Joint FAO/WHO/WOAH preliminary assessment of recent influenza A(H5N1) viruses

FAO; WHO; WOAH;

Joint FAO/WHO/WOAH preliminary assessment of recent influenza A(H5N1) viruses

23 April 2024

Year of publication 2024

Place of publication Rome, Italy ; Geneva, Switzerland ; Paris, France ;

Pages 8 p.

Author FAO; WHO; WOAH;

Publisher FAO ; WHO ; World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) ;

Product type Policy brief

Full item page

Synopsis (short abstract) During 2020, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses arose from previously circulating influenza A(H5Nx) viruses and spread predominantly via migratory birds to many parts of Africa, Asia and Europe. The epizootic has led to unprecedented numbers of deaths in wild birds and caused outbreaks in domestic poultry. In late 2021, these viruses crossed to North America and subsequently South America in October 2022. Additionally, globally, there have been increased detections of A(H5N1) viruses in non-avian species including wild and domestic (including companion and farmed) terrestrial and marine mammals and, more recently in goats and dairy cattle in the United States of America. The majority, with some regional exceptions, of the HPAI A(H5N1) viruses characterized genetically since 2020 belong to the 2.3.4.4b clade. Since the beginning of 2021, 28 detections of A(H5N1) in humans have been reported to WHO, including a case who had exposure to dairy cattle presumed to be infected with A(H5N1) virus. Of these human cases, where the haemagglutinin (HA) H5 clade is known, 13 have been caused by clade 2.3.4.4b viruses. This joint FAO/WHO/WOAH risk assessment focuses on A(H5N1) viruses characterized since 2021 and assesses the public health risk as well as the risk of the virus spread among animals.

Language English

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Spanish

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During 2020, high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses arose from previously circulating influenza A(H5Nx) viruses and spread predominantly via migratory birds to many parts of Africa, Asia and Europe. This epizootic event has led to unprecedented numbers of deaths in wild birds and caused outbreaks in poultry. In late 2021, these viruses crossed the Atlantic Ocean to North America and subsequently reached South America in October 2022. Over the past few years, there have been increased detections of A(H5N1) viruses in non-avian species globally including wild and domestic (companion and farmed) terrestrial and marine mammals, with recent cases in livestock in the United States of America. The majority of A(H5N1) viruses characterized genetically since 2020 belong to the haemagglutinin (HA) H5 clade 2.3.4.4b, with some regional exceptions. Since the beginning of 2021, 35 detections of A(H5N1) virus in humans have been reported to WHO, along with five cases of A(H5) virus detection in persons exposed to A(H5N1) infected animals. Of these human cases where the A(H5) clade is known (n = 31), 17 have been caused by clade 2.3.4.4b viruses.
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