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BookletFAO rapid qualitative risk assessment
Risk of H5 high pathogenicity avian influenza introduction in Central and South America and the Caribbean
2023Also available in:
The assessment is based on the identification of main risk pathways for highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) introduction, including informal/formal trade of live poultry and their products, and wild bird movements. A questionnaire was disseminated to Veterinary Services to collect data on HPAI risk factors and assess national capacities for HPAI surveillance, diagnosis, prevention, and control. Five levels from negligible to high were used to determine the likelihood of introduction, and a consequence assessment was conducted on potential impacts on the poultry value chain, avifauna, and public health. The assessment also considered the level of uncertainty related to data availability, quality and quantity. FAO will use information from the assessment to provide targeted capacity building support to countries/territories for enhanced HPAI preparedness, prevention, and control. -
Policy briefUpdated joint FAO/WHO/WOAH assessment of recent influenza A(H5N1) virus events in animals and people
14 August 2024
2024Also available in:
No results found.During 2020, high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses arose from previously circulating influenza A(H5Nx) viruses and spread predominantly via migratory birds to many parts of Africa, Asia and Europe. This epizootic event has led to unprecedented numbers of deaths in wild birds and caused outbreaks in poultry. In late 2021, these viruses crossed the Atlantic Ocean to North America and subsequently reached South America in October 2022. Over the past few years, there have been increased detections of A(H5N1) viruses in non-avian species globally including wild and domestic (companion and farmed) terrestrial and marine mammals, with recent cases in livestock in the United States of America. The majority of A(H5N1) viruses characterized genetically since 2020 belong to the haemagglutinin (HA) H5 clade 2.3.4.4b, with some regional exceptions. Since the beginning of 2021, 35 detections of A(H5N1) virus in humans have been reported to WHO, along with five cases of A(H5) virus detection in persons exposed to A(H5N1) infected animals. Of these human cases where the A(H5) clade is known (n = 31), 17 have been caused by clade 2.3.4.4b viruses. -
Policy briefJoint FAO/WHO/WOAH preliminary assessment of recent influenza A(H5N1) viruses
23 April 2024
2024Also available in:
During 2020, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses arose from previously circulating influenza A(H5Nx) viruses and spread predominantly via migratory birds to many parts of Africa, Asia and Europe. The epizootic has led to unprecedented numbers of deaths in wild birds and caused outbreaks in domestic poultry. In late 2021, these viruses crossed to North America and subsequently South America in October 2022. Additionally, globally, there have been increased detections of A(H5N1) viruses in non-avian species including wild and domestic (including companion and farmed) terrestrial and marine mammals and, more recently in goats and dairy cattle in the United States of America. The majority, with some regional exceptions, of the HPAI A(H5N1) viruses characterized genetically since 2020 belong to the 2.3.4.4b clade. Since the beginning of 2021, 28 detections of A(H5N1) in humans have been reported to WHO, including a case who had exposure to dairy cattle presumed to be infected with A(H5N1) virus. Of these human cases, where the haemagglutinin (HA) H5 clade is known, 13 have been caused by clade 2.3.4.4b viruses. This joint FAO/WHO/WOAH risk assessment focuses on A(H5N1) viruses characterized since 2021 and assesses the public health risk as well as the risk of the virus spread among animals.
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