7.1 Introduction
7.2 The Performance of the Board of Trustees
7.3 Senior Management Leadership
7.4 Organizational Culture
7.5 Centre-Commissioned External Reviews - an Evaluation
The Panel has identified and reviewed four distinct components of the "governance" function to form its judgement of the quality and professionalism of the leadership of the Institute. These are (1) the performance of the Board of Trustees; (2) Senior Management's leadership; (3) the organizational culture within which this leadership role is exercised; and (4) the efficacy of the Centre-Commissioned External Reviews (CCERs) that underpin the scientific programme judgements made by the leadership.
7.2.1 Overview and Historical Perspective
7.2.2 Board Size and Composition
7.2.3 A Different Approach to Standing Committees
7.2.4 Evaluating the Board's Leadership
Following a mixed review of the Board's performance as documented in the Report of the Third EMPR of (then) IBPGR (dated October, 1991) the Board began immediately to introduce process reforms aimed at fulfilling the five recommendations made in that report. These were to: (1) increase its roles in strategic planning; (2) strengthen its oversight of management and finance; (3) reduce its size, and the size of its Executive Committee; (4) participate in the annual internal programme reviews; and (5) give more attention to the Institute's financial needs and expenditure patterns. Much has been accomplished and, today, the Board processes have significantly improved such that it is in conformity with customary standards expected of all CGIAR Boards.
The Board is comprised of well-qualified and highly motivated Trustees who are strongly committed to the Institute and its mission. Through its strong leadership it has established sound working relationships with Management and conducts its business in an open, transparent, and participatory mode. It knows that much remains to be done to sharpen its strategic vision and adjust priorities to the challenges that lie ahead: it is firmly dedicated to the task.
Recognizing the need for constant self-assessment and adaptation to evolving circumstances, the Board continues to search for more effective ways to carry out its responsibilities to the Institute and to the CGIAR. It is currently conducting a multi-year experiment with alternative arrangements to the conventional Standing Committee structure (see below).
IPGRI's constitution authorizes a Board of 15 members, of whom 12 are selected by the Board (of whom 4 must be nominated by the CGIAR); one is appointed by the host country (Italy); one is appointed by FAO (but who is non-voting); and one is the Director-General who is an ex-officio member.
In response to the Third EPMR recommendations, the Board chose to fill only 10 of the 12 Board-selectable positions, thereby restricting the total number of members to 13. A Board quorum is eight. The nationality, area of expertise, and gender distribution of the current Board are as shown in Table 7.1, and the Panel commends the Board and management for the wide distributions - which are at or above CG norms.
In its efforts to aid the nominations process, the Board has recently developed and adopted a "Board Profile" that articulates the guiding principles for selection of new Trustees in terms of fields of expertise, gender, and desired regional and institutional representation: a useful initiative that gives sharper focus and guidance to the nominations process. As the Board is adjusting its size and profile of members and preparing for the EPMR and MTP, it chose to extend the term of its present Chairperson for one year. The current Chairperson has provided valuable leadership to the Board during this period of rapid growth of the Centre and innovations in Board operations.
Table 7.1: Composition of IPGRI's Governing Board
|
Name |
Country |
Speciality |
Gender |
'91 |
'92 |
'93 |
'94 |
'95 |
'96 |
|
Castillo G. |
Philippines |
Social Science |
F |
|
x |
x |
x |
x |
x |
|
Cauderon Y. |
France |
Cytogenetics |
F |
x |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Chin H.F. |
Malaysia |
Seed Physiology |
M |
x |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Chopra V.L |
India |
Biotechnology |
M |
x |
x |
|
|
|
|
|
Collins W. *** |
USA |
Plant Breeding |
F |
x |
x |
x |
x |
x |
x |
|
Demir N. |
Turkey |
Agr. Economics |
M |
x |
x |
x |
x |
x |
x |
|
de Menyonga J.M. |
Cameroon |
Plant Pathology |
M |
x |
x |
x |
x |
x |
x |
|
de Miranda Santos M. |
Brazil |
Genetics |
M |
|
|
|
|
x |
x |
|
Fujimaki H. |
Japan |
Plant Breeding |
M |
|
|
x |
x |
x |
x |
|
Hawtin G.C. |
Canada |
Genetics |
M |
x |
x |
x |
x |
x |
|
|
Holden J |
UK |
Plant Genetics |
M |
x |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Holm-Nielsen L.B. ** |
Denmark |
Botany |
M |
x |
x |
x |
x |
x |
x |
|
Kikuchi F. |
Japan |
Plant Genetics |
M |
x |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Marshall D.R. |
Australia |
Plant Genetics |
M |
x |
x |
|
|
|
|
|
Monti L. |
Italy |
Plant Breeding |
M |
x |
x |
x |
x |
x |
x |
|
Murata N. |
Japan |
Plant Breeding |
M |
x |
x |
x |
|
|
|
|
Murphy C.F. |
USA |
Plant Breeding |
M |
x |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nakagahra M. |
Japan |
Plant Genetics |
M |
|
|
|
|
|
x |
|
de Nuce M. |
France |
Agronomy |
M |
|
|
|
x |
x |
x |
|
Papasolomontos A. |
Cyprus |
Plant Protection |
M |
x |
x |
x |
x |
|
|
|
Sevilla-Panizo R. |
Peru |
Plant Breeding |
M |
x |
x |
x |
x |
x |
|
|
Spence J. |
Trinidad & Tobago |
Plant Protection |
M |
x |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Tossell W.E. * |
Canada |
Plant Breeding |
M |
x |
x |
x |
|
|
|
|
Toure M. |
Senegal |
Research Management |
M |
x |
|
|
|
|
|
|
van Sloten D.H. |
Netherlands |
Trop. Horticulture |
M |
x |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Virgo J. |
Australia |
Management |
F |
|
x |
x |
x |
x |
x |
|
Worede M. |
Ethiopia |
Plant Breeding |
M |
|
x |
x |
x |
x |
x |
|
Zehni M. |
Libya |
Plant Physiology |
M |
|
|
|
x |
x |
|
* Board Chair 1989-93
** Board Chair 1993-94 (appointed to World Bank in 1994)
*** Board Chair 1994 -
1) Normal terms April-March, hence a three-year term can show as membership in four calendar years.
In an attempt to increase participation of members in all facets of the Board's operations, create time which could be used for interactions both with staff and with national programmes, instill a sense of ownership for Board decisions, and provide BOT members with an opportunity to broaden their knowledge of IPGRI's operations, at the April 1995 BOT meeting Management proposed that the Board consider routinely meeting twice a year (once in Rome and once in the field), and operating without standing committees except for a much smaller Executive Committee and a Vavilov-Frankel Fellowships Committee. The Board Chairperson would instead task individual Trustees to introduce and lead the discussions on particular agenda items. Where appropriate, task groups would be appointed to examine particular issues and report back to the Board. After thoughtful consideration and in recognition that many organisations are today "re-engineering" structures once held sacred, the Board decided to try the new structure on an experimental basis for one year and carefully assess the results.
A formal review of this trial modus operandi was carried out in September 1996 (BOT8) by the Board itself and there was general agreement by both the Board and Senior Management that there were significant positive effects: the pervasive theme of the survey feedback is that Board members feel much more included in the Board's deliberations and the Centre's activities, and that the new structure is more efficient in the use of time for both BOT members and centre staff (This, and the prior descriptive paragraphs are adapted from the Board's own tasked assessment of the Trial Board and Committee Structure, dated September 1996, Appendix VI, Draft BOT8 Minutes.)
But there were concerns expressed too. The new model is heavily dependent on the willingness of the Board Chairperson to assume greater responsibility and a heavier workload; and the smaller Executive Committee lacks adequate financial and management representation - considered key functions in carrying out the Board's fiduciary responsibilities. The method of 'tasking', i.e. assigning responsibility for specific Board agenda items to individual Trustees, or groups of Trustees, by the Chairperson shortly before the Board meeting, gave cause for concerns about maintaining the Board's institutional memory over the longer term; and the meeting agendas became crowded-allowing little time for interaction with staff, and the discussion of the agenda items became longer and sometimes less focused. Nevertheless, following an extended and spirited discussion, the Board agreed to continue the new system, albeit with some minor modifications.
During the course of this EPMR, one or more Panel members and the Panel consultant to the Panel attended two Board meetings, BOT 7 and BOT 8. The consultant also reviewed the Minutes of previous meetings, and was permitted to attend the normally closed sessions of BOT 8. Based on its observations, the Panel shares the concerns of Board members, yet recognizes the potential advantages that can come from this different modus operandi. In particular, the use of the 'Committee of the Whole' approach in respect of the typical 'Programme Committee' and 'Nominations' functions has merit.
As was the case with a number of the Board members, the Panel, too, is concerned that:
· the process is heavily dependent on the personal operating style of the Board Chairperson, who, at BOT 8, was asked to remain in the Chair for another year beyond the normal term limits. While this is wholly in accord with Board-approved policies, nevertheless it does signal two potential difficulties: first, that the current experiment may not, in fact, be developing potential future leaders within the Board; and second, upon completion of the current Board Chairperson's extended term, there is no a priori reason to expect that the next Chairperson will want to adopt the same heavy work schedule and modus operandi.;· while rotating the individual 'tasking' of members is helpful in gaining involvement of more Board members in the totality of what IPGRI is trying to do, the Panel is also concerned with the need to ensure that there is continuity within the Board on issues that have long-term consequences. The heavy dependence on the Assistant Director-General's long involvement with IPGRI and its predecessor institute was noted as being an essential element of IPGRI's memory - the more so as no Board member (under the current tasking approach) is in a position to become the acknowledged 'memory' for a particular matter, nor is there any automatically designated member who is the 'back-up' contact to ensure ongoing issue ownership within the Board. The heavy dependence on a single staff member for this key component of IPGRI's corporate life gives cause for concern. (Interestingly, the Board itself has faced this problem in respect of both the Nominations, and Audit and Operations Task Group process where, in order to ensure some degree of continuity, the same Trustee(s) have been tasked for two successive BOT meetings with responsibility for leading the Nominations, and Audit and Operations process.)
· the lack of continuity in the leadership of key areas such as strategic or programmatic content gives rise to the potential for the quality of decisions taken to be less than optimal - although there is no evidence of this to date. With the absence of a standing committee with clear responsibilities for programme oversight, or 'vision', there is the risk that such an important part of the life of the Board will lack a 'home' or forum within which key issues will receive adequate attention. In the Board's own self-evaluation of the experiment, the lack of this strategic approach to its corporate deliberations was noted but the linkage to the lack of a 'home' for such activities was not made.
· as presently constituted, the Executive Committee consists of the Board Chairperson, the Director-General, the designated FAO-appointed Member who is a non-voting member, and one other Member. This limited group (of three, since the FAO Representative is non-voting) may not have sufficient representation to assure that decisions are fully thought through - particularly as they relate to financial matters. The Panel notes two examples: first, that approval of the final 1997 Working Budget was delegated to the Executive (Draft BOT8 Minutes, Para. 103) and second, that the External Auditor advised that there was no Board direction given to the External Auditors at the commencement of the 1995 audit. The Board Chairperson informed the Panel that the Executive Committee has not met in two years. The Panel notes that the Chairperson and the Director General regularly correspond on matters and decide those issues that warrant the attention of the Executive Committee.
· it may prove difficult to attract candidates to serve on the Board that is structured to have continually rotating assignments within it.
With respect to the Board of Trustees, the Panel recommends that the Executive Committee consist of five positions: the Board Chairperson, the Director General (ex-officio), two members who have been tasked with multiyear leadership responsibility for the Audit & Operations and Programme oversight functions, respectively, and the FAO Representative (as required by the terms of the MOU on Programme Cooperation with FAO).
The current leadership of the Board can be characterized as innovative and determined to improve Board composition and processes to support and advance the evolving mandate and mission of IPGRI. Agendas and supporting documents are complete, convenient to use, and available in advance.
As mentioned earlier, the Board has excellent relationships with the Institute's senior management and with Donors. Staff at all levels in the organisation would prefer to have greater access to the Board. Part of their concerns stem from the strong belief that, in order for the Board to provide strategic leadership, it must interact with the staff at a professional level. Another view, widely held, is that the Board spends a great deal of time on short-term financial issues, but little time on the longer-term programme issues that will define the Institute's strategy, and success, in the years ahead. Staff have also commented that the experimental approach does require even more time to prepare Board documents than previously and that the Board may not be fully appreciative of this fact.
More importantly, in the Panel's view, however, is that the Board does not yet seem to have reached a consensus view of its appropriate level of decision-making. Its attention ranges from policy-making at the most strategic level to sometimes quite close involvement in matters of detail that could readily be left with management. Much of this attention to detail stems from past activities related to the separation from FAO and the incorporation of INIBAP into the Institute - issues that are now past and that should no longer impact on the Board's ability to lift the focus of its attentions to a more strategic level of activity.
To its credit, however, it must be noted that the IPGRI Board - possibly more conscientiously than any other Board in the CGIAR System - is actively reviewing how it goes about its own deliberations and is to be commended. It reviews its own performance after each meeting - providing feedback where possible to members, and it already has a proposal on the table to address the perceived shortcomings. The Panel's recommendation given above reflects the tenor of the draft proposal.
Given the state of flux in the Board's current modus operandi, and the current opportunities to re-think its roles and responsibilities, the Panel suggests that the Board prepare a Position Paper for inclusion in the Board Policies & Procedures Manual that clearly articulates its role in respect of both programmatic and managerial oversight.
In its review of the Institute's priority-setting processes, the Panel looked for clearly articulated linkages between the Institute's basic mission statements, the stated regional, thematic, and institutional objectives, and the budgeted resource envelopes for each project within IPGRI's portfolio. Neither the 'Diversity' document, nor the Draft MTP, nor the draft Regional Strategy papers articulate these linkages.
There is a key role for IPGRI's Board of Trustees here - to ensure that there is a coherent, and well-articulated set of strategies that will guide the Institute in its priority-setting, and resource allocation decisions. For example, the BOT and Management must decide how quickly the Institute can and should grow: it must determine the relative growth between IPGRI's PGR portfolio and INIBAP's portfolio, and the level of support for the SGRP, and other initiatives.
IPGRI has not faced serious budgetary constraints heretofore, but it is clear that future funding levels will almost certainly be conditioned on logically reasoned and clearly articulated answers to these resource allocation questions. The Board itself recognized this apparent disconnection in the Institute's planning processes during its Project Portfolio Analysis discussions during BOT 8 (Draft BOT8 Minutes, para. 71 refers.) and, in order to involve the Board and Staff more closely in this strategic planning process, the Panel recommends that an ad hoc Committee of Board members and staff be formed to translate the broad statements of the Diversity for Development document, and other, more recent draft strategy papers, into a set of operational statements that will guide the resource allocation and priority-setting decisions that must underpin the implementation of the MTP (1998-2000), and PPRC programme deliberations. The work of the ad hoc Committee could be completed by end-1997, and its report presented by Management to the full Board for its review and approval.
The Panel has uniformly high regard for the leadership that the Director General and his team have provided the Institute since their appointments. Difficult times required strong, dedicated, yet sensitive leadership skills that have been exhibited, and have been effective in bringing IPGRI to where it is today. There have been difficult issues to thread through - some connected with the integration of INIBAP within IPGRI, and others involving the difficult negotiations over the separation of IPGRI from FAO.
While staff have a number of criticisms regarding the new performance appraisal system initiatives, they recognize that such new initiatives often come with both a learning curve, and teething troubles: they appreciate that management is working positively in putting appropriately modem systems in place for the good of the staff and for the Institute itself. Management's willingness to set up a Staff-Management task force to look at the issues surrounding this problem and to give staff opportunity to express their views was seen by all as a positive response, and no doubt contributes to the positive 'spirit' that exists within the Institute.
Senior Management has also taken stock of where there are weaknesses in the Institute's operations and is acting accordingly: it is in the process of recruiting a head of Human Resources with experience commensurate with the needs of the Institute; it has recruited a Budget Officer to handle the increasing workloads associated with the substantial increase in restricted core funding of much of IPGRI's budget; and it has internally reorganized its staff to better match skills with activities. As noted elsewhere it has also taken the initiative to upgrade the Institute's management information systems on projects and activities, including the many outsourced contracts that it now manages.
Overall, the Panel was impressed with the quality, professionalism, and dedication of the Institute's management team.
Culture, in an organizational sense, can be thought of as that blending of social mores, attitudes to work, and behavioural patterns with the purposeful work ethic as exampled by the leadership of the institution.
As mentioned elsewhere in this report, IPGRI is a relatively young institution with a cultural heritage that is now a blend of the parental FAO-related culture and a culture that typically comes with a new, small organisation with fresh leadership and a strong drive to succeed. The Panel noted how effectively IPGRI has detached itself from FAO in a relatively short timeframe and sees this as a positive step - since a clean break from any previous 'parent' is the sine qua non of building a strong, new institutional culture. This is not a criticism of any previous parent organization's culture; rather it is clear from management literature that cultural carry-over from earlier organizational parentage will inevitably impinge on the leadership effectiveness in any sibling organization. Indeed IPGRI management is to be commended for the new and constructive relations it has forged with FAO over the past few years.
As it interacted with the staff over multiple sessions in Rome and in the regional offices, the Panel noted a strong team spirit, with good communications within the working levels, and a keen desire by all to 'get on with the job'.
The contributory role played by the physical facilities in moulding cultural matters cannot be dismissed and this topic is covered in Chapter 9 below, where it is noted that the current space layout may not be conducive to a free flow of communications between the operational staff and Senior management.
The Centre-Commissioned External Reviews (CCERs) and the CGIAR-commissioned EPMRs now form part of a two-stage integrated process of external reviews. CCERs were brought formally into the external review process subsequent to the discussion at ICW95 of the document entitled "Improving Quality and Consistency of the CGIAR's External Centre Reviews" prepared by TAC and the CGIAR Secretariat. The CCERs are commissioned by the Centre Boards to periodically assess the effectiveness and impact of particular aspects of a Centre's work; and the EPMRs complement the CCERs by providing a wholly external assessment of the Centre's strategy, programmes, achievements and management.
In 1993 IPGRI's Board set up a system to review the activities of each of its eight programme groups between the Third and the Fourth EPMRs. These reviews constitute the CCERs in the context of the current CGIAR external review approach. The process used, in general, is that, first, a briefing paper is prepared by the programme group, approximately 2 to 3 months prior to a Board meeting. A review Panel consisting of one Board member and 2 or 3 external consultants carry out the review shortly before the Board meeting based on the background documents, interactions with staff, and with partners as appropriate. At the Board meeting the Panel's report is presented by the Panel Chairperson and staff also make presentations. After detailed consideration of the report, the Board makes its final report on the programme group. A response to the review, prepared by the programme group and senior management, is made to the Board some six months after the review indicating whether or not the Board's recommendations have been implemented.
The CCERs made available to the Panel were as follows:
· Asia, the Pacific and Oceania Group, September 1993 (This review is not strictly a CCER - it was a Programme Committee report)· Documentation, Information and Training Group, March 1994
· Europe Group, September 1994
· Germplasm Maintenance and Use Group, March 1995
· West Asia and North Africa Group, September 1995
· Genetic Diversity Group, March 1996
· Americas Group, August 1996
· Sub-Saharan Africa Group, September 1996.
To a large extent, the quality and objectivity of the CCER reports depend on the commissioning process which is the responsibility of the Board. At IPGRI, management plays an active role in the CCER process: for example, the terms of reference are drafted by the DDG Programme in consultation with the Board Chairperson and the Director-General; the composition of the CCER Panels (except for the participating Board member who is chosen by the Board Chairperson) is decided by management, in consultation with the Board, who also appoints the Panel members; and the DDG-Programme serves as the resource person to the Panel. Further, a Board member has served as a full Panel member in every CCER, and, in some earlier CCERs, a Board member has chaired the Panel. Furthermore, a Board Chairperson of another CGIAR institute has served on a CCER.
For the future, the Panel suggests that
· the Board should rely less heavily on management in designing the CCERs and in the nomination and selection of the Panel members, and that the terms of reference, membership, and the workplan of each CCER be discussed and approved by the Board;· as a matter of principle, the practice of appointing a Board member to serve as a full Panel member or as a Panel chairperson should be changed - Board members and staff should only serve as resource persons, so that the externality of the CCER process is fully maintained; and
· Board Chairs of other CGIAR institutes should not serve on a CCER Panel.
The Panel commends the Board and senior management on its initiatives in this important area of programme monitoring. It records that the CCER process adopted by IPGRI has improved the coverage and quality of information available to the EPMR Panel, thus permitting the Panel to focus on strategic concerns and the longer-term horizon.
