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Book (stand-alone)Assessment of IUU activities on Lake Victoria 2012
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No results found.Fishing all over the world is a major source of food for humanity and a provider of employment and economic benefits to those engaged in the activity. However, with increased knowledge and the dynamic development of fisheries, it should be known that world living aquatic resources, although renewable, are not infinite and need proper management, if their continued contribution to the nutritional, economic and social well-being of the growing world’s population is to be sustained. Lake Victoria i s Africa’s largest and most important inland water body with a total water surface area of 68,800km2. Lake Victoria contributes significantly through its fishery and generation of electricity to the economic benefits of not only the riparian states, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, but also to the neighboring countries and the world at large. Lake Victoria is arguably the most important single source of freshwater fish on the African continent, contributing significantly to national and regional econ omies and livelihoods of the regions inhabitants. Although not often associated with inland fisheries, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and the trade of illegal fish has threatened the biological, social, financial and cultural integrity of the lakes resources and those that depend on them. Given that Lake Victoria’s living resources are shared amongst the three riparian states, a regional fisheries body, the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization (LVFO) was formed in 1994 though the technical assistance of the FAO to manage the fisheries resources in Lake Victoria as a single ecological entity. Within the LVFO mandate, the identified areas of IUU fishing are considered in the form of: Illegal or misuse of fishing gears; illegal fishing, fish landing, processing and trading; unregulated fishing number of boats, fishers and gears (capacity); unregulated, unreported or undocumented domestic and regional fish trade; fishing and landing undersize fish in undesignated landing sites; and fishing during closed seasons or in the closed breeding areas or critical habitats. The decline of Nile perch stocks suggest that fisheries management and compliance structures within the three riparian states and at LVFO at the moment are at various levels of disarray, hence allowing IUU fishing to continue thriving unabated. Since the introduction of Nile perch into Lake Victoria in the 1950’s it has been the focus of an intensifying commercial fishery. In 1980, a total of 4 439 to ns of Nile perch were harvested, a decade later over 338 115 tons of Nile perch were landed annually. From 2000 to 2010, and average of 253 404 tons of Nile perch are caught. Despite relatively consistent landings reported by the LVFO, total biomass of Nile perch decreased from 1.4 million tons (92% of total biomass in Lake Victoria) in 1999 to it lowest recorded estimate of 298 394 tons in 2008 (14.9% of total biomass in Lake Victoria). Currently, as of 2010, the Nile perch biomass was estimate d at 18% of total biomass in Lake Victoria, which equates to 367 800 tons. Although a slight increase in biomass between 2008 and 2010 was observed, Nile perch biological indicators suggest that the fish is in a critical survival state. The average size of Nile perch has decreased from 51.7 cm TL to 26.6 cm TL, according to hydro acoustic surveys suggesting that a significant portion of total Nile perch biomass is less than 50 cm TL (legal size for export). It was reported by the LVFO stock asse ssment team that in 2006 and 2008, less than 2% of the Nile perch biomass was in fact greater than 50 cm TL. The size at first maturity of male and female Nile perch is also decreasing, this common amongst fish populations that are stressed (or overexploited). Despite the biological indicators, which suggest legal size Nile perch are less than 2% of total Nile perch biomass, the average number of fishermen increased by 33% between 2000 and 2008. During the same period, Frame survey and MCS compl iance missions noted a marked increase in the number of illegal gears being deployed to target undersize Nile perch. The number of vessels increased by 37% and the use of outboard engines increased by approximately 50%. It has been reported that motorized boats are more efficient, catching about 25 kg of fish per day, compared to 10 kg caught by non-motorized vessels. The increase in use of illegal gears, motorized vessels and fishermen suggests that fishing for Nile perch is still profitable. P reviously driven by lucrative export prices for Nile perch, fishers now target undersize illegal Nile perch for the lucrative domestic and regional trade, which is estimated to exceed the export trade by volume and value. This shift in fishing for undersize Nile perch will effect government revenues earned from the export fishery. The Nile perch fishery over the last decade contributed 0.6% less to the Tanzanian GDP, similarly, a decrease in export trade of Nile perch from Uganda of 14% occurred between 2007 and 2008, resulting in a 0.1% decrease in GDP contribution. By not controlling fishing effort targeting illegal, undersized and immature Nile perch, economic and social hardships will worsen. Current fisheries management both regionally through the LVFO, and nationally amongst the riparian states is inadequate, with respect to Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS). MCS is a collection of activities and tools intended to support fisheries management in fighting IUU fishing, and forms the framework on which accurate, informative and dynamic fisheries management decisions can be made. MCS is critical at all levels of fisheries management. Within the Lake Victoria region, co-management has been implemented through the establishment of Beach Management Units (BMU’s). A BMU is a community-based organization, which is legally accepted as a representative of a fishing community and is mandated on a voluntary basis to engage in MCS initiatives. Lake Victoria has 1 087 registe red BMU’s according to the harmonized BMU guidelines, agreed upon amongst the member states and the LFVO. Although the inclusion of community based management and MCS is critical in contributing to effective management of Lake Victoria’s fisheries resources, many challenges exist, including amongst others; geographical isolation of fishing communities, social issues (families of BMU members may partake in illicit activities), political interference (revenue collections, or election voting), corr uption, conflict of interests (BMU members are often fishmongers and fish traders) and lack of representation in higher management committees. Although advances in MCS technology have revolutionized fisheries management amongst many ESA-IO countries, the sharing of regional resources and capacity is fragmented and not effectively harnessed by the LVFO. Database management systems are not working effectively, data collecting, analyzing and dissemination are unreliable and time inefficient, respec tively and appropriate MCS tools for example net gauges are not available. The RWG-MCS reported that between 2004 and the end of 2008, a total of 4 605 suspects were apprehended, 12 126 beach seines, 9 550 small seine nets, 27 703 monofilament nets, 248 843 kilograms of immature Nile perch (249 tons) and 254 589 illegal gillnets were confiscated. These data are unreliable; furthermore they were not quantified in terms of definition of the item (how long were the nets that were confiscated 80 met er, or one kilometer, this has a profound effect on CPUE), of financial loss to fishers and traders versus the opportunity costs of MCS. The valve of court fines are insignificant especially if one considers the amount of uncontrolled fishing effort, uncontrolled illegal gears used in Lake Victoria, and the increasing value in the trade of immature fish on domestic markets. Also, there is no indication as to whether the court penalties and fines imposed on the same offences in the three partner states have any reference to the same severity across the region, or are recycled back into MCS initiatives. It is therefore difficult to determine whether the RWG-MCS interventions from 2004 to the end of 2008 were beneficial, as little to no comparative data exists. The LVFO depends highly on donor funds to support MCS and management initiatives, including training, capacity building and technical expertise. When donor funds are not available, regional MCS stagnates, which is a major concern. Operation Save the Nile perch is one such example. The EAC Council of Ministers in 2009 launched the ‘Operation Save the Nile Perch’ (OSNP), which required each of the three member states to contribute US$ 600 000. The goal of the initiative was to target illegal fishing and to curb the trade in undersize Nile perch currently threatening the economic integrity of Lake Victoria. The target of OSNP, as ratified by the Council of Ministers was to have fisheries illegalities in the lake, based on th e 2008 frame survey data as bench mark, reduced by 50% in June and 100% by December 2009. Currently as of 2011, Kenya has paid the required funds, with Tanzania only contributing 31% and Uganda zero resulting in less than half of the required funds paid in by from the member states. This undermines the legitimacy of ‘Operation Save the Nile Perch’ and political will and MCS operational capacity. The aim of this report was to assess the state of IUU in Lake Victoria, and to support the SMARTFISH programme in assisting the LVFO and established MCS committees to implement joint regional MCS trainings, by conducting a short cost benefit analysis of enhancing existing regional MCS initiatives and by evaluating past and present regional action plans to deter IUU fishing on Lake Victoria. An action plan was developed through a participatory workshop between the LVFO, national states and the MCS-RWG, held in Jinja, Uganda from the 5th to the 7th of October 2011. -
Book (stand-alone)Primary survey of Beach Management Units (BMU) in the Kenyan coastal marine fisheries 2012
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No results found.Beach Management Units (BMUs) are the backbone of fisheries co-management in Kenya, led by the Fisheries Department, Ministry of Fisheries Development. Enactment of BMU Regulations, 2007 has provided necessary legal framework for the BMUs to operate and about 73 BMUs have been formed in the Coastal region of Kenya since their introduction in 2006. Implementation of Regional Fisheries Strategy for ESA-IO, commonly known as Smart Fish has initiated a BMU Evaluation Framework in the Kenyan coastal marine fisheries as a pilot project, in its quest to accompany the BMU process in the ESA coastal and riparian countries. The overall objective of the evaluation was to assess the performance of BMUs in the Kenyan coastal marine fisheries. Specific objectives were: i) to assess the organisational performance of BMUs, ii) to verify critical conditions for BMU success, iii) to assess individual BMU member achievements and iv) to assess lead institution governance performance. Sampling targeted 34% of coastal BMUs situated along the 600 km Kenyan coastline. The coastline is traversed by five counties namely, Kwale, Mombasa, Kilifi, Tana River and Lamu. Structured interviews (Likert six-point scale) and Focus Group Discussions were held with BMU representatives, including executives and individual members. Structured interviews were also done with senior Fisheries Officers in each county. Standard evaluation criteria approaches of effectiveness, efficiency, relevance and other factors such as governance, socioeconomic benefits, human resource development and sustainability were employed. In particular, factors considered included organisation performance, performance assessment, critical factors for success, authority, leadership, political vision and adequacy of resources among others. Aggregated indices (arithmetic mean and 3.5 benchmark) on each item were calculated and plotted in bar graphs while descriptive data was analysed thematically. BMU performance findings were groupe d into four major categories namely; organisation profile, organisation performance, critical success conditions and individual BMU led achievements. A further breakdown of the last three factors resulted into 22 key performance, namely; jurisdiction (satisfactory), adaptability (satisfactory), organisational adequacy (satisfactory), democratic practices (satisfactory), social-cultural considerations (satisfactory), cooperation (satisfactory), collaboration (satisfactory), communication (satisfa ctory), mutual trust (moderately satisfactory), participation (moderately satisfactory), networking (moderately satisfactory), leadership (moderately satisfactory), conflict resolution (moderately satisfactory), representativity (satisfactory unsatisfactory), cohesion (moderately satisfactory), inclusion (moderately satisfactory), effectiveness (moderately satisfactory), resources (moderately unsatisfactory), efficiency (moderately unsatisfactory), relevance (moderately unsatisfactory), enforcem ent (moderately unsatisfactory) and cost/benefits (unsatisfactory). These former nine factors can be considered as major constraints to BMU survival. -
Book (stand-alone)Options to reduce IUU fishing in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zanzibar 2011
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No results found.This Report is in support of the EU/COI SMARTFiSH Programme’s Result Area 2, which is to improve the Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) of fisheries in the western Indian Ocean and the Great Lakes. The overall objective of this report is to contribute to the reduction of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing in the target countries of Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania (URT), but with a particular emphasis on unreported and unregulated fishing. Four main fisher ies are covered; the EEZ Tuna fisheries, the fisheries of Lake Victoria, the near-shore Industrial Prawn fishery and Coastal Artisanal fisheries. There is a particular focus on the small-scale fisheries operating along the coast and on Lake Victoria. The Report describes the current scope of data provision, management and use in these fisheries, and the fisheries management challenges faced by the three target countries, and it concludes with a number of recommendations for SMARTFiSH programmes intervention The report was prepared largely on the basis of interviews conducted in-country with officers from the respective fisheries departments and on the contents of literature provided by them. In addition, representatives of national research organisations, the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organisation and NGOs working on the coast were also able to communicate their perspective and current contributions to fisheries management and the reduction of IUU fishing. The management of EEZ tuna fish eries is the responsibility of the Deep-sea Fishing Authority (DSFA) in the URT. Although fisheries are generally not a Union issue, the recently operational DSFA represents both mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar’s interests in EEZ fisheries management. In Kenya responsibility lies with the Ministry of Fisheries Development (KMFD), which is headquartered in Nairobi but has an important office in Mombasa. At a regional level, stock assessment work is undertaken by the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (I OTC), of which both Kenya and URT are members. The provision of accurate and timely fisheries data to the IOTC is a sine qua non for the future sustainability of the tuna fisheries in the Indian Ocean and although data are also passed directly to the IOTC by fishing companies, it is important that member states have independent data sets to evaluate the performance of the fishery in their respective EEZs. This will become particularly relevant if national quotas become the favoured management ap proach in the region.
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