Introduction: TACKLING FOOD PRICE INFLATION TO ACHIEVE ZERO HUNGER
As 2030 nears, the world is significantly behind on achieving Sustainable Development Goal 2 (SDG 2) – end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture – with setbacks worsened by extreme weather events, the COVID-19 pandemic, food price surges, and geopolitical disruptions such as the war in Ukraine. These crises have elevated global hunger and food insecurity above pre-2015 levels, disproportionately affecting low-income populations and threatening other development goals such as poverty reduction and health. While there have been signs of recovery in recent years, persistent inflation has slowed this progress, continuing to undermine purchasing power and access to healthy diets. Although global food prices have somewhat stabilized, inflation remains high in many countries. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2025 explores the causes and impacts of food price inflation, analyses its effects on different food groups and diet affordability, and presents successful policy interventions to help countries in ending hunger, food insecurity, and all forms of malnutrition, while making healthy diets affordable for all.
Food security and nutrition around the world
Food security indicators: latest updates and progress towards ending hunger and ensuring food security
The latest assessment of world hunger, measured by the prevalence of undernourishment (PoU) (SDG Indicator 2.1.1), reveals signs of improvement in recent years. The PoU had begun to rise slowly in 2017 and then increased sharply in 2020 and 2021 in the wake of the pandemic. However, the latest assessment points to encouraging progress from 2022 to 2024. An estimated 8.2 percent of the global population may have faced hunger in 2024, down from 8.5 percent in 2023 and 8.7 percent in 2022. It is estimated that between 638 and 720 million people (7.8 to 8.8 percent of the global population) faced hunger in 2024. Considering the point estimate (673 million), this indicates a decrease of 15 million compared to 2023 and of 22 million compared to 2022.
The progress seen at the global level is driven by notable improvement in South-eastern Asia, Southern Asia – which mainly reflects the impact of new data from India – and South America. The PoU in Asia decreased from 7.9 percent in 2022 to 6.7 percent (323 million people) in 2024. Progress was also made in Latin America and the Caribbean, where the latest estimates show the PoU decreasing to 5.1 percent in 2024 after peaking at 6.1 percent in 2020.
Unfortunately, this positive trend contrasts with the steady rise in hunger in most subregions of Africa and in Western Asia. The PoU in Africa surpassed 20 percent in 2024, and in Western Asia it rose to 12.7 percent.
According to the current projection, 512 million people in the world may be chronically undernourished in 2030, of whom nearly 60 percent will be in Africa, highlighting the immense challenge of achieving SDG 2 (Zero Hunger).
SDG Indicator 2.1.2 – the prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in the population, based on the Food Insecurity Experience Scale – aims to track progress towards the broader goal outlined in SDG Target 2.1 of ensuring access for all people to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year round.
At the global level, the prevalence of food insecurity has declined very gradually since 2021, following the sharp increase in the wake of the pandemic in 2020. From 2023 to 2024, the global prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity decreased slightly, from 28.4 to 28.0 percent. It is estimated that about 2.3 billion people in the world were moderately or severely food insecure in 2024, which is still 335 million more than in 2019, before the pandemic, and 683 million more compared to 2015, when the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was launched.
The trends at the regional level differ notably, with food insecurity on the rise in Africa, falling in Latin America and the Caribbean, and decreasing gradually in Asia for several consecutive years, while in Oceania and in Northern America and Europe, new estimates point to a slight decline from 2023 to 2024 following a several-year rise. The prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in Africa (58.9 percent) is more than double the global average of 28 percent, whereas in Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and Oceania, it is below the global estimate – 25.2, 23.3 and 26.3 percent, respectively.
About 32.0 percent of people living in rural areas in the world were moderately or severely food insecure in 2024, compared to about 28.6 percent in peri-urban areas and 23.9 percent in urban areas. Comparing the assessment in 2024 with 2022, the prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity decreased only in urban areas, from 25.7 to 23.9 percent, while remaining virtually unchanged in rural and peri-urban areas.
Persistent inequalities between men and women are also evident, with food insecurity still more prevalent among adult women than men in every region of the world. The gender gap widened considerably at the global level in the wake of the pandemic, most notably in 2021; it then grew smaller for two consecutive years. But new estimates point to a widening of the gap at the global level between 2023 and 2024.
Cost and affordability of a healthy diet
Monitoring the affordability of healthy diets is essential for informing policies aimed at improving food security and nutritional outcomes, thereby contributing to the achievement of SDG Targets 2.1 and 2.2. The cost of a healthy diet (CoHD) for each country is an estimate of the minimum cost of acquiring a healthy diet, defined as a diet comprising a variety of locally available foods that meet energy and most nutrient requirements. The CoHD is compared to national income distributions to estimate the prevalence of unaffordability of a healthy diet (PUA) and the number of people unable to afford a healthy diet (NUA).
Worldwide, the CoHD has risen since 2017, reaching an average of 4.46 purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars per person per day in 2024. In 2024, the CoHD was highest in Latin America and the Caribbean (5.16 PPP dollars), followed by Asia (4.43 PPP dollars), Africa (4.41 PPP dollars), Northern America and Europe (4.02 PPP dollars) and Oceania (3.86 PPP dollars). Africa had the greatest increase among all world regions from 2023 to 2024.
Over the same period, incomes also grew, thus limiting the potentially negative impact of rising costs. Worldwide, an estimated 31.9 percent of people (2.60 billion) were unable to afford a healthy diet in 2024, compared to 33.5 percent (2.68 billion) in 2022, equivalent to nearly 80 million fewer people in two years.
However, the recovery has been uneven across regions. In recent years, unaffordability has been decreasing significantly in Asia and marginally in Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern America and Europe, and Oceania. Conversely, it has increased substantially in Africa, where the NUA rose above 1 billion in 2024.
The unequal recovery is even more evident across country income groups. The recovery path is slower for low-income countries (LICs), where the NUA has been steadily increasing since 2017. In 2024, a healthy diet was out of reach for 544.7 million people in LICs, equivalent to 72 percent of the population. In upper-middle- and high-income countries (UMICs and HICs), on the other hand, the PUA and the NUA have been declining since 2020. In lower-middle-income countries (LMICs), the NUA decreased between 2020 and 2024, but this improvement is mainly explained by the significant decrease in unaffordability in India.
Economic access to food is a key dimension of food security. People who are unable to afford even a least-cost healthy diet are likely experiencing some level of food insecurity, which can compromise the quality of their diet. Inadequate diets, in turn, play a critical role in shaping nutritional outcomes.
The state of nutrition: progress towards global nutrition targets
Ending malnutrition is foundational to the achievement of nearly all the SDGs. Among the indicators of child nutritional status, only stunting has undergone a significant change, improving from 26.4 percent in 2012 to 23.2 percent in 2024. There were no significant changes at the global level for child overweight (5.3 percent in 2012 to 5.5 percent in 2024) and for child wasting (7.4 percent in 2012 and 6.6 percent in 2024). Encouragingly, no regions experienced worsening in the prevalence of child wasting between 2012 and 2024, and decreases occurred in Western Africa (from 8.2 to 6.5 percent) and Central Asia (from 3.8 to 2.1 percent). Also, the percentage of children in the world benefiting from exclusive breastfeeding increased substantially: from 37.0 percent in 2012 to 47.8 percent in 2023. Nevertheless, all indicators of child nutrition need accelerated progress to achieve the 2030 targets.
There was deterioration in both nutrition indicators for older age groups. For adult obesity, the prevalence rose from 12.1 percent in 2012 to 15.8 percent in 2022. For anaemia in women aged 15 to 49 years, new updated data reflect no improvement or an increase in prevalence in nearly all regions from 2012 to 2023, and the global prevalence increased from 27.6 to 30.7 percent.
More than half of countries with data to assess progress on child wasting (74 out of 132) are on track to achieve the 2030 target. For child stunting, 35 percent of countries (56 out of 160) are on track; and for child overweight, 21 percent of countries with progress data (34 out of 162) are on track. Low birthweight has the lowest percentage of on-track countries of all the child nutritional status indicators, at 8 percent (12 out of 158). Despite considerable improvement over the last decade, only 19 percent of countries with progress data (21 out of 112) are on track to achieve the 2030 exclusive breastfeeding target. For anaemia in women aged 15 to 49 years and adult obesity, very few countries are on track.
In March 2025, the United Nations Statistical Commission officially endorsed the prevalence of minimum dietary diversity (MDD) as a new indicator for monitoring progress towards SDG Target 2.2 – to end all forms of malnutrition by 2030. Minimum dietary diversity captures the diversity of diets of two nutritionally vulnerable populations – children aged 6 to 23 months (MDD-C) and women aged 15 to 49 years (MDD-W).
Globally, only one-third (34 percent) of children aged 6 to 23 months and two-thirds (65 percent) of women aged 15 to 49 years achieved minimum dietary diversity. In other words, one-third of women and – even more worryingly – about two-thirds of children aged 6 to 23 months in the world consumed diets that were not sufficiently diverse, thereby putting them at risk of inadequate intake of essential vitamins and minerals required for good nutrition and health.
Understanding the 2021–2023 food PRICE inflation surge: causes and consequences for food security and nutrition
Food price inflation: stylized facts
Since late 2020, domestic food retail prices have risen significantly across most countries, posing considerable challenges for both consumers and policymakers. Year-on-year global average food price inflation surged from 5.8 percent in December 2020 to a staggering 23.3 percent in December 2022. These figures are heavily influenced by countries that experienced hyperinflation, such as the Sudan, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and Zimbabwe, where year-on-year inflation peaks reached levels well above 350 percent. Using the median provides a more accurate reflection of global inflation levels: median food price inflation increased sharply from 2.3 percent in December 2020 to 13.6 percent in January 2023.
Global food price inflation has significantly outpaced headline inflation since 2020, reflecting the heightened volatility and persistent pressures within agricultural and food markets. At the onset of the pandemic in early 2020, overall inflation remained relatively low. Though still modest, food price inflation was significantly higher than headline inflation. At its peak in January 2023, food price inflation was 5.1 percentage points higher than headline inflation (i.e. 13.6 percent vs 8.5 percent). Throughout 2023, both inflation rates remained at high levels but with a decreasing trend.
Food price inflation has been particularly acute in LICs. Most households, even those dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods, rely on markets for their food supplies. Market-based food sourcing leaves households vulnerable to sharp price increases, exacerbating food insecurity, deepening poverty, and limiting access to and consumption of healthy diets. Smallholder farmers and agricultural labourers are often net food buyers, so rising food prices typically outweigh any income gains they receive from selling their produce. Consequently, rising food prices not only strain household budgets but also challenge rural livelihoods, undermining progress towards poverty reduction and food security and nutrition.
Why high food price inflation?
The global policy response to the pandemic was unprecedented, with massive fiscal and monetary interventions critical to averting economic collapse – while also laying the groundwork for the inflationary pressures that followed. Governments mobilized around USD 17 trillion in fiscal support, with HICs deploying the bulk of this stimulus to protect jobs, sustain demand and stabilize markets. This support was equivalent to nearly 10 percent of global gross domestic product over two years. At the same time, central banks reduced interest rates, launched large-scale bond purchases, and provided emergency liquidity to keep financial systems functioning. These actions softened the economic blow of the pandemic. However, as supply chains remained strained and global demand rebounded sharply, the expansive policy environment contributed to rising inflation. Central banks eventually shifted course, tightening monetary policy to curb price surges.
The war in Ukraine, amplified by multiple extreme weather events, marked a second major global shock to food markets, disrupting trade routes, amplifying uncertainty, and reinforcing inflationary pressures set in motion by the pandemic. As major exporters of wheat, maize, and sunflower oil, Ukraine and the Russian Federation jointly accounted for roughly 12 percent of globally traded calories in 2021. Hostilities in the Black Sea region – along with additional disruptions in the Red Sea – curtailed exports of grains and fertilizers, particularly affecting LICs and middle-income countries (MICs) reliant on global cereal markets.
These geopolitical shocks compounded the inflationary effects of earlier pandemic-era disruptions, generating two distinct but reinforcing waves of agricultural commodity price surges in 2020. Initial price pressures on agricultural and energy commodities stemmed from fears of supply chain breakdowns, labour shortages, and precautionary trade measures at the onset of the pandemic, pushing prices up by about 15 percentage points. This first surge was briefly tempered by a collapse in global demand, but resumed as economies reopened and fiscal and monetary stimuli took effect. The second, more acute price surge – adding another 18 percentage points – was triggered by the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, which disrupted critical trade flows and curtailed fertilizer exports. Simultaneously, energy markets, destabilized by sanctions on the Russian Federation and shifting trade patterns, saw sharp price increases that fed through to agriculture, as fuel and fertilizers became more expensive.
Agricultural and energy commodity prices were key contributors to recent food price inflation. The rapid increase in food and energy commodity prices after 2020 directly contributed to higher food price inflation. Food prices in 2022 and 2023 rose well above their historical trend. The exogenous effects of agricultural and energy shocks contributed 14 percent and 18 percent to an increase in food prices in the United States of America and the euro area, respectively, at the inflation peak (in United States the inflation peak was in the third quarter of 2022 and in the euro area it was in the first quarter of 2023).
Broader macroeconomic conditions amplified the impact on food price inflation. When accounting for additional pressures from broader macroeconomic developments, such as commodity input costs for food producers and retailers, the estimated contribution of commodity price dynamics accounts for 47 percent and 35 percent of food price inflation in the United States of America and the euro area, respectively. These figures underscore the significant pass-through of agricultural and energy commodity price increases to retail food prices during 2022 to 2023.
However, commodity-driven inflation does not fully explain the extent of the price pressures observed. Actual peaks in food price inflation reached 10.6 percent in the United States of America and 15.7 percent in the euro area, pointing to other contributing factors such as rising labour costs, exchange rate fluctuations and potential increases in profit margins along the supply chain. These factors significantly contributed to food price inflation. In the United States, 53 percent of the increase was driven by markets unrelated to agricultural and energy commodities, compared to 65 percent in the euro area.
Food price inflation puts pressure on food security and nutrition outcomes
The recent surge in global inflation has had adverse effects on living conditions. Global real wages decreased by 0.9 percent in 2022 as inflationary pressures intensified, consistent with evidence that large-scale economic shocks can lead to surges in inflation and a consequent decline in real wages.
The recovery of real wages has been highly uneven across countries, with food price inflation outpacing earnings growth in many contexts. Some countries have seen wages and food prices move in relative tandem, helping to maintain stable food-adjusted earnings. In contrast, others have faced sustained real wage declines. In Egypt, surging food prices, driven by import dependency and foreign currency shortages, have significantly outpaced wage increases since mid-2022, straining household food access. Similarly, in Peru, real wages have not kept pace with inflation: by late 2023, food prices had risen by 34.5 percent relative to their pre-pandemic (early 2020) levels, while earnings had grown only 6.6 percent.
Food price inflation has become a key challenge of rising food insecurity across all income groups, with the steepest increases observed in LICs. From 2019 to 2024, LICs faced an average annual food price inflation rate of 11.4 percent, which coincided with a 6.7 percentage point increase in moderate or severe food insecurity and a 3.5 percentage point rise in severe food insecurity.
Lower-middle-income countries (LMICs) have also seen sharp increases in food insecurity despite facing lower food price inflation than LICs. Between 2019 and 2024, food price inflation in LMICs averaged 7 percent per year, yet moderate or severe food insecurity rose by 5.6 percentage points, and severe food insecurity by 1.6 percentage points. These outcomes likely reflect not only the economic strain of rising food prices, but also the impact of ongoing conflicts (e.g. Lebanon and Myanmar), as well as the broader economic vulnerabilities affecting larger populations (e.g. Nigeria and Pakistan).
Food price inflation is associated with a rise in food insecurity, with its impact varying across contexts. A 10 percent increase in food prices is linked to a rise in moderate or severe food insecurity (3.5 percent) and in severe food insecurity (1.8 percent). Country-specific characteristics, including economic resilience, institutional strength, and exposure to external shocks, determine the extent of vulnerability.
Rising food prices disproportionately undermine food security in contexts of inequality, where structural disparities across income, gender and geography amplify both exposure to shocks and barriers to effective response. In more unequal countries, weaker social protection systems, limited fiscal space, and larger vulnerable populations leave disadvantaged groups, especially women and rural households, at greater risk. Gender-based constraints, such as lower earnings, caregiving responsibilities, and restricted access to resources, reduce women’s capacity to cope with inflation, often forcing them to cut back on food intake during crises. Addressing these intersecting inequalities is essential to mitigating the impacts of food price volatility and building more inclusive, resilient agrifood systems.
Recent food price inflation has heightened the risk of child wasting, underscoring the profound nutritional consequences of price shocks. A 10 percent increase in food prices is associated with a 2.7 to 4.3 percent rise in wasting prevalence and a 4.8 to 6.1 percent increase in severe wasting among children under five years of age. The effects remain robust even after controlling for access to essential services, including clean water, sanitation, and public health services.
The surge in global food price inflation since 2022 has likely exacerbated acute malnutrition, placing millions of children in LICs and LMICs at increased risk. From January 2022 to January 2023, global food prices rose by 13.6 percent, with inflation reaching 25.2 percent in LICs and 11.8 percent in LMICs. During this period, over 65 percent of LICs and 61 percent of LMICs – together home to nearly 1.5 billion people – experienced food price inflation above 10 percent. These regions also report higher levels of child wasting. By 2024, the prevalence of wasting was 6.4 and 9.5 percent in LICs and MICs, respectively (see Annex 1A).
Price inflation of nutrient-dense foods relative to other foods: Are there differences?
Global food price data from 2011, 2017 and 2021 reveal a persistent and stable disparity in the costs of different food groups. Basic starchy staples and oils and fats remain the least expensive sources of dietary energy across all countries. In contrast, more nutritious food groups, such as animal source foods, fruits and vegetables, consistently rank as the most expensive.
Ultra-processed foods are consistently cheaper than foods at any other stage of processing. Despite growing evidence of their adverse health impacts, these products typically contain few or no whole foods and are often high in saturated fats, trans fats, and salt, and depleted of fibre, micronutrients and other bioactive compounds. By 2021, ultra-processed foods were, on average, 47 percent less expensive than unprocessed or minimally processed foods, and 50 percent less expensive than processed foods.
Food price inflation between 2021 and 2023 (and in some countries up to 2024) varied markedly across food groups. Prices for basic starchy staples, such as wheat, starchy tubers, and rice, rose faster than overall food price inflation, while oils and fats also saw steep increases. Case studies show that food price inflation in Mexico, Nigeria and Pakistan substantially outpaced general inflation, with spikes in prices of staples and edible oils. These price surges were especially pronounced in early to mid-2022, aligned with the global cereal market disruptions driven by the war in Ukraine – a major exporter of wheat and oilseeds.
Price premiums for nutrient-rich foods, particularly vegetables, fruits and animal source foods, remain substantial and volatile, reinforcing economic barriers to dietary diversity. These food groups consistently command higher prices than basic starchy staples, which continue to account for the largest share of food expenditures in many developing countries.
Each food group typically includes at least one or two low-cost items that can contribute to a nutritious diet; however, access to healthy diets is shaped not only by prices but also by cultural preferences and dietary habits. Through mid-2023, the CoHD declined in Nigeria before rising again, fluctuated in Pakistan due to seasonality, and steadily increased in Mexico. These findings highlight how the affordability of a healthy diet can vary widely across countries, even under similar inflationary pressures.
How countries navigated the perfect storm: fiscal, monetary and trade policies and their implications for food security and nutrition
From relief to reflections
Addressing food price spikes requires a comprehensive policy approach that balances short-term relief with long-term resilience. Rising food prices, driven by demand or supply shocks, global market volatility, and macroeconomic instability, can have severe consequences for food security, particularly among low-income and vulnerable populations. To mitigate these impacts and prevent future crises, governments can deploy a mix of targeted fiscal interventions, robust social protection systems, coordinated macroeconomic policies, structural and trade-related reforms, and strategic investments in data, infrastructure and innovation. The following measures provide a policy roadmap for managing current pressures while strengthening the foundations of more resilient and equitable agrifood systems.
Designing effective responses to food price inflation
Targeted fiscal measures play a critical role in supporting vulnerable populations during episodes of high food price inflation. These interventions should be carefully aligned with the broader macroeconomic and policy environment of each country. To ensure long-term sustainability, fiscal responses must be timebound and include well-defined exit strategies. This prevents the risk of permanent budgetary commitments that could constrain future fiscal space or bring public debt to unsustainable levels.
Tax reductions on essential goods, including food, can provide immediate relief to households facing rising living costs. However, such measures must be weighed against the need for sustainable public revenues, particularly in countries with limited fiscal capacity. Where tax exemptions are implemented, governments should monitor whether the benefits are effectively passed on to consumers, ensuring that interventions achieve their intended impact.
Strengthening social protection in inflationary environments
Social protection systems – through cash or in-kind transfers – are indispensable for cushioning the effects of food price crises on low-income households. However, in high-inflation contexts, the value of these transfers can erode. Programmes must therefore be calibrated to respond to inflationary pressures, with flexible mechanisms to adjust transfer values and avoid price increases.
Effective social protection requires not only adequate financing but also strong design and delivery systems. Targeting mechanisms should be transparent and responsive, and interventions should complement broader food security and nutrition strategies. In this way, social protection can serve as both a safety net and a stabilizing force during periods of high food prices.
Enhancing monetary–fiscal policy coordination
Macroeconomic stability is essential for addressing food price inflation. Sound fiscal policy must complement credible and transparent monetary policy to anchor inflation expectations and stabilize domestic markets, including agrifood systems. Coordinated actions can help prevent large currency devaluations, mitigate financial volatility, and reinforce investor confidence.
Improving structural and trade-related policy responses
Short-term price interventions, such as price controls or subsidies, may provide temporary relief but often distort markets and are inefficient over time. Governments should instead adopt a stable, coordinated and transparent strategy to manage long-term food price trends. This includes strengthening food reserves, improving market transparency, and investing in trade-related infrastructure.
Export restrictions can ease domestic price pressures in the short term but often disrupt global markets and harm long-term producer incentives. Policymakers should align trade measures with broader food security and risk management goals to minimize unintended impacts.
Maintaining strategic food reserves can help cushion supply shocks and stabilize prices, but these mechanisms must be carefully designed. Policymakers should balance food security and nutrition objectives against potential fiscal and market risks. Embedding food reserves within a broader risk management framework enhances their effectiveness and reduces unintended consequences.
Building resilience through market information and investment
Strengthening agricultural market information systems (MIS) is essential for preventing market disruptions and ensuring price stability. Transparent, reliable and timely data help reduce speculation, support smallholder participation in markets, and improve overall market efficiency. In increasingly complex global agrifood systems, enhanced MIS can be a critical tool for resilience.
Beyond information systems, long-term resilience requires sustained investment in agricultural productivity, infrastructure and innovation. Investments in research and development, storage, and transport infrastructure are particularly important to reduce food loss, improve supply chain functioning, and mitigate future food price shocks. These efforts can lay the foundation for more inclusive and sustainable agrifood systems.
Patterns, policies and pathways: a trajectory analysis
Countries experience diverse food security outcomes in response to food price inflation, despite being exposed to similar global price pressures. Between 2015 and 2023, domestic food price inflation and food security levels varied significantly across countries, revealing critical insights into the role of national policy responses. This heterogeneity offers a valuable opportunity to identify and understand which interventions have effectively mitigated food price shocks and safeguarded food security. The assessment of 153 countries shows that even among those starting from comparable levels of food insecurity, outcomes diverged; some countries maintained stability or improved, while others experienced sharp declines in food security.
An in-depth review of more than 10 000 policy records and 35 distinct policy instruments highlights significant variation in policy responses across countries with different food security trajectories. These findings underscore the importance of context-specific strategies: interventions that yield positive outcomes in one context may be less effective – or even counterproductive – in another. Recognizing and adapting to these contextual differences is essential for designing policy responses that are both immediately effective and sustainable over time.
Countries with lower-medium and high food insecurity tend to rely more heavily on price control measures and agricultural production subsidies. In lower-medium food-insecure countries, price controls were observed in over 25 percent of country-year observations, while in high food-insecure countries, the figure reached 30 percent – both notably higher than in countries with more stable food security. Production subsidies were also significantly more prevalent in these settings. For instance, among high food-insecure countries facing deteriorating food security with mild inflation, nearly 37.2 percent adopted such subsidies. Interestingly, in lower-medium food-insecure countries experiencing improvements in food security despite severe inflation, subsidies were also frequently used (23.2 percent), highlighting the potential effectiveness of well-targeted production support in offsetting inflationary pressures.
In contrast, low food-insecure countries with stable or improving outcomes were more likely to deploy a strategic mix of trade policy instruments. Export restrictions were most common among countries with low baseline food insecurity, particularly those that managed to sustain or improve food security. As baseline food insecurity increased, the frequency of export restrictions declined markedly. Among high food-insecure countries, those with deteriorating food security and only mild inflation often implemented import restrictions (37.2 percent). However, in similar countries that saw food security recover after earlier setbacks, even amid severe inflation, use of import restrictions was far less frequent (5.4 percent). A parallel trend emerged in lower-medium food-insecure countries, where import tariff liberalization was far more common among those with declining food security (38.9 percent) than among those on improving trajectories (4.2 percent), suggesting that reactive, uncoordinated trade policies may undermine long-term food security improvements.
Conclusions
The recent period of food inflationary pressure has again tested the resilience of the world’s agrifood systems in achieving SDG Targets 2.1 and 2.2 – end hunger, food insecurity, and all forms of malnutrition by 2030. While the challenges have been substantial and unprecedented, a clear message emerges: this time, the world has responded more effectively. Signs of improvement in hunger and food insecurity trends suggest that global efforts to recover from recent setbacks have had a positive impact. However, diverging regional trends highlight persistent disparities in the challenges countries face and the policy tools available to them.
Compared to previous crises such as the 2007 to 2008 food price spikes, the global response from 2021 to 2023 was more coordinated, measured and informed. Governments avoided widespread export bans and implemented more targeted, temporary interventions that helped keep agricultural trade flowing and markets functional. Initiatives such as the Agricultural Market Information System enhanced transparency, reduced speculation, and encouraged more rational policy decisions. Countries with strong institutions and social protection systems were able to respond more quickly and support vulnerable populations more effectively. Although inflation placed a significant burden on households, particularly the poorest, these policy improvements and institutional frameworks helped mitigate the sharpest effects.
