests of all other European countries combined. If the U.S.S.R. were able to expand the exploitation of its timber resources and the export capacity of its forest industries, the fear of a continuing lumber deficit would be largely removed.

Methods of overcoming the shortages

The primary object of the International Timber Conference was to reduce and eliminate so far as possible the difference between essential requirements and available supplies of softwood for the current year, and for 1948 and 1949. To this end, unanimous agreement was reached on a number of measures which could offer a satisfactory solution if applied simultaneously.

a) Increased Fellings. - All countries promised to increase their cutting for production of sawn softwoods by 10 percent during the felling seasons 1947/1948 and 1948/1949. The resulting increase in output must have the effect either of creating more exports or of diminishing the demand for imports. Certain countries, such as the United Kingdom for example, are so situated that it must be left open to them to achieve the same result by any other means which they might wish to put into effect, such as restrictions on methods of using lumber or by controlled consumption.

The Conference was ready to recognize that a certain number of countries would not be able to put forward the effort required without outside assistance. whether this should be derived from an appropriate international organization or some other source, owing to their shortages of manpower, food, coal, machinery, credit, or because of other factors.

b) Increased exports from countries within Europe. - It was hoped that certain major European exporting countries, in particular the U.S.S.R., might be able to increase their lumber exports in 1948 and 1949 over and above the 10 percent. Prior to the war, exports from the present territory of the U.S.S.R. were close to 1.4 million standards. In 1946 and 1947, less than 100,000 standards per year reached European countries from that source. If it were possible for the U.S.S.R. to resume lumber exports approaching the prewar scale, the deficit would largely disappear

c) Possible additional exports from Germany. - A number of countries emphasized that Germany was responsible for their present reconstruction needs and that German armies had not hesitated to destroy the forests of occupied countries, especially Poland. They concluded that their needs should receive the highest consideration and proposed that the occupying powers should not hesitate to impose heavy overcutting on German forests, both by reducing the rotation and by converting certain forest estates into agricultural land. It was suggested too that a ceiling be set for the per caput consumption of timber in Germany, in line with the "industry level plan" adopted for steel and other commodities. If such measures were applied, very substantial amounts of lumber and possibly pulp could be delivered for the needs of other countries.

Against this view, some of the occupying powers emphasized the immediate urgency of speeding up the reconstruction of Germany in order that all Europe might reap the benefits of this country's industrial potential. They also pointed out that destruction of German forests might have very undesirable effects a few years hence and recommended a more conservative policy.

In 1947, production in the British, American, and French zones of occupation is organized so as to provide the equivalent of 328,000 standards against the reconstruction requirements of other European countries, plus an unspecified quantity from the Russian occupation zone.

The Conference finally decided to draw the attention of the occupying powers to the need and possibility of securing important supplies of forest products from Germany and the question undoubtedly will come up again for further consideration.

Selective cutting and complete utilization, Poitiers, France Photo by courtesy U. S. Forest Service

d) Possible additional exports from overseas sources. - In determining the deficit for 1948, it was estimated that Canada, the United States, Chile, and Brazil would contribute 955,000 standards towards Europe's needs. This is an increase over estimated exports for 1947 and also somewhat higher than average prewar supplies. A possible further increase in exports from American sources was noted with satisfaction.

e) Economy in use of timber and limitation of consumption. - A whole series of measures was examined by the Conference, involving the establishment of government controls restricting the use of lumber to essential purposes; the achievement of a considerable reduction in estimated requirements by applying modern methods in construction and other fields; and the use of fiber board and other building materials derived from wood waste. All countries were urged to give the utmost attention to such economies and to seek FAO's technical advice in these matters.

It seems reasonable to hope that a combination of all the above courses, if put fully into effect, could reduce and indeed eliminate the lumber deficit. However, it must be remembered that, taking the larger view, some of these emergency remedies are inherently undesirable and some even threaten to create a more serious crisis a few years hence.

Conscious of the drain imposed by the war on European forests, many foresters are apprehensive lest further overcutting may do lasting damage to forest reserves. Compulsory reduction in timber consumption is equally undesirable, since it must mean a prolongation of acute misery for large numbers of people in many countries and conflicts with that improvement in housing and living standards which the United Nations and FAO have adopted as their goal.

It is therefore imperative to draw up a number of longer range measures capable of offsetting the negative effects of these emergency solutions, and of gradually restoring in Europe and the world a proper balance between adequate wood consumption and supplies.

The Conference devoted a great deal of attention to the initiation of a sound European forest policy and adopted a set of recommendations directed towards:

a) Achievement of adequate housing and living standards in Europe.
b) Restoration and improvement of forest resources in Europe and a substantial increase in yields.
c) Fuller utilization of the annual forest crop.
d) The opening up of hitherto undeveloped forest resources in order to supplement the inadequate supplies of lumber from European forests now accessible.

The intention of FAO to hold forest and forest products conferences in other parts of the world in furtherance of such aims, was strongly supported.

Practical means of securing international co-operation

International co-operation with regard to European timber problems is not new. Prior to the war, the Comité International du Bois (CIB) and the European Timber Exporters Convention (ETEC) attempted to stabilize the European timber market by quota agreements and other arrangements, concluded principally among the major exporting countries. Since 1945, the Timber Sub-Committee of the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe (EECE) has attempted to obtain agreement among a number of leading European importing countries on the distribution of available lumber supplies.

Most of these schemes were too limited in scope, and participants were drawn from too restricted a circle to allow full results. Delegates at Marianske Lazne felt strongly that an approach on a broader scale was needed to solve the present crisis and to open the way for a satisfactory permanent solution. In particular, they deemed it important to ensure that timber production, distribution, and consumption should always be considered as an inseparable unit, and further that there should be a proper co-ordination of short-term and long-term policies.

While the application of the technical and economic measures recommended by the Marianske Lazne Conference is the responsibility of individual governments, it will require also the continued assistance of many international agencies, above all, of the Economic Commission for Europe and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

V. Ropelewski (Poland) at President Benes' reception

The manner in which such agencies can best further the work of the Conference, and the extent of any aid that might be required, are still under discussion at high levels. The annual Conference of FAO will certainly take steps to correlate the various ideas which have been put forward as suggestions for future action. It will also want to co-ordinate measures so that duplication of effort is avoided and divergent trends, which have already made their appearance, are once more blended.

Outlook for the future

Thus the Marianske Lazne Conference brought about far-reaching agreements on a series of measures which should go far towards bridging the gap between requirements and supplies in 1948 and 1949. This will give a breathing space in which to formulate more definite long-range measures. The Conference put on record the understanding that the forest resources at present under full exploitation will not in the future suffice to satisfy the growing requirements of the world and that as yet untouched resources must be opened up and brought under systematic management. The north of Canada, Alaska, Latin America, Africa, parts of Southeast Asia and the territories of the U.S.S.R. offer such resources.

Support was given to the idea that forest production, consumption of wood, and distribution of supplies are complementary aspects of one problem. Both forest policies and industrial policies must be co-ordinated to a far greater extent than hitherto. This is a fundamental concept which FAO is striving to diffuse everywhere. Long-term policy must be formulated in the light of short-term problems; short-term problems must be solved with due attention to long-range policy.

A proper appreciation of the idea of forestry as the principal means of land use after agriculture and of the importance of timber as one of the world's major crops is now becoming widespread in a way that certainly was not apparent before the war. Private owners, communities, and business concerns are being strenuously encouraged to subject their forests to proper methods of management so as to obtain sustained yields. Forests must no longer be regarded as offering unlimited opportunities for exploitation. Governments are now prepared to offer advice and even financial inducements towards securing sound forestry, and in some instances will resort to compulsion.

At the same time efforts are being directed towards raising the status of forest workers and of employees in timber industries. Workers must be admitted to better wage rates, better standards of living, and opportunities for advancement such as can be obtained in other industries. The training of high-grade staffs, of technicians, and of an efficient labor force is seen as a prerequisite of improved forest output and greater yields in wood products.

The International Timber Conference hoped to bring about changes in the European timber situation during 1948 and even to obtain certain improvements during the current year.

When the Timber Sub-Committee of the EECE held its fourteenth meeting in June it considered that the total availabilities of softwood lumber had increased by about 300,000 standards over estimates made earlier in the year. It therefore proposed to raise the existing limits of purchase agreed by individual countries. This proposal has since been accepted, suggesting that the Marianske Lazne Conference has already had some influence on easing the strain which previously existed in Europe.