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BookletTechnical briefUpdated joint FAO/WHO/WOAH public health assessment of recent influenza A(H5) virus events in animals and people
Assessment based on data as of 18 November 2024
2024Also available in:
No results found.During 2020, high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses arose from previously circulating influenza A(H5Nx) viruses and spread predominantly via migratory birds to many parts of Africa, Asia and Europe. This epizootic event has led to unprecedented numbers of deaths in wild birds and caused outbreaks in poultry. In late 2021, these viruses crossed the Atlantic Ocean to North America and subsequently reached South America in October 2022. Over the past few years, there have been increased detections of A(H5N1) viruses in non-avian species globally including wild and domestic (companion and farmed) terrestrial and marine mammals, with recent cases in livestock in the United States of America. The majority of A(H5N1) viruses characterized genetically since 2020 belong to the haemagglutinin (HA) H5 clade 2.3.4.4b, with some regional exceptions. Since the last joint assessment of August 2024, at least 33 additional human cases of infection with A(H5) viruses have been reported. Of these, 30 were reported from the USA.FAO, WHO, and WOAH jointly updated their assessment of the risk of zoonotic transmission (i.e., animal to human) considering additional information made available since the previous assessment of 14 August 2024. This update is limited to the inclusion of additional information being made available globally. Due to the potential risk to human health and the far-reaching implications of the disease on the health of wild bird and other animal populations, the use of a One Health approach is essential to tackle avian influenza effectively, to monitor virus circulation, to prevent within species transmission and to prevent human infections from exposure to animals. -
BookletTechnical briefUpdated joint FAO/WHO/WOAH public health assessment of recent influenza A(H5) virus events in animals and people
Assessment based on data as of 1 July 2025
2025Also available in:
No results found.This risk assessment from FAO, WHO and WOAH updates the assessment of the risk of zoonotic transmission (for example, animal to human) considering additional information made available since the previous assessment of 17 April 2025. This update is limited to the inclusion of additional information being made available globally. Due to the potential risk to human health and the far-reaching implications of the disease on the health of wild birds, poultry, livestock and other animal populations, timely notification to global authorities and the use of a One Health approach are essential to tackle avian influenza effectively, to monitor and characterize virus circulation, to prevent transmission within species and to new species to reduce spread among animals, and to prevent human infections from exposure to animals. -
Policy briefPolicy briefJoint FAO/WHO/WOAH preliminary assessment of recent influenza A(H5N1) viruses
23 April 2024
2024Also available in:
During 2020, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses arose from previously circulating influenza A(H5Nx) viruses and spread predominantly via migratory birds to many parts of Africa, Asia and Europe. The epizootic has led to unprecedented numbers of deaths in wild birds and caused outbreaks in domestic poultry. In late 2021, these viruses crossed to North America and subsequently South America in October 2022. Additionally, globally, there have been increased detections of A(H5N1) viruses in non-avian species including wild and domestic (including companion and farmed) terrestrial and marine mammals and, more recently in goats and dairy cattle in the United States of America. The majority, with some regional exceptions, of the HPAI A(H5N1) viruses characterized genetically since 2020 belong to the 2.3.4.4b clade. Since the beginning of 2021, 28 detections of A(H5N1) in humans have been reported to WHO, including a case who had exposure to dairy cattle presumed to be infected with A(H5N1) virus. Of these human cases, where the haemagglutinin (HA) H5 clade is known, 13 have been caused by clade 2.3.4.4b viruses. This joint FAO/WHO/WOAH risk assessment focuses on A(H5N1) viruses characterized since 2021 and assesses the public health risk as well as the risk of the virus spread among animals.
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BookletCorporate general interestEmissions due to agriculture
Global, regional and country trends 2000–2018
2021Also available in:
No results found.The FAOSTAT emissions database is composed of several data domains covering the categories of the IPCC Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) sector of the national GHG inventory. Energy use in agriculture is additionally included as relevant to emissions from agriculture as an economic production sector under the ISIC A statistical classification, though recognizing that, in terms of IPCC, they are instead part of the Energy sector of the national GHG inventory. FAO emissions estimates are available over the period 1961–2018 for agriculture production processes from crop and livestock activities. Land use emissions and removals are generally available only for the period 1990–2019. This analytical brief focuses on overall trends over the period 2000–2018. -
Book (stand-alone)Technical bookThe future of food and agriculture - Trends and challenges 2017
Also available in:
No results found.What will be needed to realize the vision of a world free from hunger and malnutrition? After shedding light on the nature of the challenges that agriculture and food systems are facing now and throughout the 21st century, the study provides insights into what is at stake and what needs to be done. “Business as usual” is not an option. Major transformations in agricultural systems, rural economies, and natural resources management are necessary. The present study was undertaken for the quadrennial review of FAO’s strategic framework and for the preparation of the Organization Medium-Term plan 2018-2021. -
Book (series)NewsletterShiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) and food: attribution, characterization, and monitoring
Meeting Report
2018Also available in:
No results found.Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) infections are a substantial health issue worldwide. Circa 2010, foodborne STEC caused > 1 million human illnesses, 128 deaths, and ~ 13,000 Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs). Targeting interventions appropriately relies on identifying those strains of greatest risk to human health and determining the types of foods that cause STEC infections. There are hundreds of STEC serotypes; however, based on the evidence gathered during the review, the Expert Group concluded that the serotype of the STEC strain should not be considered a virulence criterion. All STEC strains with the same serotype should not be assumed to carry the same virulence genes and to pose the same risk, as many STEC virulence genes are mobile and can be lost or transferred to other bacteria. this report proposes a set of criteria for categorizing the potential risk of severity of illness associated with a STEC in food is recommended based on evidence of virulence gene profiles and associations with clinical severity. The criteria could be applied by risk managers in a risk-based management approach to control STEC in food. While ruminants and, other land animals are considered the main reservoirs for STEC, various largescale outbreaks have been linked to other foods. Thus, the report also addresses source attribution of foodborne STEC infections globally in order to inform the development of international standards by the Codex Alimentarius on the control of STEC, and in particular identify the foods which should be the focus of those standards. Finally it provides a review of monitoring programmes and methodology for STEC which can serve as a reference for countries planning to develop such programmes.