Iran suffered three consecutive years of major drought from 1999 to 2001. Estimates put the statistical probability of such a drought at once in 30 years. A largely arid and semi-arid country with wide weather fluctuations, Iran is accustomed to drought. However the recent drought was particularly hard-hitting. Variation between and within provinces was high, but it has been estimated that 25 out of 28 provinces were affected in some way and that 37 million people - half the population - were affected. Even parts of the country with high levels of precipitation in normal years were severely impacted.
Although the drought was less severe each year of its duration, the social and economic impact was greater as it progressed; an estimated 90% of the population were impacted in the last year. Rural food producers - farmers and pastoralists - were the hardest hit. The drought compounded stresses already present in the rural economy, particularly poor and inefficient management of water and land. The long-standing conflict over access to land between farmers and pastoralists also became more acute.
Pastoral communities currently comprise some 2% (1.3 million people) of the total population of Iran and meet about 25% of the livestock needs of the country. Pastoralists depend largely on grazing livestock for their livelihoods but rangelands were under severe pressure due to the drought. During the last drought rangeland production fell to half that of a normal year in many provinces, and less than that in some. The livelihoods of pastoral communities suffered in numerous ways: animal mortality increased, production of meat, milk and wool fell and sale of animal increased. The UN estimates that the drought affected more than 75 million animals (out of a national total of around 90 million), and immediate small stock losses were about 800,000. The negative impact of the sale of animals - the source of pastoralists’ wealth - was compounded by the decline in animal prices at the same time that the price of important staples such as flour increased, thus trapping pastoralists in a terms of trade collapse. The most obvious and severe effect of drought on pastoral communities is the abandonment of their traditional livelihoods system and settlement in villages, suburbs and cities.
The largest group of migratory nomadic pastoralists in Iran is the Qashqai Confederation. The Qashqai live and migrate through parts of the Zagros Mountain range of southern Iran (see attached map), mostly within the province of Fars. Their environment is quite arid, with an average annual precipitation in Fars of about 300mm. Faced with the aridity and high variability in the amount and distribution of rainfall - and therefore available forage in their environment - the Qashqai have developed complex natural resource management strategies to exploit the uncertainties by recognising and working with the patterns that emerge in nature. This has led them to a livestock-based livelihood system based on migration in order to make the best use of precipitation patterns. The Qashqai have traditionally migrated with their herds from summer to winter pastures twice per year and gained their livelihood from meat, dairy, wool, and other animal products.
The Koohi Sub-tribe is one of dozens of sub-tribes of the Confederation. Their summer pastures are located to the north of Shiraz, the capital of Fars province, near the town of Eqlid and their winter pastures are located to its south near the town of Farashband. The total distance travelled by the Koohi sub-tribe is about 860 kilometres. In general the best grazing areas are in the summering grounds, particularly those near the Kooshk-e Zar wetlands, but there are also some good grazing areas in the wintering grounds - particularly at the foothills of the mountains. According to the Koohi, in general, all areas which have little or no human impact are good for grazing but unfortunately there are few such places left. Level of precipitation is also a very important indicator of quality of grazing land.
The Koohi Sub-tribe includes 573 tentholds with a total population of about 3,500 people according to current calculations by the members of the sub-tribe. It should be noted that these figures include the migratory population only; if the settled population were added the figure would rise to about 1,000 tentholds or families. The official estimates are slightly lower: according to the 1377 (1998) national census of nomadic pastoralist populations there are 536 tentholds with a total population of 3,264 (49.2% female). According to the same census, 52.76% of the Koohi are literate and of this 41.7% are female. In total, the province of Fars has about 145,000 migratory pastoralists in the various summering grounds of the province (the highest number of any of the provinces) and about 170,000 in the wintering grounds (the second highest figure).
The livelihoods patterns of the Koohi (and all Qashqai in general) have changed greatly over the past several decades, particularly since land reform. Today their production is no longer primarily for self-subsistence. They sell their various animal products and buy a wide range of consumer items (mainly food and fuel) from the market.
Raising livestock is still the cornerstone of their economy, but there are clear signs that the situation has been changing. According to estimates from the Koohi, before the land reform of the early 1960s they had 40,000 to 50,000 heads of livestock. They kept a wide variety of animals, including sheep, goats, camels, donkeys, horses and to a more limited degree, cows, to satisfy a variety of needs, from food to transportation to clothing and shelter. The livestock were owned by the leaders of the clans and tribes while the other members of the tribe worked as shepherds and herders.
Today the role of the traditional leaders has been greatly undermined: they have been stripped of their power and this has contributed to changes in their livelihoods systems. For instance, agriculture is playing an increasingly important role as an income earner. In the past although they planted some crops this was usually for personal use only. Today growing crops (near their summer and winter grazing areas) is playing an increasingly important role, although it tends to be the more financially privileged families that can afford to do this, the main constraint being access to land. According to estimates by the Koohi, about one fifth or one sixth of them have access to agricultural land (on average about 5-6 hectares of land per tenthold) both in the summering and wintering grounds. The main crops grown are wheat (for personal use) and barley and corn (for sale).
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What happened in the Iranian land reform? Land reform refers to a series of laws in 1963 that the Shah was fond of calling the “White Revolution.” In order to understand the nature and impact of land reform it is important to keep in mind that:
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Both the size and the diversity of their herds are on the decline. The Koohi estimate that they currently have about 30,000 to 40,000 livestock, but also point out that their own population has increased from about 300 tentholds to about 600. Today sheep and goats dominate the herds while camels, donkeys, horses and cows are all fast dwindling in number. According to the national census of nomadic pastoralists of 1377 (1998) the composition of nomadic herds in the various summering grounds of Fars province is as follows: 51% goats, 47% sheep, 1% donkeys and the rest camels, donkeys, horses and cows. The main reasons for this are replacement of animals by motorised vehicles for transportation and market orientated herding which favours sheep and goats. In fact, meat is by far the most important pastoral livestock product because it brings the best price. By contrast there is much less dairy production because the women are less willing to do the hard work involved for relatively little cash benefit.
Other sources of income include employment in the service sector and handicraft production (women only). In the summering grounds some of the Koohi offer their labour to local farmers, either for a wage or for one fifth of the product. In the wintering grounds they rent agricultural land to grow crops or they offer labour to local farmers. In general, the older members of the tribes continue herding while the younger generation look for new kinds of work. According to the census about 40% of the Koohi are employed[1]. Of this, roughly 59% raise livestock, 10% work in the agricultural sector and 31% work in the handicrafts sector. Throughout the province on average 51% of nomadic pastoralists only raise livestock as their main source of income, 32% raise livestock and grow crops, 15% raise livestock, grow crops and keep orchards and 2% raise livestock and keep orchards.
The main expenses of a Koohi tenthold are for food, fuel, health, education, clothing, housing in wintering grounds, tents in summering grounds, fodder, and transportation of animals. Many of these are relatively new expenses, such as fodder[2] and rental to farmers for grazing on the stubble of their crops, or are much greater than they were in the past, such as for clothing, food, etc. In fact the Koohi say that although their cash income has increased in the past several decades their expenses have also increased a great deal. In recent years consumption patterns have changed greatly, under the direct influence of the changing consumption patterns of Iran’s villages and cities, facilitated by enhanced communications and transport. The result has been a desire for greater consumption and therefore greater costs of living. For example, rice has become a staple whereas in the past it was seen a luxury. Owning audio visual equipment, computers and mobile telephones are also increasingly seen as necessities for mobile communities- particularly among the youth. According to national census data on average about 26% of migratory pastoralists in Fars use some form of motorised vehicles, 41% have radio/audio equipment and about 6% have televisions.
These cultural factors, as well as the rejection of raising livestock as a form of livelihood by the youth, have led to widespread migration to villages and cities. Another effect of modern urban life has been the increasing use of illegal drugs by pastoralists, especially among the youth.
The Qashqai have developed a complex social structure which is intimately connected with their indigenous systems for natural resource management. Customary regulations for natural resource use and management were developed and enforced by traditional tribal leaders at various levels of the structure of the confederation.
The Qashqai Confederation comprises six tribes (tayefeh) including the “Shish Bayli” tribe. The Koohi Sub-tribe (tireh) is one of about 20 sub-tribes of the “Shish Bayli”. The Koohi sub-tribe is divided into 14 clans (bonkooh), and each clan is divided into several households, or more accurately, tentholds (obaa). These organisations will be referred to in the general term, “pastoral organisation” in this paper. Each tenthold is composed of related families and is the smallest unit of the Qashqai social structure. Generally, families making up tentholds will migrate together, and both in the summering and wintering grounds tend to camp and work near each other as a unit.
The head of the confederation (khan) and the heads of the tribes were essentially responsible for political and strategic decision-making, coordination of all the tribes and mobilisation. The heads of each of the sub-tribes (kalaantar), clans (kadkhodaa) and tentholds (reesh sefid) were more involved with decision-making about natural resource management.
Socio-political and economic changes that have enveloped Iran in the last several decades have fundamentally influenced and changed life for the Koohi sub-tribe and other pastoralists. One of the major driving forces behind these changes has been land reform (see text box, above). The pre-1963 land reform pastoralist communities used common property management systems. The land reform programme of the Shah brought about the nationalisation of all natural resources, including rangelands, forests, water and wildlife; individuals were granted use of land based on a specific short-term grazing licensing system. Thus pastoralists were alienated from their common property land and customary rights and their incentives for proper management and sustainable use of land were weakened. Nationalisation has further marginalised pastoral communities by not only fragmenting and destroying their summer and winter pastures, but also by impeding on their migratory routes.
Rangelands became state property and continue to be governed by principles of range management which have recently been refuted. Nationalised rangelands were turned over to agriculture or to a national system of protected areas both of which resulted in environmental degradation. While these policies have continued and intensified under the Islamic regime, since the reign of Mr. Rafsanjani, the government has adopted a dual policy of support (with subsidies and services) and a relentless effort at sedentarisation. This has been arranged with some encouragement from the World Bank.
Figure 1 Because of fragmentation of their migratory routes, pastoralists, like members of the Koohi Sub-tribe, above, are forced to migrate along roads by truck
The present case study is embedded within a larger ongoing project entitled Reviving nomadic pastoralism in Iran - Facilitating sustainability of biodiversity and livelihoods - A learning by doing project. Working within the framework of the host project allowed the researchers to conduct the case study in a very limited time by building on the relationships that the authors had already established with one pastoral community in Iran - the Koohi Sub-tribe. Some of the recommendations that conclude this case study are guided by lessons learned so far in the host project, therefore a brief presentation of the host project will be useful in situating the case study in context.
The project to revive nomadic pastoralism seeks to promote sustainable livelihoods and conservation of biological diversity among nomadic pastoralists in arid and semi-arid rangelands of Iran and greater Central Asia. Fundamental aspects of this project are revival and strengthening of traditional social organizations and culture, as well as collaborative and community management of ecosystem health and biodiversity.
The initial pilot project focuses on one sub-tribe of nomadic pastoralists in central Iran (the Koohi Sub-tribe). The larger goal is to perfect a modular, scalable, self-replicating, iterative model in which migratory pastoralists themselves are the central decision-makers, and in which the processes and projects undertaken are appropriate to each group’s unique culture, present status, strengths and limitations.
The project, which was launched in January 2003, began by identifying the main problems, and possible solutions, of the sub-tribe. Following the identification and categorisation of the main problem areas members of the sub-tribe tried their hand at writing project proposals aimed at projects which could contribute to solving each of the main problem areas. They also sketched out their overall vision for the project. Project funds will be used to implement some of the projects that have been devised by the sub-tribe. The results of the problem identification, project proposal and visioning exercises are presented in Annex 2.
In order to implement the projects and to rehabilitate the traditional social structure destroyed by the recent decades’ economic and social developments, the local community has formed “The Koohi Sub-tribe Nomadic Pastoralist’s Sustainable Livelihoods Council”. This council consists of representatives from all clans comprising the sub-tribe through elections at the lowest social organisational level (tenthold). The council has recently been officially registered as a non-profit company due to restrictions which make it difficult to register non-governmental organisations. Subsequently, the sub-tribe created a Community Investment Fund or sanduq, with initial funding donated by a non-governmental organisation, designed to fuel small-scale economic development initiatives. The Council will act as an advisory and (as needed) decision making board and will facilitate social mobilisation. Preliminary project plans have also been pursued for a number of initiatives. The profits from any investment made with sanduq funds will be returned to the sanduq for further investment. Once the level of investment reaches an adequate level for their needs, the sub-tribe will use any “excess” funds to establish new sanduqs in other sub-tribes and tribes, with a view to spreading this community investment system throughout the entire Confederation.
The sanduqs support two main functions: a) wealth generation for empowerment of the sub-tribe; and b) conservation of their landscape including their rangelands, water sources, and a unique wetland. The wetland and its related landscape are now being established as the first official Community Conserved Area with the endorsement of the government of Iran.
Besides the Koohi Sub-tribe and Cenesta the main partners are various branches of the Iranian Government including the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the Organisation for Forests, Rangelands and Watershed Management, and the Organisation for Nomadic Pastoralists Affairs. International partners include IIED, UNDP/GEF and IUCN/CEESP’s Working Group on Sustainable Livelihoods. All partners from outside the Koohi community operate through its Council of Elders and all major decisions are made by them.
Local institutions
Organisations working at the local level in Iran are either governmental or non-governmental. It is important to note that local-level governmental organisations are simply representatives of national organisations, implementing policies that are made in Tehran at the local level. All government policies are determined in the 5-year development plans of the Planning and Management Organisation. Therefore government agencies at the local level will not be treated as “local” institutions in this study.
The only governmental organisations which are constituted at the local level are the village councils which have been active since 1999. Village councils (“Islamic Councils,” as they are called under the law) are the representatives of the Ministry of Interior at the local level and the members are elected by local residents. “Pastoral councils” are also planned but have not yet been established.
Levels of expectation and excitement about the councils were high at the outset, but their level of effectiveness seems to be mixed. Elections take place every 4 years and the turnout for the 2003 elections were much lower throughout the country than the first round in 1999 which saw a massive turnout largely because the councils are seen to be ineffective in addressing people’s needs.
Very few active NGOs exist at the local level; most have been newly established and lack basic capacities and resources. Because of difficulties in officially registering NGOs, many NGOs have been registered as non-profit companies under the law of registering companies. The strongest NGOs tend to be concentrated in the capital. Thus the main local, non-governmental institutions are traditional community based organisations (CBOs) which are informal organisations, not officially recognised by the government. The precise structure, roles and functions vary throughout the country, but it is clear that these organisations have traditionally played a central role in decision-making about natural resource management, including drought.
In recent decades as the role of the central government has increased and modern development approaches have been adopted, CBOs have been weakened and in many cases have started to dissolve. Remaining elements of CBOs are stronger at the grassroots levels rather than at the higher levels of the structure. For example, in pastoral communities the structures are still meaningful at the level of tentholds, clans and sub-tribes whereas the tribes and confederations have effectively been dissolved.
During the past few years with greater government interest in public participation and the greater involvement in international processes related to sustainable development there is increasing interest in the role of indigenous knowledge in natural resource management. Nevertheless there is still little understanding of the role of CBOs in creating, using and preserving traditional knowledge. Another major obstacle in rehabilitating CBOs is that they are not officially recognised by the government.
Non-governmental organisations
There are no NGOs in Iran that work specifically on drought or any other natural disaster. Many civil society groups get involved in relief efforts at the time of a national emergency, but these efforts are usually organised by the Iranian Red Crescent Society (IRCS) to deliver relief or raise funds. However IRCS is not a non-governmental organisation in Iran (see below for more information about the IRCS). Also, there seems to be greater activity by various civil society groups following a “sudden” disaster such as an earthquake or flood rather than more gradual disasters such as drought.
Governmental organisations
Various government ministries, departments and organisations are involved with disaster preparedness and relief at various stages and according to their own mandate. The most wide-spread criticism of governmental response to natural disasters is that there is no single effective plan for dealing with disasters. In fact, the Comprehensive National Plan for Relief and Rescue was ratified in 1382 (2003), but it is not yet widely known or debated. It was highlighted in the media during the post-Bam earthquake coverage, but mostly for being ineffective. The Plan is run by the Disaster Task Force and is discussed in great detail throughout this report.
Disaster Task Force
The Disaster Task Force (DTF) is the governmental body responsible for the implementation of the Comprehensive National Plan for Relief and Rescue which was ratified in 1382 (2003) - see legislation and policy section, below for more information on this plan. However, the DTF had existed before the introduction of the Plan and was also responsible for coordination of natural disaster preparation and response. With the introduction of the Plan the responsibilities, members and constituent parts of the DTF have been clarified or changed. DTF is headed by the Minister of Interior and its secretariat is hosted at the Ministry of Interior.
The DTF has a largely coordinating and monitoring role, but it contains a complex web of working groups which are also responsible for implementing projects. Its coordinating role is reflected in its structure: DTF is made up of representatives from relevant government organisations and it has bureaus at the provincial and department levels. The responsibilities and policies of the DTF are broadly laid out in the Plan and are presented at length in the section, below, on policy and legislation.
The cluster of specialist working groups on prevention and risk management of the DTF (introduced through the Plan) presumably replace the National Committee on Mitigation of Natural Disasters (NCMND) which was established in 1993 to discuss and address research and policy questions. NCMND consisted of one coordination committee and 9 sub-committees that each deal with the following topics: earthquakes; plant pests and frost; reconstitution of the rangelands and combating drought; floods; air pollution; hurricanes; rescue and relief; compensation of losses; and health. The topics have been streamlined under the present arrangement to omit the groups on hurricanes, rescue and relief and compensation of losses.
Under the previous system the members of the rangelands and drought sub-committee were: the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the Ministry of Energy, Iran Meteorological Organisation, the Ministry of Interior, the Department of Environment, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting Company, and the Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephones. The sub-committee was headed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. Under the present system the drought specialist working group is still headed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. The members, terms of reference and internal regulations of each specialist working group are drafted by the head of that specialist working group and must be approved by the national working group on preparedness (another new component of the DTF introduced through the Plan) and the DTF.
Risk management specialist working groups can be established at the provincial level if needed. The need is assessed - and the members of the provincial working groups decided - by the provincial preparedness working group. The provincial preparedness working groups are established under the supervision of the provincial DTF. These are working groups with representatives from 17 organisations and are headed by the provincial governor’s deputy for development affairs (under the Ministry of Interior). The provincial DTFs are established under the supervision of the national DTF and include representatives from 26 organisations and are headed by the provincial governor (under the Ministry of Interior). The head of the DTF at the district level can call for the establishment of any specialist working groups at that level as needed. The district DTFs include 18 members and are headed by the district governor (under the Ministry of Interior). All of the activities of the district DTF must take place under the supervision of the provincial DTF.
Before the introduction of the comprehensive national plan, the DTF was seen to be doing little prevention or rehabilitation work and to be dealing with natural disasters on a case-by-case basis, organising their activities after the event had taken place. Even in its relief work, there was very little monitoring of its activities or extension our outreach efforts to involve local communities and civil society. The comprehensive plan has not been in action for very long (less than one year) so it may too soon to judge the effectiveness of the plan and the new DTF structure.
However, it could be useful to see how the DTF has acted following the recent earthquake in Bam which was a great test of its new structure. Unfortunately, the experience of Bam does speak well for the government’s new and comprehensive plan to deal with natural disasters and the old criticisms of lack of coordination and planning are being repeated again.
According to a joint WHO/Ministry of Health rapid assessment of the area following the earthquake, “Co-ordination and management are not yet effective enough. Support in terms of supplies and human resources is adequate, but lack of proper management and insufficient co-ordination has been counterproductive.”
The daily newspaper Kayhan, said that although Iran has a Disaster Task Force at the national level and in each city, the DTF is not structured in such a way as to have the power to take charge of disaster management when a disaster strikes. They criticised the DTF for being badly managed and coordinated and suggest that this was the reason why the responsibility for relief was given over to the armed forces 3 days after the earthquake.
On the other hand, Dr. Ahmad Ali Noorbala, the Director of the Iranian Red Crescent Society criticised in a press conference the intervention of other agencies in the IRCS’s relief activities and also the government’s decision to delegate the management of the post-earthquake operations to the armed forces. He said that this was in contradiction to the Comprehensive National Plan for Relief and Rescue since under this plan the management of relief and recovery in disasters is the responsibility of the IRCS. He also criticised the role played by the state broadcasting company for publicising and rallying support for the Imam Khomeini Relief Fund, rather than for the IRCS, which according to the Plan and article 44 of the 3rd development plan, puts the responsibility of coordinating disaster relief aid squarely on the shoulders of IRCS. He added that the Imam Khomeini Relief Fund was not distributing the aid fairly among the people. He said that IRCS expertise was not used at all, but that they chose to remain silent in order to prevent open conflict.
In the days following the Bam earthquake and the influx of international help to the country, the coordinator of the group of “Rescue Without Borders” criticised Iranian officials for their lack of coordination in responding to the earthquake, adding that the attention to details in implementing activities and also the speed of response in other countries that he had worked in, including Turkey, India and Nigeria had been better than Iran.
In the daily newspaper, Shargh, the MP Mohammad Reza Tabesh was reported as saying that a parliamentary report on the Bam earthquake shows that the fact that there was no organisation or structure in place for immediate response to the earthquake made the impact of the earthquake much worse. He added that the 1,600 international relief staff that were present in Bam were as effective as the 30,000 strong Iranian team.
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
Forest and Rangeland Organisation
The Forest and Rangeland Organisation (FARO) is the government body responsible for the management of the country’s rangelands (among other things) and its policies thus have an important impact on the livelihoods of pastoral communities. The drought-related activities of FARO focus on prevention and mitigation through their central programme of “establishing equilibrium between livestock and rangelands”. Over-grazing by pastoralists is up to five times the carrying capacity of the land according to FARO estimates.
The programme is very unpopular among pastoralists themselves. It is based on the premise that the main cause of deterioration of rangelands, desertification and drought is unsustainable use by pastoralists due to overpopulation of livestock. The main thrust of the programme is the sedentarisation of pastoralists and imposition of alternative livelihoods systems. Pastoralists maintain that their numbers have actually decreased in recent years and that any unsustainable use is due to the fact that they are forced onto increasingly small plots of land. Furthermore, they say that the land that is taken from them is used unsustainably by farmers and industrialists.
FARO is also involved in a variety of drought-related projects such as providing fodder during drought, improving water storage and distribution and vegetation in rangelands and developing an early warning system with the national meteorological organisation. Some of these projects are coordinated and funded by the Disaster Taskforce of the Interior Ministry (see below for more information on the taskforce). FARO is also keen to take advantage of the latest modern technology in rangeland rehabilitation and prevention of desertification - with mixed success. For example, in the mid 1990s FARO conducted projects aimed at inciting clouds to rain.
Figure 2: Water tankers distribute water to pastoral communities
As with DTF, FARO seems overwhelmed by the scale of their task: they are responsible for the management of some 50 million hectares of rangeland. Because of lack of funds, their programmes tend to be quite limited in their impact. Furthermore, they say that their work is hampered by lack of coordination between various government programmes.
Within FARO there is a growing movement for greater civil society participation - particularly by NGOs - and for greater recognition of the role of indigenous knowledge and customary law. However, this has not yet taken the form of a unified policy within the organisation and there remain many contradicting policies. For example, FARO has a history of establishing NGOs in order to have a pool of “friendly” NGOs that it can choose to work with. At the level of local communities, it is difficult to see how pastoralists could want to participate in the activities of an organisation that they perceive as threatening their way of life.
According to the 3rd development plan the short-term goals of FARO in relation to rangeland management are:
Management of livestock grazing (issuing grazing permits controlling when livestock enter grazing areas and how long they are allowed to stay)
Distribution of water
Watershed and groundwater management for range vegetation
Stemming urban migration to sustain rural production
Grants, insurance and facilities for drought-stricken populations
The long-term goals are:
Predicting rainfall and sharing information with executive branches of the government
Predicting droughts, their extent and patterns
Extension to pastoralists and farmers on drought
Calculating the number of livestock appropriate for non-drought years
Activities of the Committee on sustainable water use and management in agriculture, industry and for drinking
Promoting new crops suitable for dry lands
Promoting policies for changing rain-fed crops to irrigated crops
Increasing insurance for agriculture and pastoral products
Office of Nomadic Pastoral Affairs
The Office of Nomadic Pastoral Affairs (ONPA), also within the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, has as its main aim the provision of suitable services to improve and develop the social and economic situation of the country’s nomadic pastoralists and to improve their productivity. ONPA’s objectives include: providing services to nomadic pastoralists; helping to sedentarise them; introducing industrial models of livestock production; helping pastoralists with marketing of their products; and, helping them to establish co-operatives.
The ONPA sedentarisation programme provides each tenthold with a house, 10 hectares of irrigated crop land and access to pasture, through low interest credit. The programme has met with hesitation from pastoralists and in any case would only be available to a small proportion of pastoralists because of the high costs involved.
ONPA also aims to give technical support such as fodder and water provision (the former through pastoral cooperatives). Pastoral cooperatives are established through, and under the supervision of, the ONPA under the laws of the Ministry for Cooperatives. The main aim of the pastoral cooperatives is to provide services to pastoralists who are officially recognised as such (this means they must have a pastoral identity card), but currently their activities are limited to selling rationed food items[3] and fodder to pastoralists. Each pastoral tenthold must pay 350,000 rials (about $42 USD) to become a member of a pastoral cooperative. The sale of livestock and agricultural produce is predominantly done privately, but cooperatives seem to be a more attractive offer for farmers than herders: on average 0.8% of nomadic pastoralists in Fars marketed their livestock through cooperatives while 2.8% marketed their agricultural crops in this way.
In general the ONPA has few funds to spend on natural disasters and therefore must rely mostly on their regular budget for any drought-related activities. They could apply for extra funds but this would require a strong justification on a province-by-province basis on the effects of drought.
Department of Environment
The Department of Environment (DoE) has a strategy of emergency response mainly to protect wildlife, plant species and biodiversity in the hardest hit areas. Although their main focus is not mitigation, prevention, or development of early warning systems, DoE has received assistance from UNDP in capacity building for drought mitigation and management in areas where biodiversity is most threatened, such as wetlands and the habitats of the Asiatic Cheetah, an endangered species.
Iranian Red Crescent Society
The Iranian Red Crescent Society (IRCS) is a member of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. It focuses mainly on relief aid during emergencies such as providing tents, blankets, rations, etc. IRCS has a large network of volunteers and presents itself as a non-governmental organisation but its funding comes directly from the Ministry of Health, therefore it is widely seen in Iran as a governmental organisation. Furthermore, it is represented in governmental bodies like the DTF - an opportunity denied to NGOs that are independent of the government. In one sense the IRCS creates the government’s closest link to local communities in times of disaster by mobilising the public and local NGOs to help in relief operations, however, its volunteers contribute by providing free labour to deliver aid, not by participating in policy and decision-making. But on the other hand IRCS is very selective with the NGOs that it works with. For instance, they have invited the cooperation of non-governmental organisations that are recognised by the cabinet - an almost impossible condition to fulfil for NGOs that are truly independent of the government.
The Comprehensive National Plan for Relief and Rescue was drafted by IRCS according to article 44 of the law of the Third Plan for Economic, Social and Cultural Development. According to the plan the IRCS is responsible for coordinating relief and non-governmental aid and assistance (see legislation and policy section, below, for more information).
Islamic Republic of Iran Meteorological Organisation
The IRIMO plays a key role in providing the government with data that helps to determine the arrival and extent of a drought. IRIMO has a drought specialist research group which responds to the research needs of various government departments as needed. Following the last drought the drought research group created a draft plan of action for drought research which would take a more long-term view. The aim of the project is to better understand the negative consequences (losses) of drought and to plan better for minimising risk. One of the main aspects of the proposed research project is to define indicators of drought for each province based on its geographical, climatic and economic conditions.
United Nations
FAO
The FAO in Iran aims to support the government in developing appropriate policies for food and agriculture. In the case of drought, if the drought is severe enough to be declared as a national emergency the FAO participates in a UN assessment mission. Such missions are usually followed by assistance to mitigate the effects of the drought, usually “band-aid” solutions such as providing drinking water or seeds for farmers. The main recipients of such relief are the general public (through the provision of drinking water) while food producers take second stage despite being the hardest hit, sustaining up to 90% of the damage inflicted by droughts. Among food producers farmers tend to receive much more attention than pastoralists.
The FAO, with the support of the government, is attempting to steer its approach away from these “band-aid” solutions and relief efforts towards developing long-term policies aimed at preparedness and mitigation. Although there have been no major initiatives on drought in the past 3-4 years (since the end of the last drought), a TCP project specifically addressing drought has been prepared and is awaiting approval. The TCP project aims at the formulation of a national strategy and action plan on drought management and mitigation for the agricultural sector through capacity-building for the government, and enhancing inter-sectoral cooperation.
The FAO is in a good position to assist the government in enhancing inter-sectoral cooperation which is clearly one of the weak points of the government: key policies are in conflict with each other - even within the same ministry. Another challenge is to support institutional change since new ideas tend to be introduced by individuals and support for them tends to fade away once key individuals leave. Although there is hope that the government is finally seeking a more long-term approach to drought, the fear is that any new changes in the government tend to be quite fragile as they rely on the political support of key individuals.
UNDP
UNDP initiatives related to drought are usually short-term. For example, as mentioned above, UNDP leads the UN assessment mission during a severe drought. During the most recent drought, UNDP conducted field research to assess the ecological damage of the drought and has subsequently prepared a plan of action. The report was distributed to international donors and media, putting the spotlight on Iran’s severe situation. Currently however, UNDP has no field-based projects related to drought, nor an explicit policy focusing on drought and local communities.
In 2001 UNDP Iran was involved in organizing the first Regional Seminar on Drought Mitigation. UNDP has also been assisting the government of Iran to prepare a short-term programme to expand watershed management and rainwater harvesting in areas hardest hit by drought.
UNDP relates Iran’s unsustainable use of its natural resources to population expansion, loss of indigenous knowledge leading to the inefficient management of water resources, overgrazing, weakening of rural communities and traditional sustainable livelihood systems. Empowerment of local communities, sustainable management of water resources, and bottom-up policies and approaches are part of UNDP’s solutions, but with an absence of field projects on drought it is difficult to see how UNDP will implement their ideas.
World Bank
The World Bank has proposed a plan for a disasters insurance fund to the government. The proposal has been discussed by the ministries of housing, interior, and economics and finance over the last 2 years. If the ministries come to agreement then the World Bank would give Iran a loan of about $100 million (USD). The government would have to insure every house in the country and it would have to have a plan to support families that could not afford the insurance. The Comprehensive National Plan for Relief and Rescue calls for greater coverage of insurance schemes in case of natural disasters but it is not clear whether this will occur with World Bank assistance.
The 5-year Plans for Economic, Social and Cultural Development represent the government’s main policy document on all matters and each plan is recognised as law throughout its duration. They define the main policy lines for all ministries and departments and the annual work plans and budgets of each government ministry and organisation are based on the 5-year development plan. The first plan was effectively launched after the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1989. The 4th development plan will begin in 1384 (2005) if it is ratified on schedule (if not then it could be delayed by a year or two).
The current (and third) development plan refers directly to natural disasters in one article:
Article 44: In order to prevent and mitigate the impact of natural disasters, to prepare the public and to specify the roles of all [governmental] executive organisations in responding to natural disasters, the Iranian Red Crescent Society (with the cooperation of the Ministry of Interior and the national voluntary militia, (basij)), is responsible for producing a comprehensive plan with the cooperation of all relevant [governmental] organisations and for having it approved by the cabinet within the first year of the Third Plan for Economic, Social and Cultural Development. The plan should include provisions for disaster management, raising public awareness and preparedness and mechanisms for the participation of [governmental] executive organisations, the state broadcasting company and mass media, executive initiatives, funding sources and administration, etc.
Note: The national voluntary militia (basij) will become a member of the country’s disaster taskforces.
As a follow-up to this law, the IRCS prepared the Comprehensive National Plan for Relief and Recovery, which was ratified by the cabinet in 1382 (2003). This is the first comprehensive national plan to address natural disasters. Some elements of the plan are:
General
A definition of “disaster”, and also “national disaster” as a disaster which is too severe for one province to address on its own; the level of a disaster (local, provincial, or national) is decided by the head of the DTF on the recommendation of the provincial governorate;
The plan recognises 4 stages of the disaster management cycle: prevention, preparedness, relief and reconstruction;
One of the main objectives of the plan is to channel public voluntary aid and also the input of non-governmental organisations;
The main strategies are: research, implementing projects, investment, coordination, attracting popular participation, more efficient use of existing resources, enlisting the necessary support from all parts of government, the armed forces and particularly the voluntary militia;
Disaster Task Force
The establishment of the DTF with the objectives of overall policy-making, national planning and the highest level of monitoring of disaster related plans and programmes;
The composition and responsibilities of the DTF; when a disaster takes place all ministries, governmental organisations and the police and armed forces are supposed to cooperate fully with the directives of the head of the DTF;
The establishment of provincial offices of the DTF under the supervision of the national DTF; the composition and responsibilities of the provincial office of the DTF; when a disaster takes place all the governmental organisations, police and armed forces at the provincial level are supposed to cooperate fully with the directives of the head of the provincial office of the DTF (the governor of the province);
The composition and responsibilities of the district level offices of the DTF; all of the activities of the district offices of the DTF must be under the supervision of the provincial office of the DTF; when a disaster takes place all governmental and non-governmental organisations, police and armed forces are supposed to cooperate fully with the directives of the head of the district office of the DTF;
Preparedness working groups and their specialist working groups
National and provincial preparedness working groups: formed and operating under the supervision of the DTF to manage and follow up on all preparedness activities stipulated in this law; the responsibilities of the national and provincial preparedness groups are broadly stated; the main responsibilities are the management and follow-up of all activities related to the preparedness stage of the disaster management cycle;
The national preparedness working group will be assisted by 3 clusters of specialist working groups: the operations specialist working groups, the prevention and risk management specialist working groups, and the education specialist working groups; the responsibilities of the 3 clusters of specialist working groups are broadly defined;
Certain ministries and organisations have the added responsibility of cooperating with the DTF to improve awareness of disasters and to prepare for them through education; the role of each ministry in terms of educational activities for disasters is stipulated;
The operations specialist working groups are composed of the following 12 specialist working groups on rescue and relief; health, transportation, communications, fuel supplies, security and police, management of water, sewage and electricity, housing, agricultural and animal husbandry and industry and mines. Each of the 12 specialist groups is headed by a ministry or other relevant governmental organisation;
The prevention and risk management specialist working groups are composed of the following 6 specialist working groups on earthquakes and tremors, pests, plant diseases and frost, drought and rangeland rehabilitation, floods, air pollution, and climatic/atmospheric disasters (such as hail). Each of the 6 specialist groups is headed by a ministry or other relevant governmental organisation;
The education specialist working groups are composed of the following 5 specialist working groups on public education, specialist education, education in schools, education through mass media, and education in the state broadcasting company. Each of the 5 specialist groups is headed by a ministry or other relevant governmental organisation;
The responsibilities of these 23 specialist working groups must be defined by the head of each working group and ratified by the DTF and the national preparedness working group;
The specialists working groups members are nominated by the leader of the national working group and approved by the DTF and they must each meet once every 2 months;
The operations specialist working groups will also be established at the provincial level under the overall supervision of the national working group;
Risk management working groups will be established in each province if needed. The need and the members of the groups will be decided by the provincial preparedness working group;
The head of the DTF at the departmental level can call for the establishment of any specialist working groups at that level as needed;
The relief and rescue specialist working groups will be headed by IRCS;
Budget and donations
All help and assistance from non-governmental sectors (both national and international) shall be received and distributed by IRCS. All help and assistance from governmental sectors (both national and international) shall be received and distributed by DTF. The receipt and distribution of assistance by any other organisations is banned;
The MPO is responsible for including in the national annual budget a budget line for the various stages of disaster management in the country. This budget will be handed over to DTF which will distribute it based on its own policies, strategies and perceived needs;
The provincial councils for planning and development must dedicate a part of their annual budget to the various activities related to the 4 stages of the disaster management cycle and this will be spent on the advice of the provincial DTF;
All provincial departments and organisations must put all of their resources at the disposal of the provincial DTF as needed when a natural disaster occurs;
Insurance
The secretariat of the DTF, along with the national insurance company of Iran, is responsible for extending the coverage of insurance against natural disasters throughout the country;
The Ministry of Economic and Financial Affairs is responsible for extending insurance coverage to at least 50% of all residential and commercial enterprises by the end of 1383 (March 2005) and for creating the possibility of making insurance coverage against natural disasters mandatory throughout the country by the end of 1388 (March 2010);
The responsibility of extending insurance to all agriculture and livestock herding will be the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development according to the law of insurance fund for agricultural products of 1362 (1983).
The draft of the fourth development plan has been prepared and is currently awaiting discussion and approval by the new parliament, which was elected in February 2004. Presumably the Comprehensive National Plan for Relief and Rescue which is now in place contains all government policy on disaster management; therefore the draft does not have any articles or sections dealing specifically with natural disasters. However, there are some relevant paragraphs, which indicate that in spite of having the national plan, the government wants to highlight some issues, particularly earthquakes. For instance, the draft plan calls for:
Improvement of buildings throughout the country to make them resistant to earthquakes;
Improved organisational structure and management of weather data collections networks and improved national and international networking;
Several articles are dedicated to the issue of reforming the governance system in the country and facilitating the participation of civil society; these are presented in the section on recommendations for the 4th development plan regarding civil society;
A foreign currency account is to be created for the excess earnings from oil and gas revenues relative to annual expected revenues and is to be spent on strengthening certain areas of the economy; at least 10% of these funds dedicated for the non-governmental sector will be given to the Agricultural Bank for distribution to the agricultural non-governmental sector;
One of the objectives for rural development is the sedentarisation of at least 50% of the country’s nomadic pastoralist population; and,
Calls for the continuation of the livestock and range equilibrium plan.
Besides the content of the development plans, it is also important to examine their past performance. In general, many of the programmes in each of the plans have not been implemented. According to the 1999 UNDP Human Development Report for Iran, Iran lacks the executive, technical and information capacity required for the full successful implementation of the plans.
A recent civil society assessment of the reasons for lack of implementation of environmental laws (including the policies of the 5-year development plans) pointed to the following factors:
Weakness of civil society institutions;
Lack of responsiveness of many government agencies;
The tradition of vertical, non-participatory and paternalistic style of governance in the country;
The prolonged war with Iraq, which further weakened participatory government in the country, due to the requirement of a regimented and controlled society that happens in most countries at war;
Weakening of capacities in the public sector due to a brain drain as a result of poor pay, and the lack of ability to take advantage of trained and competent personnel. The struggle of the years since the revolution for ideological purity often also pushes many competent technocrats out of the public sector;
The creeping corruption that has been talked about by both civil society and very high level authorities, which is due to the inordinate role of the state in policy and operational spheres, to the lack of transparency and accountability of the government, and to the tremendous economic poverty that has beset the country.
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[1] The term
“employed” includes all people 6 years of age and older who have
worked for the 7 days prior to the census, or who don’t have full-time work
but worked for at least 2 of the 7 days prior to the census, or those who are
engaged in seasonal work (as long as they are not looking for other work during
their off-season). [2] In the past the animals survived on the natural vegetation of the rangelands but today there is much less vegetation so they are forced to hand feed their animals. [3] A national universal system of rationing was established during the Iran-Iraq war for essential food items and is still in place. |
